ORDER : This habeas corpus petition is filed with a prayer to declare the detention of petitioners cousin brother Alimurtuja Dadapeer Chamanamalik, under the provisions of the Karnataka Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug- Offenders, Gamblers, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Slum - Grabbers Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as 'Goonda Act’) vide detention order No.DC/POL/G.ACT/CR: 02/2015- 16 dated 14.08.2015 (Annexure 'A’) and Order No: HD 417 SST 2015 dated 21.08.2015 (Annexure-C) as illegal and to quash them. 2. Invoking provisions of Section 3(1) r/w sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Act and Government Order No.HD/72/SST/2013 dated 5.6.2015, the Deputy Commissioner and the District Magistrate, Belagavi (respondent No.2) passed the impugned detention order for the reasons recorded in the grounds of detention. 3. Heard Sri. Amar Correa, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Sri. C.S. Patil, learned Govt. Advocate for the respondents “State”. 4. Gravamen of the petitioners case is, respondents have invoked the draconian executive power of preventive detention against the detenu for the reasons enumerated in the grounds of detention which are wholly unjust, violative of fundamental right of the detenu to remain free as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and in fragrant violation of all protective procedural law to which the detenu is entitled. 5. Assailing the detention order, Sri. Amar Correa, learned Counsel for the petitioner contended inter alia that: (i) the detenu was not conveyed that there vests a right in him to submit a representation to the Government and/or to the detaining authority seeking redressal of his grievances and to seek release; (ii) the detaining authority did not convey to the detenu that a representation could be submitted to the detaining authority itself. (iii) there is variance between the meaning conveyed between Kannada and English versions of grounds of detention. Kannada version conveys a meaning that the detenu could 'address’ to the detaining authority whereas the English version means that a representation could be 'made’ to the detaining authority. (iii) there is variance between the meaning conveyed between Kannada and English versions of grounds of detention. Kannada version conveys a meaning that the detenu could 'address’ to the detaining authority whereas the English version means that a representation could be 'made’ to the detaining authority. Thus, there is a classic and fine distinction between the word 'address’ and 'make’ which in the context of preventive detention makes enormous difference; (iv) Order dated 21.08.2015 (Annexure “C”) passed by the Government confirming the order passed by the District Magistrate does not disclose that the same is passed after being satisfied with the grounds of detention as well as the order of detention; (v) Annexure “E”, the order dated 24.09.2015 passed by the Government under section 12(1) & (13) of the Act directing continuance of detention for a period of 12 months, though with a condition to renew once in three months is contrary to law; (vi) the grounds of detention are drafted in a very causal manner without verifying records. Ground Nos.5, 7, 8 and 9 refer to certain dates of hearing namely 12.08.2015, 03.08.2015, 03.08.2015 and 11.08.2015 respectively on which dates the detenue was required to attend different cases and be present before various courts. The grounds of detention as at Annexure “B” though dated 14.08.2015 which falls subsequent to the aforementioned dates does not disclose developments which may have taken place on the respective dates. Therefore, it is clear that the detaining authority has relied upon information which was collated in a casual manner and any decision based on defective or insufficient material vitiates the detention order; (vii) the detenu was included in the rowdy sheet in the year 2009 and the detention order is passed in the year 2015 which has no proximity with the period during which the petitioner may have acted in a manner prejudicial to the public order. On the above grounds, learned Counsel for the petitioner sought for quashing of the impugned order and to set petitioner at liberty. 6. Per contra, learned Government Advocate supporting the detention order submitted that the grounds urged are wholly untenable. On the above grounds, learned Counsel for the petitioner sought for quashing of the impugned order and to set petitioner at liberty. 