JUDGMENT : Anupinder Singh Grewal, J. The instant writ petition is directed against the order dated 27.11.2008, whereby the petitioner has been dismissed from service. The petitioner has also sought several directions including declaration that the entire disciplinary proceedings are bad in law, and to pay him the entire salary and allowances from 27.01.2002 till date. 2. The petitioner was initially appointed to Rajasthan Judicial Services as a Civil Judge on 08.09.1993. On 25.01.2002 while he was posted as Civil Judge (Junior Division) at Doongla under District Judgeship of Partapgarh, the Administrative Judge had visited the petitioner’s court on inspection, and found that certain files and registers were not made available by the petitioner. The Administrative Judge sent a fax massage on 27.01.2002 to Mr.S.R. Gander, Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chittorgarh to proceed to Doongla and arrange a search and seizure of the disposal register, institution register, peshi register, copying application register, file of quarterly returns sent by the officer to the High Court, cause lists from October, 2001 to January, 2002, and all files, applications and other documents including original judgments of the cases purportedly decided by the petitioner while at Doongla, which may be lying at his residence. The CJM was also directed to proceed with caution by taking necessary assistance from police authorities and to take along some lady Constables to carryout the search. 3. The CJM, Chittorgarh then carried out the search of the premises of the petitioner and his Court. This led to an unsavory incident which resulted in the Chief Judicial Magistrate lodging an FIR on 27.01.2002 against the petitioner under Sections 409, 353, 504 IPC, Section 3(i)10 SC/ST Act and Section 3, PDPP Act. 4. In the meantime, the Registrar (Classification) submitted a note on 26.01.2002 pertaining to an incident in the night intervening of 25.01.2002 and 26.01.2002 alongwith copy of fax dated 25.01.2002 sent from Doongla by Private Secretary to Justice N.P. Gupta (Administrative Judge). A note received from Private Secretary to Justice Jagat Singh dated 26.01.2002 and letter of the petitioner received through fax at 1.40 AM on 26.01.2002 were also annexed with the note which was put up before the Registrar General. A note received from Private Secretary to Justice Jagat Singh dated 26.01.2002 and letter of the petitioner received through fax at 1.40 AM on 26.01.2002 were also annexed with the note which was put up before the Registrar General. The Registrar General placed the note before the Chief Justice, whereupon the Chief Justice issued direction to initiate enquiry against the petitioner under Rule 16 of CCA Rules, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1958 Rules') and directed that he be suspended forthwith and his headquarter was fixed at Jodhpur. Charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner by enquiry officer under Rule 16 which contained the following charges: “CHARGE No. 1 While Mr. Abdul Naeem Khan was posted and functioning as Civil Judge (JD) & Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class, Doongla, District Chittorgarh (Pratapgarh Judgeship) on 25.1.2002, his court was inspected by Hon’ble Mr. Justice N.P. Gupta, Hon’ble Inspecting Judge of Pratapgarh Judgeship. During the intervening night of 25.1.2002 and 26.1.2002, he without disclosing his identity and telephone No., made telephone call on telephone No. 430361 at odd hours i.e. at 1.00 a.m. of the night at the residence of Hon’ble Mr. Justice Jagat Singh and falsely represented to his Lordship that an urgent message is to be faxed from Hon’ble Supreme Court of India to Rajasthan High Court, so the fax machine of Rajasthan High Court may be put on immediately to receive the fax message, which caused inconvenience to his Lordship, whereas infact no urgent message from the Supreme Court was to be faxed. Thus, he acted in an irresponsible, indisciplined and improper manner, unbecoming of a judicial officer and thereby committed gross misconduct. CHARGE NO. 2 While Mr. Abdul Naeem Khan was posted and functioning as above, he without revealing his identity and telephone No. made similar telephone call, soon thereafter to Mr. C.P. Singh, Registrar (Classification), Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur at his residence and asked him to make the fax machine of the High Court operative immediately for faxing an urgent message from the Supreme Court of India to the Rajasthan High Court, whereas he faxed a complaint against Hon’ble Mr. Justice N.P. Gupta from Udaipur from fax No. 0294-520005 on 26.1.2002 at about 1.40 a.m. on fax machine located at the residence of Hon’ble Chief Justice, Jodhpur. Thus he further acted in irresponsible, indisciplined and improper manner unbecoming of a judicial officer and thereby committed gross misconduct.” 5. Justice N.P. Gupta from Udaipur from fax No. 0294-520005 on 26.1.2002 at about 1.40 a.m. on fax machine located at the residence of Hon’ble Chief Justice, Jodhpur. Thus he further acted in irresponsible, indisciplined and improper manner unbecoming of a judicial officer and thereby committed gross misconduct.” 5. The petitioner neither appeared before the enquiry officer nor put up any defence before him, and hence he was proceeded exparte. The respondents are stated to have made several efforts to effect service upon the petitioner but either he was unavailable or he refused to accept the notices. The enquiry judge concluded the enquiry and submitted his report on 12.04.2007. The report was accepted by the Full Court in its meeting on 01.06.2007 whereon it was also decided to serve show cause notice to the petitioner as to why he should not be dismissed from service. The petitioner is again stated to have not furnished any reply although efforts were made to serve him and even notice was published in the daily newspapers. Vide order dated 27.11.2008, the petitioner was dismissed from service. This order could not be served upon the petitioner due to his refusal to accept it, and a public notice was issued in daily newspaper on 07.02.2009 regarding dismissal of the petitioner. The petitioner had in the meantime filed DB CWP No. 1422 of 2005 praying for a direction to respondents to allow him to discharge his duty as a Judicial Officer and to pay his salary. On 03.04.2006 the petitioner withdrew the writ petition with liberty to make a representation for his grievances to the High Court on the administrative side. The petitioner had also filed SB Criminal Misc. Petition No. 1434 of 2005 challenging the proceedings in the FIR No. 8 of 2002 wherein the prosecution was restrained from arresting him. This petition is stated to be pending adjudication. