JUDGMENT 1. Heard Shri N. Surendrajit, learned counsel with Shri P. Tamphamani, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in W.P. (C) No. 639 of 2015 and for the private respondents in W.P. (C) No. 702 of 2015; Shri Serto T. Kom, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in W.P. (C) No. 702 of 2015 and for the private respondents in W.P. (C) No. 639 of 2015 and Shri Y. Ashang, learned Government Advocate appearing for the State Respondents. 2. Since both the writ petitions arise out of the similar set of facts, the same are disposed of by this common judgment and order. 3.1. According to the petitioners, they are the residents of Kumbi and some of them are elected as Councillors and some of them are members of the Ward Development Committee, Kumbi Municipal Council which came to be constituted under the provisions of the Manipur Municipalities Act, 1994. The Kumbi Municipal Council was upgraded from the Kumbi Nagar Panchayat with effect from 28-02-2014 vide notification dated 28-02-2014 issued by the State Government. The last election of the Kumbi Nagar Panchayat being held on 03-01-2011, the term of which will expire in January, 2016 and the following persons were declared elected as Councillors thereof:– Sl. No.NameWard No. 1.N. Inaobi Meitei1 2.Kh. (O) Pratima Devi2 3.M. (O) Nungshitombi Devi3 4.W. (O) Thoibi Devi4 5.M. Bineshwar Singh5 6.N. Babudhon Singh6 7.N. (O) Shanti Devi7 8.Kh. (O) Inakhunbi Devi8 9.W. (O) Indubala Leima9 From the day i.e., 28-02-2014, all the elected 9 (nine) Councillors, Kumbi Nagar Panchayat became the duly elected Councillors, Kumbi Municipal Council. Shri M. Bineshwar Singh is the Chairperson, Kumbi Municipal Council. 3.2. As many as five Councillors submitted a requisition dated 29-05-2015 to the Executive Officer under Section 31(2)(i) of the Manipur Municipalities Act, 1994 for initiating a motion of “noconfidence” against the Chairperson, Kumbi Municipal Council and the same was forwarded to Secretary (MAHUD) by the Executive Officer vide its letter dated 04-06-2015 with a request to nominate an officer to preside the special meeting. The Under Secretary (MAHUD), Government of Manipur vide its letter dated 06-06-2015 conveyed the approval of the Government for holding a special meeting for consideration of the motion of “no-confidence” against the Chairperson and informed that the Deputy Commissioner, Bishnupur had been appointed to preside over the special meeting. The Under Secretary (MAHUD), Government of Manipur vide its letter dated 06-06-2015 conveyed the approval of the Government for holding a special meeting for consideration of the motion of “no-confidence” against the Chairperson and informed that the Deputy Commissioner, Bishnupur had been appointed to preside over the special meeting. The Deputy Commissioner vide its letter dated 08-06-2015 directed the Executive Officer, Kumbi Municipal Council to call for a special meeting for consideration of the said motion of “no-confidence” against the Chairperson and in compliance thereof, the Executive Officer, on the same day, notified that the special meeting be held on 19-06-2015 at 11.30 am in the office of the SDO, Moirang. 3.3. The special meeting of the said Kumbi Municipal Council was held on 19-06-2015, presided by the SDO, Moirang, wherein all the Councillors were present and six Councillors voted in favour of the motion of “no-confidence” and accordingly, a proceeding thereof signed by the Executive Officer, was submitted to the Deputy Commissioner who, in turn, submitted the same to the Secretary (MAHUD), Government of Manipur vide his letter dated 19-06-2015. 3.4. The validity and correctness of the said proceedings and the letter dated 19-06-2015 came to be challenged before this Court by way of a writ petition being W.P. (C) No. 558 of 2015 which was allowed, on the basis of the submissions of the learned counsels appearing for the respondents therein, setting aside the proceedings of the special meeting held on 19-06-2015 and the letter dated 19-06-2015 of the Deputy Commissioner, Bishnupur. 3.5. On 17-07-2015, six Councillors submitted another requisition for a motion of “no-confidence” against the Chairperson under the provisions of Section 31(2)(i) of the Manipur Municipalities Act, 1994 to the Executive Officer who forwarded the same to the Deputy Commissioner with a copy endorsed to the Director (MAHUD) and the Deputy Secretary (MAHUD) vide its letter dated 30-07-2015 conveyed the approval of the Government for consideration of the motion of “no-confidence” against the Chairperson and informed that the Deputy Commissioner was appointed to preside over the special meeting for consideration of the motion of “no-confidence”. Being aggrieved, this letter dated 30-07-2015 issued by the Deputy Secretary (MAHUD) came to be challenged by way of a writ petition being W.P. (C) No. 639 of 2015. Being aggrieved, this letter dated 30-07-2015 issued by the Deputy Secretary (MAHUD) came to be challenged by way of a writ petition being W.P. (C) No. 639 of 2015. On 10-08-2015 when the said writ petition was listed for consideration, this court was pleased to issue notice and direct that the letter dated 30-07-2015 issued by the Deputy Secretary (MAHUD), Government of Manipur shall remain suspended. On receipt of a copy of the order dated 10-08-2015, the letter dated 30-07-2015 was suspended by the Secretary (MAHUD), Government of Manipur vide its letter dated 12-08-2015 till a final verdict being given by this Court in the matter. W.P. (C) No. 702 of 2015: 4. While the said writ petition being W.P. (C) No. 639 of 2015 was pending for consideration, the petitioners herein filed the present writ petition questioning the legality and correctness of the letter dated 12-08-2015 and 19-08-2015 of the Secretary (MAHUD) and the Deputy Commissioner, Bishnupur respectively. The parties shall be referred to hereinafter according to their respective positions in W.P. (C) No. 639 of 2015. 