Judgment Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. This petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India is directed against the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court (for short ‘Tribunal’) on 24.07.2012. The facts, in brief, may be noticed. 2. The following reference was sent by the appropriate Government for adjudication to the Tribunal:- “Whether the termination of services of Shri Geeta Ram S/o Shri Ram Lal by the (1) Chairman Market Solan, H.P. (2) Secretary, Market Committee Solan, H.P. w.e.f. 1.12.2003 without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, whereas junior to him are retained by the employer as alleged by the workman is proper and justified? If not, what relief and service benefits and amount of compensation the aggrieved workman is entitled to?” 3. The workman (respondent herein) filed a claim petition stating that he was appointed at the first instance by proforma respondent on 01.12.2000 as Chowkidar on contractual basis for one year. He completed more than 240 days and thereafter his services were transferred to petitioners No.1 and 2. In this manner, the workman had completed 240 days in a calendar year when his services came to be illegally retrenched. 4. The petitioners filed reply and opposed the petition on the ground that the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short the ‘Act’) were not applicable to the case of the workman since his services were to be governed by the contract. 5. On the basis of the pleadings, the following issues were framed by the Tribunal. 1. Whether the termination of services of Shri Geeta Ram workman by the Chairman Market Committee Solan and Secretary, Market Committee Solan w.e.f. 1.12.2003 without complying the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is proper and justified? OPP. 2. Whether the junior retained by the employer as alleged by the workman is legal and justified? OPP. 3. Relief. 6. On the basis of the pleadings and evidence, the Learned Tribunal held that the services of the workman had been wrongly and illegally terminated without complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. After arriving at such a conclusion, the workman was held entitled for reinstatement in service with seniority and continuity with effect from his date of termination, but without backwages. The award has been challenged by the petitioners on various grounds as taken in the petition. After arriving at such a conclusion, the workman was held entitled for reinstatement in service with seniority and continuity with effect from his date of termination, but without backwages. The award has been challenged by the petitioners on various grounds as taken in the petition. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the records of the case. 7. At the outset, it may be observed that while adjudicating upon the case of the present kind, this Court is duty bound to keep in mind that the Industrial Disputes Act and other similar legislative instruments are social welfare legislations and the same are required to be interpreted keeping in view the goals set out in the Preamble of the Constitution and provisions contained in Part IV thereof in general and Articles 38, 39 (a) to (e), 43 and 43-A in particular, which mandate that the State should secure a social order for the promotion of welfare of the people, ensure equality between men and women and equitable distribution of material resources of the community to subserve the common good and also ensure that the workers get their dues. Once the Labour Court has exercised the discretion judiciously, the High Court can interfere with the award of the Labour Court only if it is vitiated by any fundamental flaws and not otherwise. (refer Harjinder Singh Vs. Punjab State Warehousing Corporation (2010) 3 SCC 192 , K.V.S. Ram Vs. Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation JT 2015 (1) SC 252, Jasmer Singh Vs. State of Haryana and another (2015) 4 SCC 458 ). 8. It has been the well established principle that industrial adjudication is not merely adjudicating contractual rights based on strict principles of law. The higher courts can interfere against the awards passed by the Labour Courts only if there are manifest errors or the order is contrary to the provisions of law and the order has been passed without jurisdiction and that is the scope of jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It was held that the High Court cannot sit on appeal over the findings recorded by the competent tribunal by converting itself into a court of appeal. 9. It was held that the High Court cannot sit on appeal over the findings recorded by the competent tribunal by converting itself into a court of appeal. 9. In a plethora of judgments, while deciding about the jurisdiction of the Hon’ble Supreme Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that in a writ of certiorari, it is not merely an error but it must be something more which must be manifest on the face of the records and that alone gives jurisdiction to interfere with the awards. When once the tribunal having jurisdiction decides the question and comes to a finding of fact, it is certainly not open to the High Court to interfere with such finding of fact by re-appreciation of evidence unless the finding is perverse and the award passed is wholly based on unwarranted evidence. Therefore, one has to see the overall view of the award passed by the Labour Court while dealing with the writ of certiorari. 10. While holding that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is very wide but while exercising it great care has to be taken, especially in respect of the orders of the tribunals constituted under the special legislation, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sadhu Ram vs. Delhi Transport Corporation (1983) 4 SCC 156 has observed as follows:- “3. We are afraid the High Court misdirected itself. The jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution is truly wide but for that very reason, it has to be exercised with great circumspection. It is not for the High Court to constitute itself into an appellate court over Tribunals constituted under special legislations to resolve disputes of a kind qualitatively different from ordinary civil disputes and to read judicate upon questions of fact decided by those Tribunals. That the questions decided pertain to jurisdictional facts does not entitle the High Court to interfere with the findings on jurisdictional facts which the Tribunal is well competent to decide. Where the circumstances indicate that the Tribunal has snatched at jurisdiction, the High Court may be justified in interfering. That the questions decided pertain to jurisdictional facts does not entitle the High Court to interfere with the findings on jurisdictional facts which the Tribunal is well competent to decide. Where the circumstances indicate that the Tribunal has snatched at jurisdiction, the High Court may be justified in interfering. But where the Tribunal gets jurisdiction only if a reference is made and it is therefore impossible ever to say that the Tribunal has clutched at jurisdiction, we do not think that it was proper for the High Court to substitute its judgment for that of the Labour Court and hold that the workman had raised no demand with the management. There was a conciliation proceeding, the conciliation had failed and the Conciliation Officer had so reported to the Government. The Government was justified in thinking that there was an industrial dispute and referring it to the Labour Court.” 