Judgment Sanjay K. Agrawal, J. 1. This is plaintiffs Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short 'the CPC') against the judgment and decree dated 22.11.2014 passed by Additional District Judge, Uttar Bastar, Kanker in Civil Appeal No. 39-A/2014 affirming the judgment and decree dated 26.07.2014 passed by First Civil Judge, Class-I, Uttar Bastar, Kanker in Civil Suit No. 58-A/2003, dismissing the suit. [For the sake of convenience, the parties would be referred hereinafter as per their status shown in the plaint before the trial Court.] Appellant/plaintiff instituted a civil suit for declaration of title & permanent injunction holding that the suit land bearing Khasra No. 316, area 0.54 hectare & Khasra No. 317, area 0.99 hectare and the Tank situated therein is the land owned by the plaintiff and he is title holder of the suit land and, therefore, the defendants be restrained from interfering with their possession over the suit land and a decree be granted declaring his title over the suit land. 2. The trial Court, by its judgment & decree dated 26.07.2014, dismissed the suit holding inter alia that by order dated 12.02.2001 in a duly constituted proceedings, the subject suit land has been directed to be vested with the State Government by Sub Divisional Officer/Nistar Officer in exercise of power conferred under Section 251 of the Land Revenue Code, 1959 (henceforth 'the Code') which has been affirmed in appeal by the Collector in a appeal preferred by appellant/plaintiff. 3. On appeal being preferred by the appellant/plaintiff, the first appellate Court maintained the judgment & decree passed by the trial Court with modification in part holding that the suit is also bad for want of notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 4. Questioning the legality and validity of impugned judgment and decree, this second appeal under Section 100 has been preferred by appellant/plaintiff stating inter alia that second appeal involves substantial question of law for determination. 5. Mr. Parag Kotecha, learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff would submit that the Sub Divisional Officer, as a Nistar Officer, has no jurisdiction to pass the order dated 12.02.2001 vesting the subject suit land and tank situated therein with the Government, as the Collector is the competent authority and, as such, the order of vesting land by Sub Divisional Officer is without jurisdiction & void order. He further submits that issue No. 7 regarding non-service of notice under Section 80 CPC has been reversed by the first appellate Court against the plaintiff without any cross objection filed by the defendants/respondents, as such, this appeal involves substantial question of law for determination as required under Section 100(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 6. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the appellant on the question of admission and perused the records of both the courts below with utmost circumspection. 7. Both the courts below have concurrently held that the subject suit land with tank stood vested by order of the Nistar Officer in exercise of power conferred under Section 251 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959 which has been duly affirmed by the appellate authority in appeal and the same has not been challenged by the appellant/plaintiff though the plaintiff/appellant was party to the said proceeding and, as such, the said finding has attained finality. 8. In the matter of State of Kerala v. M.K. Kunhikannan Nambar Manjeri Munikoth, Naduvil (DEAD) and others, (1996) I SCC 435, their Lordship of the Supreme Court has held even a void-order or decision rendered between the parties will be effective inter parties until it is successfully avoided by observing as under:-- "Even a void order or decision rendered between parties cannot be said to be non-existent in all cases and in all situations. Ordinarily, such an order will, in fact, be effective inter parties until it is successfully avoided or challenged in a higher forum. Mere use of the word 'void' is not determinative of its legal impact. The word 'void' has a relative rather than an absolute meaning. It only conveys the idea that the order is invalid or illegal. It cannot be avoided." 9. The very principle laid down in the above-stated judgment has been followed by Supreme Court in the matter of Krishnadevi Malchand Kamathia v. Bombay Environmental Action Group, (2011)3 SCC 363 , holding inter alia that even for the void order, party has to approach the appropriate forum for setting aside the such an order by following words:- "16. The very principle laid down in the above-stated judgment has been followed by Supreme Court in the matter of Krishnadevi Malchand Kamathia v. Bombay Environmental Action Group, (2011)3 SCC 363 , holding inter alia that even for the void order, party has to approach the appropriate forum for setting aside the such an order by following words:- "16. It is a settled legal proposition that even if an order is void, it requires to be so declared by a competent forum and it is not permissible for any person to ignore the same merely because in his opinion the order is void. In State of Kerala v. M.K. Kunhikannan Nambiar Manjeri Munikoth Naduvil, (1996) 1 SCC 435 : AIR 1996 SC 906 , Tayabbhai v. Metadin Agarwal, (2006) 7 SCC 470 and Sneh Gupta v. Devi Sarup, (2009) 6 SCC 194 , this Court held that whether an order is valid or void, cannot be determined by the parties. For setting aside such an order, even if void, the party has to approach the appropriate forum. 19. Thus, from the above it emerges that even if the order/notification is void/voidable, the party aggrieved by the same cannot decide that the said order/notification is not binding upon it. It has to approach the court for seeking such declaration. The order may be hypothetically a nullity and even if its invalidity is challenged before the court in a given circumstance, the court may refuse to quash the same on various grounds including the standing of the petitioner or on the ground of delay or on the doctrine of waiver or any other legal reason. The order may be void for one purpose or for one person, it may not be so for another purpose or another person." 10. Having examined the legal position on the issue in hand, reverting back to the facts of the facts of the case, it would appear that appellant/plaintiff, in his suit filed, did not allege and question the order dated 12.02.2001 passed by Nistar Officer vesting the suit land and Tank therein to the State Government is void and not sought any declaration to the effect that such an order passed by Sub Divisional Officer is void & without jurisdiction though he had an opportunity to challenge the same and seek declaration that order of vesting land is null and void. 11. 11. Guided by the principles laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid cases, it is held that appellant/plaintiff has failed to question the order of vesting land in favour of the Government in the instant suit or in a duly constituted proceedings and the said order of vesting land is binding upon him and, as such, the trial Court as well as the first appellate Court is absolutely justified in dismissing the suit and, therefore, no question of law much less substantial question of law would arise for determination. 12. Very recently, in case of Laxmidevamma & others v. Ranganath & others, (2015)1 Scale 489, their Lordships of the Supreme Court has held that Second Appellate Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 of CPC, should not upset the concurrent finding of fact unless the findings so recorded are shown to be perverse. Paragraph 15 of the report states as under:- "15. Based on oral and documentary evidence, both the courts below have recorded concurrent findings of fact that plaintiffs have established their right in 'A' schedule property. In the light of concurrent findings of fact, no substantial questions of law arose in the High court and there was no substantial ground for re-appreciation of evidence. While so, the High Court proceeded to observe that the first plaintiff has earmarked the 'A' schedule property for road and that she could not have full Hedged right and on that premise proceeded to hold that declaration to plaintiffs' right cannot be granted. In exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 C.P.C., concurrent findings of fact cannot be upset by the High Court unless the findings so recorded are shown to be perverse. In our considered view, the High Court did not keep in view that the concurrent findings recorded by the courts below, are based on oral and documentary evidence and the judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained." Concurrent findings recorded by two courts below are neither perverse nor contrary to the record, accordingly, the second appeal deserves to be and is hereby dismissed at admission stage itself. No order as to costs.