JUDGMENT H.G.RAMESH, J. 1. “The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a nonserious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.” The above observation made by the Supreme Court in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy [ (2013)12 SCC 649 vide para 22.4.(d)] is quoted as it is relevant in the context of a large number of appeals preferred by claimants against awards of Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals with huge delays. In the present appeal, the delay is two years. 2. What amounts to ‘sufficient cause’ to condone the delay in preferring an appeal against an award of a Claims Tribunal? This is the question that falls for determination in this appeal. 3. This appeal is by the claimant. He is inter alia seeking for enhancement of the compensation awarded by the Tribunal for the injuries suffered by him in a motor vehicle accident that occurred on 11.01.2007. 4. The Tribunal, by noticing that no doctor was examined and no medical bills were produced, has awarded a compensation of Rs.15,000/with interest thereon at 6% p.a. for the injuries suffered by the appellant in the accident. The Tribunal found that the appellant was travelling as a mere passenger in the goods tempo bearing No.KA02B3533, and, therefore, has made only the owner of the tempo liable for the award. 5. There is a delay of two years in preferring this appeal. The impugned judgment is dated 7 September 2010 and this appeal was presented on 5 December 2012. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the appellant and perused the affidavit of the appellant dated 2.4.2013 filed in support of the application for condonation of the delay. 6. Let me first refer to Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (‘the Act’) which inter alia provides for condonation of delay in preferring an appeal. Section 173 of the Act reads as follows: “173. 6. Let me first refer to Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (‘the Act’) which inter alia provides for condonation of delay in preferring an appeal. Section 173 of the Act reads as follows: “173. Appeals.—(1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (2), any person aggrieved by an award of a Claims Tribunal may, within ninety days from the date of the award, prefer an appeal to the High Court: Provided that no appeal by the person who is required to pay any amount in terms of such award shall be entertained by the High Court unless he has deposited with it twenty five thousand rupees or fifty per cent of the amount so awarded, whichever is less, in the manner directed by the High Court: Provided further that the High Court may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of ninety days, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal in time. (2) No appeal shall lie against any award of a Claims Tribunal if the amount in dispute in the appeal is less than ten thousand rupees.” (emphasis supplied) 7. Before examining as to whether the cause shown by the appellant is sufficient to condone the delay of two years in preferring the appeal, it is necessary to state as to what amounts to ‘sufficient cause’ within the meaning of Section 173 of the Act. The words ‘sufficient cause’ occurring in Section 173 of the Act and in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 are in pari materia, and, hence, they have to be construed similarly. Therefore, the decisions of the Supreme Court rendered in the context of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 equally apply to construe the meaning of the words ‘sufficient cause’ occurring in Section 173 of the Act. Accordingly, it is appropriate to refer to some of the decisions of the Supreme Court rendered in the context of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Let me first refer to the decision in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy [ (2013)12 SCC 649 ] wherein the Supreme Court in paras 21 & 22 has laid down the following principles relating to condonation of delay in preferring appeals: “21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are: 21.1. Let me first refer to the decision in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy [ (2013)12 SCC 649 ] wherein the Supreme Court in paras 21 & 22 has laid down the following principles relating to condonation of delay in preferring appeals: “21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are: 21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. 21.2. (ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact situation. 21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. 21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. 21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. 21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. 21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. 21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. 21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. 21.10. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. 21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. 21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. 21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinised and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. 21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude. 22. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are: 22.1. (a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a haphazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system. 22.2. (b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective. 22.3. