JUDGMENT K.M. Thaker, J. (Oral) - Heard Mr. Hasurkar, learned advocate for the petitioner, and Mr. Rathod, learned advocate for the respondent. 2. The petitioner - electricity board has taken out this petition against the award dated 25.11.2004 passed by the learned Labour Court, Rajkot in Reference (LCR) No.643 of 1993 whereby the learned Labour Court has directed the petitioner board to reinstate the respondent workman with continuity of service and to pay back wages at the rate of 25%. 3. The factual background giving rise to present petition is that, the respondent workman claimed that he was employed by the petitioner board w.e.f. 1.6.1990 and his service came to be illegally terminated w.e.f. 2.7.1993. The respondent workman also claimed that before terminating his service, the petitioner board had not followed the procedure as prescribed by the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 [hereinafter referred to as “the Act”] and his service was orally and arbitrarily terminated in July 1993 though he had put in and completed work and service for more than 240 days before his service came to be terminated. On such allegations, the respondent workman raised dispute which was considered as industrial dispute and since any settlement was not arrived at between the parties, the appropriate Government passed order of reference dated 24.12.1993 and referred the dispute for adjudication to learned Labour Court at Rajkot. The said reference culminated into Reference (LCR) No.643 of 1993. 3.1 During the proceedings before the learned Labour Court, the respondent workman filed his statement of claim which contained above mentioned allegations. The statement of claim was taken on record at Exh.3. The petitioner board filed its written statement at Exh.8 and while denying the allegations by the respondent workman, the petitioner board claimed that the respondent workman was initially engaged from 1.6.1990 to 30.6.1990 for temporary work on adhoc and temporary basis for 30 days. It was claimed that order appointing the respondent workman for the said period was issued by the competent authority. According to the petitioner board, the respondent workman was, thereafter, engaged in different capacity w.e.f. 1.7.1990 to 28.7.1990. According to the petitioner board, the respondent workman was engaged in all for 58 days in two different capacities. It was claimed that order appointing the respondent workman for the said period was issued by the competent authority. According to the petitioner board, the respondent workman was, thereafter, engaged in different capacity w.e.f. 1.7.1990 to 28.7.1990. According to the petitioner board, the respondent workman was engaged in all for 58 days in two different capacities. The petitioner board also alleged that from and after 28.7.1990, the respondent workman was rendering his service as a contractor on piece rate basis, however, after some time, he found some other lucrative employment, he stopped working and abandoned the work by discontinuing the arrangement. The witness of the petitioner Board put-up different defence and alleged that the contract arrangement was discontinued after sometime as sufficient number of employees were available with the Board. It was also claimed that the respondent workman raised a dispute and sought reinstatement. The petitioner board prayed that the reinstatement with consequential benefits claimed by the respondent workman is unjustified, which may be rejected. The parties to the proceedings led evidence, documentary as well as oral, and upon conclusion of the stage of evidence, learned counsel representing the contesting parties put forward their submissions. Learned Labour Court considered the submissions by learned counsel and also considered the documentary and oral evidence on record and found that while the petitioner board had raised defence on the ground that it was the respondent workman had abandoned the arrangement of working on piece rate basis, however, the witness of the petitioner board stated before the Court, during his deposition, that since sufficient number of employees were available and that therefore, the arrangement of engaging the respondent workman on piece work basis was discontinued by the Board. The learned Labour Court, thus, found contradictions in the case and defence of the petitioner board. The learned Labour Court also reached to the conclusion that before terminating service of the respondent workman, procedure prescribed under the Act was not followed. Neither any inquiry with respect to the conduct of the respondent workman was conducted nor compensation was paid and any other procedure/formalities were also not complied. The learned Labour Court found that the termination of the respondent's service was effected in illegal and arbitrary manner and that therefore, the respondent workman deserved to be reinstated. Neither any inquiry with respect to the conduct of the respondent workman was conducted nor compensation was paid and any other procedure/formalities were also not complied. The learned Labour Court found that the termination of the respondent's service was effected in illegal and arbitrary manner and that therefore, the respondent workman deserved to be reinstated. Having reached such conclusion, the learned Labour Court passed the award and directed the petitioner board to reinstate the respondent workman with consequential benefits and also to pay 25% back wages. The petitioner board is aggrieved by the said directions. Hence, this petition. 