6. Per contra, learned Government Advocate supporting the detention order submitted that the grounds urged are wholly untenable. In reply to the contentions urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner, he submitted as follows: (i) that in both Kannada and English versions, it is expressly conveyed to the detenu that if he was desirous, he could submit a representation to the Government, and/or to the detaining authority by forwarding the same through the Superintendent of Police; (ii) that there is absolutely no difference in the meaning which the Kannada and English versions of the detention orders convey. Adverting to the fine distinction sought to be made between the words 'address to’ and 'make’ he submitted that both convey precisely the same meaning namely, submission of a representation by the detenue to the detaining authority; (iii) That, the order passed by the Government dated 24.09.2015 as per annexure-E is also in accordance with law and does not call for any interference by this Court, because the said order is subject to renewal once in every three months; (iv) The grounds of detention contain elaborate case history of the crimes committed by the detenue. So far as the updates with regard to the hearing dates of cases mentioned in ground Nos.5, 7, 8 & 9, there is no infirmity in law inasmuch as all the said four cases have been pending for long period of time and non availability of latest progress during the immediate previous year in respect of the said four cases would not vitiate the detention order as the detaining authority has passed the order of detention after objectively considering the case in its entirety; (v) The detenu was indeed included in the rowdy sheet in 2009. A mere inclusion in the rowdy sheet would not automatically warrant detention under the provisions of the Act. Inclusion in rowdy sheet means that the person concerned was involved in unlawful activities repeatedly. Therefore, the proximity of issuance of order of detention vis-a-vis the inclusion in the rowdy sheet cannot be a sole consideration in a matter concerning preventive detention. With above contentions, the learned AGA prayed for dismissal of the petition. 7. Inclusion in rowdy sheet means that the person concerned was involved in unlawful activities repeatedly. Therefore, the proximity of issuance of order of detention vis-a-vis the inclusion in the rowdy sheet cannot be a sole consideration in a matter concerning preventive detention. With above contentions, the learned AGA prayed for dismissal of the petition. 7. We have bestowed our thoughtful consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner and the Government. We have also perused the records. 8. Records disclose that the detenu was involved in criminal activities right from the year 2006 and he was included in the rowdy sheet in 2009. The respondents have taken into consideration 13 cases in which detenu is involved to support the order of detention. G.O. dated 24.09.2015 authorizes detention for a period of 12 months subject to renewal once in three months. 9. With these facts on hand, adverting to the grounds urged on behalf of the detenu in this petition, we hold that there is no substance in the ground suggesting that detenu was not informed that he had a right of submitting a representation to the detaining authority or to the Government. We say so because, it is expressly and unambiguously mentioned in the grounds of detention that the detenue may submit representations if he so desired. 10. Similarly, the ground suggesting that there is variance in the meaning conveyed between the English and Kannada versions is also equally fallacious. The distinction sought to be made with regard to literal meaning of 'address’ and 'make’ a representation is too hyper technical and is noted only to be rejected. 11. However, the next two grounds namely proper and objective consideration of material by the detaining authority and the Government and authorizing detention for 12 months by G.O. dated 24.09.2015 require serious consideration. Re: Consideration of material by the detaining authority and the Government: According to the detaining authority, detenu was involved in criminal activities right from the year 2006. The respondents have listed out 13 cases to support the order of detention. Out of them, 12 cases pertain to commission of offences under Section 78 of the Karnataka Police Act. In one case namely C.C. 396/2013, detenu was charged with offence punishable under Sec. 420 IPC in addition to a charge under Sec. 78 of Karnataka Police Act. Grounds of detention (Annexure-B) is dated 14.08.2015. Out of them, 12 cases pertain to commission of offences under Section 78 of the Karnataka Police Act. In one case namely C.C. 396/2013, detenu was charged with offence punishable under Sec. 420 IPC in addition to a charge under Sec. 78 of Karnataka Police Act. Grounds of detention (Annexure-B) is dated 14.08.2015. As on the said date, the District Magistrate did not have the latest progress in respect of fives cases namely, C.C No.396/2013, 229/2014, 194/2014, 228/2014, 715/2014 described at Sl.No.5,6,7,8 & 9 in the tabular column. The dates of hearing of first two cases were on 12.08.2015, next two cases on 03.08.2015 and the last case on 11.08.2015. Thus, all dates of hearing are anterior to the date of issuance of grounds for detention. Obviously, the detaining authority did not have any clue with regard to the progress in these five cases while issuing the grounds of detention. Case mentioned at Sl.No.1 (C.C 532/2006) has ended in conviction on 29.12.2006 with imposition of fine of Rs.900/-. Case