JUDGMENT RAJIV SHARMA, J. 1. This regular second appeal is directed against the judgment and decree of the learned District Judge, Mandi, Himachal Pradesh dated 20.11.2003, passed in Civil Appeal No. 95 of 2002. 2. Key facts necessary for the adjudication of this regular second appeal are that the predecessor-in-interest of respondents-plaintiffs (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff), namely, Hira Singh has instituted suit for declaration and permanent prohibitory injunction against the appellants-defendants (hereinafter referred to as the defendants) on the plea that the land, as detailed in the plaint, was owned and possessed by him. In the revenue record, the suit land has been wrongly shown in the name of Gawanu, so far as the column of possession is concerned. According to him, the suit land never remained in possession of Gawanu, in any capacity whatsoever. Gawanu was plaintiff’s cousin. In the year 1962, he had shifted to Village Majhathal and since then he had been living separately from his only son Achhar Singh. In the year 1961, Gawanu had requested the plaintiff to allow him to take away fodder for his cattle from the suit land. The plaintiff permitted him to use fodder for the suit land for 2-3 years. Thereafter, Gawanu expired and the plaintiff again started cultivating the suit land. During settlement operation, Gawanu behind the plaintiff’s back, disclosed his possession before the settlement officials and the settlement officials without the permission and knowledge of the plaintiff, incorporated the name of Gawanu over the suit land in the column of possession, whereas Gawanu never possessed the suit land and his possession was permissive for only about 2-3 years. Gawanu expired in the year 1966, however, his name was still continuing in the column of possession. Sh. Achhar Singh, the only son of Gawanu had expired in the year 1990. The defendants, being grandsons were taking undue advantage of the wrong revenue entries in collusion with the revenue officials and got mutation attested in their names. 3. The suit was contested by the defendants. According to them, they were in continuous, peaceful, hostile and notorious as well as uninterrupted possession to the knowledge of the plaintiff. 4. The replication was filed by the plaintiff. The learned trial Court framed the issues on 11.10.1999. The suit was dismissed vide judgment dated 13.6.2002. The plaintiff, feeling aggrieved, preferred an appeal against the judgment and decree dated 13.6.2002. 4. The replication was filed by the plaintiff. The learned trial Court framed the issues on 11.10.1999. The suit was dismissed vide judgment dated 13.6.2002. The plaintiff, feeling aggrieved, preferred an appeal against the judgment and decree dated 13.6.2002. The learned District Judge, Mandi, partly allowed the same on 20.11.2003. Hence, this regular second appeal. 5. The regular second appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law on 17.12.2003:- “1. Whether the Lower Appellate Court has misread and misinterpreted the entries in the revenue record which continuously showed uninterrupted possession of the defendants-appellants and their predecessor in interest for the last more than 40 years, by wrongly holding that since such entries were recorded in the name of the dead person for fairly long time, no presumption can be attached to the same? Has not the Lower Appellate Court misread and misinterpreted the signification of the sign “x.” in the rent column by observing that such sign or mark is not existing anywhere in the HP Land Revenue Act or Rules framed there under? 2. Whether the findings of the Lower Appellate Court that the pleadings of adverse possession are not specific are contrary to the record and based on no evidence rendering the impugned judgment and decree illegal and erroneous?” 6. Mr. Neeraj Gupta, Advocate, on the basis of the substantial questions of law framed, has vehemently argued that the first Appellate Court has misread and misinterpreted the entries in the revenue record which continuously showed the uninterrupted possession of the defendants-appellants and their predecessor-in-interest for the last more than 40 years. He also contended that his clients have led sufficient evidence to prove their adverse possession. On the other hand, Mr. Sanjeev Kuthiala, Advocate has supported the judgment and decree passed by the learned first appellate Court dated 20.11.2003. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the judgments and records of the case carefully. 8. Plaintiff has appeared as PW-1. He has placed on record copy of jamabandi for the year 1993-94 vide Ext. P-1 and jamabandi for the year 1993-94 vide Ext. P-2. According to the statement of the plaintiff, the suit land was given to Gawanu, grandfather of the defendants, on his demand in the year 1960 to cut grass. The suit land was given for the aforesaid purpose for a limited period. P-1 and jamabandi for the year 1993-94 vide Ext. P-2. According to the statement of the plaintiff, the suit land was given to Gawanu, grandfather of the defendants, on his demand in the year 1960 to cut grass. The suit land was given for the aforesaid purpose for a limited period. He has taken back the suit land from Gawanu. Gawanu expired about 35-36 years back. Achhar Singh, father of the defendants never remained in possession of the suit land. He died 15 years back. 9. One of the defendants, Dina Nath has appeared as DW-1. He testified that they were in possession since the time of their ancestors i.e. 1958-59 onwards. Their possession was peaceful and open. DW-2 Balwant Singh deposed that the defendants were in possession of the suit land since the time of their ancestors for 40-45 years. DW-3 Brikam Ram has also made statement about the possession of the defendants and prior to their ancestors including their grandfather Gawanu. He treated defendants as owners-inpossession. Their possession was open, peaceful and without any interruption. 10. Though, DW-1 Dina Nath has deposed that they were in possession since the time of ancestors i.e. 1958-59 onwards but the fact of the matter is that this year was only stated for the first time in the Court. This fact was not pleaded in the written statement. DW-2 Balwant Singh has admitted that he was not on visiting terms with the plaintiff. DW-3 Brikam Ram has also not deposed about the commencement of the peaceful and hostile possession of the defendants. 11. PW-1 Hira Singh, has deposed that he was not present at the time of attestation of the mutation in favour of defendants. DW-1 Dina Nath has admitted that the plaintiff was not present at the time of attestation of the mutation. There is also no contemporaneous material placed on record by the defendants that notice was issued to the plaintiff at the time of attestation of the mutation. Even, the copy of mutation has not been placed on record. There is reference to this mutation only in the jamabandi for the year 1991-92. 