Judgment This revisional application is directed against the order no. 29 dated December 10, 2014 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, 10th Court, Alipore, South 24-parganas in Act-VIII Case No. 116 of 2013, by which an application raising a question of maintainability of the proceeding is rejected on contest. The aforesaid case originates from an application under Section 24 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 at the instance of the wife/opposite party praying for her appointment as guardian of the minor son till he attains the majority and to allow her to meet the said minor son in India with a direction upon the opposite party/husband to produce the child at the interval of every two months. The husband is contesting the said proceeding by taking a plea that a compromise was entered into in an earlier proceeding, being Miscellaneous Case No. 362 of 2012, whereby and whereunder the husband/petitioner was allowed to take the minor child in Malaysia for his better future and welfare; and the wife/opposite party was given a right to visit the minor son in every three months in Malaysia. Several instances and details have been narrated in the objection filed by the husband/petitioner showing that the wife, in fact, visited Malaysia and interacted with the child. Challenging the maintainability of the proceeding filed by the wife, which gave rise to the registration of the above case, an application was taken out, wherein the challenge was restricted on the said compromise decree and it is contended that by initiating the said proceeding, the wife is trying to set aside the compromise decree passed by the Court. This is how the impugned order came to be passed by the Trial Court. The Trial Court categorically held that the instant proceeding is independent of the said compromise decree and a meaningful reading of the averments made therein would hardly suggest that any attempt to thwart the compromise decree is taken. Mr. Amal Krishna Saha on his usual eloquence attacks the impugned order from a different angle. By relying upon the provision contained under Section 9 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 he submits that the Trial Court did not have the jurisdiction to entertain such application, as admittedly the minor son resides ordinarily in Malaysia. Mr. Amal Krishna Saha on his usual eloquence attacks the impugned order from a different angle. By relying upon the provision contained under Section 9 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 he submits that the Trial Court did not have the jurisdiction to entertain such application, as admittedly the minor son resides ordinarily in Malaysia. According to him, the Court can usurp the jurisdiction, provided the minor son resides within its territorial jurisdiction and if it is an admitted position that he resides in Malaysia, the application filed by the wife/opposite party is liable to be dismissed. To impress the Court what the expression “ordinarily resides” means, he relies upon a judgment of a Privy Council rendered in case of Annie Besant vs. G. Narayaniah reported in AIR 1914 PC 41 . Taking a clue therefrom Mr. Saha submits that “ordinarily resides” means where the son is currently living and is pursuing his studies and not the place where he used to reside. He strongly submits that the child was taken on consent for pursuing better studies in Malaysia and, therefore, the application is not maintainable before the Court. Mr. Basu, learned counsel appearing for the wife/opposite party, opposes the submission of Mr. Saha in contending that mere temporary residence or studying in some other place does not mean that he was not ordinarily residing at a place, which is still the permanent address of the minor child. He further submits that the intention can be gathered from the averments made in the application that the staying of the minor child in Malaysia was temporary inasmuch as he was sent to pursue his studies and, therefore, cannot be interpreted to say that he ordinarily resides in Malaysia. Mr. Basu heavily relies upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in case of Ruchi Majoo vs. Sanjeev Majoo reported in (2011) 6 SCC 479 . According to him, the expression “ordinarily resides” has been interpreted by the Supreme Court in the said Report and held that it is to be interpreted taking into account the intention of the parties and not on the basis of ordinary or grammatical meaning of the said expression. According to him, the expression “ordinarily resides” has been interpreted by the Supreme Court in the said Report and held that it is to be interpreted taking into account the intention of the parties and not on the basis of ordinary or grammatical meaning of the said expression. At the very outset, this Court must say that Section 9 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 confers jurisdiction on the District Courts to entertain an application under the said Section within whose jurisdiction the minor ordinarily resides. In the judgment of Ruchi Majoo (supra) the Supreme Court took note of the ordinary and grammatical meaning of the expression “ordinary” and “resides” and held: “24. It is evident from a bare reading of the above that the solitary test for determining the jurisdiction of the court under Section 9 of the Act is the “ordinary residence” of the minor. The expression used is “where the minor ordinarily resides”. Now whether the minor is ordinarily residing at a given place is primarily a question of intention which in turn is a question of fact. It may at best be a mixed question of law and fact, but unless the jurisdictional facts are admitted it can never be a pupre question of law, capable of being answered without an enquiry into the factual aspects of the controversy. 25. The factual aspects relevant to the question of jurisdiction are not admitted in the instant case. There are serious disputes on those aspects to which we shall presently refer. 26. We may before doing so examine the true purpose of the expression “ordinarily resident” appearing in Section 9(1). This expression has been used in different contexts and statutes and has often come up for interpretation. Since liberal interpretation is the first and the foremost rule of interpretation it would be useful to understand the literal meaning of the two words that comprise the expression. The word “ordinary” has been defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as follows: ‘Ordinary (adj.).