JUDGMENT : 1. The instant Second Appeal has been filed by the appellants/defendants assailing the judgment and decree dated 07.03.2014 passed by the Civil Judge No.3, Kamrup (M), Guwahati in Title Appeal No.6/2012 reversing the judgment dated 20.12.2011 and decree dated 04.01.2012 passed by the Munsiff No.3, Kamrup at Guwahati in Title Suit No.278 of 2003. 2. The plaintiff is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and is governed by a set of bye laws framed under the law. The plaintiff has instituted the suit represented by its General Secretary Sri Dharani Talukdar. The plaintiff’s case, in brief, is that a general meeting of the plaintiff society was held on 06.07.1997 wherein altogether 19 members were elected in the Executive Committee including Sri Bipul Deori as the President and Sri Dharani Talukdar as the General Secretary for a three year term. The next general meeting of the plaintiff was held on 20.08.2000 wherein a resolution was adopted to extend the tenure of the earlier Executive Body for the next three years commencing from 1st day of Ahin corresponding to English calendar dated 17/18 September. There are two types of members in the plaintiff society viz. lifetime members whose membership fee is Rs.501/- and ordinary members whose membership fee is Rs.21/- and there are 111 members in the plaintiff Society in total. The plaintiff has alleged that except the defendant Nos. 3, 6 and 12 none of the other defendants are members in the plaintiff society. As per the instructions of the Registrar of Societies, the plaintiff society was asked to hold a meeting to form a new executive body and accordingly, notice was also issued to hold a general meeting on 12.09.2003. However, during the General Body meeting held on 12.09.2003, the defendants being accompanied by about 50/60 persons entered into the conference hall and started creating uproar as a result of which the President and the General Secretary as well as other members had to leave the venue. It has been also been alleged that the defendants with the help of such unruly persons hijacked the meeting on 12.09.2003 and got themselves elected as the office bearer of the plaintiff society in the absence of the genuine members of the society. Thereafter, the defendants had issued letter dated 15.11.2003 and 20.11.2003 asking the plaintiff to handover the charge and the accounts. Thereafter, the defendants had issued letter dated 15.11.2003 and 20.11.2003 asking the plaintiff to handover the charge and the accounts. The plaintiff has alleged that although the defendants had no power or authority to issue the aforementioned letters to the plaintiff society and notwithstanding the fact that the meeting held on 12.09.2003, where the defendants got themselves elected in the Executive Body of the plaintiff society, is completely illegal, yet, the said defendants are demanding the charge of the society as well as the accounts. The plaintiff has, therefore, instituted Title Suit No.278/2003 in the Court of Munsiff No.3, Kamrup, inter alia, praying for a decree declaring that the meeting dated 12.09.2003 as well as the resolutions adopted therein are null and void and inoperative in the eye of law; that the letters dated 15.11.2003 and 20.11.2003 are void, inoperative; for a decree of permanent injunction and for other consequential reliefs. 3. The defendants contested the suit by filing written statement wherein they have questioned the maintainability of the suit on the ground of want of cause of action; that the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties; that the suit is not properly valued etc. In their written statement, the defendants while categorically denying that the tenure of the executive committee elected on 06.07.1997 was at all extended vide resolution adopted in the General Meeting dated 20.08.2000 have further stated that the meeting held on 12.09.2003 was a valid meeting which was convened by observing all the formalities. The said meeting was held in presence of the observer from the office of the Registrar of Societies and the new Executive Committee elected in the said meeting has been functioning smoothly. The defendants have further alleged that Sri Dharani Talukdar was the General Secretary of the plaintiff society since 1997 but he did not convene any general meeting since then and on the contrary, has been running the activities of the society at his own whims and fancies by ignoring the instructions and recommendations of the Executive Committee. The defendants have further alleged that Sri Dharani Talukdar was the General Secretary of the plaintiff society since 1997 but he did not convene any general meeting since then and on the contrary, has been running the activities of the society at his own whims and fancies by ignoring the instructions and recommendations of the Executive Committee. The defendants have further alleged that since the plaintiff did not hand over the documents to the newly constituted Executive Committee despite repeated reminders issued to them, an FIR was lodged against Dharani Talukdar and Bipul Deori on the basis of which a police case was also registered under Section 406 of the IPC whereafter the aforementioned two persons have been released on bail. Bipul Deori had later on submitted his resignation as well as the audited accounts which is yet to be accepted but Sri Dharani Talukdar being the former General Secretary is still operating the SBI Account in violation of the rules and regulations. On the basis of such pleadings the defendants have prayed for dismissal of the suit. 4. