JUDGMENT S.G. Shah, J. (CAV) - Pursuant to order dated 27.10.2015 in Civil Application (for vacating interim relief) No. 11455 of 2015, parties have agreed to decide the matter finally instead of deciding Civil Application, which would ultimately result into carrying out same set of exercise by all concerned. 2. By an order dated 25.06.2015 co - ordinate bench of this Court has while issuing notice to respondent 1/1 to 1/5 only granted ad-interim-relief, whereby impugned order dated 27.02.2015 below exhibit 275 in Special Civil Suit No. 270 of 2000 by the learned 2nd Additional Sr. Civil Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) was stayed. 3. Petitioner before this Court is proposed defendant No.11 whereas respondent Nos. 1/1 to 1/4 are original plaintiffs and respondent Nos. 2 to 11 are original plaintiffs and respondent Nos.2 to 11 are original defendants in such Civil Suit No. 270 of 2000 wherein the trial Court has while allowing the application at exhibit 275 to join proposed defendant by the same order, the prayer to amend the pleadings was also allowed. 4. Being aggrieved by such order of joining present petitioner as party - defendant in such suit, petitioner has preferred this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, since now after amendment of provisions of Code of Civil Procedure (for short “the Code”), such order of joining party, so also the amendment in the pleadings is neither appelable nor subject to revision, pursuant to provisions of the Code. 5. To ascertain the legality and validity of such impugned judgment, we have to certainly verify the original suit, issue involved in such suit and necessity of present petitioner as defendant in such suit. 5.1 The plaintiffs have preferred the suit on 17.10.2000 for specific performance of an agreement to sale of the suit property in their favour by the original defendants. So far as details of suit property is concerned, at present, it is not in dispute and, therefore, recording of it in detail is avoided since it is well described in the pleadings. The sum and substance of the plaintiff’s suit is to the effect that defendant No.1 has executed one agreement to sale on 12.08.1980 for selling the suit property and accepted the amount of Rs.25,000/-. The sum and substance of the plaintiff’s suit is to the effect that defendant No.1 has executed one agreement to sale on 12.08.1980 for selling the suit property and accepted the amount of Rs.25,000/-. Though remaining amount is to be paid by the plaintiff to defendant No.1, for which, plaintiffs have issued a notice on 05.10.2000 but defendant No.1 has neither replied to such notice nor executed the sale-deed. However, possession of the suit property was handed over to the predecessor of the plaintiffs on the date of agreement to sale i.e. on 12.08.1980 and after the death of predecessor of the plaintiffs, present plaintiffs are in possession of the suit property and, therefore, plaintiffs have filed a suit for specific performance of such agreement. It is further contended that before plaintiffs pray for specific performance of sale agreement, it was noticed that defendant Nos. 2 to 9 have claimed tenancy right over the suit property by filing Special Civil Suit No. 16 of 1965, which was ultimately declined by the judicial proceedings by judgment and order dated 06.03.1981 in Special Civil Application No. 2766 of 1976. Therefore, now there is no right or interest of defendant No.2 to 9 on the suit property and, therefore, though by revenue entry No. 1339 defendant Nos. 2 to 9 have got their name entered into revenue record before Town Planning authority, pursuant to decision of the High Court in Special Civil Application No. 2766 of 1976(1979) such revenue entries are nullity. So far as limitation and cause of action is concerned, plaintiff has contended that it was continued because of pendency of legal proceedings and since possession of the suit property was already handed over to them, there is continuous cause of action and, reason to file the suit arises only when defendant No.1 has failed to execute the sale deed and did not reply to the notice dated 03.08.2000 to execute the sale deed. With such suit, plaintiff has also filed an application for interim relief, so as to restrain the defendants from alienating the suit property, in any manner whatsoever, so also to disturb the peaceful possession by the plaintiff, in any manner whatsoever, or to take away the possession forcefully from the plaintiff. On the date of filing of the suit i.e. on 18.10.2000 ex-parte ad interim injunction was granted below exhibit 5 application in such suit. On the date of filing of the suit i.e. on 18.10.2000 ex-parte ad interim injunction was granted below exhibit 5 application in such suit. Such ex-parte ad interim injunction restraining the defendant from disturbing the possession of the plaintiff has been confirmed by order dated 29.04.2001 wherein trial Court has, after hearing both the parties and after considering their reply which is confirming interim relief, the operative order has been modified, whereby both the parties are directed to maintain status quo with regard to the possession of the suit property till final disposal of the suit. Thereby, on one hand though defendants are restrained from alienating or transferring the suit property so also restrained from taking away the possession of the suit property, in any manner, whatsoever and by any means or any nature, the trial Court has also restrained and restricted the plaintiff to part with the possession of the suit property in favour of any 3rd party. While passing such order, the trial Court has considered that since defendant No.1 has executed agreement to sale, it would be appropriate to grant status quo. The fact remains that such order of status quo which was passed to avoid further litigation and multiplicity of proceedings, is in force till date. 5.2 The record shows that the trial Court has framed the issues at exhibit 257 in the year 2009 and, thereby, the suit is ripe for adducing evidence by both the parties for final determination of the suit, in accordance with law. 6. Pending such suit, the plaintiffs have also filed one another suit being Special Civil Suit No. 29 of 2001 against present petitioner for confirming their right over the suit property seeking relief of cancellation of one sale deed dated 18.10.2000 executed by defendant No.1 in previous suit in favour of such proposed defendant No.11 - present petitioner. In such second suit on 02.01.2010, the plaintiffs have filed an application to consolidate both the suits and record common set of evidence for deciding both the suits. Such application is recorded at exhibit 261 in Special Civil Suit No. 270 of 2000. The concerned Court has kept such application for hearing but it seems that no final order was passed in such application. Such application is recorded at exhibit 261 in Special Civil Suit No. 270 of 2000. The concerned Court has kept such application for hearing but it seems that no final order was passed in such application. 