JUDGMENT 1. The substantial questions of law formulated and to be answered in this second appeal preferred by defendants are as under:- (i) Whether both the Courts below were justified in holding that the 5th Additional District Judge, Raipur has partially remanded the case vide judgment and decree dated 25.6.1998? (ii) Whether while deciding Civil Appeal No. 21-A/96 both the courts below were required to give finding on all issues framed for decision of the suit? 2. The imperative facts required for determination of above-stated substantial questions of law are as under:- [For the sake of convenience, the parties would be referred hereinafter as per their status shown in the suit before the trial Court] (2.1) Plaintiff No. 1 to 5/Respondent No. 1 to 5 filed a civil suit against the defendant No. 1 & 2/appellants herein seeking relief of declaration, injunction and for damages in respect of the agricultural land bearing Khasra No. 582/2, area 0.162 hectare situated at Telibandha, Raipur (hereinafter referred to as the subject suit property) stating inter alia that they are owner and title holder of the subject suit property and the alleged sale deed executed by Vimal and Radheshyam in favour of the defendants on 28.12.1985 and 12.12.1985 in respect of the subject suit property are not binding upon them and as such, they are entitled for relief claimed in the suit. (2.2) Defendants/appellants herein resisted the suit, filed by the plaintiffs/respondents stating inter alia that the subject suit property was originally belonged to late Bhagirathi, husband of plaintiff No. 1 and father of plaintiffs No. 2 to 5 and he executed the sale-deed in favour of one Jagdish Lavtare on 7.12.1964 and thereafter, Jagdish Prasad Lavtare sold the part of the subject suit property to one Vimal Chand vide sale deed dated 28.12.1970 and the remaining part of the land was sold to one Radheshyam Agrawal on 28.12.1970 and in turn, lastly the Vimal Chand and Radheshyam sold the subject suit property vide registered sale deed dated 28.12.1985 (Ex. D-1) 12.12.1985 (Ex.D-2) to the present defendants and in pursuance of the said registered sale-deeds, the defendants, appellants herein became the owner and title holder of the subject suit property and, as such, the suit deserves to be dismissed. 3. D-1) 12.12.1985 (Ex.D-2) to the present defendants and in pursuance of the said registered sale-deeds, the defendants, appellants herein became the owner and title holder of the subject suit property and, as such, the suit deserves to be dismissed. 3. The Trial Court, upon appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the parties, by its judgment and decree dated 31.7.1996, while deciding all the ten issues in favour of plaintiffs held that the plaintiffs are the owner and title holder of the subject suit property as the defendants have failed to prove the execution of the sale-deed by late Bhagirathi in favour of Jagdish Lavtare dated 7.12.1964 and the defendants further failed to prove the execution of sale-deeds, in their favour by Vimal Chand and Radheshyam vide Ex.D-1 & Ex.D-2. 4. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and decree of the trial Court, defendants/appellants herein preferred first appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure before the first appellate court. During pendency of the appeal, application under Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure for amendment in the written statement was filed, which came to be rejected by the first appellate Court on 10.10.1997 and the matter was heard finally and in the meanwhile order dated 10.10.1997 was challenged by the defendants in Civil Revision No. 2036 of 1997 before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. 5. The High Court of Madhya Pradesh allowed the revision, so filed by defendants and directed the First Appellate Court to decide the application for amendment at the time of hearing the appeal on merits. 6. The first appellate Court, by its judgment and decree dated 25.6.1998 affirmed the finding of the trial Court on all the issues holding it in accordance with law, however, the first appellate Court, in view of the order of High Court of Madhya Pradesh allowed the application for amendment and remanded the matter to the trial Court with a direction to the trial Court to frame issue on the contents of the application for amendment and record the evidence of the parties and decide the matter on merits. 7. The trial Court, after order of remand passed by the appellate Court, framed issue No. 11-B and allowed the parties to lead their evidence on the said issue. Defendants/ appellants commenced their evidence on 20.9.1999 and closed the same on 23.3.2000. 7. The trial Court, after order of remand passed by the appellate Court, framed issue No. 11-B and allowed the parties to lead their evidence on the said issue. Defendants/ appellants commenced their evidence on 20.9.1999 and closed the same on 23.3.2000. 8. The trial Court, by its judgment dated 11.4.2000 held that it is a case of partial (limited) remand and decided issue No. 11-B so framed subsequently on merits pursuant to the order of remand and answered the issue No. 11-B in paragraph 28, 29 & 30 in its judgment and decree. 9. Again the appellants/defendants preferred first appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure before the First Appellate Court. The First Appellate Court dismissed the appeal holding inter alia that it is a case of partial remand and finding no illegality in the judgment and decree passed by the trial court, declined to interfere with the judgment and decree passed by the trial court. 