JUDGMENT : Per Virender Singh, C.J.: 01. These batches of writ petitions have been filed by some of the District Judges’ of State of Jharkhand for treating their cases as absorption/regularization and for extending all the benefit of past service rendered by them and their services be treated as continuous service. They have also prayed for a direction upon the respondent nos. 3 to 6 to make payment of dues and current salary and also for payment of other bills. 02. For better appreciation of the case it is necessary to go into the brief background of the case. After creation of the State of Jharkhand, on 10.05.2001 the Governor of Jharkhand in consultation of the High Court, framed Jharkhand Superior Judicial Service (Recruitment, Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2001 and in pursuant thereto on 23.05.2001 the High Court of Jharkhand advertised the vacancies for the post of Djs. 03. The petitioners among others were applied for the post and after the written exam and interview a panel was prepared. Thereafter, out of the list of selected candidates, 17 candidates were appointed as ADJs in the regular cadre of Jharkhand Superior Judicial Services and rest candidates from Sr. No. 18 to 42 including the petitioners herein were appointed as FTC Judges and they joined accordingly. 04. In the year 2009 some members of subordinate judiciary of the State of Jharkhand challenged the appointment of these petitioners before this court in W.P.S No. 2872 of 2009 and by order dt.07.03.2011 the appointment of the petitioners including others who were appointed as a FTC Judges’ was declared invalid and quashed w.e.f the date on which their tenure of appointment ended i.e. 31.03.2011. 05. The petitioners, thereafter, preferred appeal before the Hon`ble Supreme Court by filing SLPs and the same were converted into Civil Appeal Nos. 6647-49 of 2012 and by a judgment dt.19.09.2012 in Mahesh Chandra Verma Vs. State of Jharkhand reported in (2012) 11 SCC 656 , the Hon`ble Apex Court, however, concurred with the view of this court, directed for appointment of the petitioners herein in the manner laid down in Brij Mohan Lal Vs. Union of India (in short B.M Lal-II) reported in (2012) 6 SCC 502 . 06. In compliance of the order passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, Jharkhand High Court invited an application from the petitioners by way of a notice inviting application dt. Union of India (in short B.M Lal-II) reported in (2012) 6 SCC 502 . 06. In compliance of the order passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, Jharkhand High Court invited an application from the petitioners by way of a notice inviting application dt. 05.03.2013 and conducted written examination and interview in the manner laid down in Braj Mohan Lal-II (Supra.) case. Thereafter, a recommendation was made for the appointment of 22 persons including these petitioners and finally the State Government appointed them afresh as District Judge vide various notifications. 07. After the appointment of the petitioners they were refused to withdraw salary under their earlier G.P.F Number by stating that their earlier services will not be considered. The petitioners were also denied other benefits like leave encashment and T.A. 08. Thereafter, the petitioners filed representations before this Court in the administrative side which after the resolution of the Standing Committee sent a proposal to the Government for providing the petitioners for pay protection treating intervening period from 01.04.2011 till their appointment in the regular cadre notionally continuous service for the purpose of pensionary benefit and other benefits of continuous of service for previous services vide its letter no. 13168 dt. 01.11.2013 but the State-respondent rejected the representations of the petitioners and the same was informed to the Registrar General of this court vide letter no. 8138 dt.13.08.2014. Hence, the present writ petitions. 09. Since all these writ petitions involved common question of law, they are being heard and decided by this common judgment. 10. Issues falls for consideration before this court is, whether the past services of the petitioners who have been appointed in terms of the judgment of Brij Mohan Lal-II (Supra.) and Mahesh Chandra Verma (Supra.) shall be taken into consideration for their pensionery and other benefits? 11. Before coming to the issues raised in this case, the propositions laid down in the aforesaid two judgments of the Hon`ble Supreme Court shall be looked into. Para 207 of Brij Mohan Lal (supra.) reads as follows:- 207. 11. Before coming to the issues raised in this case, the propositions laid down in the aforesaid two judgments of the Hon`ble Supreme Court shall be looked into. Para 207 of Brij Mohan Lal (supra.) reads as follows:- 207. Without any intent to interfere with the policy decision taken by the Governments, but unmistakably, to protect the guarantees of Article 21 of the Constitution, to improve the justice delivery system and fortify the independence of judiciary, while ensuring attainment of constitutional goals as well as to do complete justice to the lis before us, in terms of Article 142 of the Constitution, we pass the following orders and directions: 207.1. Being a policy decision which has already taken effect, we decline to strike down the policy decision of the Union of India vide Letter dated 14-9-2010 not to finance the FTC Scheme beyond 31-3-2011. 207.2. All the States which have taken a policy decision to continue the FTC Scheme beyond 31-3-2011 shall adhere to the respective dates as announced, for example in the cases of States of Orissa (March 2013), Haryana (March 2016), Andhra Pradesh (March 2012) and Rajasthan (February 2013). 