6.1 Meanwhile in Special Civil Suit No. 29 of 2001 against present petitioner, plaintiffs have filed one application at exhibit 141 contending that pursuant to decision of the Honourable Supreme Court reported in AIR 1954 SC 75 (Durga Prasad & Anr. v. Deep Chand & Ors.), the Special Civil Suit No. 270 of 2000, which is pending for specific performance of the same property, plaintiffs may be permitted to withdraw suit No. 29 of 2001, so as to file a fresh suit and/or with a permission to amend the Special Civil Suit No. 270 of 2000. With such prayer, it is further disclosed in the application that plaintiffs would like to withdraw such suit i.e. 29 of 2001 with a permission to amend Special Civil Suit No. 270 of 2000 with further request to continue the order of status quo of the suit property, which would practically bind the proposed defendant No.11 - present petitioner since he is the only defendant in such Special Civil Suit No. 29 of 2001. Such application was filed on 14.10.2010. However, such application was dismissed by the Court by its order dated 20.12.2010 i.e. after two months by observing that as though pursis is signed by plaintiff No.2 as a power of attorney holder of remaining plaintiffs, in absence of power of attorney deed in favour of plaintiff No.2 by other plaintiffs, the application is dismissed. 6.1 Thereupon another application was filed at exhibit 143 by the plaintiffs again contending that there is no bar or ban to file such application again and that now plaintiffs have rectified the objections by filing the power of attorney deed in favour of plaintiff No.2 by other plaintiffs. Thereby though it would never prejudice the defendant, in any manner, requested the Court to allow such application and to set aside the order dated 20.12.2010 by allowing such application as per exhibit 141. 6.2 There is endorsement by present petitioner being defendant in such suit that they have no objections if suit is withdrawn unconditionally. While allowing such application and thereby disposing Special Civil Suit NO. 6.2 There is endorsement by present petitioner being defendant in such suit that they have no objections if suit is withdrawn unconditionally. While allowing such application and thereby disposing Special Civil Suit NO. 29 of 2001, the trial Court has observed that when power of attorney deed of other plaintiffs in favour of plaintiff No.2 is filed and when plaintiffs have sought withdrawal with a permission to file a fresh suit, the suit is permitted to be withdrawn unconditionally and disposed of accordingly. The controversy starts at this juncture, when application at exhibit 143 for allowing to withdraw the suit contended that plaintiff may file a fresh suit or amend the previous suit No. 257 of 2000 as prayed for, but while endorsing the withdrawal and disposal of the suit below exhibit 1, the trial Court has endorsed that as per application at exhibit 143 by the plaintiffs, the suit is considered as disposed of with a permission to file a fresh suit. However, such specific words that “permission is for filing fresh suit” is not found in order below exhibit 143 wherein words are quite clear that “suit is permitted to be withdrawn unconditionally as prayed for in application at exhibit 141”. Thereby what is permitted by the Court is practically what is prayed by the plaintiffs in their application at exhibit 141 which was disposed of purely on technical ground that though it is signed by plaintiff No.2 alone as himself and as power of attorney holder of other plaintiffs, copy of such power of attorney deed was not attached with such application. Therefore, now after filing the copy of deed when plaintiff No.2 has prayed the Court to pass appropriate order below exhibit 141 and Court has endorsed below such application by an express order that suit is permitted to withdrawn unconditionally as per exhibit 141 then the real order disposing the suit is below exhibit 143 and endorsement below exhibit 141 is mere formality. There the merits are somewhat different than the order below exhibit 143. There the merits are somewhat different than the order below exhibit 143. The defence is to the effect that when by order below application at exhibit 143, such application is allowed, the application below exhibit 141 for granting permission as contended above and thereby though virtually the Court has permitted both the grounds for withdrawing the suit i.e. either to file a fresh suit or to amend the previous suit being Special Civil Suit No. 270 of 2000 which otherwise also needs to be consolidated with the present suit. However, when trial Court has, while endorsing the plaint at exhibit 1 in Special Civil Suit No. 29 of 2001 used the words that suit is disposed of with a permission to file a fresh suit, petitioner has vehemently contended before this Court that there is no express permission to amend the present suit pursuant to withdrawal of the connected suit and, therefore, now such an application to join defendant and to amend the pleadings to some extent is totally misconceived, arbitrary and illegal and, therefore, they have challenged such order contending that amendment is allowed by impugned order below exhibit 275 is not permissible and now petitioner cannot be joined as defendant in such suit wherein issues are framed and that too after the gap of 15 years. 6.3 If we peruse the application at exhibit 275, order below which is impugned in this petition, it transpires that the plaintiff has narrated the requisite history of both the orders i.e. below exhibit 141 and 143 in connected suit No. 29 of 2001 and, thereby, prayed for amending the present suit by adding present petitioner being defendant in the suit No. 29 of 2001 as an additional defendant No.11 in such suit No. 275 of 2000 and to amend the pleadings suitably, considering the averments in such connected suit and factual details with reference to such proposed defendant, so also the relief clause with reference to such proposed defendant, since such relief was already claimed in connected suit No. 29 of 2001. 6.4 Plaintiffs have already filed relevant documents on record viz. Copy of plaint, applications under reference, sale deed in favour of present petitioner which is challenged by the plaintiff. Some such documents were also filed before the trial Court in Suit No. 270 of 2000. I have perused all such documents. 6.4 Plaintiffs have already filed relevant documents on record viz. Copy of plaint, applications under reference, sale deed in favour of present petitioner which is challenged by the plaintiff. Some such documents were also filed before the trial Court in Suit No. 270 of 2000. I have perused all such documents. I have also considered rival submissions including reply filed by the petitioner before the trial Court against application for amendment at exhibit 275. 7. Prima facie what transpires from the record is simple issue that plaintiffs have already filed a suit against proposed defendant to safe-guard their right, title and interest as well as possession of the suit property. Both the suits were pending for 15 years before the trial Court. All plaintiffs have already applied before the trial Court to consolidate both the suits and meanwhile between when plaintiffs have prayed to withdraw such suit with a permission to either file a fresh suit or amend the previous suit and when trial Court has granted permission to withdraw the suit unconditionally as prayed for, and when trial Court has committed an error or mistake in endorsement below exhibit 1 in different terms, the petitioner has challenged the impugned order of joining him as defendant and amending the pleadings. Therefore, practically the dispute which arises for consideration, is purely a technical issue. It is settled legal position that such technical draw back should not restrain the litigant from asserting their right and getting the dispute adjudicated by appropriate judicial proceedings and that no one can be non-suited purely on technical ground. 