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties the learned trial Court had framed the following issues :- “1. Whether the suit is maintainable in the present form? 2. Whether there is any cause of action for the suit? 3. Whether proper court fee is paid for the consequential relief? 4. Whether the defendants except defendant No.3, 6 and 12 are the members of the plaintiff society? 5. Whether on 20-8-2000 any General Meeting was held by the plaintiff society? 6. If any General Meeting was held on 20-8-2000 by the plaintiff society, whether resolution was taken in the General Meeting dtd. 20-8-2000 that the earlier Executive Members of the Body be elected for the next three years with the same portfolio as mentioned in the meeting dtd 6-7-97? 7. Whether the Registrar of Societies by letter no.402(S)/1998-99/51 dtd 3-7-03 asked the plaintiff to submit the required documents? 8. Whether the meeting dtd 12-9-03 held by the defendants was illegal and void? 9. Whether the letters dtd 15-11-03 and 20-11-03 issued by the defendant no.3 are illegal, void and inoperative? 10. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get the decree as prayed for? 11. To what relief is the plaintiff entitled?” 5. During the course of trial, both parties had led oral as well as documentary evidence. 9. Whether the letters dtd 15-11-03 and 20-11-03 issued by the defendant no.3 are illegal, void and inoperative? 10. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get the decree as prayed for? 11. To what relief is the plaintiff entitled?” 5. During the course of trial, both parties had led oral as well as documentary evidence. After hearing the learned counsels for the parties and on appraisal of the evidence on record, the learned trial Court had decided the Issue Nos.1, 2, 3, 5, 6 and 8 against the plaintiff by holding that the plaintiff has failed to prove and establish that except the defendant Nos.3, 6 and 12 the other defendants were non members of the society. The learned trial Court had further held that as per the bye- laws of the society, Sri Dharani Talukdar was not competent to institute the suit by representing the plaintiff society in view of the new Executive Committee having been formed on 12.09.2003 and therefore, Dharani Talukdar did not have any locus standi to represent the plaintiff society. The trial Court had also held that the plaintiff had not paid proper court fee in the suit. The trial Court had further held that the plaintiff has failed to prove that the meeting held on 12.09.2003 and the resolutions adopted therein were illegal, arbitrary and dehors the law and as such it was held that there was no cause of action for instituting the suit. On the basis of such finding, the plaintiff’s suit was dismissed by the learned trial court. 6. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court dismissing the suit, the plaintiff as appellant had approached the Court of learned Civil Judge No.3, Kamrup (M), Guwahati preferring Title Appeal No.6/2012. After hearing the submissions of learned counsel for the parties, the learned Lower Appellate Court had reversed the decree of dismissal passed by trial Court by holding that the plaintiff has succeeded in proving and establishing its case. The learned Lower Appellate Court has held that by producing Exts-15, 16 and 17 the plaintiff has succeeded in establishing that except the names of defendant Nos.3, 6 and 12 the others are not members of the society since their names did not figure in the list furnished by the plaintiff. The learned Lower Appellate Court has held that by producing Exts-15, 16 and 17 the plaintiff has succeeded in establishing that except the names of defendant Nos.3, 6 and 12 the others are not members of the society since their names did not figure in the list furnished by the plaintiff. The learned Lower Appellate Court had also held that since it is the defendants who have asserted that they are members of the society, hence, the burden to prove that they are members of the society was upon the defendants which burden they had failed to discharge by leading evidence. 7. On the question of locus standi of Sri Dharani Talukdar to institute the suit, by referring to Section 6 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860, the learned Lower Appellate Court had observed that either the President or the General Secretary of a society may institute a suit on behalf of the society. It has been held that although the Bye- Laws of the Plaintiff society provides that both the President and Secretary shall represent the plaintiff society in a suit, yet, since the Bye Laws of the society is not above section 6 of the Act of 1860, hence, Sri Dharani Talukdar could validly institute the suit all by himself as the General Secretary of the plaintiff society. On the basis of such reasoning the learned Lower Appellate Court had interfered with the findings recorded by the learned trial Court to the effect that Sri Dharani Talukdar did not have the locus standi to represent the plaintiff society. The learned Lower Appellate Court had also held that the meeting held on 12.09.2003 was a public meeting and not a general meeting and therefore, the Executive Committee formed therein was also illegal. On the basis of such findings the learned Lower appellate Court had decreed the suit filed by the plaintiff society by granting all the reliefs subject to payment of deficit court fee. 8. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and decree of reversal dated 07.03.2014 passed by the lower appellate court in Title Appeal No.6/2012, the defendants as appellants have preferred the instant Second Appeal. This Court had framed three substantial questions of law on which the appeal is to be heard and the said questions are as follows :- “1. 8. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and decree of reversal dated 07.03.2014 passed by the lower appellate court in Title Appeal No.6/2012, the defendants as appellants have preferred the instant Second Appeal. This Court had framed three substantial questions of law on which the appeal is to be heard and the said questions are as follows :- “1. Whether the finding of the first appellate Court that meeting held in the year 2003 was by the non-members is perverse? 2. Whether the learned first appellate Court wrongly shifted the burden to defendant for proving that the meeting was duly held? 3. Whether the Secretary of the Society can alone represent the society in a suit or proceeding when the bye-laws provide that such representation can only be made jointly by the Secretary and President and in the absence of it whether Section 6 of the Society Registration Act, 1860 would entitle the Secretary alone to represent the society?” 9. I have heard Mr. H. K. Deka, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants and also heard Mr. G. N. Kakati, learned counsel representing the respondents. 10. Arguing in support of the first and second substantial questions of law Mr. Deka, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants, submits that both the aforementioned questions are co- related inasmuch as both the substantial questions of law pertains to the conclusion arrived at by the learned Lower Appellate Court as regards the burden of proof of the parties in establishing their respective cases. Mr. Deka submits that it is the case of the plaintiff society that except the defendant Nos.3, 6 and 12 none of the other defendants are members of the society and that the meeting held on 12.09.2003 was vitiated due to presence of large number of non-members thereby rendering the resolutions adopted therein as null and void. However, a perusal of the materials on record would go to show that the plaintiff has failed to prove and establish the said fact by leading evidence. Mr. Deka submits that although by producing Exts-15, 16 and 17 the plaintiff has made an attempt to show that the defendants except defendant Nos.3, 6 and 12 are non-members of the society, yet, the aforesaid exhibits depicted factual positions which were in clear contradiction with the pleaded stand of the plaintiff. Mr. Deka submits that although by producing Exts-15, 16 and 17 the plaintiff has made an attempt to show that the defendants except defendant Nos.3, 6 and 12 are non-members of the society, yet, the aforesaid exhibits depicted factual positions which were in clear contradiction with the pleaded stand of the plaintiff. That apart, the Exts-15 and 16 (list of members) did not bear the seal and signature of any competent authority and therefore, the said documents are not even admissible in evidence. 11. Mr. Deka has further submitted that since the plaintiff society has purportedly instituted the instant suit through a person claiming himself to be its General Secretary, hence, the plaintiff ought to have produced the authenticated members register so as to establish the fact that the defendants are non members of the society as alleged by the plaintiff. However, no such attempt has been made by the plaintiff. 12. Mr. Deka further submits that although the plaintiff has alleged that the meeting held on 12.09.2003 has been vitiated by presence of large number of non members, however, the said fact also could not be proved by the plaintiff by leading cogent evidence on record. However, notwithstanding the same, the learned lower Appellate Court has erroneously shifted the burden of proof upon the defendants to show that they are members of the society and thereby reversed the findings of the trial Court by holding that the plaintiff has succeeded in proving its case. 13. By relying upon a decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Anil Rishi v. Gurbaksh Singh reported in (2006) 5 SCC 556 Mr. Deka submits that the burden of proving a fact rests on the party which substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue. In the instant case, since the plaintiff has asserted the fact that the defendants except the defendant Nos.3, 6 and 12 are non members and the meeting held on 12.09.2003 was attended by a number of outsiders, it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove the said fact by leading evidence. By placing reliance on a decision of the Full Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court reported in AIR 1959 AP 215 in the case of Nelluru Sundaramanareddi and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh and others, Mr. By placing reliance on a decision of the Full Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court reported in AIR 1959 AP 215 in the case of Nelluru Sundaramanareddi and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh and others, Mr. Deka further submits that the overall burden of proof cast under Section 101 of the Evidence would never shift and the same would always remain upon the plaintiff. Merely because a statement of fact is made in a negative form in the plaint cannot absolve the plaintiff of proving and establishing the said fact on which the very plaint is founded. 