5. It is submitted by Shri N. Surendrajit, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners that since the motion of “noconfidence” stands defeated, no fresh application/requisition for a motion of “no-confidence” against the Chairperson can be brought before the Council within a period of one year in terms of the provisions of Section 31A of the Manipur Municipalities Act, 1994. His alternate submission is that since the first application/ requisition for a motion of “no-confidence” has been abandoned as not pressed, no second application for the same purpose is maintainable as barred by the provisions of Order 23 Rule 1(4) of the CPC. It is further submitted that since the term of the Kumbi Municipal Council is expiring in four months, the application/ requisition for a motion of “no-confidence” cannot be considered at this juncture for the reason that in terms of provisions of Section 22 read with Section 24 and 27, no election can be held for filling up the vacancy of Councillors or Chairman or Vice-Chairman if the remaining term of the Council is less than six months. His another submission is that the State Government as well as the private respondents have not filed their affidavits-in-opposition and therefore, the averments made in the petition shall be deemed to have been admitted by them. His another submission is that the State Government as well as the private respondents have not filed their affidavits-in-opposition and therefore, the averments made in the petition shall be deemed to have been admitted by them. In support of his contention, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has relied upon the decisions rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Naseem Bano Vs. State of UP & ors. reported in AIR 1993 SC 2592 and Subramanium Swamy & ors. Vs. Raju through Member, Juvenile Justice Board & anr. reported in (2014) 8 SCC 390 . On the other hand, it is submitted by Shri Serto T. Kom, the learned counsel appearing for the private respondents that since the success or defeat of a motion of “no-confidence” depends upon the decision of the Councillors present in the special meeting, the quashing/setting aside the proceedings of the special meeting by this Court, on technical ground, does not amount to “defeat” of the motion of “no-confidence” and therefore, the first motion cannot be said to have been defeated in the house. It is further submitted by him that the provisions of Section 22 of the Act provide that unless the Council is dissolved, it will continue to function for five years and an election to constitute a new council is to be completed before the expiry of the term and it is nowhere mentioned therein that since the term is expiring, a motion of “no-confidence” cannot be considered at this juncture. To substantiate his contentions, he has placed reliance on the decisions rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh Vs. Sheshrao & ors. reported in (1998) 9 SCC 113 and Mr. Joseph Sequeira, Member VP Vs. Block Developed Officer reported in AIR 2008 (NOC) 1386 (BOM). The submissions of the Shri Y. Ashang, the learned Government Advocate are more or less the same as that of the learned counsel appearing for the private respondents and therefore, his submissions are not repeated here for the sake of brevity. In addition to his relying upon the decision rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh Vs. Sheshrao & ors. reported in (1998) 9 SCC 113 , he has placed further reliance on the decision rendered by the Hon’ble High Court of Rajasthan in the case of Anandilal Vs. In addition to his relying upon the decision rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh Vs. Sheshrao & ors. reported in (1998) 9 SCC 113 , he has placed further reliance on the decision rendered by the Hon’ble High Court of Rajasthan in the case of Anandilal Vs. Chief Panchayat Officer, reported in AIR 1957 Rajasthan 163. 6. Two main issues have arisen out of the above submissions made by the learned counsels appearing for the parties - one, in regard to the interpretation of the provisions of Section 31A of the Act, 1994, inserted by way of amendment in the year 2005 and in particular, the word “defeated”, mentioned therein and second, in regard to the interpretation of the provisions of Section 22, 27 and 31 of the Act. Section 22, 27, 31 and 31A are reproduced herein below: “22. (1) Every municipality, unless sooner dissolved under this Act, shall continue for five years from the date appointed for its first meeting after a general election at which a quorum is present and no longer: Provided that a municipality which is functioning immediately before the commencement of this Act shall continue till the expiration of its duration, unless sooner dissolved by a resolution passed to that effect by the Legislative Assembly of the State of Manipur. (2) An election to constitute a municipality shall be completed:- a) before the expiry of its duration specified in sub-section (1); b) before the expiration of a period of six months from the date of its dissolution: Provided that where the remainder of the period for which the dissolved municipality would have continued is less than six months, it shall not be necessary to hold any election under this sub-section for constituting the municipality for such period: Provided further that the result of election shall be notified. (3) A municipality constituted upon the dissolution of a municipality before the expiration of its duration shall continue only for the remainder of the period for which the dissolved municipality would have continued under sub-section (1) had it not been so dissolved. 