7.1 The Honourable Supreme Court has repeatedly in several judgments viz. A. Hamsaveni and Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu and Anr. reported in (1994) 6 SCC 51 ; Ashok Kumar Pandely v. State of West Bengal reported in AIR 2004 SC 280 : 2003 AIR SCW 6105; Prabir Kumar Das v. State of Orissa and Ors. reported in (2005) 13 SCC 452 and A. Abdul Farook v. Municial Council, Perambalur reported in (2009) 15 SCC 351 : 2009 AIR SCW 5292; observed and held that the technicalities of the rules of pleading cannot be applied stringently. reported in (2005) 13 SCC 452 and A. Abdul Farook v. Municial Council, Perambalur reported in (2009) 15 SCC 351 : 2009 AIR SCW 5292; observed and held that the technicalities of the rules of pleading cannot be applied stringently. 7.2 In case of State of Punjab and Anr v. Shamlal Murari and another reported in (1976) 1 SCC 719 at page 722, it is held that : “Procedural law is not to be a tyrant but a servant, not an obstruction but an aid to justice. Procedural prescriptions are the handmaid and not the mistress, a lubricant not a resistant, in the administration of justice, where the non compliance, though procedural, will thwart fair hearing or prejudice the doing of justice to parties, the rule is mandatory. But, grammar apart, if the breach can be corrected without injury to a just disposal of the case, the Court should not enthrone a regulatory requirement into a dominant desideratum. After all, Courts are to do justice, not to wreck this end product on technicalities.” Irrationality, perversity and hyper - technicality are out of place while interpreting the statutes or testing the vires of legislation. 7.3 Therefore, hyper technicality cannot be permitted to play the procedural tyrant to defeat the vital judicial process. It is axiomatic that procedural law is the handmaid of justice. Its incorporation in the Statute Book has been to sub-serve the ends of justice and technicality alone would not outweigh the course of justice. 7.4 In AIR 1997 SC 3 United Bank of India v. Naresh Kumar, the Honourable Supreme Court has observed and held that procedural defects which do not go to the root of the matter should not be permitted to defeat a just cause. There is sufficient power vested in the Courts, under the Code of Civil Procedure, to ensure that injustice is not done to any party who has a just case. As far as possible, a substantive right should not be allowed to be defeated on account of a procedural irregularity, which is curable. 7.5 A distinction between the provisions of statue which are of substantive character and were built - in with certain specific objectives of policy on the one hand and those, which are merely procedural and technical in their nature on the other, must be kept clearly distinguished. What we have here is a pure technicality. 7.5 A distinction between the provisions of statue which are of substantive character and were built - in with certain specific objectives of policy on the one hand and those, which are merely procedural and technical in their nature on the other, must be kept clearly distinguished. What we have here is a pure technicality. The Court has to ensure that the justice does not get defeated in the vortex of technicality of procedural law. 7.6 Otherwise also, the law relating to procedural aspect is very much clear. The language employed by the draftsman of procedural law may be liberal or stringent, but the fact remains that the object of prescribing procedure is to advance the cause of justice. In an adversarial system, no party should ordinarily be denied the opportunity of participating in the process of justice dispensation. Unless compelled by express and specific language of the statute, the provisions of CPC or any other procedural enactment ought not to be construed in a manner which would leave the court helpless to meet extraordinary situations in the ends of justice (AIR 2008 SC (Supp) 767 between Sambhaji and Ors. v. Gangabai & Ors.). Procedural law is always subservient to and is in aid to justice. Any interpretation which eludes or frustrates the recipient of justice is not to be followed ( AIR 1998 SC 1827 (1) between Shreenath and Anr. v. Rajesh and Ors.). Laws of procedure are meant to regulate effectively, assist and aid the object of doing substantial and real justice and not to foreclose even an adjudication on merits of substantial rights of citizen under personal, property and other laws. Procedure has always been viewed as the handmaid of justice and not meant to hamper the cause of justice or sanctify miscarriage of justice ( (2003)3 SCC 272 Sardar Amarjit Singh Kalra (Dead) v. Smt.Pramod Gupta (Dead)), the said judgment is recently reconfirmed in Civil Appeal no.6567 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) no.22468 of 2013 between Banwari Lal (D) by Lrs. & Anr. v. Balbir Singh. 8. & Anr. v. Balbir Singh. 8. However, to appreciate the rival contentions at the cost of making this order bulky, to avoid an argument, as being repeatedly made during these days before higher forum, that lower Court has failed to consider the matter in detail as argued, I have no option but to deal with the rival submissions and number of citations referred by both the sides. 8.1 Time has came when there is need to restrict all the litigants to refer different citations when they are not much material or relevant in light of the issue on hand, which simply delays the judicial decision making process when every Court lower to any superior Court is subject to condemnation from the higher Court that Court below has not taken care of all the submissions before it. 9. Considering the factual position discussed herein above, it is sufficient to put an end to such petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India when there is no perverseness, illegality arbitrariness and when it is not deciding the rights of the parties finally. 