10. Questioning the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate court, this second appeal has been filed in which two substantial questions of law have been framed by this Court on 10.1.2013, which has been set-out in the opening paragraph of this judgment. 11. Shri B.P. Sharma, learned counsel for the appellants/defendants, while supporting, the substantial questions of law so framed would submit as under:- (i) That the remand made by first appellate court pursuant to the order of High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Civil Revision No. 2036 of 1997 was a wholesale remand directing the trial Court to record evidence of all the issues and to decide the suit on merits and, as such, the trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court fell in grave legal error in holding that it is a case of partial/limited remand and therefore, other issues apart from issue No. 11-B was required to be addressed by both the courts below afresh and they have committed an illegality by not answering all the issues afresh. (ii) All the issues framed by the trial Court as well as by first appellate Court were required to be addressed in the light of amendment incorporated as amendment would relate back to the date of institution of suit. (ii) All the issues framed by the trial Court as well as by first appellate Court were required to be addressed in the light of amendment incorporated as amendment would relate back to the date of institution of suit. (iii) The additional substantial question of law is required to be framed as the sale deed is a public document and its production is sufficient to prove the contents of the said document relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in case of Madamanchi Ramappa and Another vs. Muthalur Bojjappa, AIR 1963 SC 1633 . 12. On the other hand, Shri Y.C. Sharma, learned counsel appearing for respondents No. 1 to 5/defendant No. 1 to 5, while supporting the judgment and decree of the first appellate Court, would submit that concurrent finding recorded by two courts below that it was a partial remand and not a wholesale remand made by the first appellate court is concurrent finding recorded by two courts below, based on material available on record, and only additional issue was required to be answered which has rightly been answered by trial court, duly affirmed by the First Appellate Court as such substantial questions of law framed by this Court deserves to be answered in negative and second appeal deserves to be dismissed. 13. Per contra, Shri Manoj Paranjpe, learned counsel appearing for newly added respondent No. 6 would submit that the first appellate court after affirming the finding of the trial Court on all the issues, consciously in view of the order of High Court of Madhya Pradesh allowed the application for amendment in the written statement filed by the defendants/appellants herein and directed the trial Court to frame issue to the extent amendment incorporated in the written statement and further directed to take evidence of the parties on the amendment so granted and then decide the matter on merits. He would further submit that it is not a case of wholesale remand under Order 41 Rule 23-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, but it was a limited/partial remand, which has concurrently been held by both the courts below as the first appellate court has not reversed finding recorded on all the issues by the trial Court on merits. He would further submit that it is not a case of wholesale remand under Order 41 Rule 23-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, but it was a limited/partial remand, which has concurrently been held by both the courts below as the first appellate court has not reversed finding recorded on all the issues by the trial Court on merits. He would further submit, it is well settled law that unless finding of the trial Court on all the issues are reversed and retrial is considered necessary, no order of wholesale remand can be directed to be made and, as such, it was only out and out partial/limited remand, which has rightly been recorded concurrently by the two courts below, which warrants no interference and the substantial question framed by this Court deserves to be answered in negative. He would lastly also submit that the court trying suit on remand, cannot act contrary to the superior court direction as that court is bound by the direction issued by the superior court. He would lastly submit that no additional substantial question of law is required to be framed as appellant/defendant has neither framed any other substantial question of law in the memorandum of appeal under Section 100(3) of Code of Civil Procedure, nor pressed any other substantial question of law at the time of admission of this appeal. 14. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and given thoughtful consideration to the submissions made therein and also gone through the original records of the trial Court as well as the first appellate Court with utmost circumspection. 