207.3. The States which are in the process of taking a policy decision on whether or not to continue the FTC Scheme as a permanent feature of administration of justice in the respective States are free to take such a decision. 207.4. It is directed that all the States, henceforth, shall not take a decision to continue the FTC Scheme on ad hoc and temporary basis. The States are at liberty to decide but only with regard either to bring the FTC Scheme to an end or to continue the same as a permanent feature in the State. 207.5. The Union of India and the State Governments shall reallocate and utilise the funds apportioned by the 13th Finance Commission and/or make provisions for such additional funds to ensure regularisation of the FTC Judges in the manner indicated and/or for creation of additional courts as directed in this judgment. 207.6. All the decisions taken and recommendations made at the Chief Justices and Chief Ministers’ Conference shall be placed before the Cabinet of the Centre or the State, as the case may be, which alone shall have the authority to finally accept, modify or decline the implementation of such decisions and, that too, upon objective consideration and for valid reasons. 207.6. All the decisions taken and recommendations made at the Chief Justices and Chief Ministers’ Conference shall be placed before the Cabinet of the Centre or the State, as the case may be, which alone shall have the authority to finally accept, modify or decline the implementation of such decisions and, that too, upon objective consideration and for valid reasons. Let the minutes of the Conference of 2009, at least now, be placed before the Cabinet within three months from the date of pronouncement of this judgment for its information and appropriate action. 207.7. No decision, recommendation or proposal made by the Chief Justices and Chief Ministers’ Conference shall be rejected or declined or varied at any bureaucratic level, in the hierarchy of the Governments, whether in the State or the Centre. 207.8. We hereby direct that it shall be for the Central Government to provide funds for carrying out the directions contained in this judgment and, if necessary, by reallocation of funds already allocated under the 13th Finance Commission for judiciary. We further direct that for creation of additional 10% posts of the existing cadre, the burden shall be equally shared by the Centre and the State Governments and funds be provided without any undue delay so that the courts can be established as per the schedule directed in this judgment. 207.9. All the persons who have been appointed by way of direct recruitment from the Bar as Judges to preside over FTCs under the FTC Scheme shall be entitled to be appointed to the regular cadre of the Higher Judicial Services of the respective States only in the following manner: (a) The direct recruits to FTCs who opt for regularisation shall take a written examination to be conducted by the High Courts of the respective States for determining their suitability for absorption in the regular cadre of Additional District Judges. (b) Thereafter, they shall be subjected to an interview by a Selection Committee consisting of the Chief Justice and four seniormost Judges of that High Court. (c) There shall be 150 marks for the written examination and 100 marks for the interview. The qualifying marks shall be 40% aggregate for general candidates and 35% for SC/ST/OBC candidates. The examination and interview shall be held in accordance with the relevant Rules enacted by the States for direct appointment to Higher Judicial Services. (c) There shall be 150 marks for the written examination and 100 marks for the interview. The qualifying marks shall be 40% aggregate for general candidates and 35% for SC/ST/OBC candidates. The examination and interview shall be held in accordance with the relevant Rules enacted by the States for direct appointment to Higher Judicial Services. (d) Each of the appointees shall be entitled to one mark per year of service in the FTCs, which shall form part of the interview marks. (e) Needless to point out that this examination and interview should be conducted by the respective High Courts keeping in mind that all these applicants have put in a number of years as FTC Judges and have served the country by administering justice in accordance with law. The written examination and interview module, should, thus, be framed keeping in mind the peculiar facts and circumstances of these cases. (f) The candidates who qualify the written examination and obtain consolidated percentage as afore-indicated shall be appointed to the post of Additional District Judge in the regular cadre of the State. (g) If, for any reason, vacancies are not available in the regular cadre, we hereby direct the State Governments to create such additional vacancies as may be necessary keeping in view the number of candidates selected. (h) All sitting and/or former FTC Judges who were directly appointed from the Bar and are desirous of taking the examination and interview for regular appointment shall be given age relaxation. No application shall be rejected on the ground of age of the applicant being in excess of the prescribed age. 207.10. The members of the Bar who have directly been appointed but whose services were either dispensed with or terminated on the ground of doubtful integrity, unsatisfactory work or against whom, on any other ground, disciplinary action had been taken, shall not be eligible to the benefits stated in para 207.9 of the judgment. 207.11. 