12. According to jamabandi Ext. P-1 for the year 1993-94, Ext. D-1, copy of Misal Haquiat Bandobast, Ext. D-2 copy of jamabandi for the year 1969-70, Ext. D-4 copy of jamabandi for the year 1978-79, Ext. D-5 copy of jamabandi for the year 1974-75, Ext. There is reference to this mutation only in the jamabandi for the year 1991-92. 12. According to jamabandi Ext. P-1 for the year 1993-94, Ext. D-1, copy of Misal Haquiat Bandobast, Ext. D-2 copy of jamabandi for the year 1969-70, Ext. D-4 copy of jamabandi for the year 1978-79, Ext. D-5 copy of jamabandi for the year 1974-75, Ext. D-6 copy of jamabandi for the year 1988-89, the land was entered in the ownership column in the name of the plaintiff and in possession column in the name of Gawanu. Gawanu was the grandfather of the defendants. Gawanu died somewhere in the year 1966. Sh. Achhar Singh, father of the defendants died in the year 1987. Though Gawanu has died in the year 1966, but the revenue entries show Gawanu in possession till jamabandi for the year 1993-94. These entries exist in the revenue record as a matter of routine. There was no entry w.e.f. 1966 till 1986 in the name of Achhar Singh. The revenue record did not reflect the actual person in possession right from 1966 to 1998 i.e. for about 32 years. Khatoni Ext. PA does not pertain to the suit land. The case of the defendants was that they were in adverse possession of the suit land for more than 12 years prior to settlement operation. There is no tangible evidence led by the defendants to prove as to when the settlement operation took place and in which particular year. The entries remained in existence against the dead person. 13. There has to be specific point of time for calculating the adverse possession. The party claiming adverse possession has to prove overt acts, treating himself to be owner of the property to the knowledge and exclusion of the true owner. The mere attestation of the mutation in favour of the defendants would not advance their cause. The mutation was attested in the year 1998, thus, 12 years were not completed on the date of institution of the suit i.e. 4.9.1998. In the revenue record, the status of Gawanu was not mentioned. Only sign “X” was shown in the column of possession as well as in the rent column. It is settled law that the party claiming adverse possession has to plead and prove the necessary ingredients of adverse possession. 14. In the revenue record, the status of Gawanu was not mentioned. Only sign “X” was shown in the column of possession as well as in the rent column. It is settled law that the party claiming adverse possession has to plead and prove the necessary ingredients of adverse possession. 14. Their lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Hemaji Waghaji Jat vs. Bhikhabhai Khengarbhai Harijan and Others, (2009) 16 SCC 517 , have held that a person who bases his title on adverse possession must show by clear and unequivocal evidence that his title was hostile to the real owner and amounted to denial of his title to the property claimed. The ordinary classical requirement of adverse possession is that it should be nec vi, nec clam, nec precario and the possession required must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that it is in possession adverse to the competitor. It has been held as follows:- “14. In Secretary of State for India vs. Debendra Lal Khan, AIR 1934 PC 23 , it was observed that the ordinary classical requirement of adverse possession is that it should be nec vi, nec clam, nec precario and the possession required must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that it is possession adverse to the competitor. 23. This court had an occasion to examine the concept of adverse possession in T. Anjanappa & Others vs. Somalingappa & Another, (2006) 7 SCC 570 . The court observed that a person who bases his title on adverse possession must show by clear and unequivocal evidence that his title was hostile to the real owner and amounted to denial of his title to the property claimed. The court further observed that:- “20. The classical requirements of acquisition of title by adverse possession are that such possession in denial of the true owner's title must be peaceful, open and continuous. The possession must be open and hostile enough to be capable of being known by the parties interested in the property, though it is not necessary that there should be evidence of the adverse possessor actually informing the real owner of the former's hostile action.” 15. The possession must be open and hostile enough to be capable of being known by the parties interested in the property, though it is not necessary that there should be evidence of the adverse possessor actually informing the real owner of the former's hostile action.” 15. Their lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Tribhuvanshankar vs. Amrutlal, (2014) 2 SCC 788 , have held that possession to be adverse has to be actual, open, notorious, exclusive and continuous for the requisite frame of time as provided in law so that the possessor perfects his title by adverse possession. It has been held as follows:- “34. The conception of adverse possession fundamentally contemplates a hostile possession by which there is a denial of title of the true owner. By virtue of remaining in possession the possessor takes an adverse stance to the title of the true owner. In fact, he disputes the same. A mere possession or user or permissive possession does not remotely come near the spectrum of adverse possession. Possession to be adverse has to be actual, open, notorious, exclusive and continuous for the requisite frame of time as provided in law so that the possessor perfects his title by adverse possession. It has been held in Secy. of State for India In Council vs. Debendra Lal Khan, that the ordinary classical requirement of adverse possession is that it should be nec vi, nec clam, nec precario. 37. It is to be borne in mind that adverse possession, as a right, does not come in aid solely on the base that the owner loses his right to reclaim the property because of his willful neglect but also on account of the possessor’s constant positive intent to remain in possession. It has been held in P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy and Others vs. Revamma and Others.” 16. The learned first appellate Court has correctly appreciated the oral as well as documentary evidence placed on record. The defendants have failed to prove the adverse possession. The substantial questions of law are answered accordingly. 17. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal and the same is dismissed, so also the pending applications, if any.