Hon'ble MEHTA, J.—Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. The instant writ petition has been preferred by the petitioner Dr.Govind Narayan Purohit with the following prayers :- “It is, therefore, most respectfully prayed that by an appropriate, writ order or direction :- (i) rule 31 of the Rules of 1962 as reproduced above and rule 3(k) of the Rules of 1962 be declared as unconstitutional and ultra vires Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. (ii) or in the alternative, the non-petitioner be directed to determine the seniority of the petitioner while taking into consideration his services in pursuance of the order dated 20/22.4.1978 and to assign him appropriate place in the seniority list of lecturers of E.N.T. and to give all consequential benefits; (iii) any other order/relief(s) which may be considered just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case may kindly be passed; (iv) writ petition be allowed with cost.” 3. Since the petitioner had challenged the validity and vires of Rule 31 of the Rajasthan Medical (Collegiate Branch) Rules, 1962 (for short, referred to herein after as 'the Rules of 1962'), the matter was initially placed before the Division Bench but thereafter, during the pendency of the instant writ petition, the validity of an analogous Rule (Rule 31 of the Rajasthan Subordinate Engineering (Building & Roads Branch) Service Rules, 1973) was upheld by the Division Bench in the case of Jagdish Chandra. vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.759/1984) by judgment dated 12.8.1988, whereafter this Court by order dated 4.12.1992 directed the writ petition to be listed before the Single Bench. 4. It is pertinent to mention here that there appears to be a typographical error in the order dated 4.12.1992 wherein it is mentioned that the validity of the Rule was struck down whereas the fact remains that the validity of the Rule was upheld by the Division Bench. 5. Be that as it may, the Single Bench vide order dated 30.7.1996 allowed the writ petition preferred by the petitioner and directed that the respondents shall give continuous seniority to the petitioner from the date of his initial appointment and also grant him all consequential benefits arising thereof, after placing his name at the proper place of seniority in the seniority list. 6. The said judgment was challenged by filing a letters patent appeal. 6. The said judgment was challenged by filing a letters patent appeal. The Division Bench by its order dated 28.5.1997, set aside the aforesaid order and remanded the matter back to the Single Bench for fresh consideration giving liberty to the petitioner to file an amended writ petition after impleading all the persons likely to be affected by the decision of the writ petition as respondents. 7. It appears that while filing writ petition initially, the petitioner did not array as respondents, the persons who were likely to be affected upon the writ petition being allowed and the petitioner being granted seniority from an earlier date. After remand, an amended writ petition was filed by the petitioner impleading seven (7) other persons as respondents, who, as per the petitioner, were likely to be affected upon his prayer, for being placed higher in the seniority list, being accepted. 8. The case as set up in the instant writ petition is that after procuring the M.B.B.S. degree and post graduate specialisation in E.N.T. in the year 1977, the petitioner applied for being appointed as Lecturer upon a vacancy for the post of Lecturer being advertised by the Medical College, Jodhpur. The petitioner was invited for the interview scheduled to be held on 9.3.1978 and was declared successful, after being interviewed by Central Selection Committee, by an order of even date, which has been placed on record as Annex.2. Pur-suant to his selection, the petitioner was issued an appointment letter Annex.3 dated 20/22.4.1978 under Rule 30 of the Rules of 1962. The petitioner claims that he continued to work on the said post without any break in service. 9. In the meantime, Rajasthan Public Service Commission (for short, referred to herein after as 'RPSC') advertised vacancies for the posts of Lecturer E.N.T. vide advertisement no.3/78-79 dated 2.5.1978. The petitioner has admitted in the writ petition that he applied for the post of Lecturer in pursuance of the said advertisement but could not succeed. 10. Again, thereafter, in order to fill up urgent temporary vacancies of Lecturers, names were called from RPSC and in pursuance thereto, the petitioner's name was recommended for being appointed as Lecturer in E.N.T. department vide order dated 11.5.1979 (Annex.7). The order Annex.7 contained a condition to the effect that the candidates would have to appear before the RPSC for regular selection. The order Annex.7 contained a condition to the effect that the candidates would have to appear before the RPSC for regular selection. In the event of not being selected, their services would be terminated. The petitioner further claims that he continued to serve on the post of Lecturer E.N.T. in furtherance of his initial appointment uninterruptedly and without any break. The RPSC again issued an advertisement no.5/79-80 inviting applications for the post of Lecturer of E.N.T. In response thereto, the petitioner also applied and appeared for interview before the RPSC, but could not succeed. He was sent a communication Annex.8 dated 24.5.1980 intimating that his selection was not possible. 11. Thereafter another advertisement no.1/83-84 was issued by the RPSC in the year 1983 for the post of Lecturer (E.N.T.) and this time, the petitioner applied for and was successful. Accordingly, he was issued an appointment letter Annex.10 dated 5/11.10.1983 on the post of Lecturer (E.N.T.) under consultation with the Governor of Rajasthan. He was placed at S.No.2 in the seniority list. 12. The petitioner has approached this Court by way of the instant writ petition claiming that as he continued to serve on the post of Lecturer in pursuance of his initial appointment vide order dated 20/22.4.1978, his temporary services were taken into account for the purposes of confirmation as envisaged in Rule 26 of the Rules of 1962 and he was ultimately confirmed as a Lecturer E.N.T. under Rule 28 of the Rules of 1962. The petitioner further claims that as per Rule 31 of the Rules of 1962, his seniority is to be determined by the year of his initial appointment i.e. 1978 which as per the petitioner was a substantive appointment for all practical purposes. 13. The petitioner has arrayed Dr. Subodh Srivastava, Dr. N.K. Soni, Dr. Prakash Misra, Dr. S.D. Sharma, Dr. J.P. Gupta, Dr. Shashi Khangarot and Dr. Shiv Kumar Vaishnava as respondents no.2 to 8 in the amended writ petition, claiming that these persons were appointed as Lecturers subsequent to the petitioner. It is claimed in the writ petition that as the petitioner’s initial appointment vide order Annex.2 dated 9.3.1978, was a substantive appointment for all practical purposes and was made under the Rules of 1962, the petitioner is entitled to have his entire length of service counted for the purpose of seniority. It is claimed in the writ petition that as the petitioner’s initial appointment vide order Annex.2 dated 9.3.1978, was a substantive appointment for all practical purposes and was made under the Rules of 1962, the petitioner is entitled to have his entire length of service counted for the purpose of seniority. Accordingly, it is prayed in the writ petition that the petitioner’s initial date of induction in service i.e. 9.3.1978 be reckoned for deciding the interse seniority. 