207.10. The members of the Bar who have directly been appointed but whose services were either dispensed with or terminated on the ground of doubtful integrity, unsatisfactory work or against whom, on any other ground, disciplinary action had been taken, shall not be eligible to the benefits stated in para 207.9 of the judgment. 207.11. Keeping in view the need of the hour and the constitutional mandate to provide fair and expeditious trial to all litigants and the citizens of the country, we direct the respective States and the Central Government to create 10% of the total regular cadre of the State as additional posts within three months from today and take up the process for filling such additional vacancies as per the Higher Judicial Service and Judicial Services Rules of that State, immediately thereafter. 207.12. These directions, of course, are in addition to and not in derogation of the recommendations that may be made by the Law Commission of India and any other order which may be passed by the courts of competent jurisdiction, in other such matters. 207.13. The candidates from any State, who were promoted as FTC Judges from the post of Civil Judge, Senior Division having requisite experience in service, shall be entitled to be absorbed and remain promoted to the Higher Judicial Services of that State subject to: (a) Such promotion, when effected against the 25% quota for out-of-turn promotion on merit, in accordance with the judgment of this Court in All India Judges’ Assn. (3), by taking and being selected through the requisite examination, as contemplated for out-of-turn promotion. (b) If the appointee has the requisite seniority and is entitled to promotion against 25% quota for promotion by seniority-cum-merit, he shall be promoted on his own turn to the Higher Judicial Services without any written examination. (c) While considering candidates either under Category (a) or (b) above, due weightage shall be given to the fact that they have already put in a number of years in service in the Higher Judicial Services and, of course, with reference to their performance. (d) All other appointees in this category, in the event of discontinuation of the FTC Scheme, would revert to their respective posts in the appropriate cadre. (d) All other appointees in this category, in the event of discontinuation of the FTC Scheme, would revert to their respective posts in the appropriate cadre. Para 43, 45, 51, 57, 58, 62 and 64 of the Case of Mahesh Chandra Verma v. State of Jharkhand reported in (2012) 11 SCC 656 reads as follows:- 43. Since a select list of 27 persons was duly notified as per the Rules of 2001, after candidates from Sl. Nos. 1 to 17 were appointed as regular Additional District Judges on 15-12-2001 the select list came to an end because as per the affidavit filed on behalf of the High Court though vacancies were not mentioned in the advertisement only 13 posts of Additional District Judges were available on the date of advertisement i.e. on 23-5-2001 and 17 posts of Additional District Judges were available on the date of recommendation i.e. on 20-10-2001. On the appointment of 17 regular Additional District Judges, the selection process for appointment of regular Additional District Judges came to an end. The unexhausted select list was wrongly used for appointment of 10 FTC Judges. Again, out of the list of unsuccessful candidates, 15 persons were appointed as FTC Judges. Their names were not there in the select list. The whole procedure was irregular. Reliance placed by the High Court on the impugned judgment of this Court in is apt. It must be mentioned at the cost of repetition that on 23-5-2001 when the advertisement was issued, the posts for FTCs were not sanctioned. Therefore, these posts were not even in contemplation. They cannot be termed as vacancies contemplated or anticipated by the High Court. Undoubtedly, the correspondence between the Law Ministry and the High Court indicates that the High Court was informed about the need for creation of FTCs and that Fast Track Court Scheme may be brought into action in Jharkhand but, till the posts for FTCs were sanctioned, there was no question of taking into account any anticipated vacancies. When advertisement is for specific number of posts, the State cannot appoint more than the number of posts advertised. The select list gets exhausted when all the advertised posts get filled. When advertisement is for specific number of posts, the State cannot appoint more than the number of posts advertised. The select list gets exhausted when all the advertised posts get filled. In Rakhi Ray and in a long line of other cases to which reference need not be made, this Court has clarified that appointments beyond the number of posts advertised would amount to filling up future vacancies and the said course is impermissible in law. There is no substance in the contention that the appellants were appointed under Rule 4(a) of the Rules of 2001 or that they can get advantage of Rule 25 thereof. The Rules of 2001 and the regulations which are meant for the Jharkhand Superior Judicial Service do not apply to ad hoc Additional District Judges appointed under a scheme of temporary duration like the Fast Track Courts Scheme. The Rules of 2001 were not amended to make them applicable to FTCs. The appellants were appointed in ex-cadre post for a temporary period. This is clear from their appointment letters. Therefore, their appointments were not under the Rules of 2001. Merely because they were made to take written examination and viva voce their appointments cannot be termed as substantive appointments nor can the nature of work done by them make their appointments substantive. 