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the entire proceedings initiated against the petitioner are non est as they are not at the instance of the Chief Justice who is the disciplinary authority to issue the chargesheet. Neither the memorandum of chargesheet, nor contents of the charges were ever produced before the Chief Justice. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the entire proceedings initiated against the petitioner are non est as they are not at the instance of the Chief Justice who is the disciplinary authority to issue the chargesheet. Neither the memorandum of chargesheet, nor contents of the charges were ever produced before the Chief Justice. He has referred to Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1958 which lays down the procedure to be adopted by the disciplinary authority and placed reliance upon the following judgments: Jagdish Kumar Sinha Vs. State of Rajasthan [1980 Weekly Law Notes 1], High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan Versus Ramesh Chand Paliwal and another [ AIR 1998 SC 1079 ], Union of India and Others Vs. B.V. Gopinath [ (2014) 1 SCC 351 ], Surjit Singh Dhillon Vs. State of Rajasthan [RLW 1997 (2) Raj.1343], Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Quimat Rai Gupta and Ors. [ (2007) 7 SCC 309 ], and M.V. Bijlani Vs. Union of India and Anr. [ (2006) 5 SCC 88 ]. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also contended that the principles of natural justice have been violated, inasmuch as the petitioner has been condemned unheard as none of the notices and orders in the disciplinary proceedings were ever served upon him. The alleged service of these notices was a sham, and in case the respondents were serious in doing so the same could have been served upon the petitioner or his counsel during the course of the proceedings in the High Court as he and his counsel were regularly attending the same. He has placed reliance upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Union of India Vs. Deenanath Kanta Ram Karyakarta [ (1998) 7 SCC 569 ], Dr. Ramesh Chand Tyagi Vs. Union of India and Ors. [ (1994) 2 SCC 416 ], and R.C. Sood Vs. High Court of Judicature at Rajasthan and Ors. [ (1998) 5 SCC 493 ]. 8. He has also contended that the petitioner was not paid subsistence allowance during the period of suspension which has been deprecated by the Supreme Court in the cases of Ghanshyam Dass Vs. State of M.P. [ AIR 1973 SC 1183 ], Anwar Nisha Khatoon Vs. State of Bihar [ (2002) 6 SCC 703 ], Captain M.Paul Anthony Vs. 8. He has also contended that the petitioner was not paid subsistence allowance during the period of suspension which has been deprecated by the Supreme Court in the cases of Ghanshyam Dass Vs. State of M.P. [ AIR 1973 SC 1183 ], Anwar Nisha Khatoon Vs. State of Bihar [ (2002) 6 SCC 703 ], Captain M.Paul Anthony Vs. Bharat Goldmines Ltd. [ (1999) 3 SCC 679 ], and State of Punjab Vs. K.K. Sharma [ (2002) 9 SCC 473 ]. 9. He further contended that entire proceedings against the petitioner are vitiated on account of bias. The enquiry officer in his report has recommended maximum penalty for misconduct even though the fax was sent by the petitioner through proper channel and not directly to the Chief Justice. The language mentioned therein is most decent and it was not part of the chargesheet. The petitioner is stated to have levelled allegations against a sitting Judge transgressing limits of propriety, discipline and good manners although this was not a part of the charges levelled against the petitioner. The entire exercise of departmental proceedings was conducted with a view to dismiss the petitioner. He has relied upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Tilak Chand Magatram Obhan Vs. Kamala Prasad Shukla and Ors. [(1995) Supp. 1 SCC 21], S. Parthasarthi Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh [ AIR 1973 SC 2701 ], and Rattan Lal Sharma Vs. Managing Committee [ (1993) 4 SCC 10 ]. 10. Lastly, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that even assuming that the charges were proved against the petitioner, punishment of dismissal from service was unwarranted being disproportionate to the alleged misconduct. 11. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent contended that the petitioner has raised several new grounds during arguments which were beyond the pleadings in the writ petition and hence they cannot be considered. He has relied upon judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Bharat Singh and Ors. Vs. State of Haryana and Ors. [ AIR 1988 SC 2181 ], and Rani Laxmibai Kshetriya Gramin Bank Vs. Chand Behari Kapoor and Ors. [ (1998) 7 SCC 469 ]. 12. He has further submitted that the power of judicial review in departmental enquiry including the quantum of punishment is extremely limited and the Court does not sit as an appellate court. [ AIR 1988 SC 2181 ], and Rani Laxmibai Kshetriya Gramin Bank Vs. Chand Behari Kapoor and Ors. [ (1998) 7 SCC 469 ]. 12. He has further submitted that the power of judicial review in departmental enquiry including the quantum of punishment is extremely limited and the Court does not sit as an appellate court. He has relied upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in the cases of Union of India and Ors. Vs. B.C. Chaturvedi [ (1995) 6 SCC 749 ], Lalit Popli Vs. Canara Bank and Ors. [ (2003) 3 SCC 583 ], Sate of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. Vs. Manmohan Nath Sinha [ (2009) 8 SCC 310 ], Nirmala J. Jhala Vs. State of Gujrat and Anr. [ (2013) 4 SCC 301 ], Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank Vs. Rajendra Singh [ (2013) 12 SCC 372 ], State of Meghalaya Vs. Mecken Singh N. Marak [ (2008) 7 SCC 580 ], and Apparel Export Promotion Council Vs. A.K. Chopra [ (1999) 1 SCC 759 ]. 