14. Mr. M.R. Singhvi, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, vehemently contended that the petitioner continued to work on the post of Lecturer right from the date of his initial appointment (from 9.3.1978 onwards), which appointment was substantive in nature for all practical purposes and thus, his entire service tenure has to be reckoned for determining the seniority. As per him, the term ‘substantive appointment’ is defined in Rule 3(k) of the Rules of 1962 which lays down that substantive appointment means an appointment made under the provisions of the Rules against a substantive vacancy after due selection by any of the methods of recruitment prescribed under the Rules and includes an appointment on probation or as probationer followed by confirmation on the completion of the probationary period. Rule 31 prescribes that the seniority in each category of service shall be determined by the year of substantive appointment. He contended that the respondents no.2 to 8 were admittedly given substantive appointments much after the petitioner and, therefore, the petitioner is entitled to claim and receive seniority at a higher position than these respondents and also for his substantive service to be counted from the date of his initial appointment. He referred to the following judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court in support of his contentions:- (1) S.B. Patvardhan. vs. State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 1977 SC 2051 . (2) G.P. Doval & Ors. vs. Chief Sec., Govt. of U.P. reported in (1984) 4 SCC 329 . (3) Engineering Officers Association. vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. reported in AIR 1990 SC 1607 . (4) Rudra Kumar Sain. vs. Union of India & Ors. reported in AIR 2000 SC 2808 . (5) S.N. Dhingra. vs. Union of India & Ors. reported in AIR 2001 SC 1535 . 15. He also relied on the judgment of this Court in the case of Syed Mansoor Ali. vs. State of Raj. & Anr. (4) Rudra Kumar Sain. vs. Union of India & Ors. reported in AIR 2000 SC 2808 . (5) S.N. Dhingra. vs. Union of India & Ors. reported in AIR 2001 SC 1535 . 15. He also relied on the judgment of this Court in the case of Syed Mansoor Ali. vs. State of Raj. & Anr. reported in RLR 1988(2) 616 and urged that the writ petition deserves to be allowed and looking to the fact that the petitioner has superannuated during the pendency of the instant writ petition, the notional and financial benefits flowing from the relief being granted in the instant writ petition, be awarded to the petitioner. 16. Per contra, Mr.Vikas Balia, learned counsel representing respondent no.7, Mr.Vikram Choudhary, learned counsel representing respondents no.4 & 5 and Ms.Shweta Bora appearing for Ms. Suman Porwal, learned Dy. Government counsel, opposed the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner. 17. Mr.Vikas Balia leading the arguments submitted that the claim of the petitioner in the instant writ petition that he was regularly selected in the year 1978 on the post of Lecturer under the Rules of 1962 is perse baseless and fit to be rejected outright. Referring to the documents Annex.1 to Annex.3, he submitted that the advertisement issued in the year 1978, in pursuance whereof the petitioner was selected, was an advertisement for selection to the post of lecturer in medical college and was to be conducted by the Central Selection Committee and not RPSC. He contended that the petitioner’s appointment on the post of Lecturer by order Annex.3 was purely on urgent temporary basis for a period of six months. The appointment order Annex.3 bears a condition in itself that the appointment would stand terminated on the expiry of the above mentioned period unless specifically extended further or on a candidate duly selected by the RPSC on the post becoming available, whichever was earlier. He submitted that even if the petitioner’s claim that he was continued on the said temporary post subsequent to his initial appointment right upto his selection by the RPSC is accepted, yet no right accrued to the petitioner for having his seniority reckoned from the date of the appointment order Annex.3 because the said appointment was, as a matter of fact, not made by the RPSC. He further submitted that the petitioner’s claim that he continued to work on the post of Lecturer without any break from the date of his initial appointment, is belied by order Annex.5 which the petitioner himself relies upon in support of the contention that his services were extended from time to time and he continued to perform duties without any break. He referred to the following portion of the order Annex.5 dated 16.6.1979 and submitted that the order itself reads that the petitioner’s services were terminated with effect from 8.12.1978 and thereafter, he was given a fresh appointment with effect from 1.1.1979 to 7.4.1979:- “The officiating appointment of Dr.G.N. Purohit as Lecturer in E.N.T. made vide this department order No.F.1(34)ME/76 dtd. 20.4.78 is hereby extended w.e.f. 1.1.79 to 7.4.79 whereafter his officiating appointments has been terminated vide this department order No.F.1(42)ME/78 dated 8.12.1978.” 18. Mr. Balia urged that the petitioner chose not to challenge the termination order dated 8.12.1978 at the earliest available opportunity. As a matter fact, no grievance has been raised in the instant writ petition about the termination order dated 8.12.1978 and thus, on the face of the record, the petitioner's claim that after being appointed on the post of Lecturer on 9.3.1978, he worked incessantly till his regular selection by the RPSC, is negated. He contended that on a bare look at the order Annex.5, it is evident that there was a break in service of the petitioner between 8.12.1978 to 1.1.1979. Referring to the order Annex.R/1 filed along with the reply, he submitted that Dr. A.S. Bapna, whose name appears in the said appointment order dated 8.12.1978, was given substantive appointment in the year 1978 after recommendation of RPSC. He urged that the seniority list Annex.R/5 was issued by the State Government for the Lecturers working on substantive basis in the E.N.T. Specialty. As per the said list, as many as 11 persons were placed in seniority above the petitioner, however, the petitioner has not impleaded all the 11 lecturers referred to in the seniority list Annex.R/5 and has also not challenged the said seniority list in the instant writ petition and, therefore, he is not entitled to the relief claimed in the writ petition. 