JUDGMENT Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. 1. The present appeal has been preferred by the appellant/defendant No.3 against judgment and decree dated 4.2.2014 passed in Civil Appeal No. 154 of 2011 by learned District Judge, Hamirpur, H.P. whereby he affirmed the judgment and decree dated 8.11.2011 passed by learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Hamirpur, H.P. in Civil Suit No. 193 of 2008. 2. The facts, in brief, are that late Sh. Roshan Lal, father of the respondents/plaintiffs and his brother were owners of land measuring 130.20 square metres bearing Khasra Nos. 1028, 1026 and 1027, Khata No. 76, Khatauni Nos. 150, 151 and 152 situated in Up Mahal, Hamirpur, Tappa Bajuri, Tehsil and District Hamirpur, H.P. Out of his 11 shares in this land, Roshan Lal mortgaged his three shares, that is, the suit property in favour of respondents No. 3 and 4 herein/defendants No. 1 and 2 vide mortgage deed dated 14.1.1981 against a mortgage money of Rs. 1,500/- and mutation to this effect was sanctioned vide mutation No. 636 on 18.4.1981. The mortgage was with possession. The father of the plaintiffs expired and succeeded by the plaintiffs and mutation to this effect was sanctioned vide mutation No. 882. During his life time, the father of the plaintiffs had constructed a double storey shop over khasra No. 1027 on the area measuring 15’ x 38’ (4.5 metres x 14.1 metres). The said shop is a part of mortgaged property, i.e. the property mortgaged by Sh. Roshan Lal in favour of defendants No.1 and 2 vide mortgage deed dated 14.1.1981 for a sum of Rs. 1,500/-. After the death of the father of defendants No. 1 and 2, defendants No. 1 and 2 have come into possession of the mortgaged property. During the subsistence of mortgage, the father of defendants No. 1 and 2 inducted Sh. Johli Ram, father of present appellant and respondent No. 5 herein/ defendants No. 3 and 4 before the learned trial Court, as tenant over the aforesaid shop. The defendants No. 1 and 2 are coming in possession of the mortgaged property since 14.1.1981 by themselves, through their father and through defendants No. 3 and 4 and their father late Sh. Johli Ram. In November, 2008 the plaintiffs offered a sum of Rs. 1,500/- to the defendants and asked them to redeem the mortgaged property but they refused. The defendants No. 1 and 2 are coming in possession of the mortgaged property since 14.1.1981 by themselves, through their father and through defendants No. 3 and 4 and their father late Sh. Johli Ram. In November, 2008 the plaintiffs offered a sum of Rs. 1,500/- to the defendants and asked them to redeem the mortgaged property but they refused. Hence, the plaintiffs filed the suit against the defendants for a decree of possession by way of redemption of the suit property on payment of Rs. 1,500/- as mortgage money. 3. The defendants No.1 and 2 filed written statement and admitted the claim of the plaintiffs. Similarly, defendant No.4 filed separate written statement and also admitted the claim of the plaintiffs. A separate written statement was filed by respondent No.3 in which preliminary objections of maintainability, under Section 10 CPC, non-joinder and mis-joinder of party and that plaintiffs have not come to the court with clean hands were taken. On merits, it was alleged that the transaction regarding mortgaged suit property is only a paper transaction, rather the mortgage deed dated 14.1.1981 is a fraudulent and collusive which has been executed in the absence and without any knowledge of defendant No.3 or his father late Sh. Johli Ram. In fact, shop in question was given to late Sh. Johli Ram and defendant No.3 on 1.4.1981 in exchange to the adjoining shop. The defendant No.3 and his father were the tenants of late Sh. Wazira since the year 1961-62 and the question of inducting them as tenants by defendants No. 1 and 2 or their father does not arise and the entry showing late Sh. Johli Ram and defendant No.3 as tenants under the mortgagee is wrong and illegal. The defendant No.3 prayed for dismissal of the suit. 4. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court on 2.4.2009 framed the following issues: 1. Whether Roshan Lal had mortgaged the suit land in favour of Amar Singh on 14.1.1981 for a sum of Rs. 1,500/-? OPP 2. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for redemption of the mortgage? OPP 3. Whether the suit is not maintainable? OPD 4. Whether the suit is collusive if its effect? OPD 5. Whether the suit is barred under Section 10 of CPC? OPD 6. Whether the suit is bad for mis-joinder and non-joinder of parties? OPD 7. 1,500/-? OPP 2. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for redemption of the mortgage? OPP 3. Whether the suit is not maintainable? OPD 4. Whether the suit is collusive if its effect? OPD 5. Whether the suit is barred under Section 10 of CPC? OPD 6. Whether the suit is bad for mis-joinder and non-joinder of parties? OPD 7. Whether the plaintiffs have not come to the Court with clean hands, if so, its effect? OPD 8. Whether the mortgage deed is fraudulent and collusive, if so, its effect? OPD 9. Relief. 