ORDER : Akil Abdul Hamid Kureshi, J. 1. Petitioner is a judicial officer. He is visited with a chargesheet dated 15.06.2012. He is placed under suspension pending such departmental inquiry. He has prayed for quashing such departmental inquiry and to reinstate him with difference in salary. He has also prayed for grant of full rent of Rs. 8000/- per month for the entire period, inclusive of arrears. 2. Learned counsel Mr. J.T. Trivedi for the petitioner argued at length on the question of validity of initiation of the departmental proceedings. We also heard learned counsel Mr. Hemang Shah for the High Court administration and learned AGP Mr. Vandan Bakshi on this issue. Before we advert to this, we make it clear that we have not examined the question of the rate at which the petitioner should receive HRA during his suspension. In other words, we have examined only the main challenge of the petitioner to the departmental proceedings. The question of the rate at which he should receive his HRA is not decided in this petition. It would be open for the petitioner to take out separate proceedings, if so desired, since the two reliefs are unconnected. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the inquiry against the petitioner was conducted upon anonymous and pseudonymous complaints. Such complaints should not have been entertained by the High Court administration. The entire action of initiation of departmental proceedings for issuance or chargesheet was, therefore, illegal. Counsel submitted that, as a judicial officer the petitioner should be protected by the High Court against frivolous complaints which would be even otherwise in the interest of administration of justice. 4. In support of this contention, counsel placed reliance on a Circular dated 19.01.2015 issued by the High Court laying down the guidelines to be followed while dealing with complaints against members of subordinate judiciary. Counsel submitted that in terms of such guidelines, no action would be taken unless the complaint is accompanied by duly sworn affidavit and verifiable material to substantiate the allegations contained therein. Thus, no action could be initiated on anonymous or pseudonymous complaints. Counsel submitted that in view of such Circular, the departmental inquiry against the petitioner should be dropped. 5. Counsel submitted that in terms of such guidelines, no action would be taken unless the complaint is accompanied by duly sworn affidavit and verifiable material to substantiate the allegations contained therein. Thus, no action could be initiated on anonymous or pseudonymous complaints. Counsel submitted that in view of such Circular, the departmental inquiry against the petitioner should be dropped. 5. Independently of this Circular, counsel placed reliance on the following decisions of the Supreme Court in support of his contention: "(i) In case of R.C. Sood v. High Court of Judicature at Rajasthan reported in AIR 1999 SC 707 , in which the Supreme Court observed as under: "Another error which was committed was that the Court in its resolution of 30th November, 1994 took into consideration the complaint of Vijay Singh even though the same was not supported by an affidavit. The Chief Justice had by his order dated 12th May, 1994, decided that no complaint against a judicial officer should be entertained unless it is supported by an affidavit. Though this was an administrative order it was passed by the Chief Justice in exercise of the powers conferred on him by Rule 32 (2) of the said Rules. There was no reason as to why this order should have been ignored and the complaint of Vijay Singh entertained even though it was not supported by an affidavit." (ii) In case of Ishwar Chand Jain v. High Court of Punjab and Haryana reported in AIR 2001 SC 575 , in which the Supreme Court observed as under: "19. Before we part with the judgment and record our conclusion in the matter we would wish to highlight one aspect of the matter which needs to be considered with care and caution so far as the judicial officers are concerned. Judiciary is one of the three organs of the State and owes constitutional responsibility. Responsiveness to the needs of a litigant to have the matter disposed of expeditiously cannot be decried in any way and in any event is the need of the day. The petitioner herein has been in the judicial service since 1983 (if that date had to be taken note of) and a long period of seventeen years has been spent more in the law Courts in ventilating the personal grievance rather than redressing the grievances of the litigant public. The petitioner herein has been in the judicial service since 1983 (if that date had to be taken note of) and a long period of seventeen years has been spent more in the law Courts in ventilating the personal grievance rather than redressing the grievances of the litigant public. All of us owe a duty to the public at large and one need not take the extreme recourse unless placed against a wall. There might be some grievances here and there or some dissatisfaction about service conditions but that will not otherwise authorise a judicial officer to indulge in fanciful litigations..." 6. On the other hand, learned counsel Mr. Hemang Shah for the High Court administration drew our attention to its reply and submitted that the Circular dated 19.01.2015 would not apply to pending cases since it was not applied with retrospective effect. There were serious allegations in the complaints levelled against the petitioner. These complaints were inquired into and upon finding prima facie evidence to proceed further, chargesheet was issued against the petitioner. He would have full opportunity to defend himself. He has participated in the chargesheet proceedings for three years and at the belated stage filed the petition. 