15. In order to decide the substantial questions of law formulated and set-out in the opening paragraph of this judgment, it would be appropriate to notice few facts emerging out on the face of record, which are as under:- (i) The trial Court in the first round of litigation, while deciding all the issues, decreed the suit holding that plaintiffs are owner and title holder of the subject suit property as the defendants have failed to prove the execution of the sale-deed by late Bhagirathi in favour of Jagdish Lavtare dated 7.12.1964 and the defendants further failed to prove the execution of sale-deeds executed in their favour by Vimal Chand and Radheshyam vide Ex.D-1 & Ex.D-2. (ii) On appeal being preferred by the defendants, first appellate Court affirmed the finding of the trial Court on all the issues, however, granting amendment in favour of the defendants in paragraph seven of its judgment, directed the trial Court to frame an issue on the said amendment and record evidence of the parties and to decide the same on merits by judgment and decree dated 25.6.1998. The application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC was decided by separate order which states as under:- 25-6-1998 vihykFkhZ }kjk Jh Mh-ds- egksfc;k] izR;FkhZx.k }kjk Jh Hkrigjh] vf/koDrk vihy fu.kZ; i`Fkd ls i`”Bksa ij ikfjr dj gLrk{kfjr o fnukafdr dj [kqys U;k;ky; esa mn~?kksf”kr fd;k x;kA fu.kZ;kuqlkj iqujh{k.k ;kfpdk esa ikfjr vkns’kkuqlkj vihykFkhZ dk vkns’k 6 fu;e 17 lh-ih-lh- dk vkosnu i= Lohdkj fd;k tkdj] la’kks/ku ds vkyksd esa izdj.k bl funsZ’k ds lkFk fjek.M fd;k tkrk gS fd izdj.k esa fof/kor la’kks/ku djkdj foi{k dks la’kks/ku dk volj fn;k tkdj] vko’;drk vuqlkj okn iz’u fufeZr fd;k tkosA fof/kor mHk; i{k dh lk{; yh tkdj izdj.k dk xq.k&nks”kksa ij fujkdj.k fd;k tkosA rn~uqlkj t;i= fufeZr gksA vihy ds fu.kZ; dh izfrfyfi] la’kks/ku vkosnu i= lfgr fuEu U;k;ky; dk vfHkys[k fof/kor~ lwpukFkZ ,oa vko’;d dk;Zokgh gsrq fuEu U;k;ky; dks Hkstk tkosA mHk; i{k fuEu U;k;ky; ds le{k fnukad 1-7-1998 dks vkxkeh dk;Zokgh gsrq mifLFkr gksaxsA vfHkHkk”kd ‘kqYd fu;ekuqlkj izekf.kr gksus dk;Zdze vuqlkj tks Hkh xzkg~; gks] ns; gksA vihy izdj.k lekIr gks ifj.kke vafdr gksA izdj.k uEcj ls fujLr dj nk-fj- fd;k tkosA lgh@& 25-6-1998 ia-v-ft- U;k- (iii) In compliance of the above-stated order, the trial Court framed additional issue No. 11-B and the defendants adduced evidence on the said issue and thereafter, the trial Court answered the said issue against the defendants and in favour of the plaintiff and held in paragraph seven as under:- ^^7- bl okn ds laca/k esa ;g mYys[kuh; gS fd bl okn esa U;k;ky; ds iwoZ ihBklhu vf/kdkjh] Jhefr vkf’krk JhokLro us fnukad 31-7-1996 dks fu.kZ; ifjnr ij oknh ds i{k esa okn vkKIr fd;k FkkA ftlds fo:} izfroknh dz- ,d o nks us flfoy vihy dz- 21&v@96 ekuuh; iape vij ftyk U;k;k/kh’k egksn;k us vius fu.kZ; dh dafMdk 16 esa ;g O;Dr fd;k gS fd fo}ku fuEu U;k;ky; ds vfHkys[k esa vk;s lk{; ds vk/kkj ij tks fu”d”kZ fudkyk gS] og =qfViw.kZ gksuk ugha ik;k tkrk gS] ,slh fLFkfr esa vihy Lohdkj fd;s tkus ;ksX; ugha jgrh gSA bl izdkj ekuuh; iape vij ftyk U;k;k/kh’k egksn;k us flfoy vihy dz- 21&v@96 esa fu.kZ; fnukad 25-6-1998 dks bl U;k;ky; ds iwoZ ihBklhu vf/kdkjh }kjk ifnr fu.kZ; fnukad 31-7-1996 dh iqf”V dh gSA ekuuh; iape vij ftyk U;k;k/kh’k egksn;k] jk;iqj us bl U;k;ky; ds iwoZ ihBklhu vf/kdkjh }kjk ikfjr fu.kZ; dh iqf”V djrs gq, vius fu.kZ; dh dafMdk 17 esa ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; ds le{k izLrqr iqujh{k.k ;kfpdk dz- 2036@1997 esa fn;s x;s funs’kksZ ds vuqlkj izfroknhx.k }kjk izLrqr la’kks/ku vkosnu varxZr vkns’k 6 fu;e 17 O;ogkj izfdz;k lafgrk dk vkosnu Lohdkj dj bl izdj.k dks bl funsZ’k ds lkFk izfrizsf”kr fd;k gS fd fuEu U;k;ky; fof/kor~ la’kks/ku djkdj foi{k dks la’kks/ku dk volj fn;k tkdj vko’;drkuqlkj okniz’u fufeZr fd;k tkos rFkk fof/kor~ mHk;i{k dh lk{; yh tkdj izdj.k dk xq.k&nks”kksa ds vk/kkj ij fujkdj.k fd;k tkos rc ;g izdj.k iqu% ;g U;k;ky; esa izLrqr gqvkA ekuuh; iape vij ftyk U;k;k/kh’k egksn;k us bl U;k;ky; ds ?kks”k okn fo”k;ksa ij fn;s x;s fu”d”kZ dh iqf”V dh gSA vr% bl U;k;ky; dks ekuuh; iape vij ftyk U;k;k/kh’k egksn; ds fu.kZ; vuqlkj dsoy okn fo”k; dz- 11c laca/k esa vk;s lk{; dk foospu djuk gSA vr% ‘ks”k okn fo”k;ksa ij bl U;k;ky; ds iwoZ ihBklhu vf/kdkjh ds mHk;i{k ds lk{; dh tks foospuk dh gS mls tSlk dk rSlk bl fu.kZ; esa vfHkfyf[kr fd;k tk jgk gSA** (iv) In the appeal preferred by the defendants, the first appellate Court clearly held that it was partial/limited remand made to the trial Court, consequent to grant of amendment and all the issues were not required to be addressed and answered afresh as it was partial (limited) remand. 16. The substantial questions of law framed and to be answered by this Court in view of the aforesaid facts would be whether the trial Court as well as first appellate Court are justified in holding that it is a case of partial remand and not a wholesale remand. 17. Order 41 of CPC provides for appeals from original decrees. The Code empowers the Appellate Court to order remand in three situations. These three situations are covered by Order 41 Rule 23, Order 41 Rule 23-A and Order 41 Rule 25 of CPC, which read as under:- "23. Remand of case by appellate Court – Where the court from whose decree an appeal is preferred has disposed of the suit upon a preliminary point and the decree is reversed in appeal, the appellate court may if it thinks fit, by order remand the case, and may further direct what issue or issues shall be tried in the case so remanded and shall send a copy of its judgment and order to the court from whose decree the appeal is preferred, with directions to readmit the suit under its original number in the register of civil suits, and proceed to determine the suit and the evidence (if any) recorded during the original trial shall, subject to all just exceptions, be evidence during the trial after remand. 