45. In the ultimate analysis we are of the view that the appointments made on 2-2-2002 and 12-8-2002 are irregular, made in ignorance of settled principles underlying service law, in an anxiety to comply with the desire expressed by the Law Ministry and to set up FTCs to deal with the problem of pendency of cases. This conclusion of our’s draws support from Brij Mohan Lal (1) and Brij Mohan Lal (2). Brij Mohan Lal (2) also offers a possible solution to the problem. We shall soon advert to these judgments. 51. Since we have held that appointments were not made under the Rules of 2001, cases cited on deviation of quota or deemed relaxation of quota as per Rule 5 can have no application to this case. It must be borne in mind that appointments of Additional District Judges, FTCs in this case were made on ad hoc ex-cadre basis in a scheme of temporary duration. The fact that the High Court recommended the names makes no difference. Their appointments were irregular. 57. It must be borne in mind that appointments of Additional District Judges, FTCs in this case were made on ad hoc ex-cadre basis in a scheme of temporary duration. The fact that the High Court recommended the names makes no difference. Their appointments were irregular. 57. While dealing with the points raised in the petitions, this Court in Brij Mohan Lal (2) traced the history of the Fast Track Courts Scheme. This Court considered the notifications issued by various States appointing direct recruits, relevant rules of different States and methodology adopted for appointment to the FTCs and came to the conclusion that the said posts were temporary and the appointees cannot be said to have any legal right to the posts. It was observed that the appointments were governed under the separate set of rules than the rules governing the regular appointments to the State Higher Judicial Services. This Court observed that the cumulative effect of the notifications appointing the petitioners therein to the said posts under the Fast Track Court Scheme and the relevant rules governing them clearly demonstrate that those were temporary and, in some cases, even time-bound appointments terminable without prior notice and, therefore, it is difficult to accept the contention that the appointees were entitled to be absorbed regularly in those posts. It was observed that where neither the post is sanctioned nor it is permanent and, in fact, the entire arrangement is ad hoc or is for an uncertain duration, it cannot create any rights and obligations in favour of the appointees, akin to those of permanent employees. 58. It is necessary to quote relevant paragraphs of the said judgment: (Brij Mohan Lal (2) case, SCC p. 567, paras 172-74) “172. The prayer for regularisation of service and absorption of the petitioner appointees against the vacancies appearing in the regular cadre has been made not only in cases involving the case of the State of Orissa, but even in other States. Absorption in service is not a right. Regularisation also is not a statutory or a legal right enforceable by the persons appointed under different rules to different posts. Regularisation shall depend upon the facts and circumstances of a given case as well as the relevant rules applicable to such class of persons. 173. Absorption in service is not a right. Regularisation also is not a statutory or a legal right enforceable by the persons appointed under different rules to different posts. Regularisation shall depend upon the facts and circumstances of a given case as well as the relevant rules applicable to such class of persons. 173. As already noticed, on earlier occasions also, this Court has declined the relief of regularisation of the persons and workmen who had been appointed against a particular scheme or project. A Constitution Bench of this Court has clearly stated the principle that in matters of public employment, absorption, regularisation or permanent continuance of temporary, contractual or casual daily wage or ad hoc employees appointed and continued for long in such public employment would be de-hors the constitutional scheme of public employment and would be improper. It would also not be proper to stay the regular recruitment process for the posts concerned. [Refer to Umadevi (3).] 174. It is not necessary for us to deliberate on this issue all over again in view of the above discussion. Suffice it to notice that the petitioner appointees have no right to the posts in question as the posts themselves were temporary and were bound to come to an end by efflux of time. With reference to the letters of their appointment and the Rules under which the same were issued, it is clear that these petitioners cannot claim any indefeasible right either to regularisation or absorption.” 