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto. 22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a nonserious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.” (Underlining & Emphasis supplied) 8. It is relevant to refer to Basawaraj vs. Land Acquisition Officer [(2013)14 SCC 81] wherein the Supreme Court has held that condoning the delay by putting a condition that the applicant will not be entitled for interest for the period of delay is illegal. The following observations made therein are relevant: ”7. It is relevant to refer to Basawaraj vs. Land Acquisition Officer [(2013)14 SCC 81] wherein the Supreme Court has held that condoning the delay by putting a condition that the applicant will not be entitled for interest for the period of delay is illegal. The following observations made therein are relevant: ”7. Shri Patil, lerarned Senior Counsel, has taken us through a large number of judgments of the High Court wherein delay had been condoned without considering the most relevant factor i.e. “sufficient cause” only on the condition that applicants would be deprived of interest for the delay period. These kinds of judgments cannot be approved. The High Court while passing such unwarranted and uncalled for orders, failed to appreciate that it was deciding the appeals under the Act and not a writ petition where this kind of order in exceptional circumstances perhaps could be justified. 15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.” (Underlining supplied) 9. It is also useful to refer to the following observations made by the Supreme Court in Brijesh Kumar vs. State of Haryana [ (2014)11 SCC 351 ] in the context of condonation of delay in preferring appeals: “6. The issues of limitation, delay and laches as well as condonation of such delay are being examined and explained every day by the Courts. The issues of limitation, delay and laches as well as condonation of such delay are being examined and explained every day by the Courts. The law of limitation is enshrined in the legal maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties, rather the idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. 7. The Privy Council in General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corporation Ltd. v. Janmahomed Abdul Rahim, relied upon the writings of Mr. Mitra in Tagore Law Lectures 1932 wherein it has been said that: (IA p.426) A law of limitation and prescription may appear to operate harshly and unjustly in a particular case, but if the law provides for a limitation, it is to be enforced even at the risk of hardship to a particular party as the Judge cannot, on equitable grounds, enlarge the time allowed by the law, postpone its operation, or introduce exceptions not recognised by law. 8. In P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala, the Apex Court while considering a case of condonation of delay of 565 days, wherein no explanation much less a reasonable or satisfactory explanation for condonation of delay had been given, held as under: (SCC p.558, para 6) “6. Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds.” 10. The courts should not adopt an injustice oriented approach in rejecting the application for condonation of delay. However the court while allowing such application has to draw a distinction between delay and inordinate delay for want of bona fides of an inaction or negligence would deprive a party of the protection of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Sufficient cause is a condition precedent for exercise of discretion by the Court for condoning the delay. This Court has time and again held that when mandatory provision is not complied with and that delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, the court cannot condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone. 11. Sufficient cause is a condition precedent for exercise of discretion by the Court for condoning the delay. This Court has time and again held that when mandatory provision is not complied with and that delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, the court cannot condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone. 11. It is also a well settled principle of law that if some person has taken a relief approaching the Court just or immediately after the cause of action had arisen, other persons cannot take benefit thereof approaching the court at a belated stage for the reason that they cannot be permitted to take the impetus of the order passed at the behest of some diligent person. 12. In State of Karnataka v. S.M. Kotrayya this Court rejected the contention that a petition should be considered ignoring the delay and laches on the ground that he filed the petition just after coming to know of the relief granted by the Court in a similar case as the same cannot furnish a proper explanation for delay and laches. The Court observed that such a plea is wholly unjustified and cannot furnish any ground for ignoring delay and laches. 13. The same view has been reiterated by this Court in Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana, observing as under: (SCC pp. 56263, para 18) “18. ….Suffice it to state that appellants kept sleeping over their rights for long and elected to wake up when they had the impetus from Vir Pal Chauhan and Ajit Singh ratios. … Therefore, desperate attempts of the appellants to redo the seniority held by them in various cadres ... are not amenable to judicial review at this belated stage. The High Court, therefore, has rightly dismissed the writ petition on the ground of delay as well.” 14. In Rup Diamonds v. Union of India, this Court considered a case where the petitioner wanted to get the relief on the basis of the judgment of this Court wherein a particular law had been declared ultra vires. The Court rejected the petition on the ground of delay and laches observing as under: (SCC p. 360, para 8) “8. … there is one more ground which basically sets the present case apart. The Petitioners are reagitating claims which they have not pursued for several years. The Court rejected the petition on the ground of delay and laches observing as under: (SCC p. 360, para 8) “8. … there is one more ground which basically sets the present case apart. The Petitioners are