JUDGMENT : Sanjay Karol, J. Assailing the judgment dated 24.3.2008, passed by learned Special Judge, Una, H.P., in Sessions Case No. 4 of 2007 (Sessions Trial No. 4 of 2007), titled as State of Himachal Pradesh v. Virender Kumar, whereby respondent-accused stands acquitted, State has filed the present appeal under the provisions of Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 2. It is the case of prosecution that on 21.12.2006, SI Shakti Singh Pathania (PW-12) got a secret information that Virender Kumar (accused) who was travelling on his scooter from Santokhgar to Una was carrying charas. Such information (Ext. PW-4/A) was reduced into writing and forwarded to the Superintendent of Police, Una, through Constable Rakesh Kumar (PW-4). After associating two independent witnesses namely Surinder Kumar (PW-2) and Pawan Kumar (PW-3), naaka was set up near Rampur Bridge. Police official Daljit Singh (PW-1) was also present on the spot. At about 4.00 p.m., scooter bearing registration No. HP-20A-9886 was intercepted and after informing the accused of his statutory rights and obtaining his consent vide memo (Ext.PW-1/B), the vehicle was searched. From the dickey of the scooter, charas weighing 970 grams was recovered. Two samples of 25 grams each were drawn and sealed with seal impression-D. The remaining contraband substance was also sealed separately with the same seal impression. The contraband substance and the scooter were taken into possession vide memo (Ext. PW-1/D). NCB form (Ext. PW-12/B) in triplicate was filled up on the spot. Ruka (Ext. PW-12/C) sent through Constable Ranjit Singh (PW-5), led to registration of F.I.R. No. 546 of 2006, dated 21.12.2006 (Ext. PW-11/A), at Police Station Sadar, Distt. Una, against the accused under the provisions of Section 20 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). With the completion of necessary formalities on the spot, case property was produced before the officiating SHO, SI Mohinder Singh (PW-11) who resealed the same with his separate seal, where after the case property was deposited in the maalkhana with MHC Rajesh Kumar (PW-6). Special report (Ext. PW8/A) sent to the office of Superintendent of Police, Una was received by ASI Gian Chand (PW-8). HC Nirmal Singh (PW-7) carried the sample parcel to the Central Forensic Science Laboratory, Chandigarh and report (Ext. PW-9/A) taken on record by the police. Special report (Ext. PW8/A) sent to the office of Superintendent of Police, Una was received by ASI Gian Chand (PW-8). HC Nirmal Singh (PW-7) carried the sample parcel to the Central Forensic Science Laboratory, Chandigarh and report (Ext. PW-9/A) taken on record by the police. With the completion of investigation, which prima facie revealed complicity of the accused in the alleged crime, challan was presented in the Court for trial. 3. Accused was charged for having committed an offence punishable under the provisions of Section 20 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, to which he did not plead guilty and claimed trial. 4. In order to prove its case, in all, prosecution examined twelve witnesses and statement of the accused under Section 313 Cr. P.C. was also recorded, in which he took plea of innocence and false implication. 5. Court below acquitted the accused for the reason that prosecution could not prove its case, beyond reasonable doubt. Hence the present appeal. 6. We have heard Mr. Ashok Chaudhary, learned Addl. Advocate General ably assisted by Mr. V.S. Chauhan, learned Addl. A.G., Mr. Kush Sharma, learned Dy. A.G. and Mr. J.S. Guleria, Asstt. A.G., on behalf of the State as also Mr. Ajay Sharma, learned counsel for the accused. We have also minutely examined the testimonies of the witnesses and other documentary evidence so placed on record by the prosecution. Having done so, we are of the considered view that no case for interference is made out at all. We find that the judgment rendered by the trial Court is based on complete, correct and proper appreciation of evidence (documentary and ocular) so placed on record. There is neither any illegality/infirmity nor any perversity with the same, resulting into miscarriage of justice. 7. It is a settled principle of law that acquittal leads to presumption of innocence in favour of an accused. To dislodge the same, onus heavily lies upon the prosecution. Having considered the material on record, we are of the considered view that prosecution has failed to establish essential ingredients so required to constitute the charged offence. 8. 7. It is a settled principle of law that acquittal leads to presumption of innocence in favour of an accused. To dislodge the same, onus heavily lies upon the prosecution. Having considered the material on record, we are of the considered view that prosecution has failed to establish essential ingredients so required to constitute the charged offence. 