7. Having heard learned advocates for the parties and having perused the material on record, we notice that in the impugned chargesheet there are as many as nine charges leveled against the petitioner. These charges are as under: "While you were working as Principal Civil Judge & JMFC, Sinor, District - Vadodara during the period from 29.1.2009 to 16.10.2010 and working as Principal Civil Judge & JMFC, Naliya, District-Kahchh, during the period from 18.10.2010 to 5.1.2012, it has been reported that you had indulged in to the activities as mentioned herein below: I You were closely associated with one Ms. Jayshri @ Jyoti @ Chhamma of Village Vinzan by frequently making telephone calls with her for the purpose other than judicial. The details of the telephonic conversation made between both of you is mentioned in the Statement of Imputation. Jayshri @ Jyoti @ Chhamma of Village Vinzan by frequently making telephone calls with her for the purpose other than judicial. The details of the telephonic conversation made between both of you is mentioned in the Statement of Imputation. In Criminal Case No. 713 of 2011 pending before your Court, accused Jayshri @ Jyoti @ Chhamma tendered a Pursis pleading that she had been falsely implicated in the case by Police and thus she did not plead guilty, you, on consideration of your personal association with her and with an intention to save her from trial and possible harsher punishment as also to conclude the case on the last day of your duties at Nalia, took up the cased on 4.1.2012 (date) even though summons was yet to be served and was fixed to be returned on 21.1.2012 (date) and passed a lenient sentence of imprisonment against her until rising of the Court as also a fine of Rs. 500/- and in default a further imprisonment of 10 days. This act of yours, if proved, would amount to dereliction of duty, a misconduct as also a conduct unbecoming of a Judicial Officer. II You misused the authority as a Judicial Officer by using the vehicle belonging to Mr. Krishnalal Vasawa, a Police Constable of Sinor Police Station in the year 2010. You approached Ms. Manishaben Maganbhai Patel, daughter of Mr. Maganbhai Antolbhai Patel, who was the plaintiff of Regular Civil Suit No. 5 of 2010, for sexual favours as a consideration for deciding the said suit in favour of her father viz. Maganbhai. You then decreed the said suit within a period of 21 days on receiving sexual favour from Ms. Manishaben, a daughter of plaintiff i.e. Maganbhai Antholbhai Patel. This act of yours, if proved, would amount to a misconduct as also a conduct unbecoming of a Judicial Officer. III Since Mr. Rameshchandra B. Bhatt has made a statement in the present inquiry against you, you, by keeping grudge against Mr. Rameshchandra Balchandra Bhatt rejected all his genuine applications for adjournment in Criminal Case No. 786/2008, though he had attended the court even in heavy rain and prayed to adjourn the matter to next day. This act of yours, if proved, would amount to dereliction of duty, a misconduct as also a conduct unbecoming of a Judicial Officer. Rameshchandra Balchandra Bhatt rejected all his genuine applications for adjournment in Criminal Case No. 786/2008, though he had attended the court even in heavy rain and prayed to adjourn the matter to next day. This act of yours, if proved, would amount to dereliction of duty, a misconduct as also a conduct unbecoming of a Judicial Officer. IV As a consideration for discharge of your judicial duties for deciding Maintenance applications lodged by Ms. Varshaben Purohit known as 'Matki", resident of Sinor, Ms. Gulshanbibi of village Mandva, Ms. Shilpaben Chimanbhai of Village Barkar and Civil Case filed by Mr. Dahyabhai Patel, husband of Ms. Shushilaben Patel who was residing in the street of Ms. Manishaben at Sinor, against her you sought sexual favours from them. You also kept illicit relations with other women named Ms. Mayaben Nagjibhai of Village Sinor and Madhuben of Village Sinor who was doing household work at your residence and Jayaben, a bootlegger of Village Sinor. This act of yours, if proved, do not befitting a Judicial Officer and is an act unbecoming of a Judicial Officer as also a misconduct. V You met parties to the Regular Civil Suit Nos. 14/98 and 24/98 at different times in the shop of goldsmith at Petlad for illegal gratification. This act of yours, if proved, would amount to misconduct as also a failure on your part to maintain aloofness and absolute integrity. VI You have reportedly indulged into an act of sexual harassment of Ms. Sarojben Vasava, an Assistant working in your Court at work place i.e. in your Chamber in the Court premises. Under the guise of asking her to search for a book from your Library in your Chamber, you made advances towards her and physically contacted her by catching hold of her and kissing her on her chicks. On various occasions, you also made advances towards her with an intention to press her breast. In order to compel her to give into your sexual demands, you harassed Ms. Sarojben by asking her to work beyond office hours in violation of Government Circular No. (OFT)1082//1084/G.H. dated 2.8.1982. You also denied to her right to take Leave even though she had sufficient reasons until with a view to compel her to give into your sexual demands. In order to compel her to give into your sexual demands, you harassed Ms. Sarojben by asking her to work beyond office hours in violation of Government Circular No. (OFT)1082//1084/G.H. dated 2.8.1982. You also denied to her right to take Leave even though she had sufficient reasons until with a view to compel her to give into your sexual demands. In the court premises in your Chamber, you have been found to be in company of one lady with whom you had established physical contacts by holding her hands. You have thus failed to maintain the dignity and decorum of the Court. You