23-A. Remand in other cases – Where the court from whose decree an appeal is preferred has disposed of the case otherwise than on preliminary point and the decree is reversed in appeal and a retrial is considered necessary, the appellate court shall have the same powers as it has under Rule 23. 25. 23-A. Remand in other cases – Where the court from whose decree an appeal is preferred has disposed of the case otherwise than on preliminary point and the decree is reversed in appeal and a retrial is considered necessary, the appellate court shall have the same powers as it has under Rule 23. 25. Whether appellate court may frame issues and refer them for trial to court whose decree appealed from – Where the court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has omitted to frame or try any issue, or to determine any question of fact, which appears to the appellate court essential to the right decision of the suit upon the merits, the appellate court may, if necessary, frame issues, and refer the same for trial to the court from whose decree the appeal is preferred and in such case shall direct such court to take the additional evidence required and such court shall proceed to try such issues and shall return the evidence to the appellate court together with its findings thereon and the reasons therefor within such time as may be fixed by the appellate court or extended by it from time to time." 18. Order 41 Rule 23 of CPC is invocable by the Appellate Court where the appeal has arisen from the decree passed on a preliminary point in other words, where the entire suit has been disposed of by the trial court on a preliminary point and such decree is reversed in appeal and the Appellate Court thinks proper to remand the case for fresh disposal. While doing so, the Appellate Court may issue further direction for trial of certain issues. 19. Order 41 Rule 23-A of CPC has been inserted in the Code by Act 104 of 1976 w.e.f. 1.2.1977. According to Order 41 Rule 23-A of CPC, the Appellate Court may remand the suit to the trial Court even though such suit has been disposed of on merits. It provides that where the trial court has disposed of the suit on merits and the decree is reversed in appeal and the Appellate Court considers that retrial is necessary, the Appellate Court may remand the suit to the trial Court. Thus, on twin conditions being satisfied, the Appellate Court can exercise the same power of remand under Order 41 Rule 23-A of CPC. 20. Thus, on twin conditions being satisfied, the Appellate Court can exercise the same power of remand under Order 41 Rule 23-A of CPC. 20. So far as Order 41 Rule 25 of CPC is concerned, the Appellate Court continues to be in seisin of the matter, it calls upon the trial Court to record the finding on some issue or issues and to send that finding to the Appellate Court. The power under Order 41 Rule 25 is invoked by the Appellate Court, where it holds that the trial Court which passed the decree omitted to frame or try any issue or determine any question of fact essential to decide the matter finally. The Appellate Court, while remitting some issue or issues, may direct the trial Court to take additional evidence on such issues. 21. In a decision in P. Purushottam Reddy and Another vs. Pratap Steels Limited, (2002) 2 SCC 686 , the Supreme Court has held that unless the decree in appeal is reversed by the First Appellate Court and retrial is considered necessary wholesale remand cannot be made by the First Appellate Court. It has been held as under:- "10. The next question to be examined is the legality and propriety of the order of remand made by the High Court. Prior to the insertion of Rule 23A in Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure by CPC Amendment Act 1976, there were only two provisions contemplating remand by a court of appeal in Order 41 of CPC. Rule 23 applies when the trial court disposes of the entire suit by recording its findings on a preliminary issue without deciding other issues and the finding on preliminary issue is reversed in appeal. Rule 25 applies when the appellate court notices an omission on the part of the trial court to frame or try any issue or to determine any question of fact which in the opinion of the appellate court was essential to the right decision of the suit upon the merits. However, the remand contemplated by Rule 25 is a limited remand in as much as the subordinate court can try only such issues as are referred to it for trial and having done so the evidence recorded together with findings and reasons therefore of the trial court, are required to be returned to the appellate court. However, the remand contemplated by Rule 25 is a limited remand in as much as the subordinate court can try only such issues as are referred to it for trial and having done so the evidence recorded together with findings and reasons therefore of the trial court, are required to be returned to the appellate court. However, still it was a settled position of law before 1976 Amendment that the court, in an appropriate case could exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 151 of the CPC to order a remand. It such a remand was considered pre-eminently necessary ex debito justitiae, though not covered by any specific provision of Order 11 of the CPC. In cases where additional evidence is required to be taken in the event of anyone of the clause of Sub-rule (1) of Rule 27 being attracted such additional evidence oral or documentary, is allowed to be produced either before the appellate court itself or by directing any court subordinate to the appellate court to receive such evidence and send it to the