13. He has also contended that the misconduct by a judicial officer has to be judged upon different parameters as judicial officers have to maintain a higher standard of conduct than ordinary government employees. He has placed reliance upon the judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Daya Shankar Vs. High Court of Allahabad & Ors. [ AIR 1987 SC 1469 ], Arundhati Ashok Walavalkar Vs. State of Maharastra [ (2011) 11 SCC 324 ], High Court of Judicature at Bombay Vs. Shirishkumar Rangrao Patil [ (1997) 6 SCC 339 ], High Court of Judicature at Bombay Vs. Shashikant S. Patil and Anr. [ (2000) 1 SCC 416 ], and M.M. Malhotra Vs. Union of India [ (2005) 8 SCC 351 ]. 14. He has further contended that ample opportunity was granted to the petitioner to collect the subsistence allowance and the same was also sent to his address but the petitioner has refused to accept the same and in any case the petitioner has not been able to show how he was prejudiced due to non payment of subsistence allowance. He has relied upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Indra Bhanu Gaur Vs. Committee, Management of M M Degree College and Ors. [(2004) 1 SCC 281], U.P. State Textile Corporation Ltd. Vs. He has relied upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Indra Bhanu Gaur Vs. Committee, Management of M M Degree College and Ors. [(2004) 1 SCC 281], U.P. State Textile Corporation Ltd. Vs. P.C. Chaturvedi [ (2005) 8 SCC 211 ], and State Government of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Shankarlal [ (2008) 2 SCC 55 ]. 15. He has lastly contended that the allegations of malafide and malice in law are vague and baseless. He placed reliance upon the judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Ratnagiri Gas & Power Pvt. Limited Vs. R.D.S. Project Limited reported as (2013) 1 SCC 524 and G. Jayalal Vs. Union of India & Ors. reported as (2013) 7 SCC 150 . 16. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and with their assistance perused the record. 17. At the outset, we do not accept the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent that the counsel for the petitioner should not be allowed to raise new points, which were not pleaded in the writ petition. He has relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Bharat Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan (supra), wherein it was held that if a point of law is to be substantiated by facts, then such facts must have been pleaded in the writ petition. In the case of Rani Laxmi Bai & Anr. Vs. Chand (Supra), it was held that writ petition must fully aver facts and rights flowing therefrom to unable the respondent to meet the case of the petitioner. 18. We are, however, of the view that the counsel for the petitioner has raised legal issues pertaining to the procedure which has been followed by the respondents in the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner. The respondents were given adequate opportunity to respond to these aspects. Therefore, these judgments are distinguishable from the instant case and we proceed to examine these issues as well. 19. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the proper procedure as laid down under the 1958 Rules has not been followed and the proceedings are vitiated as the Chief Justice had neither issued the chargesheet nor was it shown to him does not merit acceptance. 19. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the proper procedure as laid down under the 1958 Rules has not been followed and the proceedings are vitiated as the Chief Justice had neither issued the chargesheet nor was it shown to him does not merit acceptance. It is evident from the perusal of the Full Court Resolution dated 06.01.1995 that the Chief Justice was authorized to nominate Administrative Judge or any other judge who shall have the power to issue chargesheet and conduct the enquiry. The relevant extract of the Resolution of the Full Court dated 06.01.1995 is reproduced herein below:- “I(i) The Administrative Judge or the Judge nominated by the Chief Justice shall have the power to issue charge sheet and to conduct enquiry under Rule 16 & 17 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 and to submit the inquiry report to the Chief Justice for placing it before the Full Court. II(ii) The Enquiry Report submitted by the Administrative Judge or the Judge nominated by the Chief Justice shall be placed before the Full Court. The Full Court after considering the Report, may agree or disagree with it and may exonerate the delinquent officer or may impose suitable punishment or him following the procedure prescribed by the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958.” 20. It is therefore, patent that the Judge nominated by the Chief Justice to hold enquiry was fully competent to issue chargesheet to the petitioner. Although Rule 16 (4) which deals with the appointment of enquiry officer provides that after considering the reply submitted by the delinquent, the enquiry officer shall be appointed, the issuance of chargesheet by the Judge, who was duly empowered to conduct the enquiry, cannot be said to be vitiated. Reference can be made to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of South Bengal State Transport Corporation vs. Ashok Kumar Ghosh & Others [ (2010) 11 SCC 71 ], wherein the appointment of enquiry officer and issuance of chargesheet simultaneously was upheld. It was held as follows:- “13. Reference can be made to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of South Bengal State Transport Corporation vs. Ashok Kumar Ghosh & Others [ (2010) 11 SCC 71 ], wherein the appointment of enquiry officer and issuance of chargesheet simultaneously was upheld. It was held as follows:- “13. In our opinion, it may be open for a disciplinary authority to initiate the departmental proceedings on consideration of the reply of an employee but as an absolute proposition of law it cannot be said that before initiating the departmental enquiry or appointing an enquiry officer, reply of the delinquent employee is required to be obtained and considered unless it is the requirement of the rules. There may be cases where the charges are of such a nature that the disciplinary authority may not require any reply from the delinquent employee but straightaway initiate the departmental enquiry and appoint an enquiry officer.” 