5. After recording the evidence, the learned trial Court decreed the suit of the plaintiffs vide judgment and decree dated 8.11.2011. Aggrieved against the said judgment and decree, the defendant No.3/appellant herein preferred an appeal before the learned lower Appellate Court, who vide his judgment and decree dated 4.2.2014 has been pleased to affirm the judgment and decree of the learned trial Court. It is against this judgment and decree that the present appeal has been preferred by the appellant/defendants No. 3 before this Court. 6. On 22.4.2014, this Court admitted the appeal on the following substantial questions of law: 1. Whether the impugned judgments and decrees are the result of non consideration of admission made by respondent No.2/plaintiff Sh. Ravi Kumar who while appearing as PW-1 admitted the case of the appellant? 2. Whether the learned lower Appellate Court being last Court of fact is right in not considering the oral as well as documentary evidence as required of it in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court and this Hon’ble Court, reported in 2005 (10) SCC 243 ; 2003 (5) SCC 89 ; 2001 (4) SCC 756 ; 2001 (3) SCC 179 ; 2011 (12) SCC 174 and 2008 (2) SLC 60? 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the records carefully. Substantial question of law No. 1 8. Admissions to be binding on a person must be clear, precise, not vague or unambiguous. Before right of a party can be considered to have been defeated on the basis of an alleged admission by a person, the implication of the statement made by him must be clear and conclusive; there should not be any doubt or ambiguity about the alleged admission. The law by no means regards admission as conclusive proof of the matters admitted. The law by no means regards admission as conclusive proof of the matters admitted. This is because, to a Court of law, admissions are what statements which do no more than suggest an inference as to some fact or facts in issue. An admission, therefore, is not a conclusive proof of the matter admitted though in certain circumstances it may operate as an estoppel. 9. The learned counsel for the appellant has taken me through the statement of PW-1 Ravi Kumar, who has been arrayed as respondent No.2. The reading of the statement as a whole does not in any way show that he has ever admitted the case of the appellant, rather he in his statement has proved on record Ext. P-1 to Ext.P-5, which are the copies of jamabandi for the years 2002-2003, 1997-98, 1976-77 and 1981-82 pertaining to the suit land in which 3 shares of Roshan Lal, out of his 11 shares, has been shown as mortgaged with Amar Singh, the predecessor-in-interest of defendants No. 1 and 2. Ext. P-6 is the copy of Aks Shajra pertaining to the suit land while Ext.P-7 is the copy of mutation No. 636 dated 18.4.1981. As per the entry in the mutation, the suit property was mortgaged by Roshan Lal with Amar Singh for a consideration of Rs. 1,500/- on 14.1.1981. While in the revenue records in the entry pertaining to Khasra No. 1027 which is shown as Gair Mumkin double storeyed shop the same stands recorded in the possession of Johli Ram as tenant under the mortgagee. 10. PW-1 in his statement has categorically stated that Johli Ram was never inducted as tenant over the shop in dispute which fact is duly corroborated from the documents Ext.P-9 to Ex.P-11. Ext.P-11 is the copy of judgment dated 30.8.2001 passed by the Rent Controller, Hamirpur in Rent Petition No. 6 of 1997 titled Rajesh Kumar and another versus Johli Ram vide which Johli Ram was found to be tenant over the shop in dispute under the petitioners therein i.e. Rajesh Kumar and Sumer Sain, who are arrayed as respondents No. 3 and 4 in the present appeal. Sh. Johli Ram had been ordered to be evicted on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent. Sh. Johli Ram had been ordered to be evicted on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent. This order of the Rent Controller was challenged before the Appellate Authority, who vide order dated 21.11.2002 dismissed the appeal and subsequently the matter was taken up in revision before this Court and this revision met the same fate and was dismissed vide order dated 31.12.2008 (Ext.P-10). Therefore, it can be safely concluded that the plea taken by Johli Ram or by the appellant that they were inducted as tenant by the owners and not by respondents No. 3 and 4 was not accepted by the Courts below including this Court and such findings have attained finality and therefore are not open to challenge. 11. The appellant cannot be permitted to read a stray line from the cross-examination to claim that the plaintiffs have admitted the case of the appellant. It is settled law that anything stated in the evidence must be read with reference to the whole evidence and not in isolation and when the statement of PW-1 is read as a whole and together, this Court is unable to find any admission made by the respondents admitting the case of the appellant. This question is accordingly answered against the appellant. Substantial Question of law No. 2 12. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the learned lower Appellate Court being the last Court of fact was required to consider the pleadings and the oral as well as documentary evidence and thereafter come to a separate conclusion and not ditto the findings recorded by the learned trial Court even if it was to concur with the findings recorded by the learned trial Court. 13. Undoubtedly, first appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case therein is open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. Therefore, the judgment of the first Appellate Court must reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues raised in the appeal. It is the duty of the learned first Appellate Court to deal with all issues and evidence led by the parties before recording such findings. Therefore, the judgment of the first Appellate Court must reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues raised in the appeal. It is the duty of the learned first Appellate Court to deal with all issues and evidence led by the parties before recording such findings. The powers of the first Appellate Court while deciding the first appeal under Section 96 read with Order 41 Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 has been subject matter of a recent decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vinod Kumar vs. Gangadhar, (2015) 1 SCC 391 wherein it was held as under: “9. The powers of the first appellate court while deciding the first appeal under Section 96 read with Order 41 Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 are indeed well defined by various judicial pronouncements of this Court and are, therefore, no more res integra. 10. As far back in 1969, the learned Judge V.R. Krishna Iyer, J (as His Lordship then was the judge of Kerala High Court) while deciding the first appeal under Section 96 of the CPC in Kurian Chacko vs. Varkey Ouseph, AIR 1969 Kerala 316, reminded the first appellate court of its duty as to how the first appeal under Section 96 should be decided. In his distinctive style of writing and subtle power of expression, the learned judge held as under: (AIR p.316, paras 1 – 2) “1. The plaintiff, unsuccessful in two Courts, has come up here aggrieved by the dismissal of his suit which was one for declaration of title and recovery of possession. The defendant disputed the plaintiff's title to the property as also his possession and claimed both in himself. The learned Munsif, who tried the suit, recorded findings against the plaintiff both on title and possession. But, in appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge disposed of the whole matter glibly and briefly, in a few sentences. 2. An appellate court is the final Court of fact ordinarily and therefore a litigant is entitled to a full and fair and independent consideration of the evidence at the appellate stage. Anything less than this is unjust to him and I have no doubt that in the present case the learned Subordinate Judge has fallen far short of what is expected of him as an appellate Court. Anything less than this is unjust to him and I have no doubt that in the present case the learned Subordinate Judge has fallen far short of what is expected of him as an appellate Court. Although there is furious contest between the counsel for the appellant and for the respondent, they appear to agree with me in this observation.” (Emphasis supplied) This Court in number of cases while affirming and then reiterating the aforesaid principle has laid down the scope and powers of the first appellate court under Section 96 CPC. 11. We consider it apposite to refer to some of the decisions. 12. In Santosh Hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari (Deceased) by L.Rs. (2001) 3 SCC 179 , this Court held as under : (SCC pp 188-89, para 15) “15. The appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial court. First appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. The judgment of the appellate court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate court while reversing a finding of fact the appellate court must come into close quarters with the reasoning assigned by the trial court and then assign its own reasons for arriving at a different finding. This would satisfy the court hearing a further appeal that the first appellate court had discharged the duty expected of it.” The above view has been followed by a three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Madhukar & Others vs. Sangram & Others, (2001) 4 SCC 756 , wherein it was reiterated that sitting as a court of first appeal, it is the duty of the High Court to deal with all the issues and the evidence led by the parties before recording its findings. 