also used your Chamber for non-judicial purpose for which you were not authorized. This act of yours, if proved, are the acts in violation of Rule 3(A) & (B) of the Gujarat Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1971, and also dereliction of duty, a misconduct as also a conduct unbecoming of a Judicial Officer. VII You have been in frequent contacts with Ms. Manjulaben - Widow of Mr. V.C. Patel - Advocate (since expired) telephonically as well as otherwise for the purpose other than judicial. The details of the telephonic conversation made between both of you is mentioned in the Statement of Imputation. This act of yours, if proved, would amount to misconduct as also failure on your part to maintain judicial aloofness and also an act unbecoming of a Judicial Officer. VIII An application of registration of birth filed by Mr. Naginbhai M. Patel was pending in the Sinor Court after your posting at Sinor, you hired on rental basis a Residential Premises belonging to the said Mr. Naginbhai M. Patel and failed to intimate the said fact to the Competent Authority. You however falsely insisted that you have informed said fact to the competent authority. This act of yours, if proved, would amount to dereliction of duty, a misconduct as also a conduct unbecoming of a Judicial Officer. IX You had no reason to be in close association with Mr. R.K. Patel, an Advocate practicing in Sinor and yet you maintained close association with him by frequently being in telephonic contacts with him for the purpose other than judicial. The details of the telephonic conversation made between both of you is mentioned in the Statement of Imputation. You had also relation with advocates Mr. P.C. Patel and N.R. Patel of Sinor. The details of the telephonic conversation made between both of you is mentioned in the Statement of Imputation. You had also relation with advocates Mr. P.C. Patel and N.R. Patel of Sinor. You obliged the litigants of the cases pending in your court, referred to the said advocates who acted as your intermediary for non judicial consideration. This act of yours, if proved, would amount to a misconduct as also a failure on your part to maintain aloofness and absolute integrity...." 8. Perusal of the charges would demonstrate that there are serious allegations of misconduct and misbehaviour against the petitioner. At this stage it is not possible to judge validity or otherwise of the charges. When the inquiry is in progress, it is not the task of the Court to go into the truth or otherwise of the allegations levelled against the petitioner. As noted, the sole ground pressed in service for quashing the chargesheet is that the inquiry was instituted upon anonymous and pseudonymous complaints which, at the outset, has not been verified and, in any case, by virtue of the said Circular dated 19.01.2015 would be rendered invalid. 9. Both the above contentions cannot be accepted. First and foremost, the complaints against the petitioner have been made either anonymously or pseudonymously. Nevertheless, after conducting preliminary inquiry only, the chargesheet was issued. Whatever be the source of initial intimation or information to the High Court, it was later on found, upon preliminary inquiry, that there was enough material to proceed further against the petitioner departmentally. The chargesheet cannot, therefore, be quashed on this ground. 10. In case of Transport Commissioner, Madras v. A. Radha Krishna Moorthy reported in (1995) 1 SCC 332 , the Supreme Court observed that correctness of the charges levelled in a chargesheet would not be subject to judicial review prior to conclusion of departmental inquiry. Even after conclusion of departmental inquiry, the scope of judicial review is restricted to the charges based on the evidence on record. It was observed that, truth and correctness of the charges was not a matter for the Tribunal to go into, more particularly at a stage prior to the conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings. The Court observed as under: "7. It was observed that, truth and correctness of the charges was not a matter for the Tribunal to go into, more particularly at a stage prior to the conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings. The Court observed as under: "7. So far as the truth and correctness of the charges is concerned, it was not a matter for the Tribunal to go into more particularly at a stage prior to the conclusion of the disciplinary enquiry. As pointed out by this Court repeatedly, even when the matter comes to the Tribunal after the imposition of punishment, it has no jurisdiction to go into truth of the allegations/charges except in a case where they are based on no evidence, i.e., where they are perverse. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal is akin to that of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is power of judicial review. It only examines the procedural correctness of the decision making process. For this reason the order of the Tribunal insofar as it goes into or discusses the truth and correctness of the charges, is unsustainable in law." 11. In case of Union of India v. N. Saxena reported in AIR 1992 SC 1233 , while recognizing that there may be departmental proceedings against a delinquent officer indicating culpability in the course of judicial proceedings, the Supreme Court criticized the Tribunal granting stay in such inquiry. It was observed as under: "6. In the first place, we cannot, but confess our astonishment at the impugned order passed by the tribunal. In a case like this the tribunal, we feel, should have been very careful before granting stay in a disciplinary proceeding at an interlocutory stage. The imputations made against the respondent were extremely serious and the facts alleged, if proved, would have established misconduct and misbehaviour. It