JUDGMENT : P.K. Lohra, J. Appellant Jodhpur Vidhyut Vitran Nigam Limited (for short, ‘JDVVNL’) has laid this first appeal under Section 96 CPC to question the legality and propriety of judgment and decree dated 8th of April 2015 passed by Addl. District Judge, Raisinghnagar, District Sri Ganganagar. 2. By the impugned judgment and decree, learned trial Court has partly decreed the suit filed by respondent for compensation under Section 1A of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 (for short, ‘Act’) and awarded compensation to the tune of Rs. 9,52,148/- with interest thereon @ 9% per annum from the date of institution of the suit. 3. The bare necessary facts, for the purpose of this appeal, are that respondent-plaintiffs filed a claim petition before the learned Addl. District Judge, Raisinghnagar (for short, ‘learned trial Court’), inter-alia, on the ground that husband of first respondent, Umed Singh, was in employment of fifth respondent as agricultural labourer. It is further averred that on fateful day of 25th December 2008 during night hours when Umed Singh visited agricultural field of fifth respondent and made an attempt to start electric motor installed in the field near transformer, he received electric shock. The gravity and magnitude of the electric shock was so high that Umed Singh electrocuted instantaneously and succumbed on the spot. Alleging in the claim that at the time of his death, Umed Singh was 26 years old and his monthly income was Rs. 8,000/-, the respondent-plaintiffs quantified the total amount of compensation to the tune of Rs. 54,94,000/-. The cause of accident, which resulted in death of Umed Singh, was attributed to the appellant precisely on the ground that transformer and other electric equipments are required to be maintained by appellant JDVVNL and it is also expected to take all safety measures to prevent any mishap including loss of human life. In the claim petition, besides appellant, fifth respondent Ramswaroop was also arrayed as defendant. After service of summons, none appeared for the fifth respondent; therefore, the learned trial Court proceeded ex-parte. The appellant JDVVNL, appeared before the learned trial Court and contested the claim of respondent-plaintiffs. In the written statement, appellant has denied all the allegations contained in the plaint. In the claim petition, besides appellant, fifth respondent Ramswaroop was also arrayed as defendant. After service of summons, none appeared for the fifth respondent; therefore, the learned trial Court proceeded ex-parte. The appellant JDVVNL, appeared before the learned trial Court and contested the claim of respondent-plaintiffs. In the written statement, appellant has denied all the allegations contained in the plaint. The appellant has also averred in the return that transformer was placed at the site but the work for connecting it with the main line through wires was underway and in the interregnum it was connected for supplying of electricity. The appellant has also pleaded ignorance about flowing of current from the pole of transformer or its girder. It is also averred in the written statement that information about receiving electric shock by Umed Singh was never divulged to the department nor the same was conveyed to the person in whose name electric connection existed. As regards the income of Umed Singh, appellant has made a categorical statement that there is no proof to this effect and therefore amount quantified is based on mere surmises. Attributing culpable negligence on the part of deceased, appellant prayed that respondent plaintiffs are not entitled for any compensation. 4. The learned trial Court, on the basis of pleadings of rival parties, framed two issues for determination. For substantiating their claim, respondent-plaintiffs examined four witnesses including first respondent Smt. Santosh and Dr. Taj Kumar Sharma. 5. In counter, appellant tendered affidavits of DW1 Rajesh Prasad Meena, DW2 Tarachand Saharan and also produced Accident Electrical Report Ex.A/1. However, DW1 Rajesh Prasad Meena after tendering his affidavit did not appear for cross-examination and only other witness DW2 Tarachand Saharan appeared for cross-examination. 6. After recording evidence of the parties, learned trial Court heard final arguments and by the impugned judgment and decree partly allowed the claim of the respondent-plaintiffs. The learned trial Court, on appreciation of evidence and available material, decided Issue No.1 in favour of respondent-plaintiffs and against the appellant. While undertaking exercise to unearth the truth about electrocution of deceased Umed Singh, learned trial Court has thoroughly examined the evidence of respondent-plaintiffs and found it to be more reliable and convincing. While adverting to the evidence of the appellants, learned trial Court has declined to consider the affidavit tendered by DW1 Rajesh Prasad Meena as he did not appear for cross-examination on his affidavit. While adverting to the evidence of the appellants, learned trial Court has declined to consider the affidavit tendered by DW1 Rajesh Prasad Meena as he did not appear for cross-examination on his affidavit. In these circumstances, nonappearance of the witness for cross-examination has rightly persuaded the learned trial Court not to rely on his affidavit which on the face of it was unworthy of any credit. The testimony of DW2 Tarachand Saharan is also scrutinised meticulously by the learned trial Court for the reason that he was the author of the Report Ex.A/1 in respect of place where the calamity occurred. While considering the Inspection Report, which was posterior to the occurrence of the calamity and death of Umed Singh and prepared almost after two months from the date of accident, the learned trial Court disbelieved the