JUDGMENT : B. Veerappa, J. 1. The petitioner is aggrieved by the order dated 30th January, 2013 made in Application No. 585/2013 on the file of the Karnataka Administrative Tribunal (for short hereinafter referred to as the KAT'), Bangalore, dismissing his application at the stage of the admission, confirming the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority dismissing him from service. The facts of the case are: "That the petitioner was working as the First Division Assistant in the 1st respondent's office and on the complaint made by one Hanumatharaju before Lokayukta against him that he demanded a sum of Rs. 10,000/- as bribe amount to get an order of suspension revoked, Lokayukta registered a criminal case in Crime No. 2/2007 for the offences punishable under Sections 7, 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. After conducting investigation, the Lokayukta filed a charge-sheet in the said crime which came to be registered as Special Case No. 214/2007. The II Additional District and Sessions Judge, Tumkur, by his order dated 30.10.2012 convicted the petitioner and the said conviction order is the subject-matter in Criminal Appeal No. 1257/2012 filed before this Court and this Court by an order dated 15.11.2012 suspended the sentence." 2. In pursuance of the conviction order passed by the Sessions Court, the Disciplinary Authority by an order dated 24.1.2013 dismissed the petitioner from service under the provisions of Rule 8(viii) of the Karnataka Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957 (for short, hereinafter referred to as the KCS (CCA) Rules, 1957). Aggrieved by the said order of dismissal, the petitioner filed Application No. 585/2013 before the KAT, Bangalore. The KAT after hearing both the parties by its impugned order dated 30th January, 2013 dismissed the application confirming the punishment of dismissal made by the Disciplinary Authority. Against the said order, the present writ petition is filed. 3. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties to the Us. 4. Sri. Ganghadhar Sangolli, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the impugned dismissal order passed by the KAT confirming the order of disciplinary authority-1st respondent is in utter violation of the principles of natural justice and also in violation of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties to the Us. 4. Sri. Ganghadhar Sangolli, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the impugned dismissal order passed by the KAT confirming the order of disciplinary authority-1st respondent is in utter violation of the principles of natural justice and also in violation of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. He also contended that the conviction order passed by the Sessions Court is the subject-matter in Criminal Appeal No. 1257/2012 before this Court and this Court by an order dated 15th November, 2012, suspended the sentence and granted bail. Therefore, the impugned orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority and confirmed by the KAT are bad in law. He further contended that the impugned orders passed by the 1st respondent as well as the KAT are in violation of the constitutional mandate made in the case of Menaka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248 : ( AIR 1978 SC 597 ). Therefore, he sought to set aside the impugned orders passed by the KAT as well as the Disciplinary Authority. 5. Per contra, Sri. D. Aswathappa, learned AGA for respondent Nos. 1 to 3 strenuously contended that when the petitioner has been dismissed from service in view of the conviction order dated 30th October, 2012 passed by the II Additional District and Sessions Judge, Tumkur in a Special Case No. 214/2007 on the basis of corruption charges, question of giving an opportunity as contended by the petitioner under Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India, does not arise. Therefore, he sought for dismissal of the writ petition. 6. We have given out thoughtful consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for the parties and perused the entire material on record. 7. It is an admitted fact that on the basis of the complaint, Lokayukta registered a case in Crime No. 2/2007 against the petitioner and after investigation, a charge-sheet was filed. After trial, the District and Sessions Judge by his order dated 30th October, 2012 in Special Case No. 214/2007 convicted the petitioner under Section 235(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for the offences punishable under Sections 7, 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 by sentencing him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 5000/- in default to undergo further imprisonment for 3 months for the offence punishable under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. He was also further sentenced to undergo imprisonment for 3 years and to pay a fine of Rs. 5000/- in default to undergo further imprisonment for 3 months for the offence punishable under Section 13(1)(d) punishable under Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 8. On the basis of the conviction order passed by the Sessions Court stated supra, the Disciplinary Authority by an order dated 24.1.2013 after following the procedure as contemplated under Clause (a) of 2nd proviso to Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India read with Rules 11 and 10(2) of the KCS (CCA) Rules, 1957 and the Government Circular dated 26.6.1996 has dismissed the petitioner from service exercising the powers under Rule 8(viii) of the KCS (CCA) Rules, 1957. The provisions of Clause (a) of 2nd proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India read as under: "311. Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of persons employed in civil capacities under the Union or a State.- (1) xxxxxxxxxxx xxxxx (2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges: xxxxxxxxxx xx xxxx Provided further that this clause shall not apply- (a) where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge;" A plain reading of the said proviso makes it clear that what is relevant for Clause (a) of the second proviso to Articles 311 is "conduct" which had lead to the convictions of the petitioner for a "criminal charge" and there cannot be suspension of such conduct. We are, therefore, of the opinion that initiating proceedings for and passing orders of dismissal, removal or reduction in the rank of a Government servant, who has been convicted by a Criminal Court is not barred merely because the sentence is suspended by the Appellate Court or on the ground that the said Government servant-accused has been released on bail pending appeal. It should be remembered that an action under clause (a) of the second proviso to Article 311 will be taken only where the conduct which has lead conviction is such that he deserves any of the three major punishments mentioned in Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. 9. In view of the provision stated supra, there is no obligation cast on the Disciplinary Authority to wait till the appeal is disposed off. Therefore, the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that there is violation of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India and that there is pendency of the criminal appeal, cannot be accepted. The observations made by the Apex Court in Menaka Gandhi's case ( AIR 1978 SC 597 ) stated supra are not at all applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 10. It is high time for the legislature and the judiciary to curb the menace of corruption which is very dangerous to the future generation than the disease of cancer to implement the object and spirit of the Prevention of Corruption Act. If a public servant, who is convicted for corruption, is allowed to continue to hold public office, it would impair the morale of the other persons manning such office, and consequently, that would erode the already shrunk confidence of the people in such institutions besides demoralizing the other honest public servants, who would either be the colleagues or subordinates of the convicted person. If honest public servants are compelled to take orders from proclaimed corrupt officers on account of the suspension of the conviction the fall out would be one of the shaking system itself. 