27. (3) A municipality constituted upon the dissolution of a municipality before the expiration of its duration shall continue only for the remainder of the period for which the dissolved municipality would have continued under sub-section (1) had it not been so dissolved. 27. If any Councillor is by reason of his death, resignation or removal or otherwise, is unable to complete his full term of office, the vacancy so caused shall be filled up by election or appointment, as the case may be, of a person under the provisions of this Act and the person so elected or appointed shall hold office for the unexpired term of his predecessor: Provided that no election for filling up a casual vacancy shall be held if the vacancy occurs within a period of six months preceding the date on which the term of office of the Councillor expires. 31.(1) The State Government may remove by a notification in the Official Gazette, from office the Chairperson or the Vice-Chairperson, in pursuance of a resolution passed by a majority of the total number of the Councillors and supported by not less than two third of the Councillors present and voting at a meeting specially convened for the purpose under sub-section (2) (2) For the purposes of sub-section (1) a meeting of the Nagar Panchayat or of the Council shall be held in the following manner, namely:- (i) the meeting shall be convened by the Executive Officer on a requisition signed by not less than one-fifth of the total number of Councillors constituting the Nagar Panchayat or the Council for the time being; (ii) the notice of such a meeting specifying the time and place thereof shall be despatched by the Executive Officer to every Councillor ten days before the meeting; (iii) the Chairperson or the Vice-Chairperson, as the case may be, against whom the resolution referred to in sub-section (1) is to be moved, shall not preside over the meeting; (iv) a copy of the notice shall be sent to the State Government. (3) If the office of the Chairperson becomes vacant all powers and duties of the Chairperson, may, until the election of a new Chairperson be exercised and performed by the Vice-Chairperson. (4) The removal of the Chairperson or the Vice-Chairperson under sub-section (1) shall be effective from the date of its resolution in this regard. (3) If the office of the Chairperson becomes vacant all powers and duties of the Chairperson, may, until the election of a new Chairperson be exercised and performed by the Vice-Chairperson. (4) The removal of the Chairperson or the Vice-Chairperson under sub-section (1) shall be effective from the date of its resolution in this regard. 31.A Restriction on motion of no-confidence:- If the motion of no-confidence against the Chairperson or the Vice-Chairperson, as the case may be, is defeated, no fresh motion of no-confidence against the Chairperson or the Vice-Chairperson or both, as the case may be, shall be brought before the Council or the Nagar Panchayat, as the case may be, within a period of one year from the date of such defeat of the motion.” 7. There is no dispute on facts and therefore, only the questions of law involved herein are to be considered and decided by this court. Admittedly, the word “defeated” is not defined in the Act and therefore, it is to be understood with reference to the objectives sought to be achieved in the Act and also with reference to the purpose for which Section 31A came to be inserted in the Act by way of an amendment. Section 31 of the Act provides for the manner in which the Chairperson or the Vice-Chairperson, as the case may be, can be removed from the office on the basis of a resolution passed by the Council. In case a special meeting is convened under the provisions of Section 31, on a requisition signed by not less than one-fifth of the total number of Councillors constituting the Council, for consideration of a motion of “noconfidence”, it shall be considered and decided therein only. The fate of the motion of “no-confidence” will be decided in the special meeting and the success or defeat thereof will be known in the special meeting itself. To succeed in a motion of “no-confidence”, two conditions are required to be fulfilled - (a) a resolution be passed by a majority of the total number of the Councillors; and (b) it shall be supported by not less than two-third of the Councillors present and voting at the special meeting. If the said two conditions are not fulfilled, the motion fails and can be said to have been rejected or defeated by a majority of the Councillors. If the said two conditions are not fulfilled, the motion fails and can be said to have been rejected or defeated by a majority of the Councillors. In other words, the consideration of a motion of “no-confidence” is an internal matter of the