10. I have heard learned advocate Mr. A. S. Vakil at length. It is his submission that original defendant No. 1 namely Bai Sarswati is owning the suit land which was sold by her in the year 1964 initially to five persons. Those five purchasers have created a partnership firm namely M/s. Arbuda Corporation. Irrespective of such sale, defendant No.1 has entered into one agreement to sale in favour of the petitioner being proposed defendant No.11 and defendant in connected suit No. 29 of 2001 namely Mahalaxmi Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. As third transaction original defendant No.1 namely Bai Sarswati has lastly executed one agreement to sale in favour of the present plaintiffs on 12.08.1980. But by a deed dated 01.05.1991 Bai Sarswati has confirmed the possession as per previous two agreement to sale dated 12.08.1980 in favour of the present petitioner and pursuant to such confirmation wherein practically there are several survey numbers involved, Bai Sarswati has executed various sale deed in favour of the petitioner on 05.06.1992, whereas sale deed of the present suit property being Survey No. 216 is executed by Bai Sarswati in favour of the petitioner on 18.10.2000 and on the same day present plaintiffs have filed a suit being Special Civil Suit No. 270 of 2000 in specific performance to agreement to sale in their favour which is dated 12.08.1980 and therefore, this suit is filed after 20 years. The plaintiffs have issued a public notice in such suit and ex parte ad interim injunction in their favour was granted on 18.10.2000 and plaintiffs have filed reply to such public notice on 31.10.2000 disclosing that in fact suit land was sold to them by its original owner on 18.10.2000. Therefore, the fact remains that the suit and the sale deed came into existence on the same day and, therefore, primary issue would be that which action is to be considered as first in priority i.e. filing of the suit or execution of the sale deed. Therefore, considering reply dated 31.10.2000 whereby present petitioner has disclosed the sale deed dated 18.10.2000 in its favour, the plaintiff has filed another suit on 28.02.2001 being Special Civil Suit NO. 29 of 2001 for cancellation of such sale deed dated 18.10.2000. On 07.07.2009 issues were framed in the first suit, on 02.01.2010 an application for consolidating both the suits was filed and rest of the history regarding withdrawal of suit till filing of this petition is discussed in previous paras and, therefore, not repeated. 10.1 What is contended, based upon such chronology, is to the effect that the trial Court has not granted the permission to amend another suit but permission is granted only to file fresh suit and that though it is not disclosed anywhere, practically suit No. 29 of 2001 is bad for want of statutory notice under the Co-operative Societies Act, now original plaintiff is taking disadvantage of their lacuna in taking appropriate steps by filing amendment at belated stage. It is further contended that the trial Court has failed to consider the list of documents and list of citations referred before it and that as per provisions of Rule 1 Order 23 of the Code once suit is withdrawn, such withdrawal would preclude the plaintiffs by way of constructive res judicata on the same ground. It is further contended that pursuant to Section 59 of the Limitation Act, now such amendment would be time barred since period of limitation to challenge the sale deed is only 3 years and there is categorical evidence regarding existence of sale deed in question since 30.10.2000, when present petitioner has replied to the public notice and therefore such amendment cannot be allowed. It is also submitted that if at all this Court considers that there is non - application of mind by the trial Court in passing the impugned order then at least when trial court has failed to appreciate the documents and citations referred by the petitioner and allowed the application summarily, then and therefore the matter may be remanded back for reconsideration. It is also contended, pursuant to Rule 17 Order 6 of the Code that amendment cannot be allowed after trial is commenced and that when issues are framed, there is no reason for the trial Court to allow any such amendment. 11. Unfortunately, I do not find any substance in any such submission for different reasons. So far as non - application of mind or summary order is concerned, the fact remains that nothing is stipulated in law that every order should have specific number of reasoning's for determination and decision in such order and that such determination shall be in what manner. Even single ground assigned for a decision is enough and it cannot be said that the order is improper only on such count, if a single ground itself is enough to determine or decide the issue on hand. Similarly, it is not necessary to burden an interim order by reproducing the entire facts though it is done in this case to avoid similar arguments before the higher authority. Similarly, it is not necessary to burden an interim order by reproducing the entire facts though it is done in this case to avoid similar arguments before the higher authority. So far as issue regarding limitation and res judicata is concerned, suffice to say that by impugned order, the final issue has not been decided between the parties but only amendment application is allowed and thereby name of the petitioner is ordered to be added as additional defendant considering the fact that plaintiff has already agitated the issue on any early date i.e. on 08.02.2001 by filing Special Civil Suit No. 29 of 2001, which was certainly within the prescribed period of limitation and at present, plaintiff has simply tried to club all the issues in same suit when suit property and issues are common and more particularly when second suit was otherwise required to be consolidated with the present suit and by all means there may not be necessity to record same set of evidence twice in two different suits. Moreover, the objections to amendment is so technical as explained herein above because practically it is based on the bona fide error or mistake on the part of the trial Court. It is clear and obvious that though in such application plaintiff has sought permission either to file fresh suit or amend such suit and though application for withdrawal was allowed unconditionally, there was different endorsement below exhibit 1 that permission is granted to file fresh suit. 12. So far as limitation to allow amendment of plaint pursuant to amended provisions of Code is concerned, learned senior counsel Mr. S. N. Shelat for respondent - original plaintiffs has categorically submitted that amended provisions of the Code would not be applicable to present suit, because such suit was filed prior to amendment of the Code, since amendment is with effect from 2002 whereas suit is pending since the year 2000. 13. Learned advocate for the petitioner has also contended that in any case, a permission to amend the pleadings in suit No. 279 of 2000 cannot be granted in any other suit, in the present case suit No. 29 of 2001. 13. Learned advocate for the petitioner has also contended that in any case, a permission to amend the pleadings in suit No. 279 of 2000 cannot be granted in any other suit, in the present case suit No. 29 of 2001. But the fact remains that both the suits are for the same property and issue is so related that on the day when suit No. 279 of 2000 was filed, wherein Court has restricted Bai Sarswati to execute sale deed, Bai Sarswati has executed the sale deed on the same day and therefore practically, considering the factual details present petitioner is certainly a necessary party in such suit and such suit certainly needs to be amended to disclose such fact which was occurred either simultaneously or after filing of the suit before the court by the original plaintiff. Considering such aspect plaintiff has already field separate suit and after couple of years plaintiffs have prayed to consolidate both the suits and when Court has not passed any order for couple of weeks, I do not think that in such circumstances technicalities should come in way of the plaintiffs so as to deny them to agitate the issue which is otherwise pending before the Court for all these years. Irrespective of above factual details which categorically confirms that there is no substance in the petition, petitioner is relying upon several decision and surprisingly only because facts of litigation's and some properties are referred in some previous cases by the Honourable Supreme court, but when all litigants are not a party in such other cases, at all and thereby when present issue was never raised before any Court, it is submitted that pursuant to such previous judgments, now it is settled position in favour of the present petitioner and, therefore, now nobody can raise such issue. 