Hon'ble GUPTA, J.—The appellant's by way of the present first appeal have challenged the judgment and decree dated 1.3.1995 passed by the District Judge, Sikar (hereinafter referred to as 'the trial Court') in civil suit No. 97/1990 (19/88), whereby the trial Court had partly decreed the suit seeking declaration, cancellation of sale deed, recovery of possession and permanent injunction. 2. The facts giving rise to this first appeal in brief are that plaintiffs-respondents No.1 to 3 filed a suit in the "trial Court" against the appellants (defendants No.1 and 4 in the suit) and respondents No.4 & 5 (defendants No.2 and 3 in the suit) seeking declaration, cancellation of the sale-deed dated 2.2.1988, recovery of possession and permanent injunction wherein, it is stated that respondent No.1 is the wife of appellant No.2 and respondent No.4 is the mother of appellant No. 2 and plaintiff-respondents No.2 and 3 are the son and daughter of appellant No.2. Respectively. Appellant No.2 and respondent No.1 constructed a house after selling the ornament of respondent No.1 for want of requisite money, details of which have been given in para No.3 of the plaint. Since the respondents No. 1 to 3 are members of a joint Hindu Undivided Family, they also have legal rights to have equal shares in the 'guwadi' and house. Because appellant No. 1 ignored and failed to maintain respondents 1 to 3, respondent No. 1 left her matrimonial house at Sikar and went to Sujangarh, taking respondents No. 2 and 3 along with her. Behind her back, appellant No. 2 sold 1/3rd share belonging to respondents No. 1 to 3 for a sale consideration of Rs. 40,000/- to proforma-respondent No. 5 (Smt. Usha Agarwal) and executed in her favour a sale-deed dated 9.8.1990, stated to be in pursuance of agreement to sale executed between them in February, 1980. Which the appellant No. 2 was not entitled to do under the law as the property in question, was the property of the joint Hindu Undivided Family and an individual person cannot sell the property of joint Hindu Undivided Family without the prior permission of other family members. 3. Which the appellant No. 2 was not entitled to do under the law as the property in question, was the property of the joint Hindu Undivided Family and an individual person cannot sell the property of joint Hindu Undivided Family without the prior permission of other family members. 3. Proforma-respondent No. 5 Smt. Usha Agarwal filed written statement to the plaint denying the averments made therein stating that the property, which had been sold to her is not a joint Hindu Undivided Family property but a property self-acquired by the appellant No. 2 and respondents No. 1 to 3 went to another place leaving the appellant No. 2 in lurch. It is stated in the written statement that respondents No. 1 to 3 have no vested legal right, title and interest in the disputed property and appellant No. 2 has legally sold his self-acquired property to her. Therefore, respondents No. 1 to 3 have no legal right to ask for division/partition of the property since she had acquired the said property after paying full sale consideration against the same and presently she is residing therein. 4. Appellant No. 2 and proforma-respondent No. 4 (defendants No. 1 and 2 in the suit) also filed written statement to the plaint denying the averments made by respondents No. 1 to 3 in their plaint stating therein that the property in dispute is not a property of joint Hindu Undivided Family but a self-acquired property and respondents No. 1 to 3 have no vested legal right, title and interest over the same and hence, their permission was not required under the law before sale of the property in question. It is stated in the written statement that marriage between appellant No. 2 and respondent No. 1 took place on 15.6.1963, whereas the land in dispute was purchased by respondent No. 2 much before the marriage on 31.5.1960 through a registered sale-deed from his own funds and the house was constructed thereon, after taking permission from the Nagar Parishad on 16.5.1962. Hence, the property in dispute is a self-acquired property, wherein the respondents No. 1 to 3 have no vested legal right, title and interest. 