21. Article 235 of the Constitution of India vests the control of officers of the judicial service of the State holding posts inferior to the District Judge with the High Court. The Full Court having authorized the Chief Justice for appointing Enquiry Officer and issuing chargesheet, the procedure followed in the instant case cannot be faulted. It is also apposite to refer to Chapter III of the Rules of the High Court of Rajasthan, 1952 which deals with the conduct of administrative business of the Court. Rule 32(1) & (2) are reproduced hereunder: “32. Effect of any irregularity in or omission to follow the procedure laid down in this Chapter. -(1) No irregularity in, or omission to follow, the procedure laid down in this Chapter shall affect the validity of any order passed or anything done under these Rules. (2) For the removal of doubt, it is hereby mentioned that all administrative work disposed of by Chief Justice, the Administrative Judge or any other Judge or Judges to whom the work has been assigned by the Chief Justice for disposal shall be deemed to be disposed of by the Court.” From perusal of Rule 32(1), it is apparent that any irregularity or omission to follow the procedure shall not effect the validity of any order passed or anything done under the Rules. It is also evident from Rule 32(2) that administrative work of Chief Justice, Administrative Judge or another Judge appointed by the Chief Justice shall be deemed to be as done by the High Court. 22. The judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Union of India Vs. B.V. Gopinath (Supra), is not applicable to the instant case as it does not pertain to a judicial officer. In that case it was held that the chargesheet has to be issued only by the appointing authority and this function cannot be delegated by the disciplinary authority to an authority subordinate thereto. In the instant case the Chief Justice had appointed a Judge of this Court as an enquiry officer in terms of the Resolution of the Full Court who cannot be said to be subordinate to the Chief Justice. The judgment of the Single Bench of this Court in the case of Surjeet Singh Dhillon Vs. State of Rajasthan is also distinguishable as it pertains to disciplinary proceedings against a Supervisor in the Agriculture Department. 23. The reliance of the counsel of the petitioner on the judgment R.C. Sood Vs. High Court (Supra) is also misplaced as it pertained to disciplinary action against the Registrar of the High Court. Earlier the matter had been dropped by the Chief Justice and it was subsequently reopened at the instance of another judge who referred it to the Full Court on the basis of a complaint which was not supported by an affidavit. The departmental proceedings were set aside on the ground that once the matter had been dropped by the Chief Justice, it could not have been reopened at the behest of another Judge. 24. The judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of State of U.P. Vs. Mohammed Nooh (supra) is distinguishable on facts as in that case the presiding officer, who was Deputy Superintendent of Police, had not only conducted the enquiry but had also himself testified against the delinquent. 25. In the case of Rattan Lal Vs. High Court (supra), disciplinary proceedings were held against the Principal of the College and one of the members of the enquiry committee also deposed as a witness. It was in such circumstances that the proceedings were held to be vitiated. In the case of S. Parthasarthi Vs. 25. In the case of Rattan Lal Vs. High Court (supra), disciplinary proceedings were held against the Principal of the College and one of the members of the enquiry committee also deposed as a witness. It was in such circumstances that the proceedings were held to be vitiated. In the case of S. Parthasarthi Vs. State of A.P. (Supra), the petitioner therein was working as a Superintendent under a Deputy Director who later held the charge of Director and suspended the delinquent while conducting the enquiry himself. The delinquent official protested against the bias of the officer right at the outset and refused to join the proceedings which were then conducted exparte. In the case of Tilak Chand Magatram Obhan (Supra), the petitioner therein who was a teacher had alleged bias against the Principal of the school who was also a member of the enquiry committee who had even issued defamation notice to the delinquent. 26. In the case at hand, the petitioner is alleging high handedness on the part of the Administrate Judge who had inspected the petitioner’s Court and is alleged to have misbehaved with him. However, it was another Judge who had been duly appointed to conduct the enquiry by the Chief Justice. The proposed disciplinary action was put up and subsequently approved by the Full Court. It is not the case of the petitioner that the Judge who conducted the enquiry was in any manner inimical or biased against the petitioner. 