is surprising that without even a counter being filed, at an interim stage, the tribunal without giving any reasons and without apparently considering whether the memorandum of charges deserved to be enquired into or not, granted a stay of disciplinary proceedings as it has done. If the disciplinary proceedings in such serious matters are stayed so lightly as the tribunal appears to have done, it would be extremely difficult to bring any wrong-doer to book. If the disciplinary proceedings in such serious matters are stayed so lightly as the tribunal appears to have done, it would be extremely difficult to bring any wrong-doer to book. We have, therefore, no hesitation in setting aside the impugned order of the tribunal and we direct that the disciplinary proceedings against the respondent in terms of the chargesheet dated March 13, 1989 shall be proceeded with according to law. In fact, we would suggest that disciplinary proceedings should be proceeded with as early as possible and with utmost zeal." "8. In our view, an argument that no disciplinary action can be taken in regard to actions taken or purported to be done in the course of judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings is not correct. It is true that when an officer is performing judicial or quasi-judicial functions disciplinary proceedings regarding any of his actions in the course of such proceedings should be taken only after great caution and a close scrutiny of his actions and only if the circumstances so warrant. The initiation of such proceedings, it is true, is likely to shake the confidence of the public in the officer concerned and also if lightly taken likely to undermine his independence. Hence the need for extreme care and caution before initiation of disciplinary proceedings against an officer performing judicial or quasi-judicial functions in respect of his actions in the discharge or purported to discharge his functions. But it is not as if such action cannot be taken at all. Where the actions of such an officer indicate culpability, namely, a desire to oblige himself or unduly favour one of the parties or an improper motive there is no reason why disciplinary action should not be taken..." 12. We would, therefore, not be inclined to terminate the departmental inquiry only on the premise that the petitioner being a judicial officer should not be subjected to such scrutiny or exposed to departmental proceedings which would not be in the interest of administration of justice. Unless it is pointed out that the allegations are ex-facie baseless and not supported by any material on record, chargesheet cannot be quashed. This was not even the contention of the advocate of the petitioner. 13. Unless it is pointed out that the allegations are ex-facie baseless and not supported by any material on record, chargesheet cannot be quashed. This was not even the contention of the advocate of the petitioner. 13. The Circular dated 19.01.2015 provides guidelines for dealing with complaints against members of subordinate judiciary and reads as under: "As directed by the Hon'ble the Acting Chief Justice, the following guidelines are required to be followed while dealing with complaints against members of Subordinate Judiciary: A. The complaint making allegations against members of the Subordinate Judiciary in the States should not be entertained and no action should be taken thereon, unless it is accompanied by a duly sworn Affidavit and verifiable material to substantiate the allegations made therein. B. If action on such complaint meeting the above requirement is deemed necessary, authenticity of the complaint should be duly ascertained and further steps thereon should be taken only after satisfaction of the competent authority designated by the Chief Justice of the High Court. C. If the above requirements are not complied with, the complaint should be filed/lodged without taking any steps thereon....:" 14. From the Circular itself it can be seen that it is an in-house procedure adopted by the High Court for initial scrutiny of complaints received against judicial officers in the State. This Circular would not have any retrospective effect and would not be applicable to any departmental proceedings which have been initiated long before. It applies to departmental proceedings to be initiated against the judicial officers and not to departmental proceedings already initiated. While on the complaints made against the petitioner preliminary inquiry was conducted by the administration before issuance of chargesheet, the petitioner now cannot place reliance on a changed procedure for initiation of departmental proceedings against a judicial officer. Had the chargesheet against the petitioner been issued after 19.01.2015 in breach of any of the guidelines laid down therein, the position would perhaps stand on a different footing. Such is not the case here. 15. Under the circumstances, the petitioner has not made out any case for quashing the chargesheet. Before closing, we may, however, record that we have not accepted the contention of learned counsel Mr. Hemang Shah that the petition was filed belatedly. Such is not the case here. 15. Under the circumstances, the petitioner has not made out any case for quashing the chargesheet. Before closing, we may, however, record that we have not accepted the contention of learned counsel Mr. Hemang Shah that the petition was filed belatedly. As noted, one of the main grounds pressed by learned counsel for the petitioner was that by virtue of the said Circular dated 19.01.2015, even pending departmental proceedings instituted upon an anonymous complaint should not be continued. The delay if at all must be viewed in the background of such contention. 16. In the result, the petition is dismissed. All defences of the petitioner in the pending chargesheet are kept open.