C. N. Thimmegowda v. Director of Agricultural Marketing No. 16
2015-12-08
H.G.RAMESH
body2015
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : H.G. Ramesh, J. 1. In these writ petitions, the sole contention urged by learned counsel for the petitioners is that no election is contemplated under the Karnataka Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation and Development) Act, 1966 (‘the Act’) and the Karnataka Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation and Development) Rules, 1968 (‘the Rules’) for sending one representative each to the Agricultural Produce Market Committee on behalf of Cooperative Marketing Societies and Agricultural Cooperative Processing Societies carrying on business within the market area. Under Sec.11(1)(iv) & (v) of the Act, one membership each is provided on behalf of the aforesaid Co-Operative Societies in the market committee. 2. The aforesaid contention, in my opinion, is devoid of merit as it is contrary to Rule 41 of the Rules. Rule 41 reads as follows:- “41. Election of the Representative of the Cooperative Marketing Societies and Agricultural Cooperative Processing Societies.- (1A) The members of the committee of management of Cooperative Marketing Societies and Agricultural Cooperative Processing Society operating within the Market area shall elect one representative each on their behalf to serve on the market committee before the date fixed by the Deputy Commissioner in this behalf: Provided that, where there is more than one Cooperative Marketing Society or Agricultural Cooperative Processing Society operating in the market area, all the members of the committee of management of both classes of societies shall elect one representative each to serve on the market committee before the date fixed by the Deputy Commissioner in this behalf.” (Emphasis supplied) The Rule extracted above contemplates holding of Election to choose one representative each from the two categories of Societies referred to therein. Hence, the contention of learned counsel for the petitioners to the contrary is devoid of merit. In the context, reliance placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on omission of Rules 44A to 44J of the Rules with effect from 22 June 1976 has no relevance. The writ petitions are accordingly dismissed. In view of dismissal of the writ petitions, interlocutory applications filed for vacating of interim orders do not survive for consideration; they stand disposed of accordingly. Petitions dismissed.