19. Mr. 19. Mr. Balia further submitted that Rule 31 of the Rules of 1962 specifically prescribes that the seniority list shall be prepared with reference to the date of substantive appointment of the concerned employee. As per him, the petitioner was given substantive appointment on the post of Lecturer, E.N.T., after selection by the RPSC in the year 1983. The petitioner admittedly was unsuccessful in his earlier two endeavors for selection in selection process conducted by the RPSC and thus, he cannot claim seniority merely because he was working as Lecturer in pursuance of an ad hoc appointment given to him in the year 1978 by the Central Selection Committee, which is an entirely different body from RPSC. Relying on the petitioner’s appointment order Annex.7 dated 11.5.1979, he urged that the petitioner's temporary appointment on the post of Lecturer was clearly conditional to the regularly selected candidates being available and the appointment order itself mentions that the concerned person would have to appear before the RPSC for regular selections and in case, he was unsuccessful, his services would be terminated. He further submitted that the petitioner's claim that he was selected against a regularly sanctioned post in the year 1978 is belied by the order Annex.11 dated 27.2.1979 whereby for the first time, the post of Lecturer E.N.T. was created by the State Government. He further submitted that the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, were all considered by the Division Bench whilst deciding the case of Jagdish Chand (supra) wherein exactly same set of facts and identical Rules applicable to the Engineering services, were examined and the prayer of the concerned petitioner to be assigned seniority on the basis of his initial ad hoc temporary appointment was turned down. Mr.Balia placed reliance on the following decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in support of his arguments :- (1) Keshav Chandra Joshi and Ors. vs. Union of India and Ors. reported in AIR 1991 SC 284 . (2) Union of India and Anr. vs. Prof. S.K. Sharma reported in AIR 1992 SC 1188 . (3) K.Madalaimuthu and Anr. vs. State of T.N. & Ors. reported in (2006)6 SCC 558. 20. He also relied on the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Rajasthan Public Service Commission, Ajmer. vs. Dr. Narendra Kumar Mangal & Ors. vs. Prof. S.K. Sharma reported in AIR 1992 SC 1188 . (3) K.Madalaimuthu and Anr. vs. State of T.N. & Ors. reported in (2006)6 SCC 558. 20. He also relied on the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Rajasthan Public Service Commission, Ajmer. vs. Dr. Narendra Kumar Mangal & Ors. Reported in 2001(2) WLC (Raj.) 677, wherein the import of these very Rules of 1962 applicable to the Medical services, was considered and the prayer of the persons appointed on adhoc temporary basis who had continued to work for three years or more, for being given seniority on the basis of their initial appointment, was turned down. He thus, prayed that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 21. Learned Addl. Government counsel and learned counsel Mr.Vikram Choudhary appearing for the respective respondents adopted and supported the arguments advanced by learned counsel Mr.Vikas Balia and prayed that the writ petition has no merit and be dismissed. 22. Heard and considered the arguments advanced at the Bar. Perused the documents annexed to the writ petition and the authorities cited by the rival counsels. 23. The basic controversy required to be adjudged in the matter is as to whether or not the petitioner’s initial appointment was a regular appointment against a substantive post and if thereafter, he continued to work thereupon without any break in service and as a consequence, is entitled to have his seniority counted from the date of his initial appointment ? 24. The advertisement Annex.1 in pursuance whereof, the petitioner was initially summoned for interview itself reads that the applicant was summoned to appear for being appointed on the post of Lecturer (E.N.T.) on the basis of the interview to be held by Central Selection Committee. Admittedly, the Central Selection Committee has no correlation with the RPSC and cannot be termed to be a body authorized to select lecturers in the State services. The petitioner has not been able to demonstrate that his initial appointment vide order Annex.3 dated 20/22.4.1978 was against a substantive sanctioned post of Lecturer advertised by RPSC. Rule 30 of the Rules of 1962, whereunder the petitioner was given appointment vide Annex.3, itself speaks of urgent temporary appointment. The Rule stipulates that the appointment made thereunder will not be continued beyond the period of one year. Rule 30 of the Rules of 1962, whereunder the petitioner was given appointment vide Annex.3, itself speaks of urgent temporary appointment. The Rule stipulates that the appointment made thereunder will not be continued beyond the period of one year. Relevant portion of Annex.3, the petitioner’s appointment order, is reproduced for ready reference:- “The appointment shall stand terminated on the expiry of the above period unless specifically extended further or on a candidate duly selected by the Rajasthan Public Service Commission the post becoming available, whichever is earlier.” 25. The order Annex.5 dated 16.6.1979 whereby the petitioner's services were extended bears reference of an earlier order dated 8.12.1978 whereby the petitioner's services were terminated. The termination of the petitioner's services on 8.12.1978 was in compliance with the conditions of the order Annex.3 and Rule 30. The petitioner did not challenge to the said part of Annex.5 wherein it is mentioned that the petitioner's officiating appointment had been terminated, either at any earlier point of time or even in the instant writ petition. The relevant portion of the order Annex.5 dated 16.6.1979 is quoted below for ready reference:- “The officiating appointment of Dr.G.N. Purohit as Lecturer in E.N.T. Made vide this department order No.F.1(34)ME/76 dtd. 20.4.78 is hereby extended w.e.f. 1.1.79 to 7.4.79 whereafter his officiating appointments has been terminated vide this department order No.F.1(42)ME/78 dated 8.12.1978.” 26. Thus, the very substratum of the petitioner's case that he continued to work incessantly on the post of Lecturer right from the date of his initial appointment till he was regularly appointed by the RPSC, is belied with the afore-quoted portion of the order Annex.5 on which the petitioner has chosen to rely upon heavily. 27. Rule 31 of the Rules of 1962 was initially challenged in the writ petition but the challenge was thereafter given up in view of the decision in Jagdish Chandra (supra). 