appellate court. In 1976, Rule 23A has been inserted in Order 41 which provides for a remand by an appellate court hearing an appeal against a decree if (i) the trial court disposed of the case otherwise than on a preliminary point and (ii) the decree is reversed in appeal and a retrial is considered necessary. On twin conditions being satisfied, the appellate court can exercise the same power of remand under Rule 23A as it is under Rule 23. After the amendment all the cases of wholesale remand are covered by Rule 23 and 23A. In view of the express provisions of these rules, the High Court cannot have recourse to its inherent powers to make a remand because as held in Mahendra vs. Sushila, AIR 1965 SC 365, it is well settled that inherent powers can be availed of ex debito justitiae only in the absence of express provisions in the Code. It is only in exceptional cases where the court may now exercise the power of remand de hors the Rules 23 and 23A. It is only in exceptional cases where the court may now exercise the power of remand de hors the Rules 23 and 23A. To wit the superior court, if it finds that the judgment under appeal has not disposed of the case satisfactorily in the manner required by Order 20 Rule 3 or Order 11 Rule 31 of the CPC and hence it is no judgment in the eye of law, it may set aside the same and send the matter back for re-writing the judgment so as to protect valuable rights of the parties. An appellate court should be circumspect in ordering a remand when the case is not covered either by Rule 23 or Rule 23A or Rule 25 of the CPC. An unwarranted order of remand gives the litigation an undeserved lease of life and therefore must be avoided. 11. In the case at hand, the trial court did not dispose of the suit upon a preliminary point. The suit was decided by recording findings on all the issues. By its appellate judgment under appeal herein, the High Court has recorded its finding on some of the issues, not preliminary and then framed three additional issues leaving them to be tried and decided by the trial Court. It is not a case where a retrial is considered necessary. Neither Rule 23 nor Rule 23-A of Order 41 applies. None of the conditions contemplated by Rule 27 exists so as to justify production of additional evidence by either party under that Rule. The validity of remand has to be tested by reference to Rule 25. So far as the objection as to maintainability of the suit for failure of the plaint to satisfy the requirement of Forms 47 and 48 of Appendix-A CPC is concerned, the High Court has itself found that there was no specific plea taken in the written statement. The question of framing an issue did not, purely as a question of law which, in their submission, strikes at the very root filed and so the plea was permitted to urged. The question of framing an issue did not, purely as a question of law which, in their submission, strikes at the very root filed and so the plea was permitted to urged. So far as the plea as to readiness and willingness by reference to clause (c) of Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 is concerned, the pleadings are there as they were neither any of the parties made a prayer for amendment in the pleadings nor has the High Court allowed such a liberty. It is true that a specific issue was very much alive to the issue whether Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act was complied with or not and the contentions advanced by the parties in this regard were also adjudicated upon. The High Court was to examine whether such finding of the trial court was sustainable or not in law and on facts. Even otherwise the question could have been gone into by the High Court and a finding could have been recorded on the available material in as much as the High Court being the court of first appeal, all the questions of fact and law arising in the case were open before it for consideration and decision." 22. In a decision in Municipal Corporation, Hyderabad vs. Sunder Singh, JT 2008 (7) SC 247, the Supreme Court, while considering the scope of Order 41 Rule 23, has held that the Court should be loathe to exercise its power under Order 41 Rule 23 of CPC and an order of wholesale remand should not be passed routinely. It was held as under:- "11. It is now well settled that before invoking the said provision, the conditions precedent laid down therein must be satisfied. It is further well settled that the Court should loathe to exercise its power in terms of Order XLI Rule 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure and an order of remand should not be passed routinely. It is not to be exercised by the appellate court only because it finds it difficult to deal with the entire matter. If it does not agree with the decision of the trial court, it has to come with a proper finding of its own. The Appellate Court cannot shirk its duties." 23. It is not to be exercised by the appellate court only because it finds it difficult to deal with the entire matter. If it does not agree with the decision of the trial court, it has to come with a proper finding of its own. The Appellate Court cannot shirk its duties." 