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2015 DIGILAW 1297 (GAU)

STATE OF NAGALAND v. MECHUMLA ANAR

2015-10-06

MANOJIT BHUYAN, UJJAL BHUYAN

body2015
JUDGMENT : 1. This appeal was heard yesterday and today is fixed for delivery of judgment. Accordingly, judgment is dictated in the open court. 2. Heard Mr. T.B. Jamir, learned Addl. A.G., Nagaland for the appellants and Mr. C.T. Jamir, learned senior counsel appearing for the sole respondent/writ petitioner. 3. State is in appeal assailing the legality and correctness of the judgment and order dated 13.3.2014 passed by the learned Single Judge allowing WP(C) No.1(K)/2014 filed by the respondent as the writ petitioner. 4. A brief narration of the essential facts is considered necessary. 5. Advertisement No. 1/2006-2007 dated 30.8.2006 was issued by the Nagaland Public Service Commission ('NPSC') inviting applications to fill up 20 vacancies in the post of Medical Officer under the Health & Family Welfare Department, Government of Nagaland. Respondent being eligible responded to the said advertisement. As per the advertisement, 80% of the vacancies were reserved for indigenous inhabitants of the State of Nagaland out of which 33% were reserved for candidates belonging to the 9 scheduled backward tribes of Nagaland on the basis of roster prepared by the State. 6. Respondent qualified in the written test and thereafter appeared in the interview. Respondent belongs to the Sangtam tribe of Nagaland which is a recognised backward tribe of the State. As per roster, the Sangtam tribe comes next to the Pochury tribe and, therefore, one of the vacancies ought to have been earmarked for the Sangtam tribe. However, NPSC recommended a candidate belonging to another tribe against the vacancy which ought to have been earmarked for the Sangtam tribe. 7. Respondent submitted representation before the NPSC requesting her recommendation as per roster. However, her request was turned down by the NPSC. This led to filing of WP(C) No.67(K)./2007 by the respondent. The writ petition was contested by the State taking the plea that during the course of the selection process NPSC had come to know that the tribe status of the respondent was questionable; therefore, she could not be recommended against the reserved quota for the Sangtam tribe. 8. This court by the judgment and order dated 28.11.2008 did not accept the contention of the State by taking the view that the respondent was a holder of a valid Scheduled Tribe/Backward Tribe certificate issued by the competent authority which was not cancelled by any authority. 8. This court by the judgment and order dated 28.11.2008 did not accept the contention of the State by taking the view that the respondent was a holder of a valid Scheduled Tribe/Backward Tribe certificate issued by the competent authority which was not cancelled by any authority. Therefore, action of the NPSC in rejecting the case of the respondent in the manner in which it was done was held to be unjust and unfair. However, since a disputed question of fact had appeared vis-a-vis tribe status of the respondent in view of paternity dispute, this court was of the view that the State should conduct an enquiry by appointing an independent enquiring authority to determine the paternity dispute of the petitioner and thereby her tribe status in accordance with law. State was directed to complete the above exercise within a period of 4 months. This court had made it abundantly clear that if the claim of the respondent was found to be true and correct, the State and the NPSC should reconsider the matter of her appointment as Medical Officer with effect from the date on which the other backward tribe candidates were appointed pursuant to the advertisement dated 30.8.2006 with "all consequential benefits". 9. Materials on record disclose that State of Nagaland had appointed Deputy Commissioner, Tuensang as Enquiry Officer to enquire into the paternity dispute of the respondent, and her consequential tribe status by issuing memorandum on 6.3.2009. Pursuant thereto, the Deputy Commissioner, Tuensang conducted enquiry and submitted his report dated 22.4.2009 before the Commissioner & Secretary, P&AR, Department, Nagaland holding that all the material evidence support the claim of the respondent as a legitimate indigenous citizen of the State of Nagaland belonging to Sangtam tribe. Accordingly, claim of the respondent as indigenous Naga tribe was upheld. 10. It appears that State of Nagaland conducted a further enquiry into the claim of the respondent. A High Power Committee was constituted with the following members : (1) Principal Secretary & Commissioner - Chairman (2) Additional Deputy Commissioner, Longkhim - Member (3) Deputy Secretary, Urban Development - Member. The High Power Committee in its deliberation dated 24.9.2009 opined that Late Litingse Sangtam is the father of the respondent as well as father of Senyangerla Sangtam who is the mother of the respondent. The High Power Committee in its deliberation dated 24.9.2009 opined that Late Litingse Sangtam is the father of the respondent as well as father of Senyangerla Sangtam who is the mother of the respondent. However, NPSC conducted a de novo enquiry on its own de hors the enquiry reports of the Deputy Commissioner, Tuensang and that of the High Power Committee. Secretary, NPSC by his decision dated 3.11.2009 held that NPSC was not inclined to accept the claim of the respondent under the backward tribe reserved quota. 