28. Mr. Singhvi, learned senior counsel representing the petitioner candidly admitted during arguments that the Rule was substituted by the State Government from time to time and ultimately, the following Rule 31 was brought in to the Statute Book by the State of Rajasthan in the year 2002:- “31. Seniority of persons appointed to the post encadred in the service shall be determined from the date of appointment on the post after regular selection in accordance with the provisos of these rules. Seniority of persons appointed to the post encadred in the service shall be determined from the date of appointment on the post after regular selection in accordance with the provisos of these rules. Appointment on ad-hoc or urgent temporary basis shall not be deemed to be to be appointment after regular selection. Provided- (1) that the seniority interse of the persons appointed to the service under Rule 5, shall be determined, modified or altered by Government, on an ad hoc basis; (2) that if two or more persons are appointed to posts in the same grade in the same year, a person appointed by promotion, shall be senior to a person appointed by direct recruitment; (3) that the seniority interse of persons appointed to posts in a particular grade by direct recruitment on the basis of one and the same selection, except those who do not join service when a vacancy is offered to them, shall follow the order in which they have been placed in the list prepared by the Commission under Rule 20; and (4) that the persons selected and appointed as a result of a selection, which is not subject to review and revision, shall rank senior to the persons who are selected and appointed as a result of subsequent selection. Seniority interse of persons selected on the basis of seniority-cum-merit basis or merit and on the same selection shall be the same as in the next below grade. Provided that a candidate who has got the benefit of proviso inserted vide Notification No. F.7(1)DOP/A-II/96 dated 1.4.1997 on promotion to an immediate higher post shall not be reverted and his seniority shall remain unaffected. This proviso is subject to final decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Writ Petition (Civil) No.234/2002 All India equality Forum vs. Union of India & Ors.” 29. Mr. Singhvi, while referring to the principles of Interpretation of Statutes submitted that whenever a Rule is substituted by way of an amendment, the subsequent provision holds the field, when the lis based on the Rule is to be decided. 30. The underlined portion of the Rule itself provides that the appointment on ad hoc or urgent temporary basis shall not be deemed to be appointment after regular selection. 31. 30. The underlined portion of the Rule itself provides that the appointment on ad hoc or urgent temporary basis shall not be deemed to be appointment after regular selection. 31. In view of the plain language of Rule 31, as it now stands, it is evident that the petitioner having been given appointment on urgent temporary basis vide order Annex.3 and thereafter, vide orders Annex.5 and Annex.7, is not entitled to claim seniority, with reference to the date of his initial urgent temporary appointment, even though, he was regularly selected on a duly sanctioned post of Lecturer, E.N.T., by the RPSC at a later date. The judgments which have been cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner, particularly, S.B. Patvardhan (supra), Baleshwar Dass (supra) and G.P. Doval (supra), were all considered by the Division Bench in Jagdish Chandra's case (supra) and after due consideration, the Division Bench held that a person appointed under the Engineering Services Rules of 1973 (which are analogous to the Rules of 1962 applicable to the Medical services) were not entitled to be considered for the purpose of seniority, on the basis of the date of ad hoc appointment, over and above the persons regularly appointed. 32. The Division Bench judgment in Syed Mansoor Ali's case (supra) is also of no avail to the petitioner because in the said case, the initial appointment of the petitioner therein, was after due process of selection. In the present case, admittedly, the petitioner was not appointed on the substantive post of a Lecturer after due process of selection conducted by the RPSC. 33. In Rudra Kumar Sain's case (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court held that when a person with requisite qualification is appointed after due consultation with or getting the approval of the High Court and continuously holds the post for a fairly long period, his appointment cannot be said to be ad-hoc or fortuitous or stop-gap. The said proposition as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court does not help the petitioner in any manner because admittedly his appointment to the post was neither in consultation with the appropriate authority i.e. RPSC nor was against a substantive post and was also not approved by the High Court. 34. The said proposition as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court does not help the petitioner in any manner because admittedly his appointment to the post was neither in consultation with the appropriate authority i.e. RPSC nor was against a substantive post and was also not approved by the High Court. 34. In the judgment of Keshav Chandra Joshi cited by Mr.Vikas Balia, learned counsel for the respondent no.7, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in no unequivocal terms held as below :- 23. As stated, the counsel for the promotees placed strong reliance on proposition 'B' while the counsel for the Direct Recruits relied on proposition 'A'. The controversy is as to which of the propositions would apply to the facts of this case. The proposition 'A' lays down that once an incumbent is appointed to a post according to rules, his seniority has to be counted from the date of his appointment and not according to the date of his confirmation. The latter part thereof amplifies that where the initial appointment is only ad-hoc and not according to rules and is made as stop-gap arrangement, the period of officiation in such post cannot be taken into account for reckoning seniority. The quintessence of the propositions in that the appointment to a post must be according to rules and not by way of ad-hoc or stop-gap arrangement made due to administrative exigencies. If the initial appointment thus made was dehors the rules, the entire length of such service cannot be counted for seniority, in other words the appointee would become a member of the service in the substantive capacity from the date of his appointment only if the appointment was made according to rules and seniority would be counted only from that date. Propositions 'A' and 'B' cover different aspects of the situation. One must discern the difference critically. Proposition 'B' must, therefore, be read alongwith Para 13 of the judgment wherein the artic decidendi of Narendra Chadha was held to have considerable force. The latter postulated that if the initial appointment to a substantive post or vacancy was made deliberately, in disregard of the rule and allowed the incumbent to continue on the post for well over 15 to 20 years without reversion and till the date of regularisation of the service in accordance with the rules, the period of officiating service has to be counted towards seniority. This Court in Narendra Chadha's case was cognizant of the fact that the rules empower the Government to relax the rule of appointment. Without reading paragraph 13 and Proposition 'B' and Narendra Chadha's ratio together the true import of the proposition would not be appreciated. We would deal with the exercise of power of relaxing the rule later. After giving anxious consideration, we are of the view that the latter half of Proposition 'A' would apply to the facts of the case and the rule laid down in that half is to be followed. If the concerned rules provide the procedure to fix inter se seniority between direct recruits and promotees, the seniority has to be determined in that manner. (Emphasis supplied) 35. The judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of K.Madalaimuthu (supra) also lays down the same proposition. It was held as under:- “24. On a consideration