Research › Search › Judgment

Karnataka High Court · body

2015 DIGILAW 1308 (KAR)

LATE HANUMAPPA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA

2015-12-03

PRADEEP D.WAINGANKAR, VINEET SARAN

body2015
JUDGMENT The dispute in the present appeal relates to Sy.No.91 (measuring 4.15 acres) and Sy.No.92 (measuring 8.23 acres) situate in Chikkagubbi village, Bangalore South Taluk, which is being claimed by the appellant on the basis of being in occupation as on the appointed dated i.e., 1.3.1974. The owner of the said survey numbers was respondent No.3 Smt. Puttaboramma. The said survey numbers were sold by respondent No.3 to respondent No.4 Smt. Sajida Begum by registered sale deed dated 26.4.1978. 2. The brief facts of this case are that the appellant claims to have filed an application on 3.12.1974 in Form No.7, relating to Section 44 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 (for short the ‘Act’) on 3.12.1974 with regard to the disputed survey numbers, as well as certain other survey numbers also. The Tribunal, by its order dated 26.12.1981, allowed the claim of the appellant and granted occupancy rights in respect of the disputed land. The respondent No.4, who purchased the disputed land from the respondent No.3 on 26.4.1978, challenged the said order of the Tribunal in W.P.No.30301/1982, which was allowed on 29.11.1982, and after quashing the order of the Tribunal dated 26.12.1981, the matter was remanded back to the Tribunal for fresh disposal, after affording adequate opportunity of adducing evidence to all the parties. Then by order dated 16.9.1998, the Tribunal rejected the Form No.7 filed by the appellant with regard to the disputed two survey numbers, which order was challenged by the appellant in W.P.No.30602/1998. On the said petition having been dismissed by judgment and order dated 14.10.2008, this writ appeal has been filed. We have heard Sri. B.V. Raman, learned counsel for the appellant as well as Sri. V.Y. Harsha, learned counsel for State respondent Nos.1 and 2, Sri. Dyan Chinnappa, learned senior counsel appearing for Sri. A.K. Subbaiah for respondent No.3(a), Sri. Tharesha, learned counsel for respondent No.4, and perused the records. 3. The submission of learned counsel for the appellant is that the appellant was in continuous possession and occupation of the land in question as a tenant of respondent No.3, and sometime in the year 1969-1970, his name was also recorded in the RTC and as such, according to the appellant, since he continued to be in possession as on the appointed date i.e., 1.3.1974, he would be entitled to the benefit of Section 44 of the Act. It is submitted that respondent No.3 had admitted before the Tribunal (in the first round of litigation) that appellant was cultivating the land in question and in defence, it was stated by the respondent No.3 that the appellant was working as a coolie. It is, thus, submitted by learned counsel for the appellant that since it was admitted that the appellant was cultivating the land as a coolie, then too, he was in occupation on crop sharing basis and as such the benefit of Section 44 of the Act ought to be given to the appellant. 4. Per contra, learned counsel for the contesting respondent Nos.3 and 4 have submitted that the appellant was never in occupation of the land as a tenant, and it was the respondent No.3 who was cultivating the land. It is submitted that at the time of survey, it was found that there were ‘mango’ trees on the land in question, whereas, the appellant has stated that there was ‘ragi’ crop sowed by him, which was thus contrary to the actual position. Learned counsel submitted that the matter is concluded by finding of fact that the appellant was not in possession and in occupation as a tenant, nor was his name registered in the revenue records on the relevant date, and as such, the benefit of Section 44 of the Act has rightly been denied to the appellant. 5. Section 44 of the Act relates to vesting of the land in the State Government, if the land was held to be in possession of tenant immediately prior to the date of commencement of the Amendment Act, which was 1.3.1974. 6. There is a clear finding of fact recorded that as on the appointed date i.e., 1.3.1974, the land did not stand in the name of the appellant. Since the claim was made by the appellant, it was thus for the appellant to prove his case that he is entitled to the benefit of Section 44 of the Act. In the absence of the appellant being able to prove his case, presumption would necessarily be that the land remained in the occupation of the registered owner, who was respondent No.3 upto 26.4.1978 and thereafter the respondent No.4. In the absence of the appellant being able to prove his case, presumption would necessarily be that the land remained in the occupation of the registered owner, who was respondent No.3 upto 26.4.1978 and thereafter the respondent No.4. In the absence of the appellant having been able to discharge his responsibility to prove that he was tenant or in occupation of the land as a tenant, vesting of the land in favour of the Government, as per Section 44 of the Act, would not be there. 7. While dismissing the claim of the appellant, the Tribunal has recorded a clear finding of fact against the appellant. The Writ court, while dismissing the writ petition, has relied on a Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of State of Karnataka –v Gowrawwa, ILR 1993 KAR 3469, wherein it has been held that the burden is on the tenant to show that he was a tenant as on 1.3.1974 and was in possession as on the appointed date, and in the absence of the same, the appellant could not be granted the benefit under Section 44 of the Act. 8. From the record, we also noticed that the Tribunal has considered the report of the inspection conducted on 31.8.1998. In the inspection report, it was found that there were ‘mango’ trees on the land in question, although the claim of the appellant is that he had sown ‘ragi’ crop. The burden to prove that the he was in possession or in occupation of the land in question as a tenant, was on the appellant, which the appellant has not been able to discharge. In the absence of the appellant having been able to show that he was in occupation as a tenant, as on the appointed date, the Tribunal, as well as writ court, have rightly rejected the claim of the appellant, and we see no reason to interfere with the orders impugned in this appeal. Appeal is accordingly dismissed. No orders as to costs.