11. This led the respondent to again approach this court by filing WP(C) No.235(K)/2009 assailing the decision of the NPSC. NPSC on its turn also instituted a writ proceeding being WP(C) No.54(K)/2010 questioning the report of the High Power Committee. Both the 2 writ petitions were heard together by this court and were disposed of by a common judgment and order dated 30.11.2012. Some of the observations and findings of the learned Single Judge made while disposing of the 2 writ petitions are relevant and may be referred to in brief. Learned Single judge took the view that the approach of the NPSC in going for de novo enquiry despite the stand taken by the State on the basis of the 2 reports, one of the Deputy Commissioner, Tuensang and the other of the High Power Committee, was not in terms of the constitutional scheme. Learned Single Judge further found that the backward tribe certificate issued in favour of the respondent was so issued in accordance with the prescribed procedure. NPSC was not justified in not accepting the report of the Deputy Commissioner, Tuensang and that of the High Power Committee. Accordingly, the decision of the NPSC was held to be illegal, arbitrary and without jurisdiction. NPSC was directed to act in compliance with the previous order of this court dated 28.11.2008. The writ petition filed by the NPSC was dismissed. 12. Pursuant to the above, notification dated 4.6.2013 was issued by the Commissioner & Secretary to the Government of Nagaland, Health & Family Welfare Department appointing the respondent to the post of Medical Officer w.e.f. 28.8.2007. It was stated that the period from 28.8.2007 till the appointment of the respondent would be counted for the purpose of pension, salary increment, leave and seniority. It was stated that the period from 28.8.2007 till the appointment of the respondent would be counted for the purpose of pension, salary increment, leave and seniority. After about 6 months, another notification dated 13.12.2013 was issued by the same authority declaring that the effective date of appointment of the respondent would be 28.8.2007 with effect from which date the pay of the respondent would be notionally fixed. However, it was clarified that monetary benefit in terms of salary, etc., would be effective from 30.11.2012 which is the date of disposal of the second writ petition filed by the respondent. 13. Respondent again approached this court questioning the decision of the State to extend monetary benefit in terms of salary, etc., to her effective from 30.11.2012 and not from the date of her appointment. This writ petition was registered as WP(C) No.1(K)/2014. Present appellants were arrayed as respondents in the said writ petition. The writ petition was contested by the appellants by filing counter affidavit. Stand taken was that payment of back wages/arrear salary could not be said to be the natural consequence of the expression "all consequential benefits". There was no specific direction of the court to pay back wages/ arrear salary to the respondent. In the light of the orders passed by this court State had duly considered the case of the respondent and had appointed her to the post of Medical Officer effective from 28.8.2007 when the other appointments were made but providing her monetary benefits w.e.f. 30.11.2012. 14. On due consideration, learned Single Judge accepted the contention advanced on behalf of the respondent and negated the stand taken by the present appellants. By the judgment under appeal, learned Single Judge took a considered view that ends of justice would demand that respondent should be given pay and monetary benefit from the date of appointment as consequential benefit. The expression "all consequential benefits" would include monetary benefit like salary which should be granted to the respondent effective from the date of her appointment. Accordingly, the writ petition was allowed by directing the State to pay salary of the respondent effective from the date of her appointment, i.e., 28.8.2007 and not from 30.11.2012 as per decision of the State. 15. It is against this judgment and order of the learned Single Judge that the State is in appeal before us. 16. Accordingly, the writ petition was allowed by directing the State to pay salary of the respondent effective from the date of her appointment, i.e., 28.8.2007 and not from 30.11.2012 as per decision of the State. 15. It is against this judgment and order of the learned Single Judge that the State is in appeal before us. 16. Referring to the grounds of appeal, learned Addl. AG appearing for the appellants submitted that State has followed the direction of this court but because of the stand taken by the NPSC, State should not be burdened with the pay of the respondent for the period from the date of her appointment which has been quantified at more than Rs. 14 lakhs. Referring to the first judgment of this court dated 28.11.2008, learned Addl. AG submits that there was no specific direction to pay salary to the respondent. The expression "all consequential benefits" used by the court in the said judgment cannot be understood to include salary of the respondent from the date of her appointment. The expression "all consequential benefits" is capable of several interpretations and cannot be given an iron clad interpretation to include payment of salary in all circumstances. State had acted reasonably by providing