Council which will decide it and no one else or no any outsider can interfere with it. 8. Section 31 and 31A are to be read together. The provisions of Section 31A would apply only after the proceedings under Section 31 are over and that too, only after the motion of “noconfidence” being defeated. Although the words “on the floor of the house” are not there in Section 31A, the conjoined reading of the Section 31 and 31A makes it very clear that the success or defeat of a motion of “no-confidence” takes place on the floor of the house of the Council and within the four walls of the house/room of the Council. Therefore, the term “defeated” being used in Section 31A of the Act, will mean the motion of “no-confidence” being defeated on the floor of the house of the Council. What the Section 31A provides is that if a motion of “no-confidence” against the Chairperson or Vice-Chairperson, as the case may be, is defeated, no fresh motion for the same purpose be brought before the Council. In other words, after a motion having been defeated once, there is a bar of bringing another fresh motion within a period of one year from the date of such defeat. In the case of Ramesh Vs. Sheshrao (supra), relied upon by the learned counsel for the private respondents, wherein a motion of “no-confidence” passed by a majority came to be treated as invalid for want of a valid notice and another motion of “no-confidence” was moved, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under – “5. The significant words in the above provisions are “if the motion is not moved or is not carried”, then “no such fresh motion shall be moved … within a period of one year” from the date of rejection of the motion. The question is whether the first motion which ended in the manner indicated above can be treated as a motion not moved or not carried by the requisite majority. In our opinion, the first motion does not fall in this category. The question is whether the first motion which ended in the manner indicated above can be treated as a motion not moved or not carried by the requisite majority. In our opinion, the first motion does not fall in this category. The first motion which was passed on 8-3-1995, was carried by the requisite majority but it became ineffective because the Commissioner on appeal by the Sarpanch held the motion of no confidence to be invalid for want of the requisite notice of holding the special meeting on 8-3- 1995. The bar contained in sub-section (3-A) of Section 35 of the Act does not cover such a situation. 6. The provision clearly is in respect of a motion which though valid, is not carried by the requisite majority of members because of its not being moved or being passed by the requisite majority. No such defect was found in the first motion in the present case which was carried by the requisite majority and not rejected in the meeting. The object of the provision clearly is to prevent frivolous noconfidence motions repeatedly within one year, if the earlier one has not been even moved or has been defeated because want of the requisite majority for passing the same. In the present case, the first motion was not of the kind which attracted sub-section (3-A) of Section 35. Accordingly, there was no ground for the Commissioner to allow the appeal since subsection (3-A) of Section 35 was not available in the present case.” Further reliance has been placed by him in a decision dated 22-01-2008 reported in 2008 (3) Bombay CR 111 wherein the Bombay High Court held as under – “8. Needless to observe, since the resolutions were not passed by six members, the same could not have been said to have been passed by the total number of members of the Panchayat. We are entirely in agreement with the first submission made on behalf of the respondents No. 3 and 4 that a resolution expressing want of confidence had to be passed by a majority of the total number of members of the Panchayat, and, not the members present at the specially convened meeting for that purpose, as sought to be contended on behalf of the petitioners. Nevertheless, we are unable to agree with the contention of the learned Senior Counsel that since the resolution at the meeting held on 21-10-2007 was not passed with the required majority, it has got to be considered to have been defeated. In our view, on-passing of a resolution with the requisite majority is different from a resolution which is defeated. The ordinary meaning of the word ‘defeat’ is to win a victory over, thwart, frustrate, overthrow...etc. For the purpose of defeating a resolution, the members present ought to have voted against the resolution by requisite majority and since none had voted against the resolution on 21-10-2007, the same could not be treated as defeated, so as to create a bar of moving a fresh resolution, in the light of the second proviso to Section 51 of the Act. In other words, for a resolution to be defeated, the majority of members present at the meeting specially convened for consideration of the no confidence motion ought to have expressed their confidence in respondents No. 4 and 5. That did not happen. Therefore, were are of the view that the second proviso to Section 51 of the Act will not come in the way of the petitioners who have now given another notice of no confidence motion dated 26-10-2007.” 