at Sl.No.2 (CC 329/2008) has been dropped on 10.12.2010. Case at Sl.Nos.3 & 4 (CC No.20/2010 & 550/2010) have ended in acquittal. This left the District Magistrate with only four cases at Sl.Nos.10, 11, 12 & 13 for consideration. Consequently, the foundation of the respondents case that the detention was ordered based on consideration of 13 cases is rendered far too fragile to bear the ponderous weight of mandatory procedural compliance. Re: Proximity with inclusion of name in the Rowdy Sheet. Admittedly, name of detenue was included in the rowdy sheet in the year 2009. Nearly, six years had elapsed before invoking the impugned action. As per the list of cases, detenue was involved in one case each during 2006, 2007 and 2009. He was involved in two cases in 2013 and four cases in 2014. Except stating that name of the detenu was included in the rowdy sheet, no justifiable reason is forthcoming in the records to support the proximity of the date of arrest with the date of inclusion of name of detenue in the rowdy sheet. Re: Authorisation of detention for a period of 12 months. Government by their order dated 24.9.2015 have authorized continuance of detention for a period of 12 months subject however to renewal once in three months. Re: Authorisation of detention for a period of 12 months. Government by their order dated 24.9.2015 have authorized continuance of detention for a period of 12 months subject however to renewal once in three months. It is mentioned in the order that such authorization is in compliance with the directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. It is no more res integra that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Cherukuri Mani v. Chief Secretary, Government of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 2014 SC 2090 has held as follows: '10. Now the issue for consideration before us is whether the State Government has the power to pass a detention order to detain a person at a stretch for a period of 12 months under the provisions of the Act. 11. To answer the above issue, it is necessary to examine the relevant provisions of the Act. Section 3 of the Act empowers the detention of certain category of persons, as defined under the Act. Apart from conferring of power, the section regulates the manner of passing the orders of detention as well as their duration. It reads thus: Section 3: Power to make orders detaining certain persons : (1) The Government may, if satisfied with respect to any bootlegger, dacoit, drug- offender, goonda, immoral traffic offender or land-grabber that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained. (2) If, having regard to the circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail in any area within the local limits of the jurisdiction of a District Magistrate or a Commissioner of Police, the Government are satisfied that it is necessary so to do, they may, by order in writing direct that during such period as may be specified in the order, such District Magistrate or Commissioner of Police may also, if satisfied as provided in sub- section (1), exercise the powers conferred by the said sub-section: Provided that the period specified in the order made by the Government under this sub-section shall not in the first instance, exceed three months, but the Government may, if satisfied as aforesaid that it is necessary so to do, amend such order to extend such period from time to time by any period not exceeding three months at any one time. (3) When any order is made under the section by an officer mentioned in sub-section (2), he shall forthwith report the fact to the Government together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as in his opinion, have a bearing on the matter, and no such order shall remain in force for more than twelve days after the making thereof, unless, in the meantime, it has been approved by the Government. 12. A reading of the above provisions makes it clear that the State Government, District Magistrate or Commissioner of Police are the authorities, conferred with the power to pass orders of detention. The only difference is that the order of detention passed by the Government would remain in force for a period of three months in the first instance, whereas similar orders passed by the District Magistrate or the Commissioner of Police shall remain in force for an initial period of 12 days. The continuance of detention beyond 12 days would depend upon the approval to be accorded by the Government in this regard. Sub-section (3) makes this aspect very clear. Section 13 of the Act mandates that the maximum period of detention under the Act is 12 months. 13. Proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 3 is very clear in its purport, as to the operation of the order of detention from time to time. An order of detention would in the first instance be in force for a period of three months. The Government alone is conferred with the power to extend the period, beyond three months. Such extension, however, cannot be for a period, not exceeding three months, at a time. It means that, if the Government intends to detain an individual under the Act for the maximum period of 12 months, there must be an initial order of detention for a period of three months, and at least, three orders of extension for a period not exceeding three months each. The expression ' extend such period from time to time by any period not exceeding three months at any one time' assumes significance in this regard.' In the light of above authoritative pronouncement, an order akin to G.O. dated 24.9.2015 authorizing detention for a period of 12 months would be unsustainable in law. 12. The expression ' extend such period from time to time by any period not exceeding three months at any one time' assumes significance in this regard.' In the light of above authoritative pronouncement, an order akin to G.O. dated 24.9.2015 authorizing detention for a period of 12 months would be unsustainable in law. 12. This is a habeas corpus writ petition filed invoking extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Preventive detention is an exception to exercising power of detention by the police or by Government exercising its police powers in cases after commission of an offence. 13. Above discussion leads us to an irrefutable inference that the detaining authority has drafted grounds of detention in a very casual manner and without application of mind. Further, the G.O. dated 24.9.2015 authorizing detention for a period of 12 months by stating that the same is in accordance with the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, is, in our considered view, virtually in violation of the directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court contained in Cherukuri Mani, AIR 2014 SC 2090 supra. 14. The power of preventive detention is an extraordinary power to be utilised against such criminals who have a 'high propensity’ to indulge in activities prejudicial to the 'public order’ or 'public safety’. This power is in contrast to the power of police to detain an accused alleged with commission of offences. Since the exercise of power of preventive detention is based on subjective satisfaction of detaining authority on objective consideration of material on record, the authorities vested with the said power are required to exercise the same with great restraint and use the power with utmost care and caution. Time and again, the Hon’ble Supreme Court and High Courts have quashed orders of detention in various cases on technical grounds. It is well settled that when a rule is issued, it is incumbent on the detaining authority to satisfy the court that the detention of the petitioner is legal and in conformity with the mandatory provisions of the law authorising such detention. (See : Icchu Devi Choraria v. Union of India, (1980) 4 SCC 531 at page 537) : ( AIR 1980 SC 1983 ). (See : Icchu Devi Choraria v. Union of India, (1980) 4 SCC 531 at page 537) : ( AIR 1980 SC 1983 ). It may also be useful to extract the following passages from the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu, reported in (2011) 5 SCC 244 : (AIR 2011 SC (Supp) 856), wherein it is held as under: '29. Preventive detention is, by nature, repugnant to democratic ideas and an anathema to the rule of law. No such law exists in the USA and in England (except during war time). Since, however, Article 22(3)(b) of the Constitution of India permits preventive detention, we cannot hold it illegal but we must confine the power of preventive detention within very narrow limits, otherwise we will be taking away the great right to liberty guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India which was won after long, arduous and historic struggles. It follows, therefore, that if the ordinary law of the land (the Penal Code and other penal statutes) can deal with a situation, recourse to a preventive detention law will be illegal. 36. It has been held that the history of liberty is the history of procedural safeguards. (See Kamleshkumar Ishwardas Patel v. Union of India [ (1995) 4 SCC 51 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 643] vide para 49.) These procedural safeguards are required to be zealously watched and enforced by the court and their rigour cannot be allowed to be diluted on the basis of the nature of the alleged activities of the detenu. As observed in Rattan Singh v. State of Punjab [ (1981) 4 SCC 481 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 853] : (SCC p. 483, para 4) : ( AIR 1982 SC 1 , P. 2, Para 4) '4. … May be that the detenu is a smuggler whose tribe (and how their numbers increase!) deserves no sympathy since its activities have paralysed the Indian economy. But the laws of preventive detention afford only a modicum of safeguards to persons detained under them, and if freedom and liberty are to have any meaning in our democratic set up, it is essential that at least those safeguards are not denied to the detenus.' 37. But the laws of preventive detention afford only a modicum of safeguards to persons detained under them, and if freedom and liberty are to have any meaning in our democratic set up, it is essential that at least those safeguards are not denied to the detenus.' 