11. By applying the above said broad principles of law laid down categorically, I am not able to see any manifest error in any of the awards passed by the Labour Court. While deciding about the jurisdictional fact and the interference by the higher courts against the orders of the inferior courts or tribunals, Lord Esher, M.R., in an illustrative judgment in Queen vs. Commissioners for Special Purposes of Income Tax (t), [1888] 21 QBD 313 has made the following remarkable assertion: “When an inferior court or tribunal or body, which has to exercise the power of deciding facts, is first established by an Act of Parliament, the legislature has to consider what powers it will give that tribunal or body. It may in effect say that, if a certain state of facts exists and is shown to such tribunal or body before it proceeds to do certain things, it shall have jurisdiction to do such things, but not otherwise. There it is not for them conclusively to decide whether that state of facts exists, and, if they exercise the jurisdiction without its existence, what they do may be questioned, and it will be held that they have acted without jurisdiction. But there is another state of things which may exist. There it is not for them conclusively to decide whether that state of facts exists, and, if they exercise the jurisdiction without its existence, what they do may be questioned, and it will be held that they have acted without jurisdiction. But there is another state of things which may exist. The legislature may entrust the tribunal or body with a jurisdiction, which includes the jurisdiction to determine whether the preliminary state of facts exists as well as the jurisdiction, on finding that it does exist, to proceed further or do something more. When the legislature is establishing such a tribunal or body with limited jurisdiction, they also have to consider, whatever jurisdiction they give them, whether there shall be any appeal from their decision, for otherwise there will be none. In the second of the two cases I have mentioned that it is an erroneous application of the formula to say that the tribunals cannot give themselves jurisdiction by wrongly deciding certain facts to exist, because the legislature gave them jurisdiction to determine all the facts, including the existence of the preliminary facts on which the further exercise of their jurisdiction depends; and if they were given jurisdiction so to decide, without any appeal being given, there is no appeal from such exercise of their jurisdiction. The above said principle of law is an universally acclaimed one.” 12. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principles, it would be seen that it was after evaluating the oral and documentary evidence on record that the learned Tribunal passed the award. 13. Workman has stepped into the witness box as PW-1 and has duly proved his case that he had been engaged on 01.12.2000 and thereafter his services were illegally retrenched after 30.11.2003 or with effect from 01.12.2003. 14. Shri Bhanu Sharma, the Secretary, Market Committee, Solan, appeared as a witness and stated that workman was initially engaged by the Market Board where he worked for two years and thereafter transferred to the Market Committee. He did not dispute that the workman had worked for more than 240 days preceding his retrenchment and categorically admitted that one workman named Pat Ram, junior to the workman was still working. 15. He did not dispute that the workman had worked for more than 240 days preceding his retrenchment and categorically admitted that one workman named Pat Ram, junior to the workman was still working. 15. In Harjinder Singh’s case (supra), it was held that for attracting the applicability of Section 25G of the Act, the workman is not required to prove that he had worked for a period of 240 days during twelve calendar months preceding the termination of his service and it is sufficient for him to plead and prove that while effecting retrenchment, the employer violated the rule of ‘last come first go’ without any tangible reason. 16. In decision reported as (1996) 5 SCC 419 Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam and others, the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered an issue in the context of Section 25H of the Act, which casts a duty upon the employer to give an opportunity to the retrenched workmen to offer themselves for re-employment on a preferential basis. It was argued on behalf of the bank that an offer of re-employment envisaged in Section 25H should be confined only to that category of retrenched workmen who are covered by Section 25F and a restricted meaning should be given to the term ‘retrenchment’ as defined in Section 2(oo). While rejecting the argument, this Court analysed Section 25F, 25H, Rules 77 and 78 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957 referred to Section 25G and held:- “7. Section 25H then provides for re-employment of retrenched workmen. It says that when the employer proposes to take into his employ and persons, he shall, in such a manner as may be prescribed, give an opportunity to the retrenched workmen who are citizens of India to offer themselves for re-employment, and such retrenched workmen who offer themselves for reemployment shall have preference over other persons. Rules 77 and 78 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957 prescribe the mode of re- employment. Rule 77 requires maintenance of seniority list of all workmen in a particular category from which retrenchment is contemplated arranged according to seniority of their service in that category and publication of that list. Rule 78 prescribe and mode of reemployment of retrenched workmen. The requirement in Rule 78 is of notice in the manner prescribed to every one of all the retrenched workmen eligible to be considered for reemployment. Rule 78 prescribe and mode of reemployment of retrenched workmen. The requirement in Rule 78 is of notice in the manner prescribed to every one of all the retrenched workmen eligible to be considered for reemployment. Shri Pai contends that Rules 77 and 78 are unworkable unless the application of Section 25-H is confined to the category of retrenched workmen to whom Section 25-F applies. We are unable to accept this contention. 