appointment to the respondent with effect from the date the other appointments were made pursuant to the advertisement dated 30.8.2006. State has also clarified that the salary of the petitioner would be notionally fixed on such date to enable her to claim increment on salary, pensionary dues, leave and seniority. Interference by the learned Single Judge, therefore, is not justified, he submits. Learned Addl. AG has placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Union of India v. Pritilata Nanda, (2010) 11 SCC 674 to contend that direction of the learned Single Judge to provide salary to the respondent w.e.f. date of her appointment is not justified. He, therefore, prays for setting aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge. 17. Per contra, Mr. C.T. Jamir, learned senior counsel for the respondent submits that for a Government servant salary is the most important aspect of employment. Devoid of salary the expression 'all consequential benefit' would be rendered meaningless. Having regard to the litigation history of the case as is noticeable, view taken by the learned Single Judge is most appropriate and no interference is called for. Devoid of salary the expression 'all consequential benefit' would be rendered meaningless. Having regard to the litigation history of the case as is noticeable, view taken by the learned Single Judge is most appropriate and no interference is called for. Learned senior counsel for the respondent has also placed reliance on a number of Apex Court judgments to contend that if the State acts illegally in denying appointment, court would be justified not only to direct appointment but also to direct payment of salary effective from the date of appointment as per order of the court. 18. Submissions made by learned counsel for the parties have received the due consideration of the court. Also perused the materials on record. 19. Since the judgment of the learned Single Judge is the subject-matter of the appeal, it would be appropriate to refer to the relevant portion of the said judgment at the outset which is extracted hereunder : "15. Having heard the learned counsel for both the parties and carefully perusing the materials on records, more particularly the judgment and order dated 28.11.2008 and 30.11.2012,1 find no difficulty in understanding that this court directed to reconsider the matter regarding appointment of the petitioner as Medical Officer with effect from the date on which other similarly candidates were appointed, pursuant to the said advertisement, i.e., advertisement dated 30.8.2006 with all consequential benefits. The said judgment and order, not being challenged by the respondent-authorities, attained finality. By the subsequent judgment and order dated 30.11.2012, also the decision made in the judgment and order dated 28.11.2008 was reiterated. This judgment and order also remained unchallenged. In view of the said direction, the respondent-authority, vide Notification dated 5.6.2013, appointed the petitioner to the post of Medical Officer (Class-I Gazetted) in the Nagaland Health and Services in the pay scale of Rs. 15600-39100 with Grade pay of Rs. 5400 p.m. plus all other allowances except NPS as are admissible under rules from time-to-time in Nagaland. 16. The said appointment was made effective with effect from 28-08-2007 and accordingly, the petitioner also joined the post as Medical Officer. However, by the impugned Notification dated 13.12.2013, the respondent No. 2 issued a clarification indicating that the pay of the petitioner would be notionaliy fixed with effect from 28.8.2007, but the monetary benefits, in terms of salary,-etc., would be effective from 30.11.2012. However, by the impugned Notification dated 13.12.2013, the respondent No. 2 issued a clarification indicating that the pay of the petitioner would be notionaliy fixed with effect from 28.8.2007, but the monetary benefits, in terms of salary,-etc., would be effective from 30.11.2012. In the present writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the said Notification by which monetary benefit has been given with effect from 30.11.2012, instead of the date of her appointment, i.e., 28.8.2007. Carefully examining the materials on record I find that there is no basis, on which the said date has been fixed. In their affidavit-in-opposition also the respondent-authorities has not stated as to why the date was fixed on 30.11.2012 for giving monetary benefits. In the above stated writ petitions this court, nowhere directed to give pay, etc., from 30.11.2012. In view of the above, I have no hesitation in holding that the said date has been arbitrarily fixed by the respondent No. 2. 17. In the case of R.S. Misra (supra), the appellant's services were terminated on 5.11.2003 and his date of superannuation was from 3.12.2005. Having failed to get his said termination order quashed, the appellant approached the hon'ble Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, while allowing the appeal directed to pay full salary and allowances to the appellant for the period from 5.11.2003 to 31.3.2005. In the case of Sabir Singh (supra), the appellant was terminated from service. The termination of the appellant was challenged and he was reinstated, upon setting aside the termination order. But he was deprived from termination benefit. He approached the Supreme Court. Notice for the purpose of termination benefit being issued the Supreme Court granted termination benefit directing to count the intervening period, for which the appellant remained out of job, for the purpose of termination benefit. 