on the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties and the decisions cited on their behalf, the consistent view appears to be the one canvassed on behalf of the appellants. The decisions cited by Mr. Rao have been rendered in the context of Rule 10(a)(i)(1) and the other relevant rules which are also applicable to the facts of the instant case. Apart from the above, the law is well settled that initial appointment to a post without recourse to the rules of recruitment is not an appointment to a service as contemplated under Rule 2(1) of the General Rules, notwithstanding the fact that such appointee is called upon to perform duties of a post borne on the cadre of such service. In fact, Rule 39(c) of the General Rules indicates that a person temporarily promoted in terms of Rule 39(a) is required to be replaced as soon as possible by a member of the service who is entitled to the promotion under the rules. It stands to reason that a person who is appointed temporarily to discharge the functions in a particular post without recourse to the recruitment rules, cannot be said to be in service till such time his appointment is regularized. It, therefore, follows that it is only from the date on which his services are regularized that such appointee can count his seniority in the cadre. 25. It, therefore, follows that it is only from the date on which his services are regularized that such appointee can count his seniority in the cadre. 25. In the instant case, the authorities on the strength of the several Government orders giving retrospective effect to the regularization of the promotees, have taken the date of initial appointment of such promotees as the starting point of their seniority. In our view, such a course of action was erroneous and contrary to the well-established principles relating to determination of seniority. In our view, the High Court took an erroneous view in the matter in applying Rule 4 of the General Rules and holding that the period during which the promotees had initially discharged the duties of District Registrars, though appointed temporarily under Rule 10(a)(i)(1), was to be counted for determining their seniority. The decision of this Court in L.Chandrakishore Singh relied on by Shri Venkataramani did not involve the question of persons appointed outside the service as a stop-gap arrangement. The fact situation of the said decision is different from the fact situation of the instant case which finds support from the decisions cited by Mr Rao. 26. We, therefore, set aside the order passed by the High court and direct the respondents concerned to redetermine the seniority of the appellants in relation to the promotees after reckoning the starting point of seniority of such promotees from the date on which their services were regularised and not from the date of their initial appointment under Rule 10(a)(i)(l) of the General Rules.” 36. In the case of Dr.Narendra Kumar Mangal (supra), the Division Bench was seized of the very same Rules of 1962 which are subject matter of consideration in the instant case. In the said case, it was held by the Division Bench that the persons who were appointed on ad hoc basis were only given relaxation from the screening test. The Division Bench further ruled that the direction as sought for regularisation of such doctors appointed under Rule 30 will clearly be de-hors the law because of the reason also that by virtue of temporary appointment under Rule 30, such ad-hoc or temporary doctors automatically do not become members of the service under the Rules of 1962. The Division Bench further ruled that the direction as sought for regularisation of such doctors appointed under Rule 30 will clearly be de-hors the law because of the reason also that by virtue of temporary appointment under Rule 30, such ad-hoc or temporary doctors automatically do not become members of the service under the Rules of 1962. Reference was made to the Hon'ble Supreme Court's orders in the cases of Dr.Bhandari and Dr.Surekha making it clear that only in the event of being selected regularly, the seniority will be decided by the appropriate authority in accordance with relevant provisions of the Rules. The Division Bench concluded:- “16. Moreover, process of shortlisting shall not amount to altering or substituting the eligibility criteria given in statutory rules inasmuch as shortlisting is a part of process of selection. Once the applications are received in response to the advertisement for the advertised posts and such applications are enormous in number with reference to the number of posts available for being filled up then the Selection Commission has no option but to short list such applicants on some rational and reasonable basis. That apart process of selection for recruitment against existing or anticipated vacancies does not create a right to appointment. In the instant case, the Rules 1962 envisaged the appointment of the doctors for the posts of Lecturers/Assistant Professors which are advertised under the impugned advertisement, only by the process of direct recruitment and further the Rules, 1962 do not provide any power to regularise the services of the doctors appointed on urgent temporary basis under Rule 30 on their selection by Central Selection Committee. Therefore, the direction as sought for regularisation of such doctors appointed under Rule 30 will clearly be de hors the law because of the reasons also that by virtue of temporary appointment under Rule 30 such adhoc or temporary doctors do not automatically become members of the service under the Rules, 1962, and which provides the mode of recruitment for the appointment to the service by direct recruitment the procedure for which is envisaged under part IV, which provides for eligibility of the person for recruitment to a post in the service and further provides for recruitment by selection in the manner indicated against each post in the Schedule attached to the Rules, 1962. Thus a reading of the Rules, 1962 clearly indicates that a person appointed to the service after having undergone selection in the manner indicated under the rules shall be a member of any of the services only upon making recruitment by the PSC and appointment by the State Government, inasmuch as after recruitment by the PSC and appointment by the State Government under the Rules, 1962 such selected person is kept on probation and only on successful completion thereof he becomes a member of the service and then only he gets his seniority from the date of the appointment in terms of the Rules, 1962. 