8. In Prandas v. The State, AIR 1954 SC 36 , Constitution Bench of the apex Court, has held as under: “(6) It must be observed at the very outset that we cannot support the view which has been expressed in several cases that the High Court has no power under Section 417, Criminal P.C., to reverse a judgment of acquittal, unless the judgment is perverse or the subordinate Court has in some way or other misdirected itself so as to produce a miscarriage of justice. In our opinion, the true position in regard to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 417, Criminal Procedure Code in an appeal from an order of acquittal has been stated in – ‘Sheo Swarup v. Emperor’, AIR 1934 PC 227 (2) at pp.229, 230 (A), in these words: “Sections 417, 418 and 423 of the Code give to the High Court full power to review at large the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded, and to reach the conclusion that upon that evidence the order of acquittal should be reversed. No limitation should be placed upon that power, unless it be found expressly stated in the Code. But in exercising the power conferred by the Code and before reaching its conclusions upon fact, the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses, (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial, (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt, and (4) the slowness of an appellate Court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses. To state this, however, is only to say that the High Court in its conduct of the appeal should and will act in accordance with rules and principles well known and recognised in the administration of justice.”” 9. Recovery memo of the contraband substance reveals recovery was effected in the presence of three witnesses namely Jeet Singh (wrongly written as Daljit Singh) (PW-1), Surender Kumar (PW-2) and Pawan Kumar (PW-3). Recovery stands effected by SI Shakti Singh Pathania (PW-12). 10. Perusal of testimonies of Surender Kumar and Pawan Kumar only reveals them not to have supported the prosecution case at all. They were declared hostile and despite their cross examination by the public prosecutor, nothing fruitful could be elicited from them. They are consistent in their deposition that in their presence, neither any contraband substance was recovered from the conscious possession of the accused nor any seal, handed over to them. They have explained their signatures on the memos (Ext.PW-1/A to Ext. PW-1/E) by deposing that blank documents were signed on the asking of the police. Both the witnesses have not studied beyond seventh standard. They do not know the accused and have explained that they were called by the police and made to sign the documents. Thus, view different than the one which prosecution wants the court to believe has emerged on record. 11. It is well established principle of law that (i) the appellate Court should not ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where two views are possible, though the view of the appellate court may be more probable; (ii) while dealing with a judgment of acquittal, the appellate court must consider entire evidence on record, so as to arrive at a finding as to whether views of the trial court are perverse or otherwise unsustainable; (iii) the appellate court is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, trial Court failed to take into consideration any admissible fact; and (iv) the trial Court failed to take into consideration any admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration evidence brought on record contrary to law. (See: Balak Ram & Anr. (See: Balak Ram & Anr. v. State of U.P., AIR 1974 SC 2165 ; Allarakha K. Mansuri v. State of Gujarat, (2002) 3 SCC 57 ; Raghunath v. State of Haryana, (2003) 1 SCC 398 ; State of U.P. v. Ram Veer Singh & Ors., (2007) 13 SCC 102 ; S. Rama Krishna v. S. Rami Reddy (D) by his LRs. & Ors., AIR 2008 SC 2066 ; Sambhaji Hindurao Deshmukh & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 11 SCC 186 ; Arulvelu & Anr. v. State, (2009) 10 SCC 206 ; Perla Somasekhara Reddy & Ors. v. State of A.P., (2009) 16 SCC 98 ; and Ram Singh alias Chhaju v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2010) 2 SCC 445 ). 12. In Sheo Swaroop and Ors. v. King Emperor, 1934 AIR (PC) 227, the Privy Council held that: "...the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses, (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial, (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt, and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses...." 13. In Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 , the apex Court observed as under: "(1) An appellate court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, "substantial and compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of language" to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of language" to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court." 14. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Banne @ Baijnath & Ors., (2009) 4 SCC 271 , the apex Court gave illustrations of certain circumstances in which the Court would be justified in interfering with a judgment of acquittal by the High Court, which principle, in our considered view, would squarely apply to the judgment under review by us. The circumstances include; (i) The High Court's decision is based on totally erroneous view of law by ignoring the settled legal position; (ii) The High Court's conclusions are contrary to evidence and documents on record; iii) The entire approach of the High Court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal leading to grave miscarriage of justice; (iv) The High Court's judgment is manifestly unjust and unreasonable based on erroneous law and facts on the record of the case; (v) Apex Court must always give proper weight and consideration to the findings of the High Court; and (vi) the apex Court