62. Indisputably, the appellants were not appointed on any permanent post. The notification of their appointment dated 12-8-2002 clearly states they were appointed against temporary and ex-cadre posts on ad hoc basis. They were not appointed under the Rules of 2001. Their appointment was made for a temporary purpose in a temporary scheme created for speedy disposal of cases. Their case is, therefore, clearly covered by Brij Mohan Lal (2). The directions given therein, particularly those contained in para 207.9 which we have quoted above, will clearly apply to them. In Brij Mohan Lal (2), this Court even considered the contention that the direct recruits had taken all the tests and, therefore, they should not be made to undergo them again. After considering this argument, this Court directed that they will have to take written examination and they must also be interviewed. In Brij Mohan Lal (2), this Court even considered the contention that the direct recruits had taken all the tests and, therefore, they should not be made to undergo them again. After considering this argument, this Court directed that they will have to take written examination and they must also be interviewed. It must be noted at this stage that on behalf of the High Court of Jharkhand a statement is made that subject to the creation of necessary posts/FTCs by the State of Jharkhand, the High Court will consider the appellants’ case afresh in terms of the decision of this Court in Brij Mohan Lal (2). The High Court has also taken up the matter with the State Government. Relevant portion from the affidavit of Shri Ambuj Nath, Registrar (Administration), High Court of Jharkhand, needs to be quoted: “19. That as per the recommendation of the 13th Finance Commission the Jharkhand High Court has requested the State Government to constitute 31 alternative courts in the cadre of Superior Judicial Service coterminous with the Holiday Courts/Shift Court Scheme of the 13th Finance Commission as the terrain and deteriorating the law and order situation was not congruent for holding morning/evening/shift courts. However, after the direction of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Brij Mohan Lal (2) case, the Jharkhand High Court has taken up the matter with the State Government for creation of 31 permanent Fast Track Courts instead of 31 alternative courts coterminous with the morning and evening shift courts and an expansion of 10% of cadre strength as per the direction of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Brij Mohan Lal (2) case in response to the direction dated 19-4-2012.” 64. We are not prepared to entertain the grievance of the contesting respondents that if the appellants are absorbed in regular cadre their promotional avenues will get affected or they will suffer monetary loss. Their locus to challenge the appellants’ appointments has been questioned. But, even if it is assumed that they have locus in view of Brij Mohan Lal-II such grievances cannot be entertained. The directions given by this Court in Brij Mohan Lal-II are under Article 142 of the Constitution, to do complete justice and while issuing directions, obviously this Court has considered the entire issue in its proper perspective. We, therefore, reject this submission. The directions given by this Court in Brij Mohan Lal-II are under Article 142 of the Constitution, to do complete justice and while issuing directions, obviously this Court has considered the entire issue in its proper perspective. We, therefore, reject this submission. In the view that we have taken we dispose of these appeals by recording that we concur with the view taken by the High Court and see no reason to interfere with it. We direct the State of Jharkhand and the High Court of Jharkhand to comply with the directions to appoint the appellants in the regular cadre in Higher Judicial Service in the State of Jharkhand strictly in the manner laid down in Brij Mohan Lal-II within a period of six months from the date of receipt of this order by it. Thus, undisputedly, the initial appointment of the petitioners was temporary on the ex-cadre posts not under Rules 2001 but in a temporary scheme for speedy disposal of the cases. In the case of B.M LAL-II (Supra.), it is in a very specific term held that petitioners as well as the other Fast Track Judges appointed by direct recruitment has no absolute right to the post. However looking to the various aspect of the matter and also to improve the Justice Delivery System as well as to do complete justice to the lis, the Hon`ble Supreme Court exercised the jurisdiction under Ar. 142 of the Constitution and laid down guidelines for appointment of the Fast Track Judges to the regular cadre of Higher Judicial Services of the State. 12. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners, Mr Mahabir Singh, submitted that the appointment of petitioner is not a fresh appointment but a regularization and absorption in Jharkhand Superior Judicial Service. It is further submitted that since the notification of appointment of petitioner issued by respondent State and the circular of posting issued by the High Court both were silent about the treatment of their past services rendered, it would be imperative to treat appointment of petitioners as fresh appointment and to give him initial basic pay of the minimum of the scale. It is further submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mahesh Chandra Verma (Supra.) held that the appointment of the petitioners were not illegal but an irregular and given directions upon the respondents to regularize them after taking suitability test. It is further submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mahesh Chandra Verma (Supra.) held that the appointment of the petitioners were not illegal but an irregular and given directions upon the respondents to regularize them after taking suitability test. It is further submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court had also refused to entertain the grievance of the contesting respondents that if the petitioners would be absorbed in regular cadre their promotional avenues will get affected or they would suffer monetary loss. It is further submitted that as per the doctrine of merger, as soon as the decision of the High Court is modified by the Hon’ble Apex Court then the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex court will remain operative and capable of enforcement in the eye of law and the petitioners