27. We now proceed to deal with the contention that the principles of natural justice were not followed. A bare perusal of the record reveals that the petitioner had himself chosen not to participate in the proceedings at any stage although efforts were made to duly apprise him about the proceedings at every appropriate stage. After the chargesheet had been issued an envelope No. 1941 containing the memorandum of the statement of charges was sent by the Registrar General to District and Sessions Judge, Jaipur vide letter No. 8191 dated 06.06.2002 (Annexure-R/8) for effecting service upon the petitioner at his Jaipur address. This envelope was returned by the District and Sessions Judge, Jaipur on 15.06.2002 (Annex. R/9) with the report of the process server and Nazir that the petitioner refused to accept the envelope. This envelope was returned by the District and Sessions Judge, Jaipur on 15.06.2002 (Annex. R/9) with the report of the process server and Nazir that the petitioner refused to accept the envelope. It was thereafter that the enquiry Judge ordered to proceed exparte against the petitioner, and it was directed that the petitioner be informed about the exparte proceedings against him and the next date of hearing to enable him to put in his appearance and file list of witnesses. In pursuance to the direction of the enquiry judge, a letter dated 12.07.2002 (Annex. R/10) was sent to the petitioner which was returned unserved due to repeated unavailability of the petitioner at his home. On 11.07.2002 (Annex. R/11) another letter was sent to the petitioner to remain present before the enquiry Judge on the next date of hearing i.e. 15.07.2002. The District & Sessions Judge, Jaipur vide his letter No. 4463 dated 11.07.2002, intimated that as per the report of the process server due to non availability of the petitioner and refusal of his sister to accept the letter, the service of the letter was effected by pasting it on the gate of petitioner’s house. This letter dated 11.07.2002 was also sent through envelope bearing No. 2732 through cycle sawar to serve upon the petitioner at his residence but the same was also returned unserved due to non availability of the petitioner. Thereafter, the enquiry judge concluded the enquiry and submitted his report on 12.04.2007. 28. The enquiry report was accepted by the Full Court in its meeting held on 01.06.2007 and it was decided to issue show cause notice to the petitioner as to why he should not be dismissed from service. The show cause notice sent to the residence of the petitioner on 12.07.2007 (Annex. R/15) by registered post was received back unserved with the postal report that the petitioner was not available at the given address. This show cause notice was again sent to the District & Sessions Judge, Jodhpur but the same was returned unserved vide letter dated 16.07.2007 (Annexure-R/16) as the petitioner had not marked his attendance at Jodhpur whereat his headquarter was fixed during the period of suspension. The notice was also sent to the District & Sessions Judge, Jaipur which was also returned unserved with the report of the process server vide letter dated 21.07.2007 (Annex. The notice was also sent to the District & Sessions Judge, Jaipur which was also returned unserved with the report of the process server vide letter dated 21.07.2007 (Annex. R/17) that the petitioner is not available at the given address at Jaipur. Hence a notice was published in the daily newspapers Rajasthan Patrika and Dainik Bhaskar on 17.11.2007 (Annex. R/18 & R/19), but no response was received from the petitioner. Subsequently, the matter was placed before the Full Court which resolved in its meeting held on 12.07.2008 that the petitioner be dismissed from service and the recommendation was sent to the Government for necessary action in accordance with Article 311 of the Constitution of India. Consequently the order of dismissal was passed on 27.11.2008. 29. The dismissal order was sent to the petitioner vide letter No. 17143 dated 28.11.2008 (Annex. R/20) by registered A.D. but the same was returned with the report that the petitioner had refused to receive the same. The dismissal order also was sent to the District & Sessions Judge, Jaipur for effecting service upon the petitioner but the same was returned vide letter dated 05.01.2009 (Annex. R/21) due to unavailability of the petitioner at home despite several attempts. The District & Sessions Judge, Jodhpur vide letter No. 5253 dated 06.12.2008 (Annex. R/22) returned the same envelope unserved stating that the petitioner had not attended the headquarter at Jodhpur till date. In continuation of further efforts for serving the orders on the petitioner, the District & Sessions Judge, Jodhpur sent it through registered post bearing dispatch No. 138 (Annex. R/23). As per report of the postman, the petitioner refused to receive the same which is mentioned in letter No. 422 dated 27.01.2009 sent by the District & Sessions Judge, Jodhpur. A public notice was also published on 07.02.2009 in the daily newspaper Rajasthan Patrika regarding the dismissal of the petitioner from service. 30. It is, thus, obvious that the petitioner had himself refused to join the enquiry proceedings or file any reply before the enquiry judge although several opportunities were granted to him. Therefore the reliance of the counsel of the petitioner on the judgment in the case of Union of India Vs. Dinanath (Supra) is misplaced as in that case only a single attempt had been made to serve the chargesheet which came back undelivered with the postal endorsement “not found”. In the case of Dr. Therefore the reliance of the counsel of the petitioner on the judgment in the case of Union of India Vs. Dinanath (Supra) is misplaced as in that case only a single attempt had been made to serve the chargesheet which came back undelivered with the postal endorsement “not found”. In the case of Dr. Ramesh Chand Tyagi (Supra), notices, which had been sent, were returned with endorsement that the delinquent had left without address and no effort was made to serve him in any other manner. However, in the instant case, it could not be said in any manner that the respondents left any stone unturned to serve the petitioner. 