17. I n nut shell, the recruitment for the advertised posts or any other posts mentioned in the schedule to the Rules, 1962 and the selection by the PSC in a condition precedent obviously because such posts fall within the purview of RPSC in accordance with the scheme of the relevant service rules read with Article 320(2) of the Constitution of India. Admittedly, the doctors (petitioners herein) had not been appointed after selection by the RPSC and as per their appointment orders they were appointed on urgent temporary basis for a fixed term of one year or till the regularly selected candidates were made available whichever was earlier. Since they did not face RPSC for regular selection, nor the Rules 1962 does provide for regularisation in case of their having been selected by the Central Selection Committee for being appointed on urgent temporary basis under Rule 30 automatically nor the term of their appointment under Rule 30 entitles them to hold the post in a substantive capacity, rather their appointment under Rule 30 though through selection by Central Selection Committee was admittedly temporary and adhoc in nature. Thus, it is not all open to any government employee or the present doctors to claim automatic alteration of status by virtue of their selection through Central Selection Committee under Rule 30 without having faced the RPSC for regular recruitment by selection under part IV because such result is not specifically envisaged by some provision in the statutory Rules of 1962. Therefore, unless there is a provision in the statutory rules for alteration of status in a particular situation it is not open to any government employee to claim a status different than that which was conferred upon him at the initial or any subsequent stage of service. Therefore, unless there is a provision in the statutory rules for alteration of status in a particular situation it is not open to any government employee to claim a status different than that which was conferred upon him at the initial or any subsequent stage of service. 18. Even the regularisation of temporary appointment can be effected only in accordance with Rules, 1962 for direct appointment and since the Rules 1962, as analysed above, provided for regular appointment of doctors only after being found suitable by the PSC, the direction as sought for regularisation of these doctors appointed under Rule 30 on temporary basis is totally impermissible, inasmuch as merely because regular appointments had not been made for years together even after their temporary appointments continued for longer period than stipulated period under Rule 30, could not entitle them to regularise without facing the RPSC for regular selection under Part IV of the Rules, 1962. That being so, the learned Judges not only in Single Bench so also in Division Bench but also their Lordships of the Apex Court in Dr. Surekha & Dr. Bhandari's cases (supra) by concurrently exempting adhoc appointees from going through the screening test, and declining to the relief for regularisation of such doctors, but directed the RPSC only to the extent of interviewing adhoc doctors who have rendered and put in service for three years or more, without requiring to go through the screening test. This procedure has been followed by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment in favour of the present adhoc appointees/doctors (petitioners) in the light of the decision in Dr. Surekha & Dr. Bhandari's cases (supra) which has attained its finality under the judgment of the Apex Court given on 5.6.95 (supra). Therefore, we do not find any illegality in the impugned judgment under appeal warranting any interference by this Court. 19. However, we may add that while making selections by way of direct recruitment there cannot be two set of persons with different eligibility in absence of specific provisions of rules and therefore stand of the learned counsel that appointment cannot be made de hors the Rules, is absolutely correct. 19. However, we may add that while making selections by way of direct recruitment there cannot be two set of persons with different eligibility in absence of specific provisions of rules and therefore stand of the learned counsel that appointment cannot be made de hors the Rules, is absolutely correct. While it is true that those candidates who have rendered years of service in the past should not undergo rigours of screening test by way of relaxation but it cannot by any stretch of imagination be inferred that on the one hand those candidates who have already served as adhoc in different specialities in the past and their services had not yet been made regular by adopting procedure of regular selection under Chapter IV of the Rules, should not undergo screening test alongwith other eligible candidates who are directly called for interview but nevertheless in our considered view only limited benefit, to which they can be held entitled, is that they should be given benefit of exemption from undergoing screening test only in view of their past service performance while all the same it is essential before they are regularly selected, they should and in all probability should not feel shy of determining their eligibility for regular appointment by selection through direct recruitment under Part IV of the Rules, 1962 and all the essential prerequisites which are required to be observed by other candidates who are directly called for interview if those can be held binding for them, they should equally be made applicable and binding for inservice candidates/doctors duly appointed on adhoc and temporary basis under rule 30 of the Rules, because it would otherwise eliminate any possible apprehension:- (a) preferential treatment extended to them which may otherwise not be construed as back door entry at the costs and expenses of meritorious persons who have to be recommended during selection by the RPSC on the basis of their merit, (b) eligibility conditions as regards candidates who are directly called for interview as per terms and conditions of the advertisement and as per qualification laid down for them under the Rules 1962 should equally be made applicable to the inservice candidates appointed under Rule 30 or otherwise, as they have to compete on the same pedestal with a view to avoid any discrimination. That being so, the Apex Court in its order passed in Special leave to appeal preferred by the RPSC against Dr. Deepak Verma (supra) has specifically clarified that the directions contained in order dated June 5, 1995 in civil appeals arising out of special leave petitions Nos. 12740-41 of 1995 were given in the facts and circumstances of those cases only and the said directions cannot be treated as laying down the law regarding selection for appointment by the RPSC which has to be made in accordance with the relevant rules. However, the present impugned common judgment had already been passed on 15.9.1995 prior to the clarification made by the Apex Court on 7.8.98 in Dr. Deepak Verma's Special Leave to Appeal (supra). 