would be extremely reluctant in interfering with a case when both the Sessions Court and the High Court have recorded an order of acquittal. The apex Court further held that :- “Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial Court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference with the decision of the trial court in a routine manner, where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for such interference." (Emphasis supplied) 15. It is a settled proposition of law that merely because a witness has turned hostile, his entire evidence cannot be termed to be unworthy of credence. It is for the Court to consider, whether as a result of contradiction, witness stands fully discredited or part of his testimony can still be believed. If the credit of a witness is not fully shaken, Court can rely upon that part of the testimony which appears to be creditworthy. In the instant case no portion of such testimony establishes the prosecution case. 16. It is also a settled proposition of law that sole testimony of police official, which if otherwise is reliable, trustworthy, cogent and duly corroborated by other admissible evidence, cannot be discarded only on the ground that he is a police official and may be interested in the success of the case. It cannot be stated as a rule that a police officer can or cannot be a sole eye-witness in a criminal case. It will always depend upon the facts of a given case. If the testimony of such a witness is reliable, trustworthy, cogent and if required duly corroborated by other witnesses or admissible evidences, then the statement of such witness cannot be discarded only on the ground that he is a police officer and may have some interest in success of the case. It is only when his interest in the success of the case is motivated by overzealousness to an extent of his involving innocent people, in that event, no credibility can be attached to the statement of such witness. 17. It is only when his interest in the success of the case is motivated by overzealousness to an extent of his involving innocent people, in that event, no credibility can be attached to the statement of such witness. 17. It is not the law that Police witnesses should not be relied upon and their evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars by other independent evidence. The presumption applies as much in favour of a police officer as any other person. There is also no rule of law which lays down that no conviction can be recorded on the testimony of a police officer even if such evidence is otherwise reliable and trustworthy. Rule of prudence may require more careful scrutiny of their evidence. If such a presumption is raised against the police officers without exception, it will be an attitude which could neither do credit to the magistracy nor good to the public, it can only bring down the prestige of police administration. 18. Wherever, evidence of a police officer, after careful scrutiny, inspires confidence and is found to be trustworthy and reliable, it can form basis of conviction and absence of some independent witness of the locality does not in any way affect the creditworthiness of the prosecution case. No infirmity attaches to the testimony of the police officers merely because they belong to the police force and there is no rule of law or evidence which lays down that conviction cannot be recorded on the evidence of the police officials, if found reliable, unless corroborated by some independent evidence. Such reliable and trustworthy statement can form the basis of conviction. [See: Govindaraju alias Govinda v. State by Srirampuram Police Station and another, (2012) 4 SCC 722 ; Tika Ram v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2007) 15 SCC 760; Girja Prasad v. State of M.P., (2007) 7 SCC 625 ); and Aher Raja Khima v. State of Saurashtra, AIR 1956 (SC) 217 . 19. Apex Court in Tahir v. State (Delhi), (1996) 3 SCC 338 , dealing with a similar question, held as under:- "6. 19. Apex Court in Tahir v. State (Delhi), (1996) 3 SCC 338 , dealing with a similar question, held as under:- "6. ....In our opinion no infirmity attaches to the testimony of the police officials, merely because they belong to the police force and there is no rule of law or evidence which lays down that conviction cannot be recorded on the evidence of the police officials, if found reliable, unless corroborated by some independent evidence. The Rule of Prudence, however, only requires a more careful scrutiny of their evidence, since they can be said to be interested in the result of the case projected by them. Where the evidence of the police officials, after careful scrutiny, inspires confidence and is found to be trustworthy and reliable, it can form basis of conviction and the absence of some independent witness of the locality to lend corroboration to their evidence, does not in any way affect the creditworthiness of the prosecution case." 20. Applying the aforesaid principle we proceed to examine the testimonies of the police officials. 21. Testimonies of HC Daljit Singh (PW-1) and SI Shakti Singh (PW-12) do not inspire confidence at all. Contradictions germane to the prosecution story cannot be ignored. Also genesis of the prosecution case cannot be said to have been established beyond reasonable doubt. 