JUDGMENT : 1. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. This writ petition is directed against the order passed by the Rajasthan Non-Government Educational Institution Tribunal, Jaipur (in short, 'the Tribunal'), dