JUDGMENT : Hon'ble LOHRA, J.—The appellants have laid this appeal under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (for short, 'the Act of 1923') being aggrieved by the impugned order dated 10.08.2011, passed by the learned Workman Compensation Commissioner, Udaipur. By the impugned order, the learned Commissioner has awarded compensation to the respondents-claimants to the tune of Rs.1,94,571/- with penalty of Rs.50,000/- and interest @ 12% per annum only. 2. Since the appeal is delayed by 552 days, the appellants have also moved an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay. Averments contained in the application reads as under :- 1. That the present appeal is being preferred againt the order of the learned Commissioner who had passed the order against the present applicants and has passed the order of compensation to the tune of Rs.1,94,571/-, in favour of the respondents-claimants vide order dated 10.08.2011. 2. That after obtaining the certified copy of the order dated 10.08.2011 necessary steps were taken to prefer appeal before this Hon'ble court and for that purpose after receiving the sanction of the competent authority the appeal has been filed. As such the time has been consumed in necessary administrative sanction as such the delay in filing the appeal is not intentional but is bonafide and in the interest of justice same may kindly be condoned. 3. That the applicants have got strong case on the merit of the case as well as the delay in filing this application is bona fide and not intentional and the inconvenience caused to the Hon'ble Court is highly regretted. 3. It is, therefore, most respectfully prayed that the application filed by the applicants may kindly be allowed and the delay caused infilling this appeal may kindly ordered to be condoned. 4. Any other appropriate order which this Hon'ble Court deems fit in favour of petitioners may also be passed. 5. Mr. Sanjay Raj Paliwal, learned counsel for the appellants, has urged that the cause of delay in filing the appeal is procedural and bona fide. Learned counsel would contend that it is settled law that when technical/ procedural irregularities and substantial justice are pitted out against each other, the cause of later must prevail. Learned counsel further submits that while considering application for condonation of delay, appellate Court is required to construe term 'sufficient cause' liberally for advancing the cause of justice. Learned counsel would contend that it is settled law that when technical/ procedural irregularities and substantial justice are pitted out against each other, the cause of later must prevail. Learned counsel further submits that while considering application for condonation of delay, appellate Court is required to construe term 'sufficient cause' liberally for advancing the cause of justice. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant and perused the application. 7. A bare perusal of the application for condonation of delay makes it amply clear that appellants have miserably failed to make out a case for condonation of delay inasmuch as no sufficient cause is mentioned in the application. In totality, the averments contained in the application are absolutely vague, cryptic and unspecific. 8. The argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants that, while construing sufficient cause, Court is required to adopt pragmatic approach appears to be quite attractive, but at the same time, Hon'ble Apex Court has also consistently held that gross negligence on the part of a litigant cannot be encouraged and in want of sufficient cause being shown application seeking condonation of delay is liable to be rejected. The contention of the learned counsel that the appellants have got a very strong case need not be examined at this stage because before switching on to the merits of the case, it is necessary for the petitioner to cross the hurdle of limitation. 9. Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Basawaraj & Anr.vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer ((2013) 14 SCC 81), while construing the expression “sufficient cause” and examining the intent of statute of limitation, has held as under :- 9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word “sufficient” is “adequate” or “enough”, inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word “sufficient” embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. Therefore, the word “sufficient” embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, “sufficient cause” means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted diligently” or “remained inactive”. However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land and Building Corpn. Ltd. vs. Bhutnath Banerjee, Mata Din vs. A. Narayanan, Parimal vs. Veena and Maniben Devraj Shah vs. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai.) 10. In Arjun Singh vs. Mohindra Kumar this Court explained the difference between a “good cause” and a “sufficient cause” and observed that every “sufficient cause” is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof than that of “sufficient cause”. 11. The expression “sufficient cause” should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide Madanlal vs. Shyamlal and Ram Nath Sao vs. Gobardhan Sao.) 12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. (Vide Madanlal vs. Shyamlal and Ram Nath Sao vs. Gobardhan Sao.) 12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.” The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. 13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266: “605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.—The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence.” 10. An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party’s own inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat and Kotecha Property vs. SBI Staff Assn., Rajender Singh vs. Santa Singh and Pundlik Jalam Patil vs. Jalgaon Medium Project.) 11. While construing Section 5 of the Limitation Act, it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. (See Popat and Kotecha Property vs. SBI Staff Assn., Rajender Singh vs. Santa Singh and Pundlik Jalam Patil vs. Jalgaon Medium Project.) 11. While construing Section 5 of the Limitation Act, it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of period of limitation prescribed for laying an appeal gives rise a right in favour of the decree holder to treat the decree as binding between parties. In other words, on expiry of prescribed period of limitation the decree holder acquires a benefit under law of limitation to construe the decree as beyond challenge, and this legal right which has accrued to the decree holder by lapse of time should not be light heartedly disturbed. The consideration, which is to be kept in mind by the Court is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown by the party, Court in its discretion may condone the delay. It is needless to emphasize here that even after sufficient cause has been shown by a party, it is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 12. Resultantly, application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is dismissed and accordingly the appeal is also dismissed.