4. Mr. Hasurkar, learned advocate for the petitioner, submitted that the respondent workman was engaged only for 58 days and thereafter, he was not on regular employment of the petitioner board. Mr. Hasurkar, learned advocate for the petitioner, claimed that the respondent workman was rendering his service as a contractor and the board made the payment on piece rate basis by voucher. He submitted that the workman voluntarily abandoned the arrangement and stopped working of his own choice as he found some lucrative work or employment. Mr. Hasurkar submitted that the respondent was doing typing work and raising bills which were paid by the competent authority through voucher and that therefore, employer/employee relationship did not exist between the petitioner board and the respondent workman after 28.7.1990 and that therefore, the direction by the learned Labour Court to reinstate the respondent workman is unjustified. Mr. Hasurkar, learned advocate for the petitioner, submitted that the work rendered by the respondent workman after 28.7.1990 to 2.7.1993 cannot be said to be the service rendered as an employee of the petitioner board. According to the learned advocate for the petitioner, the directions issued by the learned Labour Court vide impugned order is unjustified. To support his submissions, learned advocate for the petitioner board relied on the bills raised by the respondent workman and the payments made by the petitioner board on voucher basis. Mr. Hasurkar, learned Counsel could not deal with and could not explain the discrepancy in Board's two lines of defence which were urged simultaneously viz. that the respondent voluntarily abandoned the work and that since sufficient number of employees were available the arrangement with respondent was discontinued by the Board. 5. Per contra, Mr. Mr. Hasurkar, learned Counsel could not deal with and could not explain the discrepancy in Board's two lines of defence which were urged simultaneously viz. that the respondent voluntarily abandoned the work and that since sufficient number of employees were available the arrangement with respondent was discontinued by the Board. 5. Per contra, Mr. Rathod, learned advocate for the respondent workman, submitted that the contention raised on the ground that the respondent workman was working as a contractor after 28.7.1990 and that he was rendering typing service on contract basis is incorrect. He submitted that the petitioner board failed to place on record any contract allegedly entered into and executed by the board with the workman and that therefore, the learned Labour Court has rightly not believed the defence raised by the petitioner board claiming that the respondent was engaged as a contractor or that he was working as contractor with the petitioner board. Mr. Rathod, learned advocate for the respondent, denied the allegation that the respondent had abandoned the work/the arrangement. Learned advocate for the respondent workman relied on the evidence of the witness of the petitioner board where the witness claimed that since sufficient number of employees were available with the petitioner board and that therefore, the respondent workman was relieved and terminated. Mr. Rathod, learned advocate for the respondent workman, claimed that before terminating his service, the petitioner board had not followed any procedure contemplated under the Act and/or that his service was not terminated after conducting any inquiry for alleged misconduct and that therefore, the termination of his service effected by the petitioner board was arbitrary and the learned Labour Court is right in setting aside the impugned termination. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner board and respondent workman and also considered the material on record. I have also examined the award passed by the learned Labour Court and considered the reasons recorded by the learned Labour Court to justify the conclusions and directions. 7. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner board and respondent workman and also considered the material on record. I have also examined the award passed by the learned Labour Court and considered the reasons recorded by the learned Labour Court to justify the conclusions and directions. 7. Before proceeding further, it would be appropriate to take into account and keep in focus the definition of the term “workman” as defined under Section 2(s) of the Act and definition of the term “wages” as defined under Section 2(rr) of the Act, which read thus:- “2(rr) “wages” means all remuneration capable of being expressed in terms of money, which would, if the terms of employment, expressed or implied, were fulfilled, be payable to a workman in respect of his employment or of work done in such employment, and includes - (i) such allowances (including dearness allowance) as the workman is for the time being entitled to; (ii) the value of any house accommodation, or of supply of light, water, medical attendance or other amenity or of any service or of any concessional supply of foodgrains or other