JUDGMENT AND ORDER : Paran Kumar Phukan, J. 1. The material facts, which have given rise to the present application, in a nutshell are stated as follows:- The petitioner herein made an application under Section 3 of the Muslim Woman (Protection of Rights on Divorce Act) 1986 (herein after called the Act) praying for direction to the 2nd party ("the respondent herein) to pay Rs. 50,000/- as Mahr at Rs. 80,152 being the price of the articles (strihan), maintenance for the pre-divorce period etc. her case being briefly stated thus:- The marriage between the parties was solemnised according to Muslim Law on 18.02.2000, the Mahr having been fixed at Rs. 50,000/-. Soon after marriage, acrimony had started brewing in their marital relationship. The 2nd party started torturing her, demanding more money, which compelled her to take shelter in the house of her parents. The 2nd party pronounced 'Talaq' dissolved the marriage and the information of the talaq was communicated to her, while she was in the house of her parents. Having no alternative, she filed an application under the Act before the Learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Hailakandi, claiming the reliefs. 2. The 2nd party contested the proceeding, wherein he denied having tortured her, mentally and physically, demanding more money. He pleaded that the amount of Mahr was fixed at Rs. 50,000. But only, articles worth Rs. 3000/- was given to her by her father, at the time of her marriage. He tried his best to bring her back, but she refused, which compelled him to divorce her by pronouncing talaq. 3. In support of their respective cases, both the parties adduced evidence. The Learned trial Court, on the basis of the evidence, adduced by the parties came to the findings that the husband is liable to pay Rs. 50,000/- as Mahr, Rs. 3000/- towards the value of articles and another Rs. 3000/- as maintenance for the iddat period. In addition, it was directed that an amount of Rs. 1000/- per month be paid to the petitioner by the respondent 2nd party as maintenance, till she remarried. 4. Against the judgment, the 2nd party preferred revision before the Learned Sessions Judge, Hailakandi and the Sessions Judge, modified the order passed by the Learned Trial Court, setting aside the order for payment of maintenance of Rs. 1000/- per month to the petitioner. 4. Against the judgment, the 2nd party preferred revision before the Learned Sessions Judge, Hailakandi and the Sessions Judge, modified the order passed by the Learned Trial Court, setting aside the order for payment of maintenance of Rs. 1000/- per month to the petitioner. Aggrieved by the judgment, the petitioner has approached this Court challenging the legality of the order passed by the Learned Sessions Judge, so far the payment of maintenance allowance of Rs. 1000/- per month to the petitioner was concerned. 5. There is no dispute that the parties to the proceeding were legally married husband and wife and there is also no dispute regarding divorce. The most pertinent question to be decided is whether, while dealing with an application under Section 3 of the Act, the Magistrate has the power to direct the husband to pay maintenance per month to his divorced wife. 6. In the light of the authoritative pronouncement in Danial Latifi vs. Union of India, (2001) 7 SCC 740 , it becomes transparent that it is the legal obligation of the Muslim husband to make reasonable and fair provision for the future of his divorced wife. When a Muslim husband fails to perform the obligation and fail to make such a 'provision' there is no legal impediment, on the part of a Magistrate, who is in seisin of an application under Section 3 of the Act, to direct the Muslim husband to make such a provision and if the husband is not in a position to make payment of such an amount, at a time, a Magistrate may, in appropriate circumstances, assess the 'fair and reasonable provision' and may direct payment in instalments. The 'fair and reasonable provision', which the Act envisages, are really aimed at making such a 'provision' which would enable the divorced woman to maintain the standard of life, which she had been used to. The need for making of 'fair and reasonable provision' is really aimed at providing such a sum, which would enable the divorced woman to maintain herself beyond the period of iddat. Hence, in a given case, the Magistrate may have to ask if the husband has made a 'fair and reasonable provision' for the divorced woman. The need for making of 'fair and reasonable provision' is really aimed at providing such a sum, which would enable the divorced woman to maintain herself beyond the period of iddat. Hence, in a given case, the Magistrate may have to ask if the husband has made a 'fair and reasonable provision' for the divorced woman. If such a 'provision' has not been made and the husband does not have sufficient means to make such a 'provision' at a time, as the law obliges him to do, there can be no impediment, on the part of the Magistrate, to direct the husband to pay such sum of money, either at a time or in instalments, which would amount to making of a 'reasonable and fair provision' to the divorced woman. 