13. In H.K.N. Swami vs. Irshad Basith, (2005) 10 SCC 243 , this Court stated as under: (SCC p. 244, para 3) “3. The first appeal has to be decided on facts as well as on law. 13. In H.K.N. Swami vs. Irshad Basith, (2005) 10 SCC 243 , this Court stated as under: (SCC p. 244, para 3) “3. The first appeal has to be decided on facts as well as on law. In the first appeal parties have the right to be heard both on questions of law as also on facts and the first appellate court is required to address itself to all issues and decide the case by giving reasons. Unfortunately, the High Court, in the present case has not recorded any finding either on facts or on law. Sitting as the first appellate court it was the duty of the High Court to deal with all the issues and the evidence led by the parties before recording the finding regarding title.” 14. Again in Jagannath vs. Arulappa & Another, (2005) 12 SCC 303 , while considering the scope of Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 303, para 2) “2. A court of first appeal can re-appreciate the entire evidence and come to a different conclusion.” 15. Again in B.V. Nagesh & Another vs. H.V. Sreenivasa Murthy, (2010) 13 SCC 530 , this court taking note of all the earlier judgments of this court reiterated the aforementioned principle with these words: (SCC pp 530-31, paras 3 – 5). “3. How the regular first appeal is to be disposed of by the appellate court/High Court has been considered by this Court in various decisions. Order 41 CPC deals with appeals from original decrees. Among the various rules, Rule 31 mandates that the judgment of the appellate court shall state: (a) the points for determination; (b) the decision thereon; (c) the reasons for the decision; (d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled. 4. The appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial court. The first appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. The judgment of the appellate court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate court. The judgment of the appellate court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate court. Sitting as a court of first appeal, it was the duty of the High Court to deal with all the issues and the evidence led by the parties before recording its findings. The first appeal is a valuable right and the parties have a right to be heard both on questions of law and on facts and the judgment in the first appeal must address itself to all the issues of law and fact and decide it by giving reasons in support of the findings. (Vide : Santosh Hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179 at p. 188, para 15 and Madhukar vs. Sangram, (2001) 4 SCC 756 at p. 758, para 5.) 5. In view of the above salutary principles, on going through the impugned judgment, we feel that the High Court has failed to discharge the obligation placed on it as a first appellate court. In our view, the judgment under appeal is cryptic and none of the relevant aspects have even been noticed. The appeal has been decided in an unsatisfactory manner. Our careful perusal of the judgment in the regular first appeal shows that it falls short of considerations which are expected from the court of first appeal. Accordingly, without going into the merits of the claim of both parties, we set aside the impugned judgment and decree of the High Court and remand the regular first appeal to the High Court for its fresh disposal in accordance with laws”. 16. The aforementioned cases were relied upon by this court while reiterating the same principle in State Bank of India & Another vs. Emmsons International Ltd. & Another, (2011) 12 SCC 174 . “14. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the case, it would be noticed that the judgment passed by the learned lower Appellate Court is more detailed than the one passed by the trial Court. The Appellate Court has taken pains to not only discuss the pleadings but has also taken pains to evaluate the oral as well as documentary evidence without being influenced by the findings rendered by the learned trial Court. The Appellate Court has taken pains to not only discuss the pleadings but has also taken pains to evaluate the oral as well as documentary evidence without being influenced by the findings rendered by the learned trial Court. Though, in terms of the judgment in Vinod Kumar’s case (supra), the appellate court agreeing with the view of the trial court was not required to restate the effect of the evidence or reiterate the reasons given by the trial court and expression of general agreement with reasons given by the court, would ordinarily suffice. However, while undertaking such exercise, it has to be noted that general agreement with the findings recorded in the judgment under appeal should not be a device or camouflage adopted by the appellate court for shirking the duty cast on it, which is not the case in the instant appeal. 15. The learned lower Appellate Court has decided the appeal in accordance with the parameters as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court from time to time and, therefore, this substantial question of law is also answered against the appellant. 16. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I find no merit in this appeal and the same is dismissed, so also the pending application. The parties are left to bear their own costs. Interim order granted by this Court on 22.4.2014 is vacated.