articles; (iii) any travelling concession; (iv) any commission payable on the promotion of sales or business or both;) but does not include - (a) any bonus; (b) any contribution paid or payable by the employer to any pension fund or provident fund or for the benefit of the workman under any law for the time being in force; (c) any gratuity payable on the termination of his service; 2(s) “workman” means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as the consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute, but does not include any such person - (i) who is subject to the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950), or the Army Act,1950 (46 of 1950), or the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957); or (ii) who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other employee of a prison; or (iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity; or (iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding (ten thousand rupees) per mensem or exercises, either by the nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature.” 8. It is also relevant to note that the petitioner board claimed that after 28.7.1990, the respondent was engaged on contract basis to work on per page basis, and he was not workman. 8.1 At the same time, the petitioner board also claimed that the respondent workman abandoned the service as he found some other lucrative employment and that therefore, the respondent workman himself discontinued engagement of his own volition in July 1993. 8.2 Another line of defence which was put up by the petitioner board through its witness was to the effect that since sufficient number of employees were available, the petitioner board discontinued engaging the respondent workman in 1993. Thus, the Board raised and put forward three different or contradicting stand and defence. 9. One fact which emerges from such diverse and contradicting defence taken up by the petitioner board is that even after July 1990, the petitioner board had availed the service of the respondent workman until July 1993 (though according to one of its claims and allegations, it was on contract basis) and consequently, the respondent workman's engagement with the petitioner board from June 1990 to July 1993 was uninterrupted. 9.1 The petitioner board claimed that initially, the respondent workman was engaged in June 1990 for the period from 1.6.1990 to 30.6.1990 and for the said purpose, order was issued on 29.5.1990. A copy of the sanction granted by the competent authority for appointment of the respondent workman on 29.5.1990 was placed on record before learned Labour Court at Exh.20. The said sanction reads thus:- “With ref. to the above, you are requested to please issue temp. appointment order to Shri H.B.Vala against the vacant post of Stenographer. The temp. appointment is approved for only one month. Original application along with the certificates are returned herewith.” 10. Subsequently, the said appointment was extended vide order dated 2.7.1990. The said order reads thus:- “Shri H.B. Vala, appointed as Typist for the period of one month vide above order is hereby extended for 28 days from 1-7-90 to 28-7-90. No further extension will be granted in any case. Other terms and condition of above order will remain unchanged.” 10.1 The said appointment order dated 2.7.1990 was placed before learned Labour Court at Exh.23. 11. Any other appointment order is not available on record. No further extension will be granted in any case. Other terms and condition of above order will remain unchanged.” 10.1 The said appointment order dated 2.7.1990 was placed before learned Labour Court at Exh.23. 11. Any other appointment order is not available on record. 11.1 On the strength of the said two appointment orders, the petitioner board has claimed that the respondent workman was engaged from 1.6.1990 to 28.7.1990. 11.2 However, other documents, more particularly the vouchers under which the respondent workman was paid by the petitioner board for period after July 1990 should be taken into account. It is noticed that several vouchers were placed on record before the learned Labour Court and said vouchers demonstrate that the petitioner board made payments to the respondent workman under and by way of those vouchers. The amounts paid to the respondent workman are of different quantum. Certain documents purporting to be the bills raised by the respondent workman are placed on record. However, on closer scrutiny, it comes out that any link or connection co-relation between the said bills and vouchers is not established. Besides this, mode of payment alone and that too in absence of the contract or letter of appointment/engagement cannot determine status and character of employment and the employee. 12. The petitioner board claims that after 28.7.1990, the respondent workman was engaged on contract basis and he was working as contractor and was executing the typing work on piece rate basis. 12.1 The petitioner board claimed, through its witness, that when earlier existing contract came to an end, the petitioner board had made an inquiry and the rate quoted by the respondent workman was found to be lower than the rate quoted under the existing contract and that therefore, the decision to assign typing work on contract basis to the respondent workman was taken and accordingly, he was engaged on contract basis and thereafter, the respondent rendered his service for typing work on contract basis and he was paid on piece rate basis. 