will be deemed to be in continuous service and deserve all benefits including salary of intervening period. It is further submitted that Rule 78 of the Jharkhand Service Code 2001 deals with the protection of pay of the persons who had previously held the assignment under the government. It is further submitted that the petitioners have undergone suitability test prescribed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and having found suitable they were taken back in service and thus their appointment and absorption in Jharkhand Superior Judicial Service cannot be termed as new appointment but is regularization. Learned senior counsel further submitted that if they are treated as fresh appointees, then they would be deprived of G.P.F Scheme and Old pension scheme under which they were appointed initially. Due to not giving the pay protection they would be given less pay than which they were drawing previously and as such the same is contrary to the principle of natural justice as well as the norms of Service Jurisprudence. 13. In support of his submission Mr. Singh, referred to the following judgments:- i. Indian Bank versus ABS Marine Products Pvt. Ltd. reported in [2006] 5 SCC 72. It is held that many a time, after declaring the law, this Court in the operative part of the judgment, gives some directions which may either relax the application of law or exempt the case on hand from the rigour of the law in view of the peculiar facts or in view of the uncertainty of law till then, to do complete justice. While doing so, normally, it is not stated that such direction/order is in exercise of power under Article 142. It is not uncommon to find that courts have followed not the law declared, but the exemption/relaxation made while moulding the relief in exercise of power under Article 142. When the High Court repeatedly follow a direction issued under Article 142, by treating it as the law declared by this Court, incongruously the exemption/relaxation granted under Article 142 becomes the law, though at variance with the law declared by this Court. The courts should therefore be careful to ascertain and follow the ratio decidendi, and not the relief given on the special facts, exercising power under Art. 142. One solution to avoid such a situation is for this Court to clarify that a particular direction or portion of the order is in exercise of power under Art. 142. Be that as it may. ii. State of Punjab v. Rafiq Masih reported (2014) 8 SCC 883 . It is held that this Court in a number of cases had battled with tracing the contours of the provision in Articles 136 and 142 of the Constitution of India. Distinctively, although the words employed under the two aforesaid provisions speak of the powers of this Court, the former vest a plenary jurisdiction in the Supreme Court in the matter of entertaining and hearing of appeals by granting special leave against any judgment or order made by a court or tribunal in any cause or matter. The powers are plenary to the extent that they are paramount to the limitations under the specific provisions for appeal contained in the Constitution or other laws. Article 142 of the Constitution of India, on the other hand is a step ahead of the powers envisaged under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. It is the exercise of jurisdiction to pass such enforceable decree or order as is necessary for doing “complete justice” in any cause or matter. (iii) S. Nagaraj v. State of Karnataka, 1993 Supp. (4) SCC 595. It is held that any order passed by a court of law, more so by the higher courts and especially this Court whose decisions are declarations of law are not only entitled to respect but are binding and have to be enforced and obeyed strictly. No court much less an authority howsoever high can ignore it. (4) SCC 595. It is held that any order passed by a court of law, more so by the higher courts and especially this Court whose decisions are declarations of law are not only entitled to respect but are binding and have to be enforced and obeyed strictly. No court much less an authority howsoever high can ignore it. Any doubt or ambiguity can be removed by the court which passed the order and not by an authority according to its own understanding. (iv) State of U.P. vs. Neeraj Awasthi, (2006) 1 SCC 667 the Hon’ble Supreme court in para 69 held as follows: 69. In All Manipur Regular Posts Vacancies Substitute Teachers’ Assn. v. State of Manipur this Court was confronted with various interim orders passed by the High Court from time to time in several writ petitions. It was observed that if the direct recruitment takes place on one hand and substituted teachers are also directed to be regularised subsequently, it would create an enormous problem for the department to accommodate both the categories of persons and in the aforementioned situation, in exercise of its power under Article 142 of the Constitution, this Court with a view to avoid further litigation and also to avoid seemingly conflicting interim orders issued by the High Court gave certain directions. Such directions having evidently been issued by this Court in exercise of its power under Article 142 of the Constitution do not constitute a binding precedent. Even therein, the scope and ambit of this Court’s jurisdiction under Article 142 vis-à-vis existence of the statute and statutory rules and the constitutional mandate contained in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution had not been taken into consideration. (v) The Hon’ble Supreme court in Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union of India, (1998) 4 SCC 409 , held as under: 48. The