9. The facts of the present case are almost identical with that of the case of Ramesh Vs. Sheshrao (supra) and this court is of the view that the first issue involved herein is covered by the said decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In the present case, it may be noted that six out of nine Councillors voted in favour of the motion of “no-confidence” and only the proceedings thereof came to be challenged before this court on the ground that the special meeting was not presided over by the Deputy Commissioner. The quashing/ setting aside the proceedings on technical ground by this court will not tantamount to the motion being defeated on the floor of the house of the Council. Thus, the second requisition will not attract the provisions of Section 31A and is maintainable under the provisions of Section 31 of the Act. The quashing/ setting aside the proceedings on technical ground by this court will not tantamount to the motion being defeated on the floor of the house of the Council. Thus, the second requisition will not attract the provisions of Section 31A and is maintainable under the provisions of Section 31 of the Act. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has not cited any decision which has taken any contrary view in respect of the first issue except to contend that the said decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court is not applicable to the facts of the present case. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has emphasised his alternate submission also by contending that since the private respondents have deserted and abandoned their first requisition, the process for a motion of “no-confidence” stands closed and therefore, the second requisition is not maintainable as barred by the provisions of Order 23 Rule 1(4) of the CPC. This court is unable to accept his alternate submission for the reason that the provisions of Order 23 Rule 1(4) are applicable to a suit which has been abandoned by the plaintiff. This order 23 of the CPC has nothing to do with a motion being initiated under the provisions of Section 31 of the Act. 10. As regards the second issue, it is submitted by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners that since the term of the Council is expiring in few months, there is no point of a motion of “no-confidence” being considered at this juncture and it is the time for making process of election to constitute a new Council. The proviso to Section 27 clearly mandates that no election for filling up a vacancy shall be held if the vacancy occurs within a period of six months preceeding the date on which the term of office of the Councillors expires. The learned counsel for the private respondents has objected to the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners by contending that there is no provision of law in the Act which bars the motion of “no-confidence” being brought when the term of Council is to expire in four/five months. The learned counsel for the private respondents has objected to the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners by contending that there is no provision of law in the Act which bars the motion of “no-confidence” being brought when the term of Council is to expire in four/five months. It is not in dispute that the term of the Council is expiring in four/five months and the Secretary (MAHUD) vide his letter dated 11-09-2015 has requested the Secretary, State Election Commission to take up necessary actions for preparation of holding an election of the Councils including the revision of electoral rolls. As has been provided under Section 22 of the Act, the Council, unless dissolved, shall continue for five years and since there are no provisions in the Act and in particular, the provisions of Section 31, which bar the initiation of a motion of “no-confidence” by way of a requisition and the consideration thereof by the Council, there is nothing wrong for a motion of “noconfidence” being moved at this juncture under the provisions of Section 31 and the consequences will have to follow in terms of the other provisions of the Act. In the event of the Chairperson being removed under sub-section (1), all his power and duties may be exercised and performed by the Vice-Chairperson till the election of a new Chairperson. 11. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has raised another issue by contending that since the averments made in the petition have not been controverted by the respondents, the same shall be deemed to have been admitted by them and therefore, the writ petition ought to be allowed accordingly. To support his contention, he has relied upon the decisions rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Naseem Bano Case (supra) and the case of Subramanium Swamy (supra). There is no doubt about the said decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court laying down certain principles of law but since there is no dispute on facts, the said decisions will have no application in the present case and the respondents, without filing any affidavit-in-opposition, can make their submissions on the questions of law at the time of hearing the case. 12. 12. In view of the above observations, the writ petition being W.P. (C) No. 639 of 2015 is dismissed and the writ petition being W.P. (C) No. 702 of 2015 is allowed with the direction that the letters dated 12-08-2015 of the Secretary (MAHUD), Government of Manipur and dated 19-08-2015 of the Deputy Commissioner, Bishnupur stand formally quashed and set aside and consequently, interim order stands vacated. There shall be no order as to costs.