12.2 It is pertinent that the petitioner board being a corporate body and a Government undertaking, could not have engaged and availed service and made payment without executing a contract and any contract of the nature claimed by the petitioner board was not placed on record by the petitioner board and therefore, the factum of contract allegedly entered into by the petitioner board with the respondent workman is neither demonstrated nor established. 13. It is pertinent to note that the petitioner has not placed on record any document to establish that any agreement/contract determining the rate at which the payment was made by the petitioner board on execution of the work, was actually entered into between the board and the respondent. Even any sanction authorising assignment of official work of typing to an outsider on per page/piece rate basis is also not placed on record and/or any sanction approving the rate for payment on piece rate basis was also not placed on record. 14. There is no material on record to demonstrate that the procedure prescribed for entering into and executing a contract for service was followed before finalising the alleged arrangement on contract basis with the respondent. 14.1 In such circumstances and more particularly when there is nothing on record to demonstrate and establish that the rate at which person who executes the work shall be paid the remuneration for his service was determined and sanctioned by competent authority before entering into such arrangement was granted and any material to establish that the concerned person was paid according to such agreed and approved rate, then, in absence of such facts/details and supporting material the factum of alleged arrangement of agreement or contract cannot be presumed and cannot be accepted. If not for anything else then at least for determining the nature of employment and status of employee, such unsubstantiated claim cannot be believed. 14.2 Though, in such cases, more particularly in case of corporate body where matter of employment or securing personal service even on contract basis are governed by prescribed rules and/or policy, such matters cannot be governed by oral contract. 14.2 Though, in such cases, more particularly in case of corporate body where matter of employment or securing personal service even on contract basis are governed by prescribed rules and/or policy, such matters cannot be governed by oral contract. Despite such position, in present case, even if it is presumed that an agreement was finalised between the parties and if it is further assumed that such arrangement was arrived at by oral agreement then also, in absence of any agreement as regards the rate at which the remuneration for service rendered was to be paid and such arrangement as well as the rate was duly approved and sanctioned by competent authority, it cannot be presumed that a legally binding contract was executed by the Board and the respondent. 14.3 In this view of the matter, the contention or defence raised by the petitioner that the respondent was rendering service on contract basis cannot be accepted or presumed. The said fact is not established by the petitioner board in any manner before the learned Labour Court and in view of the facts of present case and in light of the evidence available on record or rather in absence of relevant evidence on this count, the decision of the learned Labour Court of not accepting such defence, cannot be faulted. 15. At this stage, it is appropriate to take into account the definition of the term “workman” as defined under Section 2(s) of the Act. The definition of said term takes in its fold “any person who is employed to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied, ....”. When the said definition is taken into account, then, it emerges that the respondent herein was rendering skilled service as steno/typist and he was engaged for executing skilled work assigned to him by the petitioner. His services were availed in lieu of payment and remuneration for the service rendered by the respondent was paid to him by the petitioner. The definition also includes engagement or employment of a person even in case where the terms of employment are implied. His services were availed in lieu of payment and remuneration for the service rendered by the respondent was paid to him by the petitioner. The definition also includes engagement or employment of a person even in case where the terms of employment are implied. Thus, in view of the definition and in light of facts of present case, more particularly in light of the fact that the respondent was engaged for “manual/skilled” work of similar nature for which he was engaged before 28.7.1990 the petitioner's submission that after 28.7.1990 the respondent herein was not a workman of the petitioner cannot be accepted and the learned Labour Court has not committed any error in rejecting the said defence or contention of the petitioner. 