37. As observed in Abdul Latif Abdul Wahab Sheikh v. B.K. Jha [ (1987) 2 SCC 22 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 244] vide SCC para 5: (SCC p. 27) : (AIR 1987 SC 715, P. 728. Para 5) '5. … The procedural requirements are the only safeguards available to a detenu since the court is not expected to go behind the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. The procedural requirements are, therefore, to be strictly complied with if any value is to be attached to the liberty of the subject and the constitutional rights guaranteed to him in that regard.' As observed by Mr Justice Douglas of the United States Supreme Court in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath [95 L Ed 817 : 341 US 123 (1950)] : (US p. 179) '… It is procedure that spells much of the difference between rule [of] law and rule [of] whim or caprice. Steadfast adherence to strict procedural safeguards [are the main assurances] that there will be equal justice under law.' 38. Procedural rights are not based on sentimental concerns for the detenu. The procedural safeguards are not devised to coddle criminals or provide technical loopholes through which dangerous persons escape the consequences of their acts. They are basically society’s assurances that the authorities will behave properly within rules distilled from long centuries of concrete experiences. 39. Personal liberty protected under Article 21 is so sacrosanct and so high in the scale of constitutional values that it is the obligation of the detaining authority to show that the impugned detention meticulously accords with the procedure established by law. The stringency and concern of judicial vigilance that is needed was aptly described in the following words in Thomas Pelham Dale case [(1881) 6 QBD 376 (CA)] : (QBD p. 461)' 'Then comes the question upon the habeas corpus. The stringency and concern of judicial vigilance that is needed was aptly described in the following words in Thomas Pelham Dale case [(1881) 6 QBD 376 (CA)] : (QBD p. 461)' 'Then comes the question upon the habeas corpus. It is a general rule, which has always been acted upon by the courts of England, that if any person procures the imprisonment of another he must take care to do so by steps, all of which are entirely regular, and that if he fails to follow every step in the process with extreme regularity the court will not allow the imprisonment to continue.' 15. On careful consideration of the facts of instant case in the light of pronouncements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, we hold that there was no proper application of mind while recording the grounds of detention. Consequently, the order of detention dated 14.8.2015 by the detaining authority stood vitiated. Further, G.O. dated 24.9.2015 by the State Government directing continuance of detention for a period of 12 months subject to renewal once in three months is contrary to the pronouncement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Cherukuri Mani, AIR 2014 SC 2090. Therefore, both orders are unsustainable in law and are liable to be set aside. 16. Before parting with the case, we deem it appropriate to observe that, this is third consecutive writ petition in which we are quashing the orders of detention purely on the ground of non-compliance of procedural requirements within a short span of time. In the circumstances, we deem it appropriate to direct the respondents to be extremely careful while passing orders of detention as it touches upon the valuable right to freedom of a detenu guaranteed under the Constitution of India. Protection of Constitutional rights of detenu are of paramount importance to the Courts, and we express our deep concern with the casual manner in which the detaining authority and the Government have been dealing with the case. Accordingly, we direct marking a copy of this order to the Chief Secretary, Government of Karnataka for strict compliance of provisions of Preventive detention laws as also the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and this Court in future. 17. In the result, the petition is allowed. Accordingly, we direct marking a copy of this order to the Chief Secretary, Government of Karnataka for strict compliance of provisions of Preventive detention laws as also the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and this Court in future. 17. In the result, the petition is allowed. Detention order No.DC/POL/G.ACT/CR: 02/2015-16 dated 14.8.2015 (Annexure-A) passed by the District Magistrate, Belgavi & the detaining authority; G.O.No: HD 417 SST 2015 dated 21.08.2015 (Annexure-C) and G.O.No.HD 417 SST 2015 dated 24.9.2015 (Annexure-E) passed by the State Government are quashed. Respondents are directed to set the detenu at liberty forthwith, if he is not required in any other case. Operative portion of this order be communicated to the detaining authority forthwith. Registry is directed to send a copy of this order to the Chief Secretary, Government of Karnataka, for compliance. Petition allowed.