23. In a decision in Ashwinkumar K. Patel vs. Upendra J. Patel and Others, AIR 1999 SC 1125 , the Supreme Court has held that the Appellate Court should not ordinarily remand a case under Order 41 Rule 23 of CPC, as such, remand orders lead to unnecessary delay and cause prejudice to the parties and Appellate Court should itself consider material available and should decide the appeal one way or other. It was held as under:- "7. In our view, the High Court should not ordinarily remand a case under Order 41, Rule 23, CPC to the lower Court merely because it considered that the reasoning of the lower Court in some respects was wrong. Such remand orders leads to unnecessary delays and cause prejudice to the parties to the case. When the material was available before the High Court, it should have itself decided the appeal one-way or other. It could have considered the various aspects of the case mentioned in the order of the trial Court and considered whether the order of the trial Court ought to be confirmed or reversed or modified. It could have easily considered the documents and affidavits and decided about the prima-facie case on the material available. In matters involving agreements of 1980 (and 1996) on the one hand and an agreement of 1991 on the other, as in this case, such remand orders would lead to further delay and uncertainty. We are, therefore, of the view that the remand by the High Court was not necessary." 24. Now keeping in view the twin requirements of Order 41 Rule 23-A CPC and law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in aforesaid cases i.e. P. Purushottam Reddy, Municipal Corporation, Hyderabad and Ashwinkumar K. Patel (supra), I proceed to examine the question the facts of present case as to whether the remand made by the first appellate Court on 25.6.1998 was wholesale/open remand or it was a partial remand. In the instant case, the trial Court had disposed of the suit on merits by adjudicating and returning finding on all the issues therein and suit was not disposed off on the preliminary issue. 25. A close perusal of the judgment and decree of the first appellate Court would unmistakably show that the first appellate court has considered the finding on all the issues recorded by the trial Court and has affirmed the said finding as recorded by the trial Court finding them in accordance with law. 26. Thereafter, the first appellate Court proceeded to consider the order passed in revision preferred by the appellants/defendants before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Civil Revision No. 2036 of 1997 with reference the application for amendment and granted the said application for amendment in the written statement and in consequence thereof, directed the trial Court to frame issue on the amendment incorporated in the written statement and to record finding on the said issue and dispose of the same on merits. 27. At this stage it would appropriate to refer the amendment incorporated in written statement, additional issue framed. The amendment incorporated in the written statement states as under:- "After death of Bhagirathi, Ceiling Case No. 441-A/90(C)/78-79 is being contested by plaintiff No. 1 knowing full well that the land in question has been sole by late Bhagirathi but the plaintiff did not object the sale of the land which is the subject matter of the suit and she also did not object the resale of the property before the competent authority in the ceiling case. Plaintiffs had played fraud with the Court and mis-leaded the Hon'ble Court by suppressing the material fact. In this count alone the suit filed by plaintiffs is liable to be dismissed." Additional issue framed states as under:- ^^11c & D;k HkkxhjFkh dh e`R;q mijkUr oknh dz- 1 us lhfyax izdj.k 441,@90¼l½@78-79 esa Hkkx ysdj fookfnr Hkwfe ds fodz; dh tkudkjh gksus ij Hkh fodz; ij vkifr ugha fd;k] ;fn gka] rks izHkko\** 28. In this count alone the suit filed by plaintiffs is liable to be dismissed." Additional issue framed states as under:- ^^11c & D;k HkkxhjFkh dh e`R;q mijkUr oknh dz- 1 us lhfyax izdj.k 441,@90¼l½@78-79 esa Hkkx ysdj fookfnr Hkwfe ds fodz; dh tkudkjh gksus ij Hkh fodz; ij vkifr ugha fd;k] ;fn gka] rks izHkko\** 28. Order-sheet recorded by the trial court, on 26.10.1998 states as under:- 26-10-1998 oknhx.k }kjk Hkrigjh vf/koDrk mifLFkrA izfroknhx.k }kjk Jh egksfc;k vf/koDrkA la’kks/ku ds izdk’k esa vfrfjDr okn&iz’u dz- ¼11½ fufeZr fd;k x;kA mHk; i{k ;fn pkgs rks vU; okn iz’u vkxkeh frfFk ds iwoZ izLrkfor dj ldrs gSA okn iz’u dz- ¼11½ dks lcwr djus dk Hkkj izfroknh ij gS] vr% vkxkeh frfFk ij izfroknhx.k mDr okn&iz’u ds lanHkZ esa lk{; izLrqr djsaA izdj.k okn&iz’u dz- 11 izfroknh ds lk{; gsrqA v-rk 15-12-1998 lgh@& 26-10-1998 }kn’k O;ogkj U;k;k/kh’k] oxZ 2] jk;iqj ¼e/; izns’k½ 29. Likewise, the order-sheet recorded by the trial court on 20.9.1999 states as under:- 20-9-1999 oknh }kjk vf/koDrk Jh Hkrigjh mifLFkrA izfroknh }kjk vf/koDrk Jh egksfc;k mifLFkrA izfroknh lk{kh vuqifLFkr gSA izdj.k ekuuh; ftyk U;k;k/kh’k ls vfrfjDr okn fo”k; dz- 11 ds laca/k esa izfrizsf”kr fd;k x;k gSA ftls lkfcr djus dk Hkkj izfroknh ij gSA izfroknh dks lk{; izLrqr djus gsrq 26-10-1998 ls volj fn;k tk jgk gS ijUrq izfroknh }kjk vHkh rd dksbZ lk{kh izLrqr ugha fd;k x;k gSA vkxkeh frfFk esa vko’;d :i ls mifLFkr j[ks mUgsa vU; dksbZ volj ugha fn;k tkosxkA izdj.k vfrfjDr okn&fo”k; dz- 11 ij izfroknh lk{; gsrqA lgh@& jkts’k dqekj JhokLro izFke O;ogkj U;k;k/kh’k] oxZ 2] jk;iqj ¼e/; izns’k½ iqu%’p& blh Lrj ij izfroknh ds vf/koDrk us fuosnu fd;k fd os xokgksa dks lEeu }kjk vkgwr djuk pkgrs gSA vr% mUgsa funsZ’k fn;k x;k fd bl laca/k esa vkosnu dy izLrqr djsaA lgh@& jkts’k dqekj JhokLro izFke O;ogkj U;k;k/kh’k] oxZ 2] jk;iqj ¼e/; izns’k½ 30. Having noticed nature of amendment, issue framed and order-sheet recorded, therein, reverting back to the facts of case it would appear that it is not a case where the suit has been disposed of on preliminary issue and decree is reversed in