16. It would also be appropriate to consider the said definition of the term “workman” along with the definition of the term “wages” as prescribed under Section 2(rr) of the Act. According to the said definition, “wages means all remuneration capable of being expressed in terms of money which are paid on fulfilment of terms of employment, expressed or implied would be termed as “wages” but it would not include any bonus or contribution to provident fund or gratuity payable on termination of service. Thus, the amounts/remuneration paid to the respondent for the period after 28.7.1990 for the work executed by him would fall within the term “wages” and consequently, it would be “wages” paid to a “workman”. Under the circumstances, the decision by the learned Labour Court treating the amount/remuneration paid to the respondent as wages and the recipient of the said wages as workman cannot be faulted. 17. Once the aforesaid conclusion is reached, then, it would follow that if the service of the respondent was to be put to an end then the petitioner board ought to have and was obliged to follow the procedure prescribed in law. 18. It is not the case of the petitioner board that the service of the respondent was terminated on account of misconduct or for any act of commission or omission which would amount to misconduct. If that was so then the petitioner ought to have followed principle of natural justice by affording reasonable and sufficient opportunity of hearing and defence to the respondent i.e. the petitioner ought to have conducted domestic/departmental inquiry. In present case, undisputedly domestic inquiry was not conducted. If that was so then the petitioner ought to have followed principle of natural justice by affording reasonable and sufficient opportunity of hearing and defence to the respondent i.e. the petitioner ought to have conducted domestic/departmental inquiry. In present case, undisputedly domestic inquiry was not conducted. Actually neither the case of misconduct is pleaded nor procedure of conducting inquiry and affording opportunity of hearing to the petitioner is followed. 19. In this view of the matter, the service of the petitioner could have been terminated, if so required and justified in the facts of the case, by following procedure prescribed under Chapter 5A or 5B as the case may be i.e. after complying the conditions and requirements prescribed under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. However, in present case, it is undisputed fact that the service of the respondent was terminated without following the said procedure, i.e. without making payment of compensation and the said breach was committed despite the fact that the respondent had worked for 240 days during his engagement/employment with the respondent during preceding 12 months. Thus, it emerges that the service of the respondent was terminated without conducting inquiry or without paying retrenchment compensation. Differently put, respondent's service was terminated without following procedure prescribed by law. 20. When it is concluded, and by the learned Labour Court and accordingly finding of fact is recorded that the respondent was a workman in the service of the petitioner board then this Court would not re-appreciate the evidence as if sitting in appeal and this Court would not interfere with findings of fact unless found to be perverse. Besides this, the foregoing discussion - after examining the evidence - has brought out and satisfied the Court that the findings recorded by learned labour Court are not incorrect or erroneous. Besides this, the foregoing discussion - after examining the evidence - has brought out and satisfied the Court that the findings recorded by learned labour Court are not incorrect or erroneous. Moreover, when it is also established before the learned Labour Court that the respondent worked with the petitioner board from 1.6.1990 and when the petitioner failed to establish that the respondent had worked with the petitioner board from 28.7.1992 to 2.7.1993 as contractor and when it is noticed that the service rendered or the work executed by the respondent during the said period i.e. from 28.7.1992 to 2.7.1993 amounts to service rendered by a “workman” and that therefore, the respondent has to be treated as workman of the petitioner board even during the said period, then, it would follow that the action of the petitioner board of discontinuing the respondent workman w.e.f. 2.7.1993 amounts to illegal action, inasmuch as the said action was taken without concluding domestic inquiry and without paying retrenchment compensation i.e. without following procedure prescribed by law. 21. This leaves behind the contention that it was the respondent who had voluntarily abandoned the work - probably because he had found other lucrative employment and he then stopped the work. 21.1 In present case there is no material to prove the petitioner's said allegation. The petitioner failed to prove that respondent had abandoned the work. In present case, the employer has, by presuming that the workman voluntarily abandoned the service, removed his name from the roster of the workmen and thereby terminated his service. 21.2 The action is taken on the presumption that since the workman was not reporting for duty, he had voluntarily left and abandoned the service. Ordinarily when a workman overstays the period of leave which he had applied for and which was sanctioned or when a workman suddenly (i.e. without prior intimation or permission), remains absent from his duty, such conduct on the part of the workman is considered and treated as misconduct. 