31. This act and conduct of the petitioner, in refusing to accept service and not furnishing any reply to the charges leveled against him, is itself an act wholly unbecoming of a judicial officer, which clearly aggravates the misconduct on his part. There is no gainsaying that the judicial officers are entrusted with onerous responsibilities, and hence they are expected to maintain higher standard of conduct than other government employees. They are required to maintain complete rectitude and conduct themselves in an exemplary manner both inside and outside the court premises. Reference may be made to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Arundhati Ashok Walavalkar Vs. State of Maharashtra reported as (2011) 11 SCC 324 , wherein it was held as follows: “23. We are, however, unable to accept the aforesaid contention for the simple reason that we could probably interfere with the quantum of punishment only when we find that the punishment awarded is shocking to the conscience of the court. This is a case of judicial officer who was required to conduct herself with dignity and manner becoming of a judicial officer. A judicial officer must be able to discharge his/her responsibilities by showing an impeccable conduct. In the instant case, she not only travelled without tickets in a railway compartment thrice but also complained against the ticket collectors who accosted her, misbehaved with the Railway officials and in those circumstances we do not see how the punishment of compulsory retirement awarded to her could be said to be disproportionate to the offence alleged against her. 24. In a country governed by rule of law, nobody is above law, including judicial officers. 24. In a country governed by rule of law, nobody is above law, including judicial officers. In fact, as judicial officers, they have to present a continuous aspect of dignity in every conduct. If the rule of law is to function effectively and efficiently under the aegis of our democratic setup, Judges are expected to, nay, they must nurture an efficient and enlightened judiciary by presenting themselves as a role model. Needless to say, a Judge is constantly under public glaze and society expects higher standards of conduct and rectitude from a Judge. Judicial office, being an office of public trust, the society is entitled to expect that a Judge must be a man of high integrity, honesty and ethical firmness by maintaining the most exacting standards of propriety in every action. Therefore, a judge's official and personal conduct must be in tune with the highest standard of propriety and probity. Obviously, this standard of conduct is higher than those deemed acceptable or obvious for others. Indeed, in the instant case, being a judicial officer, it was in her best interest that she carries herself in a decorous and dignified manner. If she has deliberately chosen to depart from these high and exacting standards, she is appropriately liable for disciplinary action.” 32. We do not also find any merit in the submission of the counsel for the petitioner that the disciplinary proceedings are vitiated as the petitioner was not paid subsistence allowance. It has been categorically stated by the respondents that a cheque of Rs. 40705/- was sent to the petitioner but he had refused to accept the same. The reliance of the counsel of the petitioner on the judgment in the case of Ghanshyam Dass Vs. State of M.P. (Supra) is misplaced as in that case the delinquent had specifically communicated to the enquiry officer about his inability to attend the enquiry due to paucity of funds due to non payment of subsistence allowance. His headquarters were at a distance of 500 km. from the place of enquiry and it was in such circumstances that it was held that grave prejudice had been caused to the delinquent. The other judgments relied upon by the Counsel for the petitioner are also distinguishable on facts and not applicable to the instant case as they pertain to cases wherein the delinquent was prejudiced by nonpayment of subsistence allowance. The other judgments relied upon by the Counsel for the petitioner are also distinguishable on facts and not applicable to the instant case as they pertain to cases wherein the delinquent was prejudiced by nonpayment of subsistence allowance. As already discussed the petitioner has neither put in appearance before the enquiry officer nor submitted any reply to any of the charges against him at any stage of the enquiry proceedings. Leave alone submitting a reply and alleging prejudice on account of non payment of subsistence allowance, the petitioner has even refused to accept several notices and letters which were sought to be served on him through various modes of service. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the petitioner was in any manner prejudiced by the non payment of subsistence allowance. He had neither reported at his headquarters Jodhpur during the period of suspension nor accepted the subsistence allowance which was sent to him. 33. We are conscious of the fact that while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the scope for interference with the disciplinary proceedings is extremely limited. The judicial review is confined to the manner in which decision is taken rather than the decision making process. Even if another view is possible on the given facts and circumstances, this Court shall not interfere as it does not exercise appellate jurisdiction over the disciplinary authorities. However, perusal of the findings of the enquiry officer does not reveal that it is based on no evidence or material which is wholly extraneous to the case has been taken into account. The relevant extract of the findings of the enquiry judge is reproduced here under:- “Mr.C.P. Singh PW-1 who was Registrar (Classification) Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur at the relevant time has stated that during the night intervening January 25 and 26, 2002 at about 1.10 a.m. he was informed by Hon'ble Mr.Justice Jagat Singh that an urgent message was expected from the Supreme Court of India. So, the fax machine be got switched on to receive the same. He tried to contact the Court Officer and the Superintendent of Confidential Cell, Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur on phone, but he could not do so. In the meanwhile he received a telephonic call at this residence. So, the fax machine be got switched on to receive the same. He tried to contact the Court Officer and the Superintendent of Confidential