8. Rule 77 requires the employer to maintain a seniority list of workmen in that particular category from which retrenchment is contemplated arranged according to the seniority of their service. The category of workmen to whom Section 25-F applies is distinct from those to whom it is in applicable. There is no practical difficulty in maintenance of seniority list of workmen with reference to the particular category to which they belong. Rule 77, therefore, does not present any difficulty. Rule 78 speaks of retrenched workmen eligible to be considered for filling the vacancies and here also the distinction based on. The category of workmen-can be maintained because those falling in the category of Section 25-F are entitled to be placed higher than those who do not fall in that category. It is no doubt true that persons who have been retrenched after a longer period of service which places them higher in the seniority list are entitled to be considered for re- employment earlier than those placed lower because of a lesser period of service. In this manner a workman falling in the lower category because of not being covered by Section 25-F can claim consideration for reemployment only if an eligible workman above him in the seniority list is not available. Application of Section 25-H to the. Other retrenched workmen not cove-red by Section 25-f does not, in Any manner, prejudice those covered by Section 25-F because the question of consideration of any retrenched workman not covered by Section 25-F would arise only, if and when, no retrenched workman covered by Section 25-F is available for re-employment. There is, thus, no reason to curtail the ordinary meaning of 'retrenched workmen' in Section 25-H because of Rules 77 and 78, even assuming the rules framedunder the Act could have that effect. 9. The plain language of Section 25-H speaks only of reemployment of 'retrenched workmen'. There is, thus, no reason to curtail the ordinary meaning of 'retrenched workmen' in Section 25-H because of Rules 77 and 78, even assuming the rules framedunder the Act could have that effect. 9. The plain language of Section 25-H speaks only of reemployment of 'retrenched workmen'. The ordinary meaning of the expression 'retrenched workmen must relate to the wide meaning of 'retrenchment' given in Section 2(oo). Section 25-F also uses the wo rd 'retrenchment' but qualifies it by use of the further words 'workman' who has been in continuous service for not less than one year'. Thus, Section 25-F does not restrict the meaning of retrenchment but qualifies the category of retrenched workmen covered therein by use of the further words workman. Who has been in continuous service for not less than one year. It is clear that Section 25-F applies to the retread a workman who has been in continuous service for not less: one year and not to any workman who has bean in continuous service for less than one year; and it does not restrict or curtail the meaning of retrenchment merely because the provision therein is made only for the retrenchment of a workman who has been in continuous service for not less the one year. Chapter V-A deals with all retrenchments while Section 25-F is confined only to the mode of retrenchment of workmen in continuous service for not less than one year. Section 25-G prescribes the principle for retrenchment and applies ordinarily the principle of 'last come first so' which is not confined only to workmen who have been in continuous service for not less than one year, covered by Section 25-F.” 17. Thus, on the perusal of the above decisions, it becomes clear that: a) The employer may deviate from rule of ‘last come first go’ enshrined in Section 25G of the Act in cases of lack of efficiency or loss of confidence, etc. on the part of the workman but in such a case the onus will be on the employer to justify such deviation; b) It is sufficient for a workman to plead and prove that while effecting retrenchment, the employer violated the rule of ‘last come first go’ without any tangible reason for the purpose of applicability of Section 25G of the Act. c) Section 25G of the Act prescribes the principle for retrenchment and applies ordinarily the principle of “last come first go” which is not confined only to workmen who have been in continuous service for not less than one year, covered by Section 25F.” 18. The learned counsel for the petitioners has vehemently contended that the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act are not applicable to the instant case as the services of the workman would be governed by the contract of his service. This argument cannot be accepted for the simple reason that admittedly prior to making the reference to the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, the respondent herein had filed Original Application No.3523 of 2003 before the Administrative Tribunal, Shimla and as per the decision rendered in the same, it was held that the matter was covered under the Industrial Disputes Act. Admittedly, not only as the said order attained finality, but thereafter the workman even served a demand notice, which was sent to the Labour-cum- Conciliation Officer and after failing of the conciliation, the matter was ultimately referred to the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court. Admittedly, the petitioners neither challenged the order of reference nor did they ever raise the plea of jurisdiction before the Tribunal. 19. It cannot be disputed that the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court can only adjudicate upon such like matters only in case the person approaching it is a “workman” as defined under Section 2(s) of the Act. Having said so, the petitioners are clearly estopped from raising such a plea. In addition to above, the learned Tribunal has come to a categorically conclusion that one Pat Ram, who is junior to the workman has been retained while the services of the workman have been dispensed with. Even if, for a moment, it is presumed that the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act are not applicable, even then this action of the petitioners is in violation to the principle of ‘last come first go’ and any violation of the aforesaid principle would perse be discriminatory and violative of the Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 20. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I find no merit in this petition and the same is accordingly dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of.