14. As regards the 3rd substantial question of law, by referring to the provision of Section 6 of the Societies Registration Act read with the relevant clause of the bye laws, Mr. Deka submits that the bye laws would compliment and qualify the provision of Section 6 so as to determine as to who may represent the society in a suit. In view of the clear language of Section 6 of the Act read with the relevant provision of the bye laws, it is apparent that in case of the plaintiff society it is only the President and the General Secretary together who would be competent to represent the plaintiff society in a law suit. He, submits that first of all , Sri Dharani Talukdar is no longer the General Secretary of the plaintiff society with effect from 12.09.2003 as a new Executive Committee had taken over the affairs of the society on that day. As such, he could not have instituted a suit in the name of the plaintiff society. Even assuming that Sri Dharani Talukdar was the General Secretary on the date of institution of the suit even in that case in view of the specific provision contained in the bye laws of the society he alone could not have instituted the aforesaid suit in the name of the plaintiff society without joining the president. He, therefore, submits that the plaintiff does not have any locus standi in the matter and the said issue was rightly decided by the learned trial Court. However, the decision of the learned Lower Appellate Court in reversing the said finding is ex facie illegal and hence, the same is liable to be interfered with by this Court. He, therefore, submits that the plaintiff does not have any locus standi in the matter and the said issue was rightly decided by the learned trial Court. However, the decision of the learned Lower Appellate Court in reversing the said finding is ex facie illegal and hence, the same is liable to be interfered with by this Court. Mr Deka submits that the word ‘and’ used in the bye laws has to be given its due meaning, the language being clear and unambiguous. In support of his aforesaid contention, Mr. Deka places reliance upon a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sri Jeyaram Educational Trust and others v. A. G. Syed Mohideen and others, reported in (2010)2 SCC 513 . 15. Per contra, Mr. G. N. Kakati, learned counsel for the respondents, submits that by producing Exts-15, 16 and 17 the plaintiff society has demonstrated the fact that the names of the defendants except a few of them were not included in the said list. Although Exts-15 and 16 are not the lists of members which bore the seal and signature of any authority, yet, the defendants did not raise any objection at the time of introduction of the said documents and as such they cannot be allowed to raise objections about the admissibility of the said documents at this belated stage. He further submits that based on Exts-15, 16 and 17 the learned Lower Appellate Court had recorded a finding of fact to the effect that all the defendants are not members of the plaintiff society. The onus of showing that the defendants are all members of the plaintiff society was clearly upon the defendants side which onus they had failed to discharge. If the defendants were all members of the plaintiff society then there should not have been any difficulty for them to produce the membership register in support of their claim. Since the defendants have failed to do so, hence, there is no illegality or perversity in the finding recorded by the learned Lower Appellate Court on the aforesaid issue. 16. If the defendants were all members of the plaintiff society then there should not have been any difficulty for them to produce the membership register in support of their claim. Since the defendants have failed to do so, hence, there is no illegality or perversity in the finding recorded by the learned Lower Appellate Court on the aforesaid issue. 16. By referring to a decision of this Court reported in the case of Haladhar Sarma v. Assam Go-Seva Samity reported in AIR 1979 GAUHATI 23 as well as a decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court reported in AIR 1982 AP 138 in the case of Andhra Pradesh Kuruma Sangham Society v. Mirza Ayanutullah Baig Mr. Kakati submits that the defendants have not disputed in categorical terms the competence of Dharani Talukdar to institute the suit. Even in the memorandum of appeal they have referred to Dharani Talukdar as the General Secretary of the plaintiff society. Once the appellants have recognized Dharani Talukdar as the General Secretary of the plaintiff they cannot now turn back and deny his locus standi to institute the suit. He further submits that since they have not pleaded the question of locus standi in the written statement, hence, the appellants cannot be permitted to urge the said issue for the first time at the stage of the Second Appeal. 17. Mr. Kakoti further submits that Exts-Ga and Cha would go to show that the meeting held on 12.09.2003 was a public meeting and therefore, the learned Lower Appellate Court had rightly observed that the meeting was not validly conducted as the same was a public meeting and not a General Meeting of the plaintiff society. Since such finding of fact has been recorded on the basis of materials on record, hence, there is no illegality or infirmity in the findings recorded by the learned Court below. 