13.1 To be more precise and clear, it is to be recorded that only because of reference of original defendants in some other judgment by the Honourable Supreme Court, the rights of the present plaintiffs cannot be decided when present plaintiffs were never party in such other suits and the issue raised by the plaintiffs in present suit is never adjudicated by any other Court, in any manner. 14. 14. Petitioner is relying upon following decisions: (1) (1986) 4 SCC 537 between Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. L. K. Ratna and Ors., wherein learned advocate for the petitioner relying upon para 17 of the judgment contending that when joining him as a defendant is illegal why he should be asked to defend the suit and to wait for a decision in his favour or to file an appeal if decision is not in his favour. Though observations of such para seems to be attractive, practically it is with reference to the specific provisions of a different enactment, which was under consideration before the Honourable Supreme Court and, therefore, only because of such observations and practically reproduction of some other judgments, it cannot be said that in such cases irrespective of legal rights of the plaintiffs, defendant should not be called upon to defend the suit, so as to bring the fact on record. In the present case, the fact remains that the sale deed in favour of the petitioner is executed on the same day when the trial Court has restrained the executor i.e. original owner being defendant No.1 Bai Sarswati from executing any such sale deed. It can certainly be said that when any suit was pending, it cannot be said that the petitioner has to satisfy with an unjust trial if he is joined as litigant/defendant in the present suit. Therefore, such observations, which is otherwise with reference to altogether different set of facts, circumstances and enactment, would not help the petitioner to succeed in the present petition. (2) (1990) 4 SCC 594 between S. N. Mukerjee v. Union of India, wherein learned advocate for the petitioner is relying upon para 35, 36, 39 and 40. Perusal of such decision and para under reference make it clear that cited case is with reference to a different enactment and based upon the different facts and circumstances and suit under consideration. The issue before the Honourable Supreme Court in such case was regarding responsibility of the person against different charges when they are alternative to each other, hence the Honourable Supreme Court has held that if appellant is not found guilty of the first charge, he was rightly acquitted from second charge. The issue before the Honourable Supreme Court in such case was regarding responsibility of the person against different charges when they are alternative to each other, hence the Honourable Supreme Court has held that if appellant is not found guilty of the first charge, he was rightly acquitted from second charge. Therefore, what is observed in paras under reference in the similar manner of previous citation is not relevant to the facts and circumstances and enactment under consideration and that it is stated that qusi-judicial functionaries are required to record reasons for their decision and, therefore, it cannot be said that impugned order is without reason and needs to be disturbed either by setting aside the order or by remanding back the matter when suit is pending since the year 2000. (3) (2010) 9 SCC 496 between Kranti Associates Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Masood Ahmed Khan & Ors., wherein in para 47 it has been repeated like previous decision that all order should have reasons. However, as already considered, there is no criteria of quantity of reasons and, therefore, single reason can be treated as a proper reason. The non - speaking/unreasoned order may be in summary nature in a word or two as if admit or reject. But when adequate reason is assigned in minimum words, it cannot be said that impugned order is non - speaking order. (4) (2013) 4 SCC 404 between Mahlaxmi Co-opeative Housing Society Ltd. & Ors v. Ashabhai Atmaram Patel and Ors. wherein learned advocate for the petitioner is relying upon para 5, 7 to 12 and 25 to 32 contending that in such cited case, the Honourable Supreme Court has already considered and decided against original land owner Bai Sarswati and in favour of the present petitioner, though properties are alienated in favor of the present petitioner. With due respect, this is purely an attempt to misguide the Court for the simple reason that practically the issue before the Honourable Supreme Court is absolutely on a different aspect i.e. whether High Court was right in not allowing the withdrawal of the suit which was allowed by the trial Court under Order 23, Rule 1 and the Honourable Supreme Court has practically dealt with provisions of Order 23, Rule 1 with reference to right of the plaintiff to withdraw the suit unconditionally. Before we refer any other details as relied upon by the petitioner suffice to record that the dictum of the Honourable Supreme Court in such reported case is regarding right of the plaintiff to withdraw the suit unconditionally whereas, so far as instant case is concerned, there is no illegality in the order passed by the trial Court disposing the suit under Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code accepting the pursis dated 07.07.2008 and 18.09.2008 and thereby the High court was not disturbing the order dated 07.07.2008 and 18.09.2008 in Special Civil Suit No. 681 of 1992. Thereby the Honourable Supreme Court has confirmed the order of the trial Court whereby the trial Court has allowed the withdrawal of the suit against the present petitioner being defendant therein. However, fact remains that present plaintiff was not a litigant in that suit and, therefore, whatever is discussed with reference to the properties of the Bai Sarswati in such cited case would not bind the present plaintiff who was never party to such litigation and only because of reference to defendant No.1 Bai Sarswati so also present petitioner in such different suits filed by different persons and withdrawn by them at the relevant point of time. In any case, as already recorded, the fact remains that cited case is for considering the legal provisions of Order 23, Rule 3 regarding withdrawal of the suit and not for deciding any dispute between the present plaintiff and the proposed defendant. Therefore, only