JUDGMENT Anil Kumar, J. Heard Sri V.K. Singh, learned counsel for petitioners, Sri Vinay Bhushan, learned Additional Chief Standing counsel on behalf of O.P.No. 1 as well as Sri Azad Khan, learned counsel appearing on behalf of O.P.No. 2 and perused the record. 2. Sri Vinay Bhushan, learned Additional Chief Standing counsel on behalf of O.P.No. 1 as well as Sri Azad Khan, learned counsel appearing on behalf of O.P.No. 2 have raised a preliminary objection that the petitioner has challenged the order dated 17.02.2007 passed by Dy. Director of Consolidation, Barabanki in Case No. 139 (State Vs. Gaonsabha) under Section 48 of C.H. Act by filing present writ petition, without giving any satisfactory explanation in regard to delay and laches, hence the present writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay. 3. Sri V.K. Singh, learned counsel for petitioners while rebutting the said contention submits that in view of the facts stated in paragraph No. 12 of the writ petition, there is no delay in filing the present writ petition and keeping in view the said facts, the writ petition may be heard and decided on merit. I have learned counsel for parties and perused the record. 4. As per undisputed facts of the present case that by means of the instant case the petitioner has challenged the order dated 17.02.2007 passed by Dy. Director of Consolidation, Barabanki and in regard to delay explanation has been given in para No. 12 which reads as under: - "That the petitioners had no knowledge abut the reference but when the Gaonsabha has creating hindrance, then the petitioners came to know about the order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation." Thus, taking into consideration the averment as made in paragraph No. 12 of the writ petition as well as the law as laid down by Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of B. Madhuri Goud vs. B. Damodar Reddy (2012) 12 SCC 693, the relevant portion quoted herein below : - "The learned Single Judge of the High Court accepted the respondent's explanation and condoned the delay by observing that there were some laches on the part of the counsel but the respondent cannot be penalised for the same. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. The Limitation Act, 1963 has not been enacted with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they approach the court for vindication of their rights without unreasonable delay. The idea underlying the concept of limitation is that every remedy should remain alive only till the expiry of the period fixed by the legislature. At the same time, the courts are empowered to condone the delay provided that sufficient cause is shown by the applicant for not availing the remedy within the prescribed period of limitation. The expression "sufficient cause" used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and other statutes is elastic enough to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which serves the ends of justice. No hard-and-fast rule has been or can be laid down for deciding the applications for condonation of delay but over the years courts have repeatedly observed that a liberal approach needs to be adopted in such matters so that substantive rights of the parties are not defeated only on the ground of delay. " 5. In Collector (LA) v. Katiji (1987) 2 SCC 107 this Court made a departure from the earlier judgments in which strict interpretation was placed on the expression "sufficient cause" and observed : "3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The expression 'sufficient cause' employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice-that being the life-purpose for the existence of the instruction of courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realised that : 1.Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2.Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realised that : 1.Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2.Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decide4d on merits after hearing the parties. 3.Every day's delay must be explained' does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay ? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4.When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5.There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6.It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the 'State' which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step-motherly treatment when the 'State' is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression 'sufficient cause'. So also the same approach has to be evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the end in view to do even-handed justice on merits in preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits." 6. In N. Balakrishan v. M. Krishnamurthy 4 (1998) 7 SCC 123 on which reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the respondent, this Court observed : "9. It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the Court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdicition, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammelled by the conclusion of the lower court. * * * * * 11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. * * * * * 11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis litium ( it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time." 7. In P. K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala (1997) 7 SCC 556 this Court reversed the order passed by the High Court for condonation of 565 days' delay in filing of an appeal by the State against the decree passed by the subordinate court and observed : "6. Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds." In Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. Of Brihan Mumbai (2012) 5 SCC 157 this Court referred to some of the judicial precedents and observed : "23. Of Brihan Mumbai (2012) 5 SCC 157 this Court referred to some of the judicial precedents and observed : "23. What needs to be emphasised is that even though a liberal and justice-oriented approach is required to be adopted in the exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other similar statutes, the courts can neither become oblivious of the fact that the successful litigant has acquired certain rights on the basis of the judgment under challenge and a lot of time is consumed at various stages of litigation apart from the cost. 24. What colour the expression 'sufficient cause' would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay." 8. I am of the considered opinion that on the basis of the averment as made in paragraph No. 12 of the writ petition, no sufficient ground or reasons has made out by the petitioner to condone the delay in order to enable the petitioner to approach this Court by filing writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India at a belated stage thereby challenging the order 17.02.2007 passed by Dy. Director of Consolidation, Barabanki. Thus, the writ petition is dismissed on the ground of delay.