ORDER : Aravind Kumar, J. 1. Sri S. Lakshminarayana, Additional Government Advocate accepts notice on behalf of the State as directed by this Court since issue of Court fee is involved in present petition. Heard Sri B.S. Sachin, learned Counsel appearing for petitioner and Sri S. Lakshminarayana, learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for the State. 2. Petitioner is questioning the order Annexure-A whereunder the petitioner has been called upon to pay Court fee at 10% of the value of the property in view of the ratio laid down by the Division Bench in Saraswathi Devi Prathap v. State of Karnataka ILR 1990 Kar. 289 (DB). It is the contention of Sri B.S. Sachin, learned Counsel appearing for petitioner that petitioner would be required to pay ad valorem Court fee only when there is a caveat entered into by any of contesting party as provided under the Proviso II, Article 11(6)(iii) of Karnataka Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1958 and in the instant case, order sheet of the Trial Court indicates that no such caveat having been entered into, and as such question of payment ad valorem Court fee does not arise. 3. The constitutional validity of Section 11 was under challenged before this Court in Saraswathi Devi Prathap's case and Division Bench of this Court has held as under: "6. There is also no substance in the second contention of the petitioners that the fee payable under Article 6 is in respect of any ministerial act. A combined reading of Articles 6 and 11(1) would show that in respect of applications for grant of probate or letters of administration, in the first instance a fixed Court fee is payable at the rate prescribed and when contested it should be treated as suit and 50% of the ad valorem Court fee payable in respect of suits of similar value minus the fixed Court fee already paid, has to be paid and ultimately when the application is granted, before issuing the probate or letters of administration, the balance of the Court fee has got to be paid. Therefore, the contention of the petitioners that the levy is for ministerial act and not a fee payable into the Court is untenable." 4. Therefore, the contention of the petitioners that the levy is for ministerial act and not a fee payable into the Court is untenable." 4. Keeping the above law laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in mind, when the facts in hand are examined, it requires to be noticed that writ petition is liable to be dismissed on two grounds; firstly, on the ground of delay and latches inasmuch as, present writ petition is filed on 25-11-2015 after lapse of two years and seven months after order came to be passed, without explaining the cause for delay and secondly, on merits also. 5. Insofar as the merits of the case are concerned, undisputedly, the petitioner herein has filed a petition under Section 276 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 for grant of probate in respect of alleged Will dated 4-2-1994 executed in his favour by deceased Sri Nyatha Reddy. Said petition which is at Annexure-B would indicate that four respondents have been arrayed, who are none other than sons of Nyatha Reddy. As such, at first instance, Court below had issued notice to those respondents, who have appeared and contested the matter. Hence, jurisdictional Court has treated said plea raised in the petition as contentious and same is to be adjudicated as a suit as per Section 286 of the Indian Succession Act. In view of the same, valuation made by the plaintiff/petitioner was ordered to be revalued or in other words, plaintiff has been directed to file a fresh valuation and as such, Trial Court has directed the petitioner to pay Court fee at 10% ad valorem. Proviso to Article 11(1)(iii) of Schedule II clearly indicate that where a caveat is entered and a application is registered as a suit, then fee prescribed in Article I, Schedule I would be payable on the market value of the property less fee already paid. Section 286 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 would indicate that a Delegate of District Court will not grant probate or letters of administration in any case in which there is dispute to such grant, or in which it otherwise appears that probate or letters of administration ought not to be granted. Explanation thereto would define the word "contention" to mean appearance of anyone in person, or by his recognised agent, or by a pleader duly appointed to act on his behalf, to oppose proceeding. Explanation thereto would define the word "contention" to mean appearance of anyone in person, or by his recognised agent, or by a pleader duly appointed to act on his behalf, to oppose proceeding. In other words, where objection for grant of probate is raised it has to be treated as a suit, in which event, Article 1 of Schedule I would be attracted and the dictum laid down by the Division Bench referred to supra would be applicable to the facts on hand. Hence, Trial Court was fully justified in directing the petitioner/plaintiff to pay ad valorem Court fee. There is no jurisdictional error committed by the Trial Court. Hence, writ petition is hereby dismissed.