—Regular; usual; noral; common; often recurring; according to established order; settled; customary; reasonable; not exercised by, or characteristic of, the normal or average individual.’ The word “reside” has been explained similarly as under: ‘Reside. – Live, dwell, abide, sojourn, stay, remain, lodge. (Western-Knapp Engg. Co. The word “ordinary” has been defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as follows: ‘Ordinary (adj.).—Regular; usual; noral; common; often recurring; according to established order; settled; customary; reasonable; not exercised by, or characteristic of, the normal or average individual.’ The word “reside” has been explained similarly as under: ‘Reside. – Live, dwell, abide, sojourn, stay, remain, lodge. (Western-Knapp Engg. Co. v. Gilbank, F 2d a p. 136) To settle oneself or a thing in a place, to be stationed, to remain or stay, to dwell permanently or continuously, to have a settled abode for a time, to have one’s residence or domicile; specifically, to be in residence, to have an abiding place, to be present as an element, to inhere as a quality, to be vested as a right. (Bowden v. Jensen, SW 2d at p.349.)’ 27. In Webster’s Dictionary also the word “reside” finds a similar meaning, which may be gainfully extracted: ‘1. To dwell for a considerable time; to make one’s home; live. 2. To exist as an attribute or quality with in. 3. To be vested: with in.’ It further appears that the Apex Court has an occasion to consider the decision of the Privy Council delivered in case of Annie Besant (supra) relied upon by the husband/petitioner in paragraph 28 thereof, which quoted herein below: “In Annie Besant v. G. Narayaniah the infants had been residing in the district of Chingleput in the Madras Presidency. They were given in custody of Mrs. Annie Besant for the purpose of education and were getting their education in England at the University of Oxford. A case was, however, filed in the District Court of Chingleput for the custody where according to the plaintiff the minors had permanently resided. Repeating the plea that the Chingleput Court was competent to entertain the application Their Lordships of the Privy Council observed: (IA p.322) ‘………………….The District Court in which the suit was instituted had no jurisdiction over the infants except such jurisdiction as was conferred by the Guardians And Wards Act, 1890. By the 9th section of that Act the jurisdiction of the court is confined to infants ordinarily resident in the district. By the 9th section of that Act the jurisdiction of the court is confined to infants ordinarily resident in the district. It is in Their Lordships’ opinion impossible to hold that infants who had months previously left India with a view to being educated in England and going to the University of Oxford were ordinarily resident in the district of Chingleput.’ Taking into account the subsequent judgments of the Supreme Court in case of Jagir Kaur vs. Jaswant Singh reported in AIR 1963 SC 1521 and Kukldip Nayar vs. Union of India reported in (2006) 7 SCC 01 and several other judgments of different High Courts, it is ultimately held that to interpret the expression “ordinarily resides”, the intention of the parties is to be gathered and not on the abstract narration of the facts in the application. The intention is essentially a question of facts, which sometime assumes the character of mixed question of facts and law. The intention is required to be gathered not only from the pleadings but also from the evidence produced before the Court, both orally and documentary. What is apparent may not be real. Though sometimes the thing as it exists suggests something superficial, but may not be real when the intention of the parties are unearthed before the Court. This Court, therefore, does not think it fit that at the nascent stage of proceeding and solely relying upon certain averments, the entire proceeding is to be nipped in the bud without affording an opportunity to the parties to adduce evidence in order to gather the intention. Furthermore, there is no foundation of such plea in an application filed before the Trial Court. I am not unmindful of the settled proposition of law that if a pure question of law is raised, even before the higher Court, the parties should be permitted to take such plea provided there is sufficient materials available on the record. This is not a case, where this Court is in a position to determine on the basis of the available documents and the averments made in the application and the objection by the respective parties that the intention is discernable, which suggests that the place in which the minor son used to reside is not a place of his ordinary residence or he does not use to reside ordinarily therein. Reverting to the case made out in an application before the Trial Court, the entire challenge hinges on the compromise decree passed in an earlier proceeding between the parties. Though the compromise decree is not produced before this Court, but there is no sufficient materials or averments available on the record to show that in the instant proceeding the compromise decree is to be set aside. The instant proceeding is under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 for custody of the minor child and to act as Guardian till he attains majority. Whether the compromise decree has any bearing on the core issue involved in the said proceeding is again a dependant upon the evidence and cannot be decided at the stage of Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure or before the parties are invited to adduce evidence. In whatever angle this Court looks at it, the proceeding initiated by the wife is not liable to be thrown out of the court’s record at the stage it is so sought and it is open to the court to decide both the issues as indicated above on full-fledged trial. This Court, therefore, does not find any infirmity or illegality in the order impugned in this revisional application. The same is hereby dismissed. However, the Trial Court is requested to make efforts to dispose of the said proceeding including the interlocutory applications as expeditiously as possible without granting unnecessary adjournments to either of the parties and preferably within six months from the date of the communication of this order. There will be no order as to costs.