21.3 In some cases there may be provision under applicable Service Conditions/Rules or Standing orders which would provide that if a workman overstays the sanctioned leave and/or if he remains absent without leave, then his lien on the post will be lost. 21.3 In some cases there may be provision under applicable Service Conditions/Rules or Standing orders which would provide that if a workman overstays the sanctioned leave and/or if he remains absent without leave, then his lien on the post will be lost. When the employer considers it appropriate and necessary to terminate the service of an employee on account of remaining absent without leave, then the employer cannot conveniently take, a short-cut by resorting to the remedy of striking out the name on the ground that the workman has voluntarily abandoned the service but opportunity of hearing should be granted to the workman by calling for his explanation as to the reasons for absence and after considering the reasons and explanations offered by the workman, the employer may take action if the explanation is not found satisfactory and the workman fails to justify his absence. However, if such opportunity is not granted, then it would amount to denial of reasonable and sufficient opportunity of hearing to the concerned workman and it would result into violation of principles of natural justice. 21.4 When employer notices that a workman is absent from duty consecutively for long period, then the employer cannot immediately jump to the conclusion that the workman has voluntarily left the job. 21.5 Before reaching to such conclusion, opportunity of hearing, after calling for concerned workman's explanation, is required to be granted so as to ascertain the circumstances on account of which the workman did not or could not report for duty. 21.6 Though, in all cases, a full-fledged inquiry/proceedings may not be necessary, principles of natural justice should be adhered to. In the case of Viveka Nand Sethi v. Chairman, J&K Bank Ltd. [ (2005) 5 SCC 337 ], Hon'ble Apex Court observed, inter alia, that: “20. It may be true that in a case of this nature, the principles of natural justice were required to be complied with but the same would not mean that a full-fledged departmental proceeding was required to be initiated. It may be true that in a case of this nature, the principles of natural justice were required to be complied with but the same would not mean that a full-fledged departmental proceeding was required to be initiated. A limited enquiry as to whether the employee concerned had sufficient explanation for not reporting to duties after the period of leave had expired or failure on his part on being asked so to do, in our considered view, amounts to sufficient compliance of the requirements of the principles of natural justice.” 21.7 When the employer resorts to the conclusion or inference that the workman has voluntarily abandoned the service, the said conclusion or inference by the employer results into not only civil consequences but dire consequences for the concerned employee inasmuch as he stands to lose his service, his livelihood. 21.8 Therefore, such inference or conclusion and action based thereon ought not be taken lightly or casually and certainly not in violation of principles of natural justice. 21.9 Besides this, if compliance with principles of natural justice are allowed to be sacrificed in such cases, then it would become very easy and convenient for any employer to orally terminate workman's service or to stop the workman from entering the premises or to restrain him from marking his attendance for few days and then to raise the plea that the workman stopped reporting for duty voluntarily and thereby he abandoned the service. 21.10 When the employer raises the plea of voluntary abandonment of service by the workman, the employers conduct should support and justify the inference and such inference can be justified by employer only by demonstrating the steps taken by him to ascertain as to whether the workman had actually abandoned the service or for some circumstances he was unable to report for duty. In such circumstances, the employer would, ordinarily, give an intimation to the workman calling him to report for work or he would intimate the workman that his conduct of remaining absent without permission amounts to misconduct and will entail appropriate action or he would give an intimation to the workman that if the workman did not immediately resume his duty, then he will be deemed to have abandoned the service. 21.11 In the decision in the case of D.K. Yadav v. JMA Industries Limited [ (1993) 3 SCC 259 ], Hon'ble Apex Court observed, inter alia, that: “9. It is a fundamental rule of law that no decision must be taken which will affect the right of any person without first being informed of the case and be given him/her an opportunity of putting forward his/her case. An order involving civil consequences must be made consistently with the rules of natural justice. In Mohinder Singh Gill & Anr. v. The Chief Election Commissioner & Ors. (1978) 2 SCR 272 at 308F the Constitution Bench held that 'civil consequence' covers infraction of not merely property or personal right but of civil liberties, material deprivations and non-pecuniary damages. In its comprehensive connotion every thing that affects a citizen in his civil life inflicts a civil consequence. Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Edition, page 1487 defined civil rights are such as belong to every citizen of the state or country they include rights capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil action. In State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei & Ors., AIR 1967 SC 1269 , this court held that even an administrative order which involves civil consequences must be made consistently with the rules of natural justice. The person concerned must be informed of the case, the evidence in support thereof supplied and must be given a fair opportunity to meet the case before an adverse decision is taken. Since no such opportunity was given it was held that superannuation was in violation of principles of natural justice. 11. The law must therefore be now taken to be well settled that procedure prescribed for depriving a person of livelihood must meet the challenge of Article 14 and such law would be liable to be tested on the anvil of Article 14 and the procedure prescribed by a statute or statutory rule or rules or orders effecting the civil rights or result in civil consequences would have to answer the requirement of Article 14. So it must be right,just and fair and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive. There can be no distinction between a quasi-judicial function and an administrative function for the purpose of principles of natural justice. The aim of both administrative. So it must be right,just and fair and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive. There can be no distinction between a quasi-judicial function and an administrative function for the purpose of principles of natural justice. The aim of both administrative. inquiry as well as the quasi-.judicial enquiry is to arrive at a just decision and if a rule of natural justice is calculated to secure justice or to put it negatively, to prevent miscarriage of justice, it is difficult to see why it should be applicable only to quasi-judicial enquiry and not to administrative enquiry. It must logically apply to both.” 21.12 When an employer does not treat the workman's absence from duty as misconduct but treats workman's absence from duty as act of voluntary abandonment of service without complying the principles of natural justice, then his decision and action would, in light of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Limited v. Presiding Officer, (1990) 3 SCC 682 as well as the law laid down by the decision in the case of State Bank of India v. N. Sundermani, (1976) 1 SCC 822 , amount to and fall within the purview of retrenchment. This would entail obligation to comply the requirement prescribed under section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 21.13 In the cases where the employer raises defence and plea of abandonment of service and fails to establish that either of the above mentioned procedure, i.e. he complied principles of natural justice or the requirement under section 25F was followed, such action and plea or defence would not be sustainable. 21.14 In this context, reference may be made to the observations by the Hon'ble Apex Court in paras 6 and 7 of the decision in the case of D.K. Yadav (supra):- "6. His contention that expiry of eight days' absence from duty brings about automatic loss of lien on the post and nothing more need be done by the management to pass an order terminating the service and per force termination is automatic, bears no substance. The constitution bench specifically held that the right of the employer given under the standing Orders gets effected by statutory operation. The constitution bench specifically held that the right of the employer given under the standing Orders gets effected by statutory operation. In Robert D'Souza's case (supra) in para 7, this court rejected the contention that on expiry of leave the termination of service is automatic and nothing further could be done. It was further held that striking of the name from the rolls for unauthorised absence from duty amounted to termination of service and absence from duty for 8 consecutive days amounts to misconduct and termination of service on such grounds without complying with minimum principles of natural justice would not be justified. In Shambhunath's case three Judges bench held that striking of the name of the workman for absence of leave itself amounted to retrenchment. In H.D. Singh v. Reserve Bank of India & Ors. (supra), this court held that striking of the name from the rolls amounts to an arbitrary action. In State Bank of India v. Workmen of State Bank of India and Anr. (1991) 1 SCC 13 , a two judge bench of this court to which one of us, K.R.S., J. Was a member was to consider the effect of discharge on one month's notice or pay in lieu thereof. It was held that it was not a discharge simpliciter or a simple termination of service but one camouflaged for serious misconduct. This court lifted the veil and looked beyond the apparent tenor of the order and its effect. It was held that the action was not valid in