5. Hence, the property in dispute is a self-acquired property, wherein the respondents No. 1 to 3 have no vested legal right, title and interest. 5. Appellant No. 1 also filed written statement wherein it is stated the self-same grounds of written statements submitted by appellant No. 2 and proforma respondents No. 4 and 5 however stating that he is the bonafide purchaser of the property in dispute, therefore, the suit be dismissed. 6. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed the following issues:- ^^¼1½ D;k okni= dh pj.k la- 1 yxk;r 3 ds vuqlkj layXu uD'ks esa fn[kkbZ gqbZ oknxzLr lEifr la;qDr fgUnq ikfjokfjd lEink rFkk okfnuh Jherh pUnzk ds L=h/ku ls vftZr lEifRr gS\ ;fn gka rks D;k bl esa oknhx.k dk 3@4 Hkkx gS\ ¼2½ D;k cSpku i= rk- 2-2-1988 rFkk 9-8-1990 fcyk cny fcyk vf/kdkj oknhx.k dks lwpuk fn;s xqIr :i ls fu"ikfnr fd;s gq, gS vkSj oknhx.k ds flfoy jkbZVl ds eqdkcys esa Dyvne] cSvlj rFkk vcU/kuh; gS\ ;fn gka rks bl dk okn ij D;k izHkko gS\ ¼3½ D;k oknhx.k dks cSpku i= rkjh[kh 2-2-1988 ,oa 9-8-1990 ds fy, gD'kQk izkIr gS\ ;fn gka rks bldk okn ij D;k izHkko gS\ ¼4½ D;k izfroknh la- 1 us 31-5-1960 dks oknxzLr lEifRr viuh LovftZr /kujkf'k ls Ø; dh vkSj dCtk dh gqbZ tehu dk uxj ifj"kn ls 16-5-1962 dks btktr rkehj izkIr djh\ ;fn gka rks bl dk okn ij D;k vlj gS\ ¼5½ D;k oknh la- 1 oknkrj rk- 5-10-1990 esa fy[ks vuqlkj 12&13 o"kZ iwoZ viuk lkjk lkeku ysdj dfFkr dUgS;kyky ds lkFk t;iqj pyh xbZ vkSj ;fn gka rks bl dk okn ij D;k vlj gS\ ¼6½ D;k izfrokfnuh Jherh m"kk vxzoky ckSukQkbZM ,oa V:ÝDpj QkWj dUlhMjs'ku gS] ;fn gka rks bl dk okn ij D;k vlj gS\ ¼7½ D;k izfroknhx.k fo'ks"k gtkZ oknhx.k ls ikus ds vf/kdkjh gS\ ¼8½ vuqrks"k\ 7. To prove the aforesaid issues, the respondent No. 1 examined herself in the trial Court as PW.1 and respondent No. 2 examined himself as PW.2. As against this, the respondent No. 5 examined herself as DW1, appellant No. 2 examined himself as DW2, appellant No. 1 examined himself as DW3 and examined Sh. Gopal Prasad Agrawal as DW4 and Atmaram Sharma as DW5 and Ganpatlal Sharma as DW6. 8. As against this, the respondent No. 5 examined herself as DW1, appellant No. 2 examined himself as DW2, appellant No. 1 examined himself as DW3 and examined Sh. Gopal Prasad Agrawal as DW4 and Atmaram Sharma as DW5 and Ganpatlal Sharma as DW6. 8. The learned trial Court after hearing both the sides, partly decreed the suit in favour of the respondents No.1 to 3 holding respondent No. 1 as member of the joint Hindu Undivided Family. However, the Court did not entitle her for getting any share in the disputed property but-held the respondents No. 2 and entitled for the division of property and getting their respective shares in the ratio of 1/5: 1/5 in the suit property by virtue of their being the legal heirs of appellant No. 2. 9. I have heard learned counsel for the appellants and perused the material on record carefully and minutely. 10. It is submitted by Shri Sagar Mal Mehta, learned senior counsel for the appellants that the impugned judgment & decree is contrary to the facts and evidence on record. He submitted that the trial Court while deciding Issue No.1 has given a specific finding accepting the fact that the disputed property is not an ancestral property and despite this specific finding on Issue No. 1, the trial Court has held respondent No. 2 and 3 entitled for getting shares in the disputed property. Thus, the finding of the trial Court on Issue No. 1 is in itself contrary to the conclusion which it arrived at. It was submitted that when the trial Court itself has not accepted the disputed property as an ancestral pro-perty and held the same to be the self-acquired property of appellant No. 2, in any eventuality, the question of having any vested legal right, title and interest of the respondents No. 2 and 3 in the self acquired property of defendant-appellant No. 2 during his lifetime, does not arise. The trial Court