same by observing that it is not inspiring confidence. In my considered opinion, such conclusion of the learned Court below cannot be categorized as infirm in the backdrop of facts and circumstances of the case. Moreover, the learned Court below in deciding Issue No.1 against the appellant has also placed reliance on a decision of this Court in RSEB v. Banarsi Devi 1996 DNJ Raj. 443 and a decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in M.P. Electricity Board v. Shail Kumari & Ors., (2002) 2 SCC 162 . In the said verdict, Hon'ble Apex Court examined the doctrine of Strict Liability and observed that irrespective of any negligence of careless, State Electricity Board is liable to pay damages for the snap electrocution. The Court held: "Even assuming that all such measures have been adopted, a person undertaking an activity involving hazardous or risky exposure to human life, is liable under law of torts to compensate for the injury suffered by any other person, irrespective of any negligence or carelessness on the part of the managers of such undertakings. The basis of such liability is the foreseeable risk inherent in the very nature of such activity. The liability cast on such person is known, in law, as "strict liability". It differs from the liability which arises on account of the negligence or fault in this way i.e. the concept of negligence comprehends that the foreseeable harm could be avoided by taking reasonable precautions. The liability cast on such person is known, in law, as "strict liability". It differs from the liability which arises on account of the negligence or fault in this way i.e. the concept of negligence comprehends that the foreseeable harm could be avoided by taking reasonable precautions. If the defendant did all that which could be done for avoiding the harm he cannot be held liable when the action is based on any negligence attributed. But such consideration is not relevant in cases of strict liability where the defendant is held liable irrespective of whether he could have avoided the particular harm by taking precautions." 7. Therefore, the findings and conclusions on Issue No.1 are just and proper on the touchstone of evidence and available material as well as law on the subject. 8. The second issue was relating to quantum of compensation for which the respondent claimants are entitled. In absence of any cogent evidence and more particularly any adverse evidence by the appellant for determining the age of the deceased, the learned trial Court has placed reliance on police report under Section 174 Cr.P.C. which postulates police to inquire and report on suicide etc. and further autopsy report and inquest of the dead body are also taken note of in this behalf and thereupon the Court below recorded its finding that at the time of death Umed Singh was 26 years old. Although respondents in their claim petition have projected a very embellished version about monthly income of the deceased as Rs. 8,000/- but the learned trial Court assessed the monthly income of the deceased moderately by relying on Gazette Notification issued in January 2015 prescribing minimum wages for unskilled labour i.e. Rs. 4,960 per month. On the basis of that monthly income, the learned trial Court has applied multiplier of 17 and deducted ¼ for the personal expenses of the deceased. That apart, the learned trial Court has also rightly assessed loss of consortium for first respondent wife to the tune of Rupees one lac and for loss of love and affection for the children @ Rs. 25,000 each, which is also just considering the age of the deceased, who was in his prime youth at the time of occurrence of the calamity. After undertaking such exercise, the learned trial Court has worked out the total amount of compensation to the tune of Rs. 9,52,148. 25,000 each, which is also just considering the age of the deceased, who was in his prime youth at the time of occurrence of the calamity. After undertaking such exercise, the learned trial Court has worked out the total amount of compensation to the tune of Rs. 9,52,148. In my considered opinion, the approach of the learned trial Court in assessing the compensation is just and reasonable and even the multiplier which is pressed into service by the learned Court below is appropriate in accordance with the second schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Moreover, after considering the dependents which are four in number deduction of ¼ for personal and living expenses of deceased is also reasonable which is in conformity with the dictum of Hon'ble Apex Court in Smt. Sarla Verma & Ors. v. Delhi Transport Corporation & Anr. [ (2009) 6 SCC 121 ], Court made following observations in Para 30 in the verdict: 30. Though in some cases the deduction to be made towards personal and living expenses is calculated on the basis of units indicated in Trilok Chandra, the general practise is to apply standardised deductions. Having considered several subsequent decisions of this court, we are of the view that where the deceased was married, the deduction towards personal and living expenses of the deceased, should be one-third (?rd) where the number of dependent family members is 2 to 3, one-fourth (¼th) where the number of dependant family members is 4 to 6, and one-fifth (?th) where the number of dependant family members exceeds six. 9. Therefore, viewed from any angle, findings and conclusions of the learned Court below on Issue No.2 and quantifying compensation by the learned Court below is just and reasonable which requires no interference by this Court in exercise of appellate jurisdiction. 10. Resultantly, I am not persuaded to interfere with the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court. The present appeal, therefore, fails and same is dismissed summarily. Appeal dismissed.