law. 7. The principle question is whether the impugned action is violative of principles of natural justice. In A.K. Kriapak and Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., (1969) 2 SCC 262 a Constitution bench of this court held that the distinction between quasi judicial and administrative order has gradually become thin. Now it is totally eclipsed and obliterated. The aim of the rule of the natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules operate in the area not covered by law validly made or expressly excluded as held in Col. J.N. Sinha v. Union of India & Anr. (1971) 1 SCR 791 . It is settled law that certified standing orders have statutory force which do not expressly exclude the application of the principles of natural justice. These rules operate in the area not covered by law validly made or expressly excluded as held in Col. J.N. Sinha v. Union of India & Anr. (1971) 1 SCR 791 . It is settled law that certified standing orders have statutory force which do not expressly exclude the application of the principles of natural justice. Conversely the Act made exceptions for the application of principles of natural justice necessary implication from specific provisions in the Act like Sections 25F; 25FF; 25FFF; etc, the need for temporary hands to cope with sudden and temporary spurt of work demands appointment temporarily to a service of such temporary workmen to meet such exigencies and as soon as the work or service are completed, the need to dispense with the services may arise. In that situation, on compliance of the provisions of section 25F resort could be had to retrench the employees in conformity therewith particular statute or statutory rules or orders having statutory flavour may also exclude the application of the principles of natural justice expressly or by necessary implication. In other respects the principles of natural justice would apply unless the employer should justify its exclusion on given special and exceptional exigencies." 21.15 In present case, it has emerged from the material on record that the petitioner neither complied principles of natural justice nor the procedure under section 25F. 21.16 Undisputedly, any opportunity of hearing after calling for explanation was not granted and any inquiry worth its name was not conducted. 21.17 Similarly, undisputedly, retrenchment compensation was not paid though the respondent workman fulfilled the conditions required for attracting provision of section 25F inasmuch as before relevant date, he was employed for not less than 12 months and during 12 months preceding the relevant date he had worked for not less than 240 days. On this count, the learned Labour Court has recorded finding of fact and there is no material on record of this petition to disagree with the said finding of fact by the learned Labour Court. In this view of the matter, the petitioners action is found to be unsustainable and the defence raised by the petitioner on ground of voluntary abandonment of service by the respondent is not acceptable. The decision of the learned Labour Court rejecting the said plea cannot be faulted. In this view of the matter, the petitioners action is found to be unsustainable and the defence raised by the petitioner on ground of voluntary abandonment of service by the respondent is not acceptable. The decision of the learned Labour Court rejecting the said plea cannot be faulted. 21.18 The above discussed aspects bring out that the petitioner board failed to establish that the respondent workman had voluntarily abandoned the service and stopped reporting for work on his own volition. 22. In aforesaid manner, when it was established before the learned Labour Court and when the learned Labour Court has on the basis of the material on record before it reached to the conclusion that the petitioner's action of discontinuing the respondent was illegal and unjust, the corollary would be direction for reinstatement. When the service of the workman is terminated without following procedure prescribed by law, then, the direction to reinstate such illegally terminated workman would follow as a corollary and consequential direction. Under the circumstances, the direction by the learned Labour Court to reinstate the respondent with continuing of service is just and legal and cannot be faulted and does not deserve to be interfered with. 23. Now, the issue which arises is with regard to the direction to pay back wages. The learned Labour Court has, by the award impugned in present petition, directed the petitioner board to pay back wages at the rate of 25%. It is necessary to note that the respondent was engaged by the petitioner board as steno/typist. Thus, in view of the fact that the respondent possesses specialised skill and that therefore, during the interregnum, he would have engaged himself gainfully and would have put his specialised skill to use which would result into gainful engagement. Under the circumstances, the decision by the learned Labour Court of denying 75% back wages and instead awarding 25% back wages appears just and proper and this Court is not inclined to interfere with the said direction. In the result, the petition fails and deserves to be rejected and is, accordingly, rejected. Rule is discharged. Orders accordingly. Petition dismissed.