20. As regards seniority of the present doctors (petitioners) though a catena of decisions have been relied upon by the learned counsel at the bar but we do not enter into all these aspects of seniority in a comprehensive manner here in all these appeals, because question of seniority will only arise upon the regular selection and in the cases of the present doctors (petitioners) who have admittedly not undergone process of regular selection under the Rules, 1962 before they approached this Court and it is only upon the decision of the learned Single Judge, and before which they had also applied for direct recruitment with a view to undergo process of regular selection through RPSC advertisement under challenge, that the RPSC has already permitted such doctors to appear in selection process for regular appointment though subject to final result of their appeals on or about 12.12.95 and their result have also been declared on 20.12.95 Above all, the Apex Court in its order dated 5.6.95 in Dr. Surekha & Dr. Bhandari's cases (supra) categorically made it clear that only in the event of being selected regularly the seniority will have to be decided by the appropriate authority in accordance with relevant provisions of the Rules. Hence, we refrain from entering into this controversy as to the seniority of these doctors appointed under Rule 30 and who are petitioners in their writ petitions (supra). The seniority of persons or appointees under the Rules, 1962 is required to be adjudged and assigned only in consonance with provisions contained in Rule 31 of the rules, 1962. Hence, we refrain from entering into this controversy as to the seniority of these doctors appointed under Rule 30 and who are petitioners in their writ petitions (supra). The seniority of persons or appointees under the Rules, 1962 is required to be adjudged and assigned only in consonance with provisions contained in Rule 31 of the rules, 1962. This Court cannot go beyond or devise any separate system de hors the rules which, itself, would be against the Rules so also the mandate of the Constitution of India. Therefore, we leave the matter entirely to be examined by the appropriate authority under the rules and in case of any grievance the aggrieved person may resort to recourse by approaching appropriate appellate forum if he is not assigned his desired seniority after regular selection and in consonance with the seniority rules. But no relief can either be granted in these writ appeals nor can be entertained by this Court at this stage, inasmuch as we may also make it clear that direction by the learned Single Judge being duly affirmed by us is not the process of regularisation of their temporary or adhoc appointment made under Rule 30, but allowing them to undergo process of regular selection through direct recruitment as provided for regular appointment under part IV of the Rules, 1962 without requiring and by exempting them to appear in the screening test. Hence, exemption from appearing in the screening test will not in any way give them right or benefit for adjudging seniority by deeming that their temporary services were regularised. The seniority is to be adjudged only upon regular selection but in consonance with and in the light of statutory rules, i.e. Rule 31 of the Rules, 1962 in the facts and circumstances of the case at hand." 37. Thus, in the very same services wherein the petitioner claims seniority, the Division Bench of this Court turned down the prayer of ad hoc appointees to be considered for seniority from the date of their initial ad hoc or urgent temporary appointment. 38. Another important question which arises for this Court's consideration is as to whether all the persons, who are likely to be affected by the petitioner's prayer being accepted, have been impleaded as respondents in the writ petition or not. 38. Another important question which arises for this Court's consideration is as to whether all the persons, who are likely to be affected by the petitioner's prayer being accepted, have been impleaded as respondents in the writ petition or not. The seniority list which has been annexed with the reply as Annex.R/5 sets out the names of 11 persons, who were accorded seniority in the year 1981 itself. The petitioner's name was admittedly introduced in the departmental seniority list in the year 1983 after he was given substantive appointment vide order Annex.10 dated 5/11.10.1983. Therefore, it was essential for the petitioner to have impleaded all the 11 persons whose names appear above petitioner in the seniority as per the list Annex.R/5. Non-impleading of the all persons likely to be affected by the outcome of this writ petition amounts to non-joinder of necessary parties and the writ petition must fail for this reason. 39. The Hon’ble Apex Court recently dealt with the controversy involving the claims of the ad hoc and urgent temporary appointees to receive selection scales in the case of State of Rajasthan vs. Jagdish Narain Chaturvedi reported in AIR 2010 SC 157 . The issue involved in the said case was as to whether the ad hoc appointment or appointments on daily wage or work charge basis are appointments made to the cadre/service in accordance with the provisions contained in the recruitment rules. Ofcourse, the lis before the Hon’ble Apex Court was regarding the entitlement of such persons for grant of selection scale who were appointed initially on ad hoc basis and their services were regularized at a later stage. Two Division Benches of this Hon’ble Court took a view that in cases where the employees continued to work on ad hoc basis on a particular post over a long period of time and their services were regularized later on, they would be entitled to claim selection scale from the date of their initial appointment. The Hon’ble Apex Court reversed the said view and held as below :- “17. In order to become "a member of service" candidate must satisfy four conditions, namely (i) the appointment must be in a substantive capacity; (ii) to a post in the service i.e. in a substantive vacancy; (iii) made according to rules; (iv) within the quota prescribed for the source. 18. In order to become "a member of service" candidate must satisfy four conditions, namely (i) the appointment must be in a substantive capacity; (ii) to a post in the service i.e. in a substantive vacancy; (iii) made according to rules; (iv) within the quota prescribed for the source. 18. Ad hoc appointment is always to a post but not to the cadre/service and is also not made in accordance with the provisions contained in the recruitment rules for regular appointment. 23. Apart from Haryana Veterinary case, (2000 AIR SCW 3301) (supra) the position in law as stated in State of Punjab vs. Ishar Singh ( 2002 (10) SCC 674 ) : (2002 AIR SCW 2652) and State of Punjab vs. Gurdeep Kumar (2003 (11) SCC 732) : (2001 AIR SCW 2607) clearly lay down that while reckoning the required length of service the period of ad hoc service has to be excluded…..” 40. In the aforesaid judgment of Jagdish Narain Chaturvedi (supra), reliance was placed on the decision rendered by the 3 Judges Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Haryana vs. Haryana Veterinary and AHTS Association and Anr. reported in AIR 2000 SC 3020 . In para 6 of the said judgment, the Hon’ble Apex Court held as below :- “6. The contention of Mr. Jain, learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the State of Haryana, with reference to the provisions of Recruitment Rules is also well founded, as would appear from the analysis made hereunder. Under the Recruitment Rules which had been made in exercise of powers conferred by the Proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution "Member of Service" means an officer appointed substantively to a cadre post and includes in case of a direct appointment an officer on probation or an officer who having successfully completed his probation awaits appointment to a cadre post. In case of an appointment by transfer an officer who is on probation or who having successfully completed the probation awaits appointment to a cadre post. Under Rule 6 of the Recruitment Rules, recruitment to the service in the cadre post could be made both by way of direct