Cell, Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur on phone, but he could not do so. In the meanwhile he received a telephonic call at this residence. The caller without revealing his identity and telephone number stated that an urgent message was to be faxed from the Supreme Court of India. He then contacted Mr.Sajjan Singh the Care Taker and asked him to switch on the fax machine installed at the bungalow of Hon'ble the Chief Justice so that the urgent fax message which was expected to be received from the Supreme Court of India may be transmitted and received. Before Mr. Sajjan Singh could reach the bungalow of the Chief Justice, Mr. Singh received another telephonic call. This time the caller was a lady. She also asked him to get the fax machine switched on so that the fax message from the Supreme Court of India could be faxed. She also did not disclose her identity and telephone number. She was, however, informed that the message could be faxed on No.430565. At about 1.45 a.m., Mr. Sajjan Singh, the Care Taker, informed him that no message from the Supreme Court of India was received but a message was received from Udaipur from one Mr.Abdul Naeem Khan, Civil Judge (JD) cum Judicial Magistrate, Dungala. He has further stated that a copy of the fax message is Ex.1. It is dated 26.1.2002. It was faxed from Udaipur from telephone number 520005. He also received note Ex.2 from the Private Secretary to Hon'ble Mr. Justice Jagat Singh. He obtained details of STD Calls made from telephone number 520005 on 26.1.2002 to 27.1.2002 through the District & Sessions Judge, Udaipur. The details of telephone calls made by Mr. Khan are entered in Ex.4 at Sr. No.3587 to 3592. These were made between 1.06 a.m. to 1.39 a.m. The last two telephone numbers mentioned therein are made to the telephone number installed at the official residence of Hon'ble The Chief Justice. There is no ostensible reason to disbelieve the uncontroverted and uncrossed statement of Mr.Singh or to doubt its truthfulness. His statement is duly corroborated by the documentary proof Ex.1 to Ex.4. Mr.Dharmendra Kumar Paliwal PW-2 is the license holder of STD/PCO at Udaipur. Its number is 520005. There is no ostensible reason to disbelieve the uncontroverted and uncrossed statement of Mr.Singh or to doubt its truthfulness. His statement is duly corroborated by the documentary proof Ex.1 to Ex.4. Mr.Dharmendra Kumar Paliwal PW-2 is the license holder of STD/PCO at Udaipur. Its number is 520005. It has got the fax facility on it as well. He has stated that during the night intervening between 25th and 26th January, 2002 at about 11.30 p.m. A man accompanied by a lady visited his shop. They came on a Rajdoot motor-cycle and told him that they wanted to send an urgent fax message about some death. Saying so, they went away and came back at about 12.00 night. They drafted the fax message at this shop a number of times and ultimately faxed the same at Jodhpur number. He had supplied the details Ex.4 about the calls made by them which are entered at Sr. No.3587 to 3592 in the register maintained by him. When the fax message stood delivered on fax number 0291-430565 a receipt was given to them. Thereafter, they went away from his shop without putting their signatures in the register saying that they were already getting very late. He received the amount of calls made by them which is entered in the register Ex.P5. He has stated that he could idcentify the man and lady because they remained at his shop for a sufficiently long time. After seeing the photograph of Mr. Khan in the Directory of the Judicial Officers, he has identified Mr. Khan to be the person who had come to his shop along-with a lady. Shri K.K.Mathuria, PW-3, the then Private Secretary to Hon'ble Mr. Justice Jagat Singh has proved that he had handed over the note Ex.2 to Mr.C.P.Singh, the then Registrar (Classification) as per the directions of his lordship. Mr.Sajjan Singh PW-4, the then Care Taker has stated that on receiving a telephonic message from Mr.C.P.Singh, Registrar (Classification), he went to the bungalow of Hon'ble the Chief Justice in the night intervening January 25 and 26, 2002 and switched on the fax machine as he was asked by him that an urgent fax message was expected to be received from the Supreme Court of India. At about 1.40 a.m. A fax message was received, but it was from Mr.Abdul Naeem Khan which is Ex.-5. At about 1.40 a.m. A fax message was received, but it was from Mr.Abdul Naeem Khan which is Ex.-5. He handed it over to Mr.C.P.Singh, the then Registrar (Classification). Mr.Nazim Hussain PW-5 was the then Reader in the Court of Civil Judge (JD) cum Judicial Magistrate, Dungala during March 2001 to March 2002. He has stated that the fax message Ex.1 is in the hand writing of Mr.Abdul Naeem Khan. He being the Reader of Mr. Khan at Dungala was well acquainted with his signatures and writing. He has proved the signatures of Mr. Khan on fax message Ex.1. I do not find any cogent and valid reason to disbelieve the unrebutted testimony of these witnesses which is also duly corroborated by the documentary evidence on record. From the oral and documentary evidence produced by the department in support of the charges against Mr. Khan, it is abundantly proved that he made a telephonic call to Hon'ble Mr. Justice Jagat Singh at his official Telephone No.43061 at 1.00 a.m. At odd hours of the night intervening 25.1.2002 and 26.1.2002 without disclosing his identity and telephone numbers and falsely represented to His Lordship that an urgent message is to be faxed from the Supreme Court of India to the High Court and requested his Lordship to get the fax machine switched on. Evidently, he has caused great inconvenience and anguish to his Lordship. He has also proved to have made a telephone call soon thereafter to Mr. C.P.Singh, the then Registrar (Classification), Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur at his residence and asked him to get the fax machine of the High Court switched on immediately for faxing the message from the Supreme Court of India without divulging his identity and