JUDGMENT : Jayant Patel, J. As the learned single Judge passed common order in the Special Civil Applications, the present appeals are considered simultaneously. 2. Admit. Mr. Mishra, learned counsel for the respondents waives service of notice. With the consent of the learned counsel for both the sides, the appeals are finally heard. 3. All the appeals are directed against the common order dated 23.6.2015 passed by the learned single Judge in the respective cases, whereby the learned single Judge, for the reasons recorded in the order has directed that the petitioners shall be treated as permanent employees on completion of two years of their ad hoc service and the resultant effect would be that the same will take effect from 2007 onwards. 4. We have heard Mr. Shalin Mehta, learned Senior Advocate appearing with Mr. Gadhia for the appellant and Mr. Mishra, learned counsel for the respondents. 5. The only contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant was that in spite of the fact that petition was filed in the year 2015, the learned single Judge granted benefit with retrospective effect, that too from 2007 onwards. He submitted that the concerned employees who are the respondents herein were appointed on ad hoc basis in 2005 and even if it is considered for the sake of examination that after two years their cases were required to be considered for regularisation, then also such right, at the most could be said to have accrued in 2007. But the original petitioners slept over such right and did not pursue the matter at all except making representation and after about 8 years in the year 2015, the petitions were preferred by them. The learned single Judge could grant the benefit from prospective effect but such benefit could not be conferred with retrospective effect, that too from 8 years back and, therefore, the learned single Judge can be said to have committed an error to that extent. 6. Whereas Mr. Mishra, learned counsel appearing for the respondents-original petitioners submitted that the concerned petitioners were appointed on compassionate ground on ad hoc basis but on regular post. Once they were given compassionate appointment, it was unlike the case of ad hoc employees who were to be regularised. One can rather say that the posts were available but appointment can be given on regular basis. Once they were given compassionate appointment, it was unlike the case of ad hoc employees who were to be regularised. One can rather say that the posts were available but appointment can be given on regular basis. In any case, they were required to be regularised on completion of the period of two years, but for about 8 years, no action was taken in spite of the recommendation made by the Trust to the higher authority and therefore, the petitions were preferred. In the impugned order, the learned single Judge has rightly considered the aspect that there was right of regularisation upon completion of two years and other similarly situated employees were also granted all the benefits, but the petitioners were left out and, therefore, the learned single Judge granted the benefit appropriately. 7. It was alternatively submitted by the learned counsel appearing for both the parties that if reasonable period is considered prior to the date of filing of the petitions, the same may be appropriate and this Court may modulate the relevant relief to that extent. 8. In our view, there is considerable force in the contention that the original petitioners did not take any action for about 8 years and have approached to the Court in the year 2015. But at the same time, on merits, there is good case for the original petitioners for regularisation since they were appointed on the compassionate ground. As such, it was not a case of regularisation but it could rather be said as confirmation in service because the appointments were not purely on ad hoc basis but rather were appointed on regular post on compassionate ground. It is hardly required to be stated that even if compassionate appointments are offered, they are on regular posts and the employee so offered appointment has to meet with regularisation criteria, but they cannot be thrown out from service on the ground that they were temporary or ad hoc. If the original petitioners had right to be considered for regular salary on the post in question, the fact remains that for about 8 years, they did not take any action by approaching before the Court. There is delay to that extent and such delay has not been properly explained except that representations were being made. If the original petitioners had right to be considered for regular salary on the post in question, the fact remains that for about 8 years, they did not take any action by approaching before the Court. There is delay to that extent and such delay has not been properly explained except that representations were being made. Considering the facts and circumstances, we find that when on merit, there was a good case but as there is delay, the petitioners can at the most, get the benefit of period of three years from the date of filing of the petition and not prior thereto since the right could be said as not pursued during the period of delay and, therefore, the Court may decline the relief on the equitable consideration. We do not find further to be discussed on the said aspect since the learned counsel for both the sides have also not seriously resisted the question of grant of benefit up to three years. Suffice it to say that considering the facts and circumstances, the benefit can be made available to the original petitioners at the most up to the period of three years from the date of filing of the petition and not prior thereto. 9. In view of the above observation and discussion, the impugned order passed by the learned single Judge is modified to the extent that the benefit of regularisation in service for getting benefit at par with the permanent employee would be available to the original petitioners from January, 2012 onwards. The direction given by the learned single Judge for earlier period, that is prior to January, 2012 shall stand quashed and set aside. The appeals are allowed to the aforesaid extent. It is observed that the present decision shall not be treated as a precedent. 10. Considering the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs. Writ Appeals partly allowed.