18. Referring to a decision of the Allahabad High Court reported in AIR (37) 1950 Allahabad 447 [Pheru Ahir and another v. Mangru Gandaria and others] Mr. Kakati submits that the word ‘determination’ used in Section 6 of the Societies Registration Act would have to be given its due meaning so as to conclude that the provision of the Act would have an overriding effect over the bye law. Therefore, the interpretation of the Lower Appellate Court is perfectly justified and in accordance with the Rules. Kakati submits that the word ‘determination’ used in Section 6 of the Societies Registration Act would have to be given its due meaning so as to conclude that the provision of the Act would have an overriding effect over the bye law. Therefore, the interpretation of the Lower Appellate Court is perfectly justified and in accordance with the Rules. Contending that the plaintiff was entitled to a relief of permanent injunction on the basis of the declaratory relief sought for by him, Mr. Kakati has placed reliance on a decision of the Full Bench of Allahabad High Court rendered in the case of Chief Inspector of Stamps, U.P. Allahabad v. Mahanth Lazmi Narain and others reported in AIR 1970 ALLAHABAD 488 to contend that once the relief of declaration is granted in favour of the plaintiff, the consequential relief of injunction would follow automatically as otherwise the decree itself would become meaningless. 19. I have considered the rival submissions of the parties and have also perused the materials on record. In the instant case the plaintiff has filed the suit seeking a declaration that the meeting held on 12.09.2003 is not a general meeting of the plaintiff society but was a public meeting attended by large number of outsiders and that the proceedings and/or resolutions adopted in the said meeting stood vitiated in the eye of law. The plaintiff has further alleged that except defendant Nos.3, 6 and 12 the other defendants are all non members who have been inducted into the Executive Body of the plaintiff society. The plaintiff has tried to prove and establish the said fact by placing reliance on Ext-15 which is a list of executive members as well as Ext-16 which is the membership collection register of general members. The learned Lower Appellate Court has held that Ext-15 contains the name of defendant Nos.8, 12, 15 and 18 whereas the name of defendant No.11 is included in Ext-16. The said finding of fact appears to be contrary to the pleaded stand of the plaintiff. That apart, the document Ext-16 is not certified or signed by any Executive Member of the plaintiff society and as such the same was apparently not an authentic list of members. Such being the position Exts-15 and 16 were not even admissible in evidence. 20. That apart, the document Ext-16 is not certified or signed by any Executive Member of the plaintiff society and as such the same was apparently not an authentic list of members. Such being the position Exts-15 and 16 were not even admissible in evidence. 20. On the basis of the aforesaid Exts 15, 16 and 17 the learned Lower Appellate Court has actually recorded a finding that the names of defendant Nos.3, 6, 8, 11, 12, 15 and 18 appears in the list of members but as regards the other defendants the burden of proof that they were members of the plaintiff society was upon the said defendants who have failed to convincingly establish their membership. The aforesaid view of the learned Lower Appellate Court appears to be in contradiction with the true purport and import of Section 101 of the Evidence Act, 1872. 21. It is settled law that the burden of proof being the persuasive burden cast under section 101 read with section 102 of the Evidence Act, 1872 is always upon the plaintiff side and the said burden never shifts. Once the plaintiff succeeds in prima facie establishing its case by leading cogent evidence on record, the onus would then shift upon the defendant side to lead evidence to disprove the plaintiff’s case. In the case of Anil Rishi (supra) the Hon’ble Apex Court while interpreting the mandate of Section 101 of the Evidence Act has observed as follows in paragraph 19 :- “19. There is another aspect of the matter which should be borne in mind. A distinction exists between burden of proof and onus of proof. The right to begin follows onus probandi. It assumes importance in the early stage of a case. The question of onus of proof has greater force, where the question is of , which party is to begin. Burden of proof is used in three ways : (i) to indicate the duty of bringing forward evidence in support of a proposition at the beginning or later; (ii) to make that of establishing a proposition as against all counter evidence; and (iii) an indiscriminate use in which it may mean either or both of the others. The elementary rule in Section 101 is inflexible. The elementary rule in Section 101 is inflexible. In terms of Section 102 the initial onus is always on the plaintiff and if he discharges that onus and makes out a case which entitles him to a relief, the onus shifts to the defendant to prove those circumstances, if any, which would disentitle the plaintiff to the same.” 22. In Nelluru Sundaramareddi (supra) the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court has observed in para 25 as follows :- “Section 101 gives effect to the ancient rule founded on considerations of good sense that the party who