reagitating claims which they have not pursued for several years. The petitioners were not vigilant but were content to be dormant and chose to sit on the fence till somebody else’s case came to be decided.” ” 10. The expression sufficient cause means some cause beyond the control of the party and implies no negligence, no inaction, or want of bona fides on the part of the party seeking condonation of delay in presenting the appeal. Sufficient cause is a condition precedent for exercise of discretion for condoning the delay. As observed by the Supreme Court in the decisions extracted above, if a statute prescribes a period of limitation, it has to be applied, and court cannot, on equitable grounds, enlarge the time allowed by law, postpone its operation, or introduce exemptions not recognised by law. In case there was no sufficient cause preventing a litigant to approach the court on time, condoning the delay by putting a condition that the appellant will be deprived of interest for the delayed period amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provision and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature. Such a conditional order is not permissible in law as held by the Supreme Court in Basawaraj. The concept of liberal approach cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. The conduct of a party relating to his inaction or negligence in taking steps to prefer the appeal requires to be taken into consideration while considering condonation of delay. When the delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, Court cannot condone the delay on sympathetic grounds. Court has to draw a distinction between delay and inordinate delay. In cases of inordinate delay, doctrine of prejudice is attracted, and hence, such cases warrant a strict approach. 11. Now let me refer to the appellant’s affidavit dated 2 April 2013 where the cause for the delay of two years in preferring the appeal is stated. It is verbatim reproduced below: “2. That, in the above case certified copy of judgment and award dated 7.9.2010 has been applied on 12.9.2010 and same is received on 22.9.2010. 11. Now let me refer to the appellant’s affidavit dated 2 April 2013 where the cause for the delay of two years in preferring the appeal is stated. It is verbatim reproduced below: “2. That, in the above case certified copy of judgment and award dated 7.9.2010 has been applied on 12.9.2010 and same is received on 22.9.2010. After receiving the certified copies my trial court advocate handed over all the documents and also expressed his opinion that since the award is in a lower side I can prefer the appeal. 3. That, at the time of accident, I was working as a cleaner cum-loader and earning my livelihood. I am the only breadwinner of my family and I have to look after my old aged parents also. My financial position was weak. I sustained fracture of both the bones of right arm, fracture of left leg and also other injuries. I took the treatment as inpatient in Private Hospital. I underwent major surgery for which I incurred huge expenditure towards hospitalisation and medicine. I borrowed hand loan from my relatives and friends to bare expenditure towards hospitalisation and other expenses. Since I am not able to attend my work, I lost the earnings also. When I revealed my financial difficulties to my trial court advocate, he told me that since the award is in a lower side, the Respondent may satisfied the award soon and he will intimate me as soon as the Respondent satisfies the award. Wherefore I am under the impression that case will be considered as closed only after receiving of award amount and even after receiving the award amount I can prefer the appeal within 90 days. 4. That, since I am not received the award amount, I went to my trial court advocates office in the last week of November 2012 to make enquiry. At that occasion, my trial court advocate told that the Respondent is not yet satisfied the award and also enquired me regarding the development of the appeal. Only on that occasion, after discussion with my trial court advocate, I realised that the appeal is required to be filed within 90 days of receiving certified copies and not within 90 days of receiving the award amount. Immediately thereafter I contacted my High Court Advocate and arrange to file this appeal on 5.12.2012.” 5. That, I have very good case on merit. Immediately thereafter I contacted my High Court Advocate and arrange to file this appeal on 5.12.2012.” 5. That, I have very good case on merit. I am not conversant with the legal aspect. The delay in filing of this appeal is bonafide and not intentional. Due to communication gap between myself and my lawyer and also due to financial difficulty, and nonconversant with the legal aspect the delay in filing is caused. If the delay in filing is not condoned I will be put to great hardship. As the same way no hardship will be caused to the respondent if the delay in filing is condoned.” 12. I have examined the cause shown in the light of the principles stated above. The appellant’s erroneous impression that he could prefer an appeal within 90 days after receipt of the award amount is no ground in law to condone the inordinate delay. It is relevant to state that he was represented by an advocate before the Tribunal. Not receiving the award amount is also no ground in law to condone the inordinate delay as the court fee payable on the appeal is only Rs.15/. There was total lack of seriousness on the part of the appellant in taking steps to prefer the appeal. No diligence was shown by the appellant to prefer the appeal within the time allowed by law. He failed to act diligently in the matter. In my opinion, the cause shown is totally unacceptable to condone the inordinate delay of two years in preferring the appeal. I.A. No.1/2013 is accordingly dismissed. Consequently, the appeal also stands dismissed. Appeal dismissed.