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2015 DIGILAW 1271 (RAJ)

Naresh Kumar v. Khushi Ram

2015-07-09

BELA M.TRIVEDI

body2015
ORDER : Bela M. Trivedi, J. The order dated 21.03.2014 passed by the Rent Tribunal, Kota (hereinafter referred to as "the Tribunal") in the Rent Petition No.59/2009 has been challenged by the petitioner-defendant by way of present petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. By the impugned order, the Tribunal has dismissed the application of the petitioner-defendant filed under Order 6, Rule 17 of CPC seeking amendment in the written statement. 2. The respondent Khushi Ram had filed the eviction petition before the Tribunal seeking eviction of the petitioner-defendant on the ground that he required the suit shop for his son, who wanted to carry on his business in the said premises. It appears that the petitioner-defendant resisted the said eviction petition by filing the written statement. When the said petition was fixed for final hearing, the petitioner-defendant had submitted the application under Order 6, Rule 17 of CPC seeking amendment in the written statement contending inter-alia that son of the respondent had got the service in one Career Point Coaching Institute and he was no more unemployed. According to the petitioner, the said subsequent event was required to be brought on record and therefore the application seeking the amendment in the written statement was filed. The Tribunal after hearing the learned counsels for the parties, dismissed the said application vide the impugned order, against which the present petition has been filed. 3. Learned counsel Mr. Ravi Kumar Kasliwal for the petitioner placing heavy reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in case of Seshambal (dead) through L.R.s. v. M/s. Chelur Corporation, Chelur Building & Ors., AIR 2010 Supreme Court 1521 and in case of Jai Prakash Gupta (Dead) through LRs. v. Riyaz Ahamad & Anr., (2009) 10 SCC 197 , submitted that the subsequent events which took place after the filing of the suit, having material bearing on the right to relief claimed by the party, should be permitted to be brought on record by way of amendment in the pleadings. According to him, the ground on which the respondent had sought to evict the petitioner did not survive as the son of the respondent had got the job pending the suit, and therefore such fact would have material bearing on the relief claimed by the respondent-plaintiff. However, the learned counsel Mr. According to him, the ground on which the respondent had sought to evict the petitioner did not survive as the son of the respondent had got the job pending the suit, and therefore such fact would have material bearing on the relief claimed by the respondent-plaintiff. However, the learned counsel Mr. Abhi Goyal for the respondent placing reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in case of Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Srivastava, (2001) 2 Supreme Court Cases 604 and of this Court in case of Kailash Chand v. Gyan Chand Chordia (Jain) & Anr., 2014 (2) WLC (Raj.) 480, submitted that every subsequent event need not be permitted to be brought on record if same was not germane to the relief claimed. He further submitted that the son of the respondent had got the temporary service in the coaching institution, however his services have already been terminated and again he is unemployed, and that in any case his son wanted to carry on business in the suit premises, and therefore the subsequent event did not have any material bearing on the relief claimed by the respondent-plaintiff. 4. Having regard to the submissions made by the learned counsels for the parties, and to the impugned order passed by the Tribunal, it appears that the amendment in the written statement was sought to be made by the petitioner when the eviction petition was fixed for final hearing after the evidence was led by both the parties. As per the settled legal position, the right to relief must be judged by reference to the date suit or the legal proceedings when instituted. Of course, the subsequent events which are germane and have material bearing to the relief claimed by the plaintiff could be brought on record. However, at this juncture, the observations made by the Apex Court in case of Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Srivastava (supra) are required to be reproduced as under:- "10. We have no doubt that the crucial date for deciding as to the bona fides of the requirement of the landlord is the date of his application for eviction. The antecedent days may perhaps have utility for him to reach the said crucial date of consideration. We have no doubt that the crucial date for deciding as to the bona fides of the requirement of the landlord is the date of his application for eviction. The antecedent days may perhaps have utility for him to reach the said crucial date of consideration. If every subsequent development during the post-petition period is to be taken into account for judging the bona fides of the requirement pleaded by the landlord there would perhaps be no end so long as the unfortunate situation in our litigative slow-process system subsists. During 23 years, after the landlord moved for eviction on the ground that his son needed the building, neither the landlord nor his son is expected to remain idle without doing any work, lest, joining any new assignment or starting any new work would be at the peril of forfeiting his requirement to occupy the building. It is a stark reality that the longer is the life of the litigation the more would be the number of developments sprouting up during the long interregnum. If a young entrepreneur decides to launch a new enterprise and on that ground he or his father seeks eviction of a tenant from the building, the proposed enterprise would not get faded out by subsequent developments during the traditional lengthy longevity of the litigation. His need may get dusted, patina might stick on its surface, nonetheless the need would remain intact. All that is needed is to erase the patina and see the gloss. It is pernicious, and we may say, unjust to shut the door before an applicant just on the eve of his reaching the finale, after passing through all the previous levels of the litigation, merely on the ground that certain developments occurred pendente lite, because the opposite party succeeded in prolonging the matter for such unduly long period." 5. In the instant case, the respondent plaintiff having filed the suit for the bona fide requirement for his son on the ground that he wanted to carry on business in the suit premises. If during the pendency of the said proceeding, the son of the plaintiff engages himself in some temporary employment, it could not be said that his bona fide requirement to carry on business in the suit premises had come to an end. If during the pendency of the said proceeding, the son of the plaintiff engages himself in some temporary employment, it could not be said that his bona fide requirement to carry on business in the suit premises had come to an end. It cannot be expected that he should remain unemployed till the eviction proceedings filed in the courts are decided. If he had engaged himself in some temporary employment it could not be said that such event would have material bearing on the relief claimed by the respondent plaintiff. In case of Seshambal (dead) through L.R.s. v. M/s. Chelur Corporation, Chelur Building & Ors. (supra), also the Apex Court has held interalia that the right to relief must be judged by reference to the date suit or legal proceedings were instituted, however if subsequent events take place after filing of the suit, which have a bearing on the right to relief claimed by the party, such subsequent events can not be shut out from consideration. There cannot be any disagreement to the proposition of law laid down in the said case, however in the instant case, the so called subsequent event has no bearing much less substantial bearing on the relief claimed by the respondent in the suit, and therefore rightly not allowed to be brought on record by the tribunal. 6. In that view of the matter, the Court does not find any illegality or infirmity in the impugned order passed by the Tribunal, which even otherwise is just and proper. The petition being devoid of merits, is dismissed. By this order, the stay application also stands dismissed.