ORDER : A.S. Bopanna, J. 1. Petitioners-Institution are assailing the order dated 6-6-2012 passed in Application No. 6/2012 by the Labour Court, Gulbarga, impugned at Annexure-E to the petition. The respondent was employed in the petitioners-institution and had retired from service on 31-3-2011. Subsequently, he has filed an application before the Labour Court, Gulbarga, under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, the Act') seeking that orders be passed to direct the institution to pay a sum of Rs. 11,27,805/- along with interest. Petitioners herein who had appeared filed objection to the said application. The Labour Court after recording the evidence of the parties and considering the rival contentions has ordered payment of Rs. 2,65,052/- insofar as the amount that had been determined in the said order. Petitioners claiming to be aggrieved by the said order are before this Court. 2. The learned Counsel for the petitioners while assailing the order passed by the Labour Court would contend that the Labour Court was not justified in its conclusion. It is their case that firstly the respondent does not answer the definition of 'workman' as contained in the Act. Further, in any event, consideration in an application under Section 33-C(2) of the Act could not have been made by the Labour Court since there is no prior determination of the right for the amount claimed in the said application in appropriate proceedings. He therefore contends that the order passed by the Labour Court is not justified. Further, in any event, consideration in an application under Section 33-C(2) of the Act could not have been made by the Labour Court since there is no prior determination of the right for the amount claimed in the said application in appropriate proceedings. He therefore contends that the order passed by the Labour Court is not justified. In support of the contention that it is only if there is pre-determination of the right, an application under Section 33-C(2) of the Act would be maintainable, the learned Counsel has relied on the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi v Ganesh Razak and Another, (1995)1 SCC 235 , 1995 SCC (L and S) 296, 1995 I LLJ 395 (SC), in the case of Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation v Birendra Bhandari, 2006(6) AIR Kar.R. 421 (SC), AIR 2006 SC 3220 , (2006)10 SCC 211 , 2006 III LLJ 969 (SC), 2006 AIR SCW 4901, (2007)1 SCC (L and S) 69 and in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh and Another v Brijpal Singh, 2006(2) AIR Kar.R. 606 (SC), AIR 2006 SC 3592 , (2005)8 SCC 58 , 2005 III LLJ 1003 (SC), 2006 AIR SCW 66, 2005 SCC (L and S) 1081. 3. The learned Counsel for the respondent on the other hand would seek to sustain the order passed by the Labour Court. It is contended that mere designation of employee would not decide as to whether he is a workman or not. In that light, taking note of the duties that were being discharged by the respondent herein, the Labour Court has construed that he answers the definition of 'workman'. That apart, it is contended that the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioners would not be applicable to the present facts since in the instant case, all that the respondent was seeking before the Labour Court was in fact was the unpaid amount as per pre-existing rights. The amount as had been claimed in the application is the amount which was being received by the employees of the petitioners-institution but the amount had not being paid for the period subsequent to 2003 which was claimed in the application. The amount as had been claimed in the application is the amount which was being received by the employees of the petitioners-institution but the amount had not being paid for the period subsequent to 2003 which was claimed in the application. He contends that in the similar circumstance, when certain other employees had approached the Labour Court, the Labour Court had granted the relief and the challenge made to such orders by the petitioners-institution which is the very same petitioners herein, this Court had rejected the writ petitions in W.P. Nos. 81344 of 2010 and 82275 of 2012. He therefore contends that in the present facts, the order passed by the Labour Court having taken into consideration all aspects of the matter and having kept in view the evidence that was let in by the parties in the instant proceedings does not call for interference. 4. In the light of the contentions with regard to the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioners, the position is no doubt is well-established that the claim under Section 33-C(2) of the Act can be entertained only if there is pre-existing right or if there is a dispute, there should be a prior determination of such right. However, what is also to be taken into consideration is that determination of pre-existing rights is to be made in the appropriate proceedings depending on the facts and circumstances that would arise in a particular case, as to whether such right claimed was to be determined for the first time as a right that would enure to the benefit of the workman or whether a pre-existing entitlement was only denied. 5. In that light, if the instant facts are taken into consideration it is to be noticed that the claim as made in the application is for the period from 1-1-2003 to 31-3-2006. Further, certain of the benefits ordered are from the periods from 2006 to 2011. The fact that by the period for which the claim has been made in the application, respondent herein had rendered long service in the petitioner-institution cannot be in dispute. Further, certain of the benefits ordered are from the periods from 2006 to 2011. The fact that by the period for which the claim has been made in the application, respondent herein had rendered long service in the petitioner-institution cannot be in dispute. If that aspect of the matter is kept in view and the nature of the contention put forth in the application as well as the objection before the Labour Court is taken into consideration, the respondent herein had contended before the Labour Court that the benefits which were being paid to the staff of the petitioners herein was similar to the benefits that was being paid to the Government staff. The respondent herein had further contended that such benefit was being paid earlier but after the year 2002 it has been done away and as such, the amount not paid subsequently was payable to the respondent herein. The petitioners herein while filing their objection statement had merely denied such contention. Subsequently, the parties have tendered evidence before the Labour Court. The respondent examined himself as W.W. 1 and while one P. Sampathrao was examined as a witness on behalf of the petitioners herein as M.W. 1. 6. In the light of the contentions that had been put forth in the pleadings before the Labour Court, the Labour Court while referring to the evidence of the parties has taken note of the admission made by M.W. 1 with regard to the provisions that were made applicable and the manner in which payments were being made earlier. It is based on such evidence, the Labour Court has arrived at the conclusion that the amounts as claimed by way of benefits towards arrears of DA and HRA as also leave encashment were payable as was being paid during the earlier period. Therefore, if the nature of consideration as made by the Labour Court is kept in view, it is seen that the determination as made therein is not in a manner which is beyond the scope of provisions under Section 33-C(2) of the Act. In fact, consideration is made only to take note of the pre-existing right in favour of the respondent herein for payment of the said amount since it had not been considered by the petitioners-institution. 7. In fact, consideration is made only to take note of the pre-existing right in favour of the respondent herein for payment of the said amount since it had not been considered by the petitioners-institution. 7. Therefore, in that circumstance, the Labour Court had only concluded that the amount which was due and payable being paid in the earlier years and had not been paid from 1-1-2003. Hence, the Labour Court quantified the same has arrived at conclusion that amount is payable. The said conclusion reached by the Labour Court cannot be considered to be erroneous, more particularly, when before arriving at such conclusion the Labour Court has referred to the contention with regard to the duties and powers that was being exercised by the respondent herein notwithstanding his designation. That apart, as pointed out, two other employees of the petitioners-institution herein had also filed similar application and the said applications which were considered and orders were passed though assailed before this Court were not interfered. The learned Counsel for the petitioners herein would no doubt contend that against the said order writ appeals are filed and the same are pending. However, when consideration has been made against the petitioners herein by the learned Single Judge and presently, since I do not find any error committed by the Labour Court so as to call for interference, I am of the opinion that the order dated 6-6-2012 passed by the Labour Court in the instant facts also does not call for interference. The petitions being devoid of merit are accordingly dismissed.