because proposed defendant is one of the defendant in such cited case and even if there is reference of several survey numbers being owned by Bai Sarswati which includes survey number of present suit, the bare reading and perusal of such judgment makes it clear that in those other cases, plaintiffs of those other suits have categorically disclosed before the Court that they have amicable settlement outside the Court and, therefore, they do not want to continue with the suit which fact is objected by some of the defendants mainly by defendant herein Bai Sarswati and when trial Court has accepted the withdrawal pursis which was disturbed by the High Court, the Honourable Supreme Court has held that plaintiff has absolute right to withdraw his suit or abandonment of part of the suit, so also compromise the suit. Therefore, this judgment would not help the petitioner to succeed in the present petition. (5) AIR 2009 SC 628 between Deepak Bajaj v. State of Maharashtra & Anr., wherein learned advocate for the petitioner is relying upon para 7 to 14 of the judgment. However, this is the case under Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 regarding detention of the accused without initiating any proceedings, wherein the Honourable Supreme Court has observed that the judgment of the Court is not to be read mechanically. However, it is also observed in the same judgment that little difference in facts or additional facts makes lot difference in precedental values of the decision. Therefore, when the facts and circumstances and enactment under consideration before the Honourable Supreme Court was altogether different, such judgment is not applicable to the present facts and circumstances and, therefore, citing such decision and thereafter complaining that lower Court has not considered all the decisions certainly needs to be checked and deprecated by all means. (6) (1974) 2 SCC 387 between Shanti Kumra R Canji v. Home Insurance Co. of New York, wherein the Honourable Supreme Court has dealt with powers of the High Court under the Letters Patent, which is self code i.e. dealing with the appeals before the larger bench against the order by the Single Judge and, therefore, when it is not dealing with general provisions of the Code, such judgment is not much material. Even if we peruse the head note as referred by learned advocate for the petitioner, it becomes clear that the Honourable Supreme Court was mainly dealing with the issue that whether order of allowing the amendment, is discretionary order or not and that whether an appeal can be filed against an order of amendment since it was not a judgment under Clause 15, as is it not deciding the issue finally. The question of limitation is also considered in such judgment, while considering the amendment in the pleadings; when it is stated that if amendment is after the period of limitation and thereby when allowing the amendment is making the law of limitation nugatory then such amendment cannot be granted. The question of limitation is also considered in such judgment, while considering the amendment in the pleadings; when it is stated that if amendment is after the period of limitation and thereby when allowing the amendment is making the law of limitation nugatory then such amendment cannot be granted. Though it is settled legal position, the fact remains that, even in the Limitation Act there is a provision that if some litigation is pending before some other authority then period for which such other litigation is pending needs to be considered while deciding the issue of limitation. Therefore, only because of such judgment, petition cannot be allowed. (7) (2000) 1 SCC 712 between B. K. Narayana Pillai v. Parameshwaran Pillai & Anr. wherein similar observations are made by the Honourable Supreme Court as discussed in the previous case as to whether a legal right has accrued to the party due to lapse of time, an amendment resulting in the defeat of such a right should not be allowed or not. However, in the same judgment and in the same head note is further stated that delay in its own, untouched by fraud, should not be a ground for rejecting application for amendment and opposite party should be properly compensated with costs for the delay. Ultimately what is held in para 4 is material when Court has reconfirmed that error or mistake, if not fraudulent, should not be a ground for rejecting the plaint or written statement. Thereby Honourable Supreme Court has allowed the defendant to amend the pleadings in the form of written statement to plead an alternative defence only with a condition of paying all the arrears on account of licence fee and costs assessed at the rate of Rs.3000/- Therefore, at the most, petitioner is entitled to some costs, if at all there is delay on the part of the plaintiff. However, factual details disclosed herein above makes it clear that the issue which is sought to be amended in the plaint was subject matter of Special Civil Suit No.29 of 2001 for all the period through out, which other-wise needs to be consolidated with this suit and, therefore, practically plaintiff has prayed to consolidate both the issues in the single suit and, thereby, there would not cause prejudice or harm to the petitioner - defendants and, therefore, there is no question of even granting cost. (8) AIR 2011 SC 41 between Ban Vibhag Karamchari Griah Sahkari Sanstha Maryadit (Regd.) v. Ramesh Chandar & Ors., wherein petitioner is relying upon para 33 to 39 and (9) AIR 2013 SC 3188 between Mashyak Grihnirman Sahkari Sanstha Maryadit v. Usman Habib Dhuka & Ors., wherein petitioner is relying upon the para 5, 6 and 7. Perusal of above citations, makes it clear that cited cases are concerned with the co-operative society, wherein amendment prayed for by other-side was allowed by the lower Court but while disallowing the amendment, the Honourable Supreme Court has observed that the amendment sought for, was clearly afterthought for the obvious purpose to avert inevitable consequence. Whereas in the present case, there is no question of any such afterthought; as disclosed herein above, other suit was already pending since the year 2001 and amendment is simply for clubbing both the issues, which is otherwise also permissible, since both the suits need to be consolidated and decided by single set of evidence and, therefore, practically there would be not injustice or otherwise to the present petitioner as defendant in such other suit which was withdrawn and now present petitioner is ordered to be joined as a defendant in the first suit. More particularly, when the dispute is pertaining to same property. (10) AIR 2014 SC 1772 between Voltas Ltd. v. Rolta India Ltd., wherein learned advocate for the petitioner has referred para 26 to 29 of such judgment. If we peruse such paragraphs practically there is discussion on previous cases and facts of the case but when the Honourable Supreme Court has finally determined as above in favour of the allowing amendment, the discussion in the judgment on negative issue is purely academic and practically answering the arguments by the respondent but when appeal is allowed the arguments advanced by the appellant is certainly negativated by the Honourable Supreme Court. The Honourable Supreme