ORDER : 1. Leave granted. 2. Heard Mr. Kashinath De, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. Abhijit Sen Gupta, learned counsel for the respondent. 3. The appellant instituted Ejectment Suit No.61 of 2003 before the Rent Controller at Kolkata for eviction of the legal heirs of the original tenant, Mr. Govind Shaw. As claimed by the learned counsel for the appellant, the respondents ceased to be the tenants after expiry of five years from the commencement of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 (for short, ‘the Act’) in view of Section 2(g) of the Act. Be it stated, the Act came into force with effect from 10th July, 2001. 4. The suit was filed for eviction on many a ground. Though the evidence was recorded by the Small Causes Court, the plaintiff realizing that the suit would not be maintainable for eviction as the respondents had ceased seized to be the tenants in law as per Section 2(g) of the Act, he filed an application No.803/13 before the High Court of Calcutta under Section 24(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking transfer of the case to the regular court on the foundation that the respondents were not more tenants and hence, the regular civil court would have jurisdiction. The High Court referred to certain decisions which pertain to vested rights of tenants but did not record a finding. However, the conclusion recorded by the High Court reads as follows : “Having heard the learned Advocates for the respective parties one fact that clearly emerges is that there is no pleading at all in the plaint to the effect that the contesting opposite parties have lost their right of tenancy in the suit premises on the expiry of five years from the date of death or from the date of coming into force of the said Act of 1997, whichever is later. As discussed above, it will appear that the reading of the plaint indicates that the contesting opposite parties were asked to vacate the suit premises with the expiry 8 March 2002 or whenever tenancy month expires next but not on the expiry of five years as contemplated under the said Act of 1997. As discussed above, it will also appear that the plaintiff was willing to accept rent from January 2002. As discussed above, it will also appear that the plaintiff was willing to accept rent from January 2002. The learned Advocate for the contesting opposite parties also submitted that in the affidavit of evidence-in-chief the plaintiff/petitioner did not make out any case as contemplated under the said Act of 1997 in so far as the right of having protection from eviction for a period of five years as contemplated under the said Act of 1997 is concerned. The learned Advocate for the contesting opposite parties was right in submitting that even if the prayer made in the application under Section 24 C.P.C. is allowed the City Civil Court concerned cannot decide the suit in the absence of the necessary pleadings. The said learned Advocate was right in submitting that on the basis of the pleadings as its stands the prayer for transfer cannot be allowed. It is difficult to say, on the basis of the pleadings in the plaint, as pointed out by the learned Advocate for the contesting opposite parties, that the Small Causes Court concerned has lost its jurisdiction. It is true that the learned Advocates for the respective parties have made their submissions, as already noted above, but this Court is of the view that the matter can be disposed of on factual basis that the argument made by the learned Advocate for the plaintiff/petitioner is not supported by any appropriate pleading in the plaint. In view of the discussions made above, the prayer for transfer as made in the application under Section 24 of the Civil Procedure Code is rejected and the said application under Section 24 C.P.C. is, accordingly, dismissed. 5. It is submitted by learned counsel for the appellant that when the jurisdiction vested in the Small Causes Court sceased to exist after expiry of five years, the respondents became trespassers and, therefore, the regular civil court would have jurisdiction to pass appropriate order directing them to vacate the premises in question. That apart, it is also submitted that in the plaint that there was a prayer for recovery of Khas possession. In this backdrop, it is urged that the High Court should have been well advised to issue direction of transfer of the case to a competent civil court. 6. Mr. That apart, it is also submitted that in the plaint that there was a prayer for recovery of Khas possession. In this backdrop, it is urged that the High Court should have been well advised to issue direction of transfer of the case to a competent civil court. 6. Mr. Abhijit Sengupta, learned counsel for the respondents, per contra, would contend that the second proviso to Section 2(g) would protect the respondents inasmuchas the landlord by conduct have accepted the respondents as tenants and, therefore, in praesenti, they are the tenants and the Small Causes Court would still have jurisdiction to deal with the lis. 7. On a perusal of the order passed by the High Court, we find that it has though proceeded to delineate on the vested right yet not recorded any finding and, therefore, we are not obliged to deal with the same. Suffice it to state that the High Court has rejected the application on the ground of pleadings. 8. We have been apprised that the evidence before the Small Causes Court is closed and the issue relating to the tenancy and trespasser is going to be argued as the evidence had been led on that score. A court is always entitled to deal with the existence of its jurisdiction on the basis of certain facts which are in the jurisdictional realm. Therefore, in fitness of things, it would be appropriate that the Small Causes Court record a finding with regard to the status of the respondents and if it expresses the view that they are not the tenants but encroachers, then it can take recourse to order VII Rule 10A of the Code of Civil Procedure. Needless to say, if it comes to hold that they are the tenants, it shall proceed in accordance with law. The Small Causes Court is directed to dispose of the suit within a period of four months from today. Be it noted, we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case. 9. Resultantly, the appeal is allowed with the aforesaid directions and the order passed by the High Court is set aside. 10. There shall be no order as to costs.