Supreme Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 has power to make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice “between the parties in any cause or matter pending before it”. (v) The Hon’ble Supreme court in Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union of India, (1998) 4 SCC 409 , held as under: 48. The Supreme Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 has power to make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice “between the parties in any cause or matter pending before it”. The very nature of the power must lead the Court to set limits for itself within which to exercise those powers and ordinarily it cannot disregard a statutory provision governing a subject, except perhaps to balance the equities between the conflicting claims of the litigating parties by “ironing out the creases” in a cause or matter before it. Indeed this Court is not a court of restricted jurisdiction of only dispute-settling. It is well recognised and established that this Court has always been a law-maker and its role travels beyond merely dispute-settling. It is a “problem-solver in the nebulous areas” (see K. Veeraswami v. Union of India but the substantive statutory provisions dealing with the subject-matter of a given case cannot be altogether ignored by this Court, while making an order under Article 142. Indeed, these constitutional powers cannot, in any way, be controlled by any statutory provisions but at the same time these powers are not meant to be exercised when their exercise may come directly in conflict with what has been expressly provided for in a statute dealing expressly with the subject. 14. Learned Counsel Mr. Shri Ram Sharma appearing in connected W.P.S No. 4800 of 2014 submitted that there is a difference between illegal appointment and irregular appointment. Illegal appointment goes to the root of the case whereas irregular appointment is that where rule has not been adhered to. He has referred to the case of G.K. Dudani v. S.D. Sharma, reported in, 1986 Supp SCC 239 wherein it is held that the position that a temporary post can be held in a substantive capacity is now firmly established by decisions of this Court in Baleshwar Dass v. State of U.P. and O.P. Singla v. Union of India. According to these decisions, all persons holding substantive posts or temporary posts in substantive capacity are members of the service. According to these decisions, all persons holding substantive posts or temporary posts in substantive capacity are members of the service. In Singla case this Court further pointed out (at SCC p. 483, para 81): “A person can be said to hold a post, permanent or temporary, in a substantive capacity only if his appointment to that post is not fortuitous or ad hoc.” The judgment in Chauhan case is clear on the point that the appointment of none of the promotees in question was a fortuitous or an ad hoc appointment. 15. Learned counsel, Mr. Manoj Tandon, appearing on behalf of the some of the writ petitioners in connected petitions stated that the letter no. 8138 dt. 31.08.2014 has been issued in contrary to Ar.166 and 233 of the Constitution of India as any decision relating to the appointment, posting and promotion of District Judges in the State shall be made by the Governor in consultation with the High Court. He further stated that if the petitioners will be governed under New Pension Scheme, they will get lessor payment due to short span of service. 16. Per contra, Mr. Binod Poddar, learned Advocate General appearing for the respondent-State submitted that according to the order passed by this High Court on 07.03.2011, the appointments of the petitioners were not in accordance with law and declared invalid and the Hon’ble Supreme Court also concurred the judgment of this court dt. 07.03.2011. By referring para 174 of the case of Brij Mohan Lal-II (Supra.), Learned Advocate General submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in an explicit term held that this petitioners cannot claim any indefeasible right either to regularization or absorption. 17. So far the claim of the petitioners to extend all the benefits of past service by treating them in continuous service, undisputedly, initially the petitioners were appointed under the scheme in a temporary basis not under any Rule and thereafter, they were removed from service by judgment dt. 07.03.2011. In terms of the judgment of Mahesh Chandra Verma (Supra.) and B.M Lal (Supra.) they were absorbed in the regular cadre after a suitability test. 07.03.2011. In terms of the judgment of Mahesh Chandra Verma (Supra.) and B.M Lal (Supra.) they were absorbed in the regular cadre after a suitability test. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.M. Lal-II clearly held that appointees to the FTCs do not have any right to the post and such appointments were temporary, ad hoc and on urgent basis for a limited period and thereafter, examined their case as to whether these petitioners would at all be entitled to some relief within the framework of law. Thus, it appears that the case of Fast Track Judges’ were looked into by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a very limited extent and after going through the entire aspect of the matter adopted a measure under Ar.142 that was necessary to do complete justice to the parties and also for improving Justice Delivery System. It is a settled principle of law that after regularization benefit of past services cannot be taken into consideration in the matter of seniority if earlier appointment was not made under the Rule. As such even though it is accepted that the petitioners were regularized they shall be treated to be regularized with effect from the date on which they came in the regular cadre. 