Court has dealt with the issue regarding limitation for filing counter claim the arbitrator has considered two issues that whether the counter claim is barred by law of limitation and that whether the counter claim is maintainable or it is beyond the scope of reference. The Honourable Supreme Court has dealt with the issue regarding limitation for filing counter claim the arbitrator has considered two issues that whether the counter claim is barred by law of limitation and that whether the counter claim is maintainable or it is beyond the scope of reference. After disclosing the facts and law applicable when Honourable Supreme Court has held in last para of the judgment that interim award passed by arbitrator as regards rejection of the counter claims stands nullified, it becomes clear and obvious that the Honourable Supreme Court has decided that counter claim is not barred by law of limitation, so also it is maintainable and not beyond scope of reference and directed the Arbitrator to proceed to deal with the counter claim as indicated in the judgment. In view of such determination by the Honourable Supreme Court, I failed to realise that how this judgment would help the petitioner. Therefore, such paragraphs are not the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court but only discussion on the issue. Even if we consider the relevant judgments referred in those paragraphs none of this judgment confirms that amendment cannot be allowed strictly in a given facts and circumstances because it is settled legal position that each such citations are to be considered with reference to facts of the case on hand while deciding such case and, therefore, it does not become the rule of thumb for all the cases and forever. (11) Order dated 26.03.2014 in Appeal from Order No. 100 of 2014. In this unreported judgment the co-ordinate bench of single Judge has dismissed the Appeal from Order against refusal of interim order in favour of the appellant in that litigation, wherein Bai Sarswati, who was one of the litigant, in the present petition, is defendant. However, only because of the reason that in such proceedings also Bai Sarswati was a litigant would not help the petitioner to challenge the impugned order herein for the simple reason that dispute arising in such Appeal from Order is altogether different and it was dealing with Order 43, Rule 1R holding that orders under Order 39, Rule 1 and 2 are discretionary and in absence of cogent reasons, the appellate Court may not interfere. Therefore, only because of factual detail in such appeal is to the effect that plaintiff therein has not initiated any steps almost for 6 years, is not relevant for the simple reason that in the present case, the plaintiff has filed separate suit within couple of months and at present he has prayed to join issues of both the suits considering the nature of dispute and property involved in such suit. Therefore, this judgment would not help the petitioner in any manner. 15. As against that learned senior counsel Mr. Shelat is relying upon following citations and provisions of law; (1) 2007(1) SCC 765 between State Bank of Hyderabad v. Town Municipal Council, wherein Honourable Supreme Court has held that provision of Rule 17 Order 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable in view of Section 16(2) of the amended Act 2002 since the Special Civil Suit No. 270 of 2000 is filed on 18.10.2000. (2) AIR 2012 SC 2925 (1) between Vidhur Impex and Traders Pvt. Ltd. v. Tosh Apartments Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. (3) 2012 (2) GLH 693 between Nawab John v. V. N. Subramaniyam Wherein Honourable Supreme Court has decided that whether transferee pendent lite can be implicated as a defendant in a suit for specific performance. In case of Nawab John (supra) it is specifically held that pendent lite application should normally be allowed. Therefore, when plaintiff is seeking to join the petitioner as proposed defendant being transferee of the suit property and more particularly when suit on the same issue is pending for all these years, joining him as defendant cannot be objected. (4) AIR 2008 SC 1960 between Puram Ram v. Bhaguram and anr. (5) AIR 2004 SC 4102 between Pankaj v. Yellappa (6) AIR 1985 SC 817 between Vineet Kumar v. Mangal Sain Wadhera Wherein Honourable Supreme Court has considered the issue regarding limitation act and categorically held that amendment of pleadings is within the discretion of the Court and that amendment seeking time bar relief can also be allowed and that jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is supervisory and its exercise is not proper in this order of trial court which is passed on sound consideration of law and facts and when it cannot be said that the order of the trial Court was either without jurisdiction or was perverse or arbitrary. In Puran Ram (supra) even disclosure of property was allowed to be amended when it was found that there is mistake in description of the property. Even at the cost of repetition, it is to be said that by present application for amendment plaintiff is only seeking to consolidate all the issues relating to same properties when petitioner - propose defendant has purchased suit property pendente lite. In the case of Pankaj (supra) it is held that question of limitation is to be decided during the trial and not at the time of deciding the amendment application and, therefore, it cannot be declined because the dominant purpose is to allow minimise litigation. In the case of Vinitkumar (supra) it was held that normally amendment may not be allowed only if it changes the cause of action but is whether to amend it is not more than adding to the facts already in existence, the amendment would be allowed even after statutory period of limitation. (7) 1992 (2) GLH 459 between General Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. SRM Industries (8) AIR 2008 SC 1147 between Usha Devi v. Rijwan Ahmad & Ors. (9) AIR 2006 Sc 1647 between Rajesh Kumar Aggrawal & Ors. v. K. K. Modi & Ors. Wherein while considering the provisions of Order 6, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding amendment of the pleading, the Court has held that while granting the amendment, merit could not be considered whereas in the present case the plaintiff has already filed a separate suit and at present he simply seeks to club or consolidate the issue. In Ushadevi (supra) the Honourable Supreme Court has specifically held and observed that merit of amendment is hardly a relevant consideration and it is open for the defendant to raise their objections with regard to amended plaint. In Rajesh (supra) the Honourable Supreme Court held that object of Rule 17 Order 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure is that Court should try the merits of the case that come before it and should consequently allow all amendments that may be necessary for determining the real question in controversy between the parties provided, it does not cause injustice or prejudice to the other-side. (10) 2009 (10) SCC 84 Ravajeetu Builders & Developers v. Narayanswamy & sons and Ors., wherein Honourable Supreme Court has enumerated factors to be considered while dealing with application for amendment. Whereby even if we apply