appeal and retrial is considered necessary. On the other hand, the first appellate Court has specifically dealt with all the findings recorded by the trial Court and affirmed the finding of the trial Court. On the other hand, the first appellate Court has specifically dealt with all the findings recorded by the trial Court and affirmed the finding of the trial Court. Once the findings are affirmed and not reversed in appeal and the retrial is not considered necessary, the First Appellate Court has rightly to the extent of averment made in application for amendment made partial/limited remand to the trial court and, as such, the order of the first appellate Court is in line with principles of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of P. Purushottam Reddy and Another and Municipal Corporation, Hyderabad (supra) that wholesale remand should not be passed ordinarily or routinely made as it has to be made only after decree is reversed in appeal and the retrial is considered necessary, as such in the considered opinion of this Court, it was out and out the partial remand and in case of partial remand, the trial Court trying the suit on remand is bound by the directions given by the superior court and cannot go beyond the superior court's direction. 31. It is well settled that the court to which the case is remanded has to comply with the order of remand and acting contrary to the order of remand is contrary to the law. In identical fact situation, the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in case of Rukhmanand vs. Deenbandh, 1971 JabLJ (SN) 159, has held as under:- "It is settled law that when a suit is remanded for a decision afresh with certain specific directions, the jurisdiction of the trial Court after remand depends upon the terms of the order of remand and the trial Court cannot either consider matters other than those specified in the remand order, or enter into questions falling outside its limit. There was, therefore, no jurisdiction in the learned trial Judge to allow an amendment of the pleadings which was outside the scope of the remand order." 32. There was, therefore, no jurisdiction in the learned trial Judge to allow an amendment of the pleadings which was outside the scope of the remand order." 32. Thus, the trial Court trying the suit on remand is absolutely justified in holding that it was a limited and partial remand to the extent of amendment application granted by the First Appellate Court pursuant to the order passed in the civil revision preferred by the defendants before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh inserting one paragraph in the written statement and pursuant to which additional issue was framed and defendant without any demour or protest led evidence on issue No. 11-B framed subsequent to the order of Appellate Court. Even otherwise holding the remand order dated 25.6.1998 to the wholesale remand is contrary to the scheme and object of Order 41, Rule 23, 23-A CPC and as such, it was partial remand made by the first appellate court, which has rightly been complied with the court trying the suit on remand and the first appellate Court has rightly affirmed the same and accordingly said question is answered against the defendants/appellants and in favour of the respondents/plaintiffs; and it is held on partial remand, both the courts below were not required to give findings all the issues afresh and was only required to return finding on the additional issue so framed. 33. Determination of the aforesaid substantial question of law brings me to the next question urged by Mr. B.P. Sharma, learned counsel for the appellants relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in case of Madamanchi Ramappa (supra) stating inter alia that certified copy of the sale-deed was filed which was executed by Shri Bhagirathi in favour of Jagdish Lavtare and certified copy of the sale deed is admissible in evidence and therefore, it involves one mere substantial question of law and the additional substantial question of law can the framed at the time of final hearing of the appeal relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in case of Union of India vs. Ibrahim Uddin and Another, (2012) 8 SCC 148 . 34. Sections 100 and 101 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 deal with the second appeal and provides as under:- "100. 34. Sections 100 and 101 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 deal with the second appeal and provides as under:- "100. Second appeal – (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any Court subordinate to the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. (2) An appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree passed ex-parte. (3) In an appeal under this section, the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state that substantial question of law involved in the appeal. (4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question. (5) The appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated and the respondent shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such question: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law, not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question. 101. Second appeal on no other grounds – No second appeal shall lie except on the grounds mentioned in section 100." 