11. The Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel, reported in (1985) 3 SCC 398 : ( AIR 1985 SC 1416 ) held that:- "The object underlying the second proviso is public policy, public interest and public good and the Court must, therefore, repel the temptation to be carried away by feelings of commiseration and sympathy for those government servants who have been dismissed, removed or reduced in rank by applying the second proviso. Sympathy and commiseration cannot be allowed to outweigh considerations of public policy, concern for public interest, regard for public good and the peremptory dictate of a constitutional prohibition. Sympathy and commiseration cannot be allowed to outweigh considerations of public policy, concern for public interest, regard for public good and the peremptory dictate of a constitutional prohibition. Considerations of fair play and justice requiring a hearing to be given to a Government servant with respect to any of the major penalties proposed to be imposed upon him do not arise when the second proviso to Article 311(2) comes into play and the same would be the position in the case of a service rule reproducing the second proviso in whole or in part and whether the language used is identical with that used in the second proviso or not The second proviso is based on public policy and is in public interest and for public good and the Constitution makers who inserted it in Article 311(2) were the best persons to decide whether such an exclusionary provision should be there and the situations in which this provision should apply." 12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering the provisions of Section 389(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India and Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act in the case of K.C. Sareen v. C.B.I. Chandigarh, reported in 2001 AIR SCW 3339 : ( AIR 2001 SC 3320 ) at paragraphs 11 and 12 has held as under: "11. Corruption by public servants has now reached a monstrous dimension in India. Its tentacles have started grappling even the institutions created for the protection of the republic. Unless those tentacles are intercepted and impeded from gripping the normal and orderly functioning of the public offices, through strong legislative, executive as well as judicial exercises the corrupt public servants could even paralyse the functioning of such institutions and thereby hinder the democratic polity. Proliferation of corrupt public servants could garner momentum to cripple the social order if such men are allowed to continue to manage and operate public institutions. When a public servant is found guilty of corruption after a judicial adjudicatory process conducted by a court of law, judiciousness demands that he should be treated as corrupt until he is exonerated by a superior court. The mere fact that an appellate or revisional forum has decided to entertain his challenge and to go into the issues and findings made against such public servants once again should not even temporarily absolve him from such findings. The mere fact that an appellate or revisional forum has decided to entertain his challenge and to go into the issues and findings made against such public servants once again should not even temporarily absolve him from such findings. If such a public servant becomes entitled to hold public office and to continue to do official acts until he is judicially absolved from such findings by reason of suspension of the order of conviction, it is public interest which suffers and sometimes, even irreparably. When a public servant who is convicted of corruption is allowed to continue to hold public office, it would impair the morale of the other persons manning such office, and consequently that would erode the already shrunk confidence of the people in such public institutions besides demoralising the other honest public servants who would either be the colleagues or subordinates of the convicted person. If honest public servants are compelled to take orders from proclaimed corrupt officers on account of 6 the suspension of the conviction, the fallout would be one of shaking the system itself. Hence it is necessary that the court should not aid the public servant who stands convicted for corruption charges to hold only (sic) public office until he is exonerated after conducting a judicial adjudication at the appellate or revisional level. It is a different matter if a corrupt public officer could continue to hold such public office even without the help of a court order suspending the conviction. 12. The above policy can be acknowledged as necessary for the efficacy and proper functioning of public offices. If so, the legal position can be laid down that when conviction is on a corruption charge against a public servant the appellate court or the revisional court should not suspend the order of conviction during the pendency of the appeal even if the sentence of imprisonment is suspended. It would be a sublime public policy that the convicted public servant is kept under disability of the conviction in spite of keeping the sentence of imprisonment in abeyance till the disposal of the appeal or revision." 13. It would be a sublime public policy that the convicted public servant is kept under disability of the conviction in spite of keeping the sentence of imprisonment in abeyance till the disposal of the appeal or revision." 13. The Hon'ble Apex Court while considering the provisions of Sections 19(1) and 22 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 in the case of Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh ( AIR 2012 SC 1185 ) reported in (2012) 3 SCC 64 has strongly condemned the corruption in the Country at para-68 as under: "11. Today, corruption in our country not only poses a grave danger to the concept of constitutional governance, it also threatens the very foundation of Indian democracy and the Rule of Law. The magnitude of corruption in our public life is incompatible with the concept of a socialist, secular democratic republic. It cannot be disputed that where corruption begins all rights end. Corruption devalues human rights, chokes a development and undermines justice, liberty, equality, fraternity which are the core values in our preambular vision. Therefore, the duty of the Court is that any anti-corruption law has to be interpreted and worked out in such a fashion as to strengthen the fight against corruption. That is to say in a situation where two constructions are eminently reasonable, the Court has to accept the one that seeks to eradicate corruption to the one which seeks to perpetuate it." In view of the aforesaid reasons, the impugned order passed by the Tribunal confirming the order of the Disciplinary Authority need not be interfered with as the same is in accordance with law. The petitioner has not made out any good ground to interfere under the extraordinary writ jurisdiction. Accordingly, writ petition is dismissed.