22. Who reduced the secret information into writing has not been explained by the prosecution. SI Shakti Singh admits not to have done so. Also what is the source of information may not have been disclosed, but then there has to be some basis on which there was reasonable apprehension in the mind of the police officials, pointing finger of suspicion towards the accused. That has not been done so. Independent witnesses are not residents of the area where the naaka was set up. Why no person from the locality was associated remains unexplained. Further SI Shakti Singh is not in a position to disclose the place where naaka had been set up. His presence on the spot is doubtful. The witness admits that police officials were in uniform and neither the accused tried to flee nor was he frightened only reflective of innocence of the accused. Further SI Shakti Singh is not in a position to disclose the place where naaka had been set up. His presence on the spot is doubtful. The witness admits that police officials were in uniform and neither the accused tried to flee nor was he frightened only reflective of innocence of the accused. His deposition to the effect that prior to carrying out search, accused was informed of his rights, cannot be said to be inspiring in confidence for there is nothing on record to substantiate such fact. The witness wants the court to believe that the vehicle was intercepted on 21.12.2006 at about 4.00 p.m. By that time police had set up naaka based on the secret information of the accused travelling on a scooter carrying charas. Witness further admits that the proceedings continued till the time it became dark. But then there is no reference of torch light anywhere in the record. Allegedly proceedings were conducted on the spot with the same. 23. HC Daljit Singh wants the court to believe that SI Shakti Singh carried out search and recovered 970 grams of charas from the conscious possession of the accused. But then he admits such secret information was not received in his presence nor is he aware of the time or the persons present or associated in reducing the information into writing. This witness further states that the contraband substance was weighed with a taraju (traditional weighing scale). Now who got the scales, from where and from whom; remains unexplained. He further states that except for recording of statements and preparation of site plan, entire proceedings stood completed by 4.45 p.m. which is contradicted by SI Shakti Singh according to whom, proceedings continued till late in the evening and were conducted in the light of a torch. 24. We further find version of SI Shakti Singh, of having entrusted the case property to SI Mohinder Singh (PW-11) not to be inspiring in confidence. It seems that no search was carried out on the spot. SI Mohinder Singh wants the court to believe that on 21.12.2006 at about 8.35 p.m., SI Shakti Chand produced the accused as also the case property along with NCB form, sample seal, scooter, one purse and currency notes of Rs. 1390/-. Now SI Shakti Singh is silent about the currency notes. Seizure memo also does record such fact. SI Mohinder Singh wants the court to believe that on 21.12.2006 at about 8.35 p.m., SI Shakti Chand produced the accused as also the case property along with NCB form, sample seal, scooter, one purse and currency notes of Rs. 1390/-. Now SI Shakti Singh is silent about the currency notes. Seizure memo also does record such fact. This further renders the prosecution version to be doubtful. 25. There is yet another mitigating circumstance in favour of the accused. According the MHC Rajesh Kumar (PW-6), on 23.12.2006 itself, the case property was handed over to HC-Nirmal Singh (PW-7) for being depositing at the Central Forensic Science Laboratory, Chandigarh. Nirmal Singh admits the same to have been deposited only on 26.12.2006. He tried to explain that 24th and 25th were gazetted holidays. He further admits to have returned from Chandigarh on 23.12.2006 itself. There is not much distance between Una and Chandigarh. But then if the witness had returned on 23.12.2006 itself, then why is it that he did not deposit the case property in the maalkhana and allowed it to be kept with himself for two days. This remains unexplained. There is nothing on record to establish that 24th of December was a holiday or the laboratory was closed. Possibility of the property being tampered with cannot be ruled out. 26. The Court below, in our considered view, has correctly and completely appreciated the evidence so placed on record by the prosecution. It cannot be said that the judgment of trial Court is perverse, illegal, erroneous or based on incorrect and incomplete appreciation of material on record resulting into miscarriage of justice. 27. The accused has had the advantage of having been acquitted by the Court below. Keeping in view the ratio of law laid down by the Apex Court in Mohammed Ankoos and others v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, (2010) 1 SCC 94 , since it cannot be said that the Court below has not correctly appreciated the evidence on record or that acquittal of the accused has resulted into travesty of justice, no interference is warranted in the instant case. For all the aforesaid reasons, present appeal, devoid of merit, is dismissed, so also pending applications, if any. Bail bonds, if any, furnished by the accused are discharged. Records of the Court below be immediately sent back. Appeal dismissed.