all such factors to the impugned order I do not find any substance or reason in the petition to allow it. (11) (2015) (1) GLR 425 between Ishwarbhai Girdhardas Pabari v. Chandhalben Dhirajlal Variya, wherein learned single Judge of this High court has considered provisions of Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act wherein it is held that such section empowers the Court to permit the plaintiff to amend the plaint at any stage, if plaintiff has not claimed relief for possession and that restrictions upon the amendment of pleadings, as placed by proviso to Order 6, Rule 17 of the Code would not be attracted in case amendment is sought in suit for specific performance of agreement to sell and, therefore, petitioner is entitled to amend the plaint even for relief of possession. In the present case, petitioner has specifically pleaded that he is in possession before all the Courts and Court has protected his possession since the year 2000 when suit is filed and, therefore, now there is no reason refuse the amendment and thereby to allow the petition. (12) 2009 (3) GLH 419 between Mansukhlal Bachubhai Parmar v. State of Gujarat & Anr., wherein learned single Judge has held that amendment can be allowed even at the stage of appeal if it is required to be decided the real question in controversy and when it does not change the nature of suit wherein Court has relied upon the decision in the case of Rajeshkumar (supra). (13) 2010 (1) GLH 695 between Gangaben Ambalal Patel v. Somabhai Parshottambhai Patel, learned single Judge of this High Court has dealt with almost similar situation and held that Code of Civil Procedure grants unfettered discretion to the Court for amendment of the plaint in order to bring out real controversy between the parties and, therefore, when prayer sought is in consonance with the prayer already made in the suit based upon subsequent events, the amendment needs to be allowed. The Court has relied upon the decision in case of Rajeshkumar (supra). 16. In view of aforesaid discussion there is substance in the submission by the learned senior counsel Mr. The Court has relied upon the decision in case of Rajeshkumar (supra). 16. In view of aforesaid discussion there is substance in the submission by the learned senior counsel Mr. Shelat for the respondent that; (1) Amended provision of Order 6, Rule 17 would not be applicable to the present case as the suit is prior to such amendment comes in force, since the amendment is in the year 2002 whereas suit is filed in the year 2000. (2) It cannot be said that while allowing to withdraw the Special Civil Suit No. 29 of 2001, the Court has not granted the permission as prayed for only because of improper endorsement below exhibit 1 when there is no such disclosure in the order permitting withdrawal below an application for the purpose and that disclosure of plaintiffs intention while withdrawing the suit is only to consider that he intend to amend the present suit so as to avoid multilitigation. (3) History of activities by the defendant Bai Sarswati is not material to consider the limitation and when there is no question of limitation because of pendency of second suit there cannot be any objections to join the defendants. (4) Doctrine of lis pendens will certainly apply and amendment is not changing either nature of the suit, or nature of relief or cause of action and there is no question of limitation because of pendency of second suit. (5) Therefore, when basic structure of the suit is not being changed but amendment would bring out the real controversy between the parties and for the property in question which would evade multiplicity of proceedings and when there is no question of delay because of pendency of second suit, petition is without any merit. (6) Section 22 of Specific Relief Act would be applicable. (7) The order of withdrawal of Sections 29 of 2001 is certainly conditional to initiate further proceedings. However, such order has not been challenged and, therefore, it becomes final and thereby there is certainly a liberty granted to the plaintiff to agitate the issue in Special Civil Suit No. 29 of 2001. (7) The order of withdrawal of Sections 29 of 2001 is certainly conditional to initiate further proceedings. However, such order has not been challenged and, therefore, it becomes final and thereby there is certainly a liberty granted to the plaintiff to agitate the issue in Special Civil Suit No. 29 of 2001. In that case, the only dispute regarding nature of proceedings that may be initiated by the plaintiff where by fresh suit which is other wise required to be consolidated with present suit or by amending present suit by avoiding multiplicity of litigation since otherwise also the only one set of evidence is to be recorded once both the suits are consolidated as prayed for. 17. It would be appropriate to recollect the decision rendered in the case of Jai Jai Ram Manohar Lal v. National Building Material Supply, Gurgaon reported in AIR 1969 SC 1267 (1), wherein it is held that, “Rules of procedure are intended to be a handmaid to the administration of justice. A party cannot be refused just relief merely because of some mistake, negligence, inadvertence or even infraction of the rules of procedure. The Court always gives leave to amend the pleading of a party, unless it is satisfied that the party applying was acting mala fide, or that by his blunder, he had caused injury to his opponent which may not be compensated for by an order of costs. However, negligent or careless may have been the first omission, and, however, late the proposed amendment, the amendment may be allowed if it can be made without injustice to the other side.” “There is no rule that unless in an application for amendment of the plaint it is expressly averred that the error, omission or mis-description is due to a bona fide mistake, the Court has no power to grant leave to amend the plaint. The power to grant amendment of the pleadings is intended to serve the ends of justice and is not governed by any such narrow or technical limitations.” Such judgment is relied upon in case of Honnamma and Ors. v. Nanjundaiah reported in AIR 2008 SC 2076 and in case of Puran Ram v. Bhaguram reported in AIR 2008 SC 1960 . 17.1 In Durga Prasad and Anr. v. Deep Chand and Ors. v. Nanjundaiah reported in AIR 2008 SC 2076 and in case of Puran Ram v. Bhaguram reported in AIR 2008 SC 1960 . 17.1 In Durga Prasad and Anr. v. Deep Chand and Ors. reported in AIR 1954 SC 75 , the larger bench of the Honourable Supreme Court made it clear that plaintiff’s claim is maintainable. But since such decision is touching the main dispute between the parties, at present the other facts need not be discussed. However, judgment confirms that plaintiff has absolute right to join and seek relief against the petitioner. 18. In view of above facts and circumstances, there is no substance in the petition and the same is dismissed. Rule is discharged. 19. In view of order passed in main petition, Civil Application does not survive and the same is disposed of. Further order In view of above order, learned advocate for the petitioner prays for staying the impugned order for some period. Therefore, interim relief is extended for eight weeks. Application allowed.