35. It is well settled law that no second appeal shall lies except on a substantial question of law involved and formulated at the time of admission of appeal under Section 100(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure. In second appeal filed under Section 100 of CPC the appellant is required to precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal under Section 100(3) of CPC and where the court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved, it shall formulate that question and the appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated under Section 100(5) of CPC. Section 101 of CPC clearly states that no second appeal shall lie except on the grounds mentioned in Section 100 of CPC. 36. Section 101 of CPC clearly states that no second appeal shall lie except on the grounds mentioned in Section 100 of CPC. 36. Quite recently in the matter of Balwinder Singh vs. National Fertilizer Limited and Others, (2014) 13 SCC 277, their Lordships of the Supreme Court has clearly and categorically held that the second appellate court has no jurisdiction to admit or decide second appeal without formulating substantial question of law at the initial stage and as such formulation of substantial question of law is sine qua non for exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 of CPC. 37. Guided by the provisions contained in Section 100 of CPC and following the principles of law enunciated by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case Balwinder Singh (supra), if the facts of the present case are examined it would appear that the appellant/ defendant has not incorporated any such substantial question of law in his memorandum of appeal as required under Section 100(3) of CPC nor appears to have raised the such question at the time of admission of appeal before this Court on 10.1.2013. However proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 100 of CPC empowers the second appellate court to frame additional substantial question of law if it is satisfied that such substantial question of law needs to be framed at the time of final hearing as also held by Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Ibrahim Uddin (supra) and it is for the Second Appellate Court to frame additional substantial question of law subject to twin requirement being satisfied that case involves additional substantial question of law and for reasons to be recorded. In the matter of Dharam Singh vs. Karnail Singh and Others, AIR 2009 SC 758 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court, while considering the applicability of sub-section (5) of Section 100 of CPC held pertinently as under:- "13. The plea about proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 100 instead of supporting the stand of the respondent rather goes against them. The proviso is applicable only when any substantial question of law has already been formulated and it empowers the High Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law. The plea about proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 100 instead of supporting the stand of the respondent rather goes against them. The proviso is applicable only when any substantial question of law has already been formulated and it empowers the High Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law. The expression on any other substantial question of law clearly shows that there must be some substantial question of law already formulated and then only another substantial question of law which was not formulated earlier can be taken up by the High Court for reasons to be recorded, if it is of the view that the case involves such question." 38. This Court, after hearing the learned counsel for parties is satisfied and of considered opinion, that no additional substantial question of law arises for determination in the facts of the case as both the courts below have concurrently held that defendants have failed to prove the execution of attestation of sale deed by Bhagirathi in favour of Jagdish Lavtare on 28.12.1970 and the defendants have further failed to prove the execution of the sale-deeds in their favour by Vimal Chand and Radheshyam dated 28.12.1985 vide Ex. D-1 and 12.12.1985 vide Ex. D-2, respectively and findings recorded by two courts below holding that defendants have failed to prove the execution of sale deed by Bhagirathi in favour of Jagdish Lavtare on 7.12.1964 and the defendants have further failed to prove the execution of the sale-deeds in their favour by Vimal Chand and Radheshyam dated 28.12.1985 vide Ex. D-1 and 12.12.1985 vide Ex. D-2 are concurrent finding of fact based on oral and documentary evidence on record and it is neither perverse contrary to the record. Very recently, in the matter of Laxmidevamma and Others vs. Ranganath and Others, (2015) 1 SCALE 489, their Lordships of the Supreme Court has held that concurrent findings of fact should not be upset by this Court unless the findings are shown to be perverse, as such, submission made by learned counsel for appellant to frame additional substantial question of deserves to be rejected and accordingly rejected. 39. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the two substantial questions of law are answered against the appellants/defendants and in favour of the plaintiffs. 39. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the two substantial questions of law are answered against the appellants/defendants and in favour of the plaintiffs. Consequently, the second appeal filed by the appellants/defendants deserves to be and is accordingly dismissed and plaintiffs suit decreed by the trial Court and duly affirmed by the first appellate Court would stand re-affirmed. No order as to costs. 40. A decree be drawn up accordingly.