7. From the decision rendered by the Constitution Bench, in Danial Latifi (supra), there remains no room for doubt that though the responsibility of a Muslim divorced woman's former husband to pay 'maintenance' to her shall remain confined to the period of iddat, it does not completely absolve such a woman's former husband from the liability to make 'reasonable and fair provision' for her future. The 'provision', so made, would obviously include her 'maintenance' as well. This 'provision' must be made by the former husband within the period of iddat and not thereafter. When the husband is unable to make 'provision' for his divorced wife, responsibility to maintain her falls, in terms of Section 4, on her relatives and, on their inability to provide 'maintenance' to her, responsibility to provide 'maintenance' to her falls on the State Wakf Board. 8. The pronouncement of Danial Latifi (supra) makes it amply clear that the Muslim husband is not absolved from liability to make 'reasonable and fair provision' for his divorced wife which includes her 'maintenance' as well and provision must be made within the period of iddat in terms of Section 3 of the MW Act. 9. 8. The pronouncement of Danial Latifi (supra) makes it amply clear that the Muslim husband is not absolved from liability to make 'reasonable and fair provision' for his divorced wife which includes her 'maintenance' as well and provision must be made within the period of iddat in terms of Section 3 of the MW Act. 9. Comparing the provisions of the MW Act with that of Section 125 Cr.P.C. the Apex Court in Danial Latifi's Case (Supra) observed:- A comparison of these provisions with Section 125 Cr.P.C. will make it clear that requirements provided in Section 125 and the purpose, object and scope thereof being to prevent vagrancy by compelling those who can do so to support those who are unable to support themselves and who have a normal and legitimate claim to support are satisfied. If that is so, the argument of the petitioners that a different scheme being provided under the Act which is equally or more beneficial on the interpretation placed by us from the one provided under the Code of Criminal Procedure deprive them of their right, loses its significance. The object and scope of Section 125 CrPC is to prevent vagrancy by compelling those who are under an obligation to support those who are unable to support themselves and that object being fulfilled, we find it difficult to accept the contention urged on behalf of the petitioners. Even under the Act, the parties agreed that the provisions of Section 125 Cr.P.C. would still be attracted and even otherwise; the Magistrate has been conferred with the power to make appropriate provision for maintenance and, therefore, what could be earlier granted by a Magistrate under Section 125 Cr.P.C. would now be granted under the very Act itself. This being the position, the Act cannot be held to be unconstitutional." 10. The principles laid down by the Apex Court in the aforesaid cases clearly shows that the Magistrate under the Act has the power to grant maintenance in favour of a divorced Muslim woman and the parameters and the considerations are the same as stipulated in Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 11. In the instant case, the learned Magistrate has directed payment of Rs. 1000/-, as monthly maintenance allowance apart from Mahr, maintenance during iddat period and value of articles. 11. In the instant case, the learned Magistrate has directed payment of Rs. 1000/-, as monthly maintenance allowance apart from Mahr, maintenance during iddat period and value of articles. Although, she had the option of seeking direction in terms of Section 3(2) of the Muslim Woman Act to make "provision" from her former husband, no such direction was sought for payment of maintenance except for the pre-divorce period. Had there been any such claim by her for making 'provision', the Court could have directed the husband to make such 'provision' for her maintenance, even after the iddat period. But no such claim was made. Consequently, the order of the Magistrate directing payment of maintenance of Rs. 1000/- per month, till remarriage of the petitioner is not legally sustainable. 12. The petitioner is entitled to Mahr amount of Rs. 50,000/-, Rs. 3000/- towards value of articles and another Rs. 3000/- as maintenance for the iddat period. 13. The petitioner if so advised may approach the Court below for a direction for making provision for her maintenance even after iddat period. 14. With the above directions and observations the revision stands disposed of.