18. Coming to the claim of notionally treating the service of the petitioners as continuous only for the purpose of pensionary and other retiral benefits, it is settled position of law that when the Hon’ble Supreme Court gives any direction under Art.142, the same must be strictly complied with and no court shall mould, alter, add or deduct anything which is not given under the direction. The Hon’ble Supreme Court neither in Mahesh Chandra Verma (Supra.) nor B.M Lal-II (Supra.) has not dealt with the post appointment situation of the petitioners and as such this court cannot give anything what has not been given by the Hon’ble Supreme court under Art.142. 19. With regard to the relief of pay protection, Rule 78 appears to be relevant and as such the same is quoted herein below:-Rule 78 of the Jharkhand service code reads as follows:- 78. 19. With regard to the relief of pay protection, Rule 78 appears to be relevant and as such the same is quoted herein below:-Rule 78 of the Jharkhand service code reads as follows:- 78. The initial substantive pay of a Government Servant who is appointed substantively to a post on a time scale of pay is regulated as follows:- a. If he holds lien on a permanent post other than a tenure post, or would hold a lien on such a post had his lien not been suspended; i. when appointment to the new post involves the assumption of duties or responsibilities of greater importance (as interpreted for the purpose of Rule 89) than those attaching to such permanent post, he will draw as initial pay the stage of the time scale next above his substantive pay in respect of the old post; ii. when appointment to the new post does not involve such assumption, he will draw as initial pay the stage of the time-scale which is equal to his substantive pay in respect of the old post, or, if there is no such stage the stage next below that pay, plus personal pay equal to the difference and in either case will continue to draw that pay until such time as he would have received an increment in the Time-Scale of the old post or for period after which an increment is earned in the time-scale of new post, whichever is less. But if the minimum pay of the time scale of new post, is higher than his substantive pay in respect of the old post, he will draw that minimum as initial pay; iii. when appointment to the new post is made on his own request under Rule 56(a) and the maximum pay in the time-scale of that post is less than his substantive pay in respect of the old post he will draw that maximum of as initial pay. when appointment to the new post is made on his own request under Rule 56(a) and the maximum pay in the time-scale of that post is less than his substantive pay in respect of the old post he will draw that maximum of as initial pay. (b) If the conditions prescribed in Clause (a) are not fulfilled he will draw as initial pay the minimum of the time-scale; Provided, both, in cases covered by Clause (a) and in cases, other than cases of re-employment after resignation or removal or dismissal from the public service covered by Clause(b), that if he either- (1) has previously held substantively or officiated in- (i) the same post; or (ii) a permanent or temporary post on the same time-scale or (iii) a permanent post other than a tenure post, on an identical time scale, or a temporary post on and identical time-scale such post being on the same time-scale as a permanent post, or (2) is appointed substantively to a tenure post on a time-scale identical with that of another tenure post which he has previously held substantively or in which he has previously officiated, then the initial pay shall not be less than the pay, other than special pay, personal pay or emolument classed as pay by the State Government under Rule 34(a) (iii), which he drew on the last such occasion and he shall count the period during which he drew that pay on such last and any previous occasions for increment in the stage of the time-scale equivalent to that pay. If however, the pay last drawn by the Government servant in a temporary post has been inflated by the grant of premature increments the pay which he would have drawn, but for the grant of those increments, shall unless otherwise ordered by the authority competent to create the post, be taken for the purposes of this provision to be the pay which he last drew in the temporary post. From bare reading of Rule 78, it appears that if a person, who was holding a post either permanent or temporary, has been re-appointed to a post, other than resignation, removal or dismissal, substantively to such post than he shall not get less than the pay he was drawing on such last occasion and he shall count the period during which he drew that pay on such last and any previous occasions for increment in the stage of the time-scale equivalent to that pay. However, in the present case, the petitioners at the time of their discontinuation from service were getting pay equivalent to the regular District Judges’ but since they were discontinued from the service and thereafter, re-appointed in terms of the judgment passed in Mahesh Chandra Verma (Supra.) and B.M Lal-II (Supra.), Rule 78 shall not be applicable to them and they shall get initial pay of District Judge. 20. As a sequel to the aforesaid discussion, we are of the considered view that the petitioners are not entitled to any benefit of past service rendered by them as Fast Track Judges’. The net result is that all the writ petitions, on hand, are dismissed, without any order as to costs.