has erred in law by observing that since the temporary injunction was in operation, the registered sale deed dated 9.8.1990 executed by appellant No. 2 in favour of appellant No. 1 was null and void. This finding is contrary to law as, had the appellant No. 2 violated the temporary injunction, at the most, a contempt proceeding could initiated against him. This finding is contrary to law as, had the appellant No. 2 violated the temporary injunction, at the most, a contempt proceeding could initiated against him. But by no stretch of imagination can the sale-deed be termed as null and void on the basis of the aforesaid finding. 11. I am in full agreement with the submissions made by the learned senior counsel for the appellants. As regards issue No. 1, the trial Court has given a specific finding that the property in dispute and the construction done over it is neither the ancestral property nor construction was done by using the stridhan or any money taken from the father of the respondent No. 1 and in view of this, I am of considered view and the respondents No. 1 to 3 are not entitled to get any share therein. The trial Court has also recorded a finding that the property in dispute is a self-acquired property of appellant No.2. Despite this, the trial Court held the respondents No. 2 and 3 entitled for getting 2/5 share from the disputed property during his lifetime, which is contrary to law. Therefore, the finding of the trial Court given on issue No.1 to the effect that respondents No. 2 and 3 are entitled to get a share of 2/5 from disputed the property is hereby set-aside and issue No. 1 is decided in favour of appellant No. 2 and against the respondent No. 1 to 3. 12. So far as Issues No.2, 3 and 4 are concerned, the trial Court has given a specific finding on Issues No.1 and 4 that the fact of construction by appe-llant No.1 on the disputed property after getting permission from the Nagar Parishad, is proved. While deciding Issue No.1, the trial Court also accepted the fact that property in question is a self-acquired property of appellant No.2; therefore, in my considered view respondent No.2 and 3 do not have any vested legal right, title and interest in thee disputed property. Therefore, in view of the finding given by the trial Court on issue No.1 that property in dispute is a self-acquired property, the finding given by the trial Court on Issues No.2, 3 and 4 is liable to be set-aside, being contrary to each other. 13. Therefore, in view of the finding given by the trial Court on issue No.1 that property in dispute is a self-acquired property, the finding given by the trial Court on Issues No.2, 3 and 4 is liable to be set-aside, being contrary to each other. 13. The finding given by the trial Court that merely because the temporary injunction was in operation and during its operation, the registered sale-deed dated 9.8.1990 executed by appellant No. 2 in favour of appellant No. 1 was null and void, is also not sustainale in law and I am in full agreement with the argument raised by the learned senior counsel for the appellants in this regard. In case, there had been any disobedience on the part of appellant No. 2 of the temporary injunction, at the best, contempt proceedings could be initiated against him. But only on the basis of the temporary injunction being in operation, the sale-deed executed in favour of appellant No. 1 cannot be termed as 'null and void'. On this premise, the Issues No. 2, 3 and 4 are also decided in favour of the appellants and against the respondent No. 1 to 3. In view of the above, the relief, which the trial Court has granted under the impugned judgment and decree under Issue No. 8, is liable to be set-aside and it is hereby set-aside. In the result, the appeal succeeds and the same is hereby allowed. The impugned judgment and decree dated 1.3.1995 passed by the learned District Judge, Sikar in Civil Suit No. 97/1990 (19/1988) is hereby set-aside and the suit filed by the respondent No. 1 to 3 is dismissed. The record shall be sent back to the trial Court forthwith.