18. In the case of Union of India (supra), the petitioner, who was physically handicapped was selected for appointment as Class-Ill employee in the Railways Division Manager, South Eastern Railways and despite her selection (at SI. No. 11) she was denied appointment on the ground that she was not sponsored by an employment exchange and her juniors, i.e., candidates at Serial Nos. 12 and 13 were offered appointment. The Tribunal dismissed her petition (OA No. 198 of 1997). Therefore, she preferred a writ petition and the High Court directed that she be appointed from the date on which her juniors were appointed. 12 and 13 were offered appointment. The Tribunal dismissed her petition (OA No. 198 of 1997). Therefore, she preferred a writ petition and the High Court directed that she be appointed from the date on which her juniors were appointed. The High Court also provided that she be given back wages and seniority. Direction was made to make payment within 30 days from the date of order (i.e., 5.8.2008). While modifying the said order, the Hon'ble Supreme Court directed to pay back wages from 5.8.2008, i.e., the date of order. In this case, there was no direction to give all consequential benefits from the date of appointment. Therefore, I am of the respectful opinion that the said decision will not help the respondent. 19. In the case of U.P. SRTC Ltd. (supra), the service of the petitioners were terminated. After about seven years from the date of termination, an application challenging the termination was made. On his reinstatement, the petitioner claimed back wages for the termination period. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that payment of back wages is a discretionary power which is to be exercised keeping in view the facts and circumstances of each case and neither straitjacket formula can be evolved, nor a rule of universal application can be adopted. The above case being a case of termination, the decision referred in the said case will not be applicable in the present case. Because, in the case at hand there is specific direction to give all consequential benefits following appointment of the petitioner. 20. In the present case, while deciding the above mentioned writ petitions, this court specifically directed that consequent upon her appointment, the petitioner shall be entitled to get all consequential benefits. The dictionary meaning of 'consequential benefit/consequential relief' as provided in Biswas Law Dictionary are as follows: "The expression consequential relief means some relief which follows directly from the main relief (declaration), the valuation of which is not capable of being definitely ascertained and which is not specifically provided for and cannot be claimed independently of the declaration as a substantial relief." Similarly, the term 'consequential relief' has been defined in Law Lexicon as under: "A consequential relief means a relief which necessarily flows the principal relief sought. It is a relief which in the circumstances of the case cannot be allowed if the principal relief is refused. It is a relief which in the circumstances of the case cannot be allowed if the principal relief is refused. The word 'relief sought' in section 7(iv) of the Court-Fees Act, 1870, does not refer to the consequential relief merely, but that they may mean the relief sought as a whole, that is, the declaratory decree or order with the consequential relief." 71. In view of above, there is no difficulty in understanding that the term consequential relief means the relief, which follows directly from the main relief. Admittedly in the present case, the petitioner has been appointed with effect from 28.8.2007. The direction to appoint her from the said date was the main relief granted to her. Unless there is anything to the contrary, the appointment of a person carries pay and other service benefits. If an incumbent is not debarred from getting monetary benefits, pay benefit along with such other benefits should follow the appointment. As there is no order depriving the petitioner from getting pay and other benefits from the date of her appointment, she should naturally be entitled to get pay benefit also from the date of such appointment. Fact remains that the petitioner was not appointed by the respondent-authorities illegally holding that the she did not belong to the reserved category, i.e., Sangtam (Naga) Tribe. From the enquiry reports, submitted by the Deputy Commissioner and also the Enquiry Committee headed by the Commissioner, Nagaland it has been clearly revealed that she was wrongfully denied appointment with effect from the date on which other similarly situated persons were appointed. The appointment letter issued by the respondent-authorities clearly indicates that appointment was made with effect from 28.8.2007 and the said order was made in pursuance to the order passed by this court on 28.11.2008. The enquiry report submitted by the Deputy Commissioner and the Enquiry Committee headed by the Commissioner and Secretary of Nagaland leads to understand that the petitioner was entitled to be appointed from the date, on which other similarly situated candidates were appointed. Therefore, had the respondent-authorities appointed her, on 28.8.2007, she would have enjoyed all service