telephone number infact, no such message from the Supreme Court of India was to be faxed and was infact faxed and the fax sent by Mr.Khan was a complaint addressed directly to the Hon'ble Chief Justice, RHC, Jodhpur against Hon'ble Mr. Justice N.P.Gupta, the Inspecting Judge. Thus, he has acted in most irresponsible, indisciplined and improper manner unbecoming of a judicial officer and has thereby committed gross misconduct for which he is found guilty of the charges levelled against him under Rule 16 of the CCA Rules and deserves the maximum penalty provided under the Rules for this gross misconduct. Justice N.P.Gupta, the Inspecting Judge. Thus, he has acted in most irresponsible, indisciplined and improper manner unbecoming of a judicial officer and has thereby committed gross misconduct for which he is found guilty of the charges levelled against him under Rule 16 of the CCA Rules and deserves the maximum penalty provided under the Rules for this gross misconduct. The gravity of his aforesaid misconduct gets further enhanced by the fact that he has sent a complaint through Fax at the mid of the night directly addressed to Hon'ble the Chief Justice against Hon'ble Mr. Justice N.P.Gupta, the Inspecting Judge without getting it duly forwarded and through proper channel. This apart, the language used therein is most indecent indicating his dare devil manner of levelling wild allegations against an Hon'ble sitting Judge of the High Court transgressing all limits of propriety, discipline and good manners wholly unbecoming of a judicial officer.” 34. It is well settled that the court shall interfere in the quantum of punishment only in case the punishment imposed is not merely disproportionate but shockingly disproportionate to the misconduct or one which shocks the conscious of the Court. Reference can be made to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank Vs. Rajinder Singh [ (2013) 12 SCC 372 ], wherein it has been held as follows:- “15. As is clear from the above that the judicial review of the quantum of punishment is available with a very limited scope. It is only when the penalty imposed appears to be shockingly disproportionate to the nature of misconduct that the Courts would frown upon. Even in such a case, after setting aside the penalty order, it is to be left to the disciplinary/Appellate Authority to take a decision afresh and it is not for the court to substitute its decision by prescribing the quantum of punishment. 16............... 17............... 18............... 19. The principles discussed above can be summed up and summarized as follows: 19.1. When charge(s) of misconduct is proved in an enquiry the quantum of punishment to be imposed in a particular case is essentially the domain of the departmental authorities. 19.2. The Courts cannot assume the function of disciplinary/departmental authorities and to decide the quantum of punishment and nature of penalty to be awarded, as this function is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority. 19.3. 19.2. The Courts cannot assume the function of disciplinary/departmental authorities and to decide the quantum of punishment and nature of penalty to be awarded, as this function is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority. 19.3. Limited judicial review is available to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, only in cases where such penalty is found to be shocking to the conscience of the Court 19.4. Even in such a case when the punishment is set aside as shockingly disproportionate to the nature of charges framed against the delinquent employee, the appropriate course of action is to remit the matter back to the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority with direction to pass appropriate order of penalty. The Court by itself cannot mandate as to what should be the penalty in such a case. 19.5. The only exception to the principle stated in para (d) above, would be in those cases where the co-delinquent is awarded lesser punishment by the disciplinary authority even when the charges of misconduct was identical or the co-delinquent was foisted with more serious charges. This would be on the Doctrine of Equality when it is found that the concerned employee and the co-delinquent are equally placed. However, there has to be a complete parity between the two, not only in respect of nature of charge but subsequent conduct as well after the service of charge sheet in the two cases. If co-delinquent accepts the charges, indicating remorse with unqualified apology lesser punishment to him would be justifiable.” 35. Tested in the light of the aforementioned principles, the dismissal of the petitioner cannot be held to be shockingly disproportionate to the act of misconduct. It is reiterated that the conduct of the judicial officer has to be of the highest level. He had not only impersonated and misused the name of the Supreme Court while asking the operators at the residence of the Judge, Chief Justice and the Registrar to switch on the fax machine but had called at their residence at an odd hour after midnight. If the petitioner had any grievance regarding the inspection of the Administrative Judge, he could have approached the Chief Justice in an appropriate manner. His conduct subsequent to his suspension in evading service and not submitting any reply before the enquiry officer is also deplorable which aggravates the misconduct on his part. If the petitioner had any grievance regarding the inspection of the Administrative Judge, he could have approached the Chief Justice in an appropriate manner. His conduct subsequent to his suspension in evading service and not submitting any reply before the enquiry officer is also deplorable which aggravates the misconduct on his part. He also did not report at Jodhpur, which was his headquarter during the period of suspension. This kind of behaviour on the part of a judicial officer cannot be countenanced, and the only punishment which would be appropriate in such a case is dismissal from service. 36. Consequently, the instant petition is dismissed with no order as to costs.