appointment as well as by promotion in the proportion from different sources mentioned in the said Rule. Under Rule 6 of the Recruitment Rules, recruitment to the service in the cadre post could be made both by way of direct appointment as well as by promotion in the proportion from different sources mentioned in the said Rule. Sub-rule (3) of Rule 6 authorises appointment to a cadre post as stopgap arrangement from sources other than the allotted source when a candidate from the allotted source is not available from sources 1 and 3, but such appointee is liable to be reverted to his original cadre when a candidate from the allotted source is available and the period of service rendered by such person shall not be reckoned for the purpose of his seniority. Sub-rule (4) of the Rule thus enables the State Government to fill up a short-term vacancy in the exigencies of public service after recording reasons for a period not exceeding six months in each case without resorting to the select list prepared under Rule 9. Under Rule 8 appointment to the service has to be made by way of direct recruitment strictly in the order of merit indicated by the Public Service Commission depending upon the number of vacancies available in the Cadre. Under Rule 9 appointment by promotion can be made from the panel to be prepared on the basis of merit and suitability in all respects with due regard to seniority, which list has to be forwarded to the Public Service Commission and the Commission on consideration of the list prepared by the Government along with other documents received, can make such changes as necessary and would then forward the approved list to the State Government. It is from this list appointment to the service has to be made by the Government in the order in which names have been placed by the Commission, as provided under sub-rule (9) of Rule 8. Rule 11 provides for continuation on probation for a period of 2 years and Rule 12 is the Rule for seniority. It is from this list appointment to the service has to be made by the Government in the order in which names have been placed by the Commission, as provided under sub-rule (9) of Rule 8. Rule 11 provides for continuation on probation for a period of 2 years and Rule 12 is the Rule for seniority. A combined reading of the aforesaid provisions of the Recruitment Rules puts the controversy beyond any doubt and the only conclusion which could be drawn from the aforesaid Rules is that the services rendered either on ad hoc basis or as a stopgap arrangement, as in the case in hand from 1980 to 1982 cannot be held to be regular service for getting the benefits of the revised scale of pay or of the selection grade under the Government Memorandum dated 2nd June, 1989 and 16th May, 1990, and therefore, the majority judgment of the High Court must be held to be contrary to the aforesaid provisions of the Recruitment Rules, consequently cannot be sustained. The initial letter of appointment dated 6-12-1979 pursuance to which respondent Rakesh Kumar joined as an Assistant Engineer on ad hoc basis in 1980 was also placed before us. The said appointment letter unequivocally indicates that the offer of appointment as Assistant Engineer was on ad hoc basis and Clauses 1 to 4 of the said letter further provides that the appointment will be on ad hoc basis for a period of 6 months from the date of joining and the salary was a fixed salary of Rs. 400/- p.m. in the scale of Rs. 400/- to Rs. 1,100/- and the services were liable to be terminated without any notice and at any time without assigning any reason and that the appointment will not enable the appointee any seniority or any other benefit under the Service Rules for the time being in force and will not count towards increment in the time scale. In view of the aforesaid stipulations in the offer of appointment itself we really fail to understand as to how the aforesaid period of service rendered on ad hoc basis can be held to be service on regular basis. The conclusion of the High Court is contrary to the very terms and conditions stipulated in the offer of appointment and, therefore, the same cannot be sustained. The conclusion of the High Court is contrary to the very terms and conditions stipulated in the offer of appointment and, therefore, the same cannot be sustained. The regular letter of appointment dated 29-1-1982 in favour of Rakesh Kumar was also produced before us and that letter indicates that the respondent Rakesh Kumar along with others had applied to the Secretary, Haryana Public Service Commission for being appointed as an Assistant Engineer and the Service Commission after selecting the number of persons prepared a list and appointment letters were issued by the Government from the said list on the basis of the merit position of different candidates. Thus the appointment of respondent Rakesh Kumar was a fresh appointment in accordance with the Statutory Rules after the Public Service Commission adjudged their suitability and the regular service of the respondent Rakesh Kumar must be counted from the date he joins the post pursuance to the offer of appointment dated 29-1-1982 and the prior service rendered by him on ad hoc basis cannot be held to be regular service nor can it be tagged on to the later service for earning the benefit under the Government Circular dated 2nd June, 1989 as well as the Clarificatory Circular dated 16th May, 1990. The conclusion of the majority judgment of the High Court, therefore, is wholly erroneous and cannot be sustained.” (Emphasis supplied) The aforequoted observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court totally cover the controversy raised in the case at hand. 41. The conclusion of the majority judgment of the High Court, therefore, is wholly erroneous and cannot be sustained.” (Emphasis supplied) The aforequoted observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court totally cover the controversy raised in the case at hand. 41. In view of the aforesaid discussion, it is evident that (a) the petitioner has failed to establish that vide order Annex.2, he was appointed in the year 1978 on a substantive post by regular process of selection prescribed under Rule 24 of the Rules of 1962 ; (b) the petitioner has also failed to satisfy this Court that he continued to work incessantly on the post right from his initial appointment till the date of his regular selection vide Annex.7 ; (c) the petitioner has not raised any grievance regarding his termination from service by order dated 8.12.1978 referred to in the order Annex.5 and as such, the plea raised in the instant writ petition that there was no break in service of the petitioner during the period 1978 to 1983 is contrary to the material available on the record ; and (d) the writ petition also suffers from the fatal defect of non-joinder of necessary parties. 42. As a consequence of the aforesaid discussion, the action of the respondents in not acceding to the prayer of the petitioner for according him seniority from the appointment order Annex.3 dated 20/22.4.1978 cannot be called into question as the same does not suffer from any infirmity, illegality or arbitrariness. 43. Consequently, there is no force in the instant writ petition and the same is hereby dismissed. 44. No order as to costs.