benefits with effect from the said date. I do not understand on what basis the respondent had given her pay benefit from 30.11.2012. Therefore, had the respondent-authorities appointed her, on 28.8.2007, she would have enjoyed all service benefits with effect from the said date. I do not understand on what basis the respondent had given her pay benefit from 30.11.2012. As she has been given such benefit from 30.11.2012, i.e., during the period in which she was not holding the job, there was no reason not to give her the said benefit from the date of her appointment. The said decision is found to be arbitrary. But for the illegal decision, taken by the respondent-authority, the petitioner would have joined the job on 28.8.2007 itself and in that case, apart from enjoying the pleasure of getting appointment, she would have got pay and other monetary benefits, arising out of such appointment. It appears that she has been deprived from enjoying the pleasure of employment and monetary benefit with effect from 28.8.2007 for no fault on her part. The respondent-authority by taking an erroneous decision illegally deprived her from enjoying the said service benefit. Therefore, ends of justice demands that she should be given pay and monetary benefits from the date of appointment, as consequential benefits. 22. In view of above considering entire aspect of the matter and the attending facts and circumstances of the case, I have no hesitation in holding that the expression "all consequential benefits" granted to the petitioner, would include monetary benefit also, i.e., salary, etc. Therefore, she is entitled to get arrear salary from the date of her appointment, i.e., 28.8.2007. 23. In view of what has been discussed above, I find sufficient merit in this writ petition. Accordingly, this writ petition is allowed directing the respondent-authorities to pay salary, including arrear pay, etc., with effect from the date of appointment, i.e., 28.8.2007 instead of 30.11.2012. The entire exercise be completed within a period of four months from this date. 24. With the above direction, this writ petition is disposed of." 20. Before examining the view taken by the learned Single Judge, a brief reference to the notifications issued by the State appointing the respondent may be adverted. A conjoint reading of the 2 notifications dated 4.6.2013 and 13.12.2013 would show that respondent was appointed with effect from 28.8.2007. 24. With the above direction, this writ petition is disposed of." 20. Before examining the view taken by the learned Single Judge, a brief reference to the notifications issued by the State appointing the respondent may be adverted. A conjoint reading of the 2 notifications dated 4.6.2013 and 13.12.2013 would show that respondent was appointed with effect from 28.8.2007. From what can be gathered from the submissions made and from the materials on record is that this is the date when other appointments were made to the post of Medical Officer pursuant to the selection undertaken following the advertisement dated 30.8.2006. It was clarified that pay of the respondent would be notionally fixed from such date but actual monetary benefit in terms of salary would be paid from 30.11.2012. 21. This court in the first round of litigation in the judgment and order dated 28.11.2008 had directed the State to verify and conduct enquiry regarding the paternity dispute of the respondent having a bearing on her tribe status with the further direction that if on such enquiry respondent's claim was found to be true and correct, the State as well as the NPSC won Id re-consider the appointment of respondent with effect from the date on which the other backward tribe candidates were appointed with "all consequential benefits". 22. As noticed above, the State had conducted 2 enquiries to determine the status of the respondent, one through the Deputy Commissioner, Tuensang and the other through the High Power Committee. Reports of both the enquiries supported the claim of the respondent as member of the backward Sangtam tribe. NPSC for reasons beyond comprehension clearly exceeded its jurisdiction and decide to hold de novo enquiry with regard to the status of the respondent despite clear and categorical reports of the State. The course of action adopted by the NPSC was disapproved by this court in the second round of litigation. Direction was issued to act on the report of the 2-committees of the State. It was thereafter that the 2 notifications came to be issued. 23. Reverting back to the judgment under appeal, we find that on due consideration, the learned Single Judge has taken the view that "all consequential benefits" in the context of the claim of the respondent would include payment of salary effective from the date of appointment. It was thereafter that the 2 notifications came to be issued. 23. Reverting back to the judgment under appeal, we find that on due consideration, the learned Single Judge has taken the view that "all consequential benefits" in the context of the claim of the respondent would include payment of salary effective from the date of appointment. While taking such a view, learned Single Judge has held that he failed to understand on what basis the pay benefit was given to the respondent from 30.11.2012. Implicit in the above observation is that the State having given the benefit of pay to the respondent on a date (30.11.2012) on which respondent was not actually serving, it was not open for the State to now contend that salary cannot be given to the respondent from the date of appointment as because she did not serve during that period. Because of their own conduct as would be discernible from the 2 notifications dated 4.6.2013 and 13.12.2013, such a stand would be completely impermissible. 