ORDER : Bela M. Trivedi, J. The present petition has been filed by the petitioner-defendant challenging the order dated 13.10.08 passed by the Civil Judge (JD) & Judicial Magistrate, Bandikui, District Dausa (hereinafter referred to as 'the trial court') in Civil Suit No. 10/97, whereby the trial court has dismissed the application of the petitioner-defendant seeking amendment in the written statement under Order 6, Rule 17 of CPC. 2. It appears that the original plaintiff Ramgopal (now deceased) had filed the suit seeking eviction of the suit shop against the petitioner-defendant on the ground of bona fide requirement of the said shop for his son Ved Prakash and on the ground that the petitioner-defendant had sublet the suit premises. During the pendency of the suit, the original plaintiff Ramgopal had expired and his legal representatives, who are the respondent Nos. 2.1 to 2.8 in the present petition, have been brought on record. It appears that after the evidence of the plaintiff was over, the petitioner-defendant filed an application seeking amendment in the written statement for bringing subsequent events on record to the effect that the respondents-plaintiffs had got the possession of another shop on 26.10.07 under the decree of a court through Nazir, and the said shop was vacant and available to them. The said application was resisted by the respondent No. 2.1 Chandra Shekhar stating inter-alia that the said shop was given to him pursuant to the decree passed in another suit against the another tenant, for his business purpose, and the said shop was situated at a distance of about 250-300 feet from the disputed shop. The trial court dismissed the said application of the petitioner by the impugned order against which the present petition has been filed. 3. It is sought to be submitted by the learned counsel Ms. Sangeeta Sharma for the petitioner that pending the suit the respondents had got the vacant possession of another shop and that was also suitable to the respondents for expanding their business, and the said subsequent event was required to be brought on record. 4. However, the learned counsel Mr.
It is sought to be submitted by the learned counsel Ms. Sangeeta Sharma for the petitioner that pending the suit the respondents had got the vacant possession of another shop and that was also suitable to the respondents for expanding their business, and the said subsequent event was required to be brought on record. 4. However, the learned counsel Mr. Abhi Goyal for the respondents has submitted that the father of the respondents-i.e. the original plaintiff Ramgopal had filed the separate suit seeking possession of the another shop from tenant of that shop on the ground of the bona fide requirement of the respondent No. 2.1 Chandra Shekhar, and the said suit having been decreed, the possession of the said shop has been handed over to the respondent No.2.1 Chandra Shekhar. Hence, the said facts being not relevant to decide the present suit, the trial court has rightly dismissed the application of the petitioner. 5. Having regard to the submissions made by the learned counsels for the parties and to the documents on the record it appears that the suit was originally filed by the deceased Ramgopal on the ground that the suit shop was bona fide required for his son Ved Prakash, who was carrying on the business adjacent to the suit shop and he wanted to expand his business. It appears that one another suit was filed by the said Ramgopal seeking possession of another shop from the tenant of the said shop for the bona fide requirement of his another son Chandra Shekhar. The said suit having been decreed by the trial court, the possession of the said shop has been handed over to the said Chandra Shekhar. In view of the said decree, the petitioner had filed the application for bringing on record the said subsequent events. The trial court has observed that the said another shop was required for another son Chandra Shekhar and it was otherwise also situated at the distance of 250-300 feet from the present shop. In view of the same, it could not be said that the said subsequent event would have any material bearing on the relief claimed in the present suit. The court as such does not find any illegality or infirmity in the impugned order.
In view of the same, it could not be said that the said subsequent event would have any material bearing on the relief claimed in the present suit. The court as such does not find any illegality or infirmity in the impugned order. At this juncture, the observations made by the Apex Court in the case of Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Srivastava, (2001) 2 Supreme Court Cases 604 are required to be reproduced as under:- "10. We have no doubt that the crucial date for deciding as to the bona fides of the requirement of the landlord is the date of his application for eviction. The antecedent days may perhaps have utility for him to reach the said crucial date of consideration. If every subsequent development during the post-petition period is to be taken into account for judging the bona fides of the requirement pleaded by the landlord there would perhaps be no end so long as the unfortunate situation in our litigative slow-process system subsists. During 23 years, after the landlord moved for eviction on the ground that his son needed the building, neither the landlord nor his son is expected to remain idle without doing any work, lest, joining any new assignment or starting any new work would be at the peril of forfeiting his requirement to occupy the building. It is a stark reality that the longer is the life of the litigation the more would be the number of developments sprouting up during the long interregnum. If a young entrepreneur decides to launch a new enterprise and on that ground he or his father seeks eviction of a tenant from the building, the proposed enterprise would not get faded out by subsequent developments during the traditional lengthy longevity of the litigation. His need may get dusted, patina might stick on its surface, nonetheless the need would remain intact. All that is needed is to erase the patina and see the gloss. It is pernicious, and we may say, unjust to shut the door before an applicant just on the eve of his reaching the finale, after passing through all the previous levels of the litigation, merely on the ground that certain developments occurred pendente lite, because the opposite party succeeded in prolonging the matter for such unduly long period." 6. In that view of the matter, the present petition being devoid of merits is dismissed.
In that view of the matter, the present petition being devoid of merits is dismissed. Since the suit is an old one, it is directed that the trial court shall dispose of the same as expeditiously as possible.