substantially asserts the affirmative of an issue has to prove it. It is well-settled that the effect of the rule cannot be circumvented by manipulating the words of the issue. Phipson in his book on “The Law of Evidence” (9th Edition, p. 33 says – I have omitted the authorities cited— “In deciding which party asserts the affirmative, regard must of course be had to its grammatical form, which latter the pleader can frequently vary at will; moreover, a negative allegation must not be confounded with the mere traverse of an affirmative one. The true meaning of the rule is that where a given allegation, whether affirmative or negative forms an essential part of a party’s case, the proof of such allegation rests on him.” 23. From the above observations what can be seen is that no matter in whatever language the averments made in the plaint be couched, the burden to prove the foundational facts so as to establish the case would always lie upon the plaintiff and the said burden would never shift upon the defendants’ side. In the instant case, what can be seen from the pleadings contained in the plaint is that the plaintiff has stated that except the defendant Nos.3, 6 and 12 the other defendants are non members of the society and the General Meeting dated 12-09-2003 stood vitiated due to the presence of large number of outsiders. However, from an examination of the records it is apparent that the plaintiff side had clearly failed to prove and establish its basic case by leading cogent evidence on record. As such, there was no reasonable basis for the learned Lower Appellate Court to reverse the finding of the trail Court on Issue No.8. However, from an examination of the records it is apparent that the plaintiff side had clearly failed to prove and establish its basic case by leading cogent evidence on record. As such, there was no reasonable basis for the learned Lower Appellate Court to reverse the finding of the trail Court on Issue No.8. Such being the position, the substantial question of law Nos.1 and 2 are answered in favour of the appellants/ defendants and against the respondent/ plaintiff. 24. Coming to the substantial question No.3, a perusal of the bye-laws of the society would go to show that as per the said bye laws it is the President and the General Secretary who would be competent to institute any suit or proceeding in the name of the plaintiff-society. The provisions of Section 6 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 reads as follows :- “6. Suits by and against societies.-- Every society registered under this Act may sue or be sued in the name of the president, chairman, or principal secretary, or trustees, as shall be determined by the rules and regulations of the society and, in default of such determination, in the name of such person as shall be appointed by the governing body for the occasion. Provided that it shall be competent for any person having a claim, or demand against the society, to sue the president or chairman, or principal secretary or the trustees thereof, if on application to the governing body some other officer or person be not nominated to be the defendant.” 25. From a conjoint reading of Section 6 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 read with the bye-laws of the society, it is thus apparent that in the absence of any repugnancy with the Act of 1860, it is the bye-laws of the society which would determine the person(s) competent to represent the society in a legal proceeding. A perusal of the relevant provisions of bye laws leave no manner of doubt that the same is in consonance with the provisions of section 6 of the Act of 1860 and hence, in case of plaintiff society, it is both the President and the General Secretary who would have to represent the society in a suit or a legal proceeding and the same cannot be done by one of the entities. 26. 26. That apart, the pleadings contained in the plaint does not disclose as to in what manner Sri Dharani Talukdar has continued to remain in the post of General Secretary of the society beyond 12.09.2003. Even if it is presumed that the meeting held on 12.09.2003 is not valid in the eye of law, even in that case , as per the bye laws of the society, the term of an Executive Body having been expressly limited to a period of three years, upon expiry of the term of the Executive Committee, Sri Dharani Talukdar could not have continued as a General Secretary in the absence of a valid re-election. The plaintiff has failed to produce any material before the Court to show that he continued to remain in the post of General Secretary of the plaintiff society after the expiry of three years reckoned from 20.08.2000. Therefore, viewed from any angle, Sri Dharani Talukdar was not competent to institute the abovementioned suit representing the Plaintiff Society nor did the plaintiff society have any cause of action against the defendants so as to institute the suit. As such, the learned trail court had rightly decided the point of maintainability against the plaintiff. 27. In view of what has been discussed herein before, the substantial question No.3 also stands answered in favour of the appellants/ defendants and against the plaintiff/respondent. Consequently, this Second Appeal must succeed and the same is hereby allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the learned Lower Appellate Court stands set aside. In the result, the plaintiff’s suit would stand dismissed. Parties to bear their own cost.