24. We agree with the view taken by the learned Single Judge that the expression "all consequential benefits" would include monetary benefit, i.e., salary as well. Having said so, and expressing our agreement with the reasoning given by the learned Single Judge, we are, however, constrained to differ from the view taken by the learned Single Judge on the question of effective date for payment of salary to the respondent. In the case of Pritilata Nanda (supra), she had claimed appointment in a Class-III post in Railways as a physically handicapped candidate. Though she was empanelled in the merit list at SI. No. 11 and though 13 candidates were given appointment, she was denied appointment on the ground that her name was not sponsored by the Employment Exchange. She had approached the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) but unfortunately, her plea was not accepted by the CAT. Against tire decision of CAT, she filed a writ petition before the Orissa High Court which was allowed by the Division Bench. It was held that since she satisfied all requirements of the advertisement and was a successful candidate, denial of appointment to her was not justified. In the light of the above, Division Bench directed the Railways to issue appointment letter to her, further directing that she would be entitled to full back wages and seniority. It was held that since she satisfied all requirements of the advertisement and was a successful candidate, denial of appointment to her was not justified. In the light of the above, Division Bench directed the Railways to issue appointment letter to her, further directing that she would be entitled to full back wages and seniority. The appointment letter was directed to be issued within 30 days. Union of India questioned the legality of the decision of Orissa High Court in the above referred judgment of Pritilata Nanda (supra). The Hon'ble Supreme Court agreed with the view taken by the High Court that by denying appointment to Pritilata, her fundamental rights under article 16 of the Constitution of India were violated. However, the Supreme Court noted that there was a small aberration in the operative portion of the order of the High Court. While the High Court was fully justified in directing the Railways to appoint her from the date persons lower in merit were appointed, the Supreme Court held that it was not possible to confirm the direction given for payment of full salary with retrospective effect. The Supreme Court took the view that the High Court should have directed notional fixation of pay to Pritilata with effect from the date the person placed at SI. No. 12 in the merit list was appointed and to give her all monetary benefit with effect from "that date" (emphasis ours). Accordingly, the Supreme Court modified the order of the High Court by directing that Pritilata should be given actual monetary benefit with effect from 5.9.2008, i.e., the date specified in the order passed by the High Court. Date of High Court's order was 5.8.2008 and direction was to issue letter of appointment within 30 days. Therefore, "that date" was taken as 5.9.2008. 25. Having noticed the above, we may now revert back to the initial judgment dated 28.11.2008 since the direction given in the judgment is the foundation of the appointment of the respondent as well as her entitlement to salary. As per judgment and order of this court dated 28.11.2008, State was directed to conduct enquiry into the claim of the respondent as to her tribe status and if the claim was found to be true and correct, to re-consider her appointment with effect from the date on which the other backward tribe candidates were appointed with "all consequential benefits". As per judgment and order of this court dated 28.11.2008, State was directed to conduct enquiry into the claim of the respondent as to her tribe status and if the claim was found to be true and correct, to re-consider her appointment with effect from the date on which the other backward tribe candidates were appointed with "all consequential benefits". We have already noted that other backward tribe candidates were appointed on 28.8.2007 and from the said date respondent's appointment has been given with notional fixation of salary. Following the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pritilata Nartda (supra), we are of the considered opinion that ends of justice would be met if the final direction of the learned Single Judge is modified by making the effective date for payment of salary to the respondent as 28.3.2009, i.e., 4 months from 28.11.2008 which is the date of the first judgment of this court since the claim of the respondent was directed to be examined within 4 months therefrom. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 13.3.2014 with the modification that respondent would be entitled to her salary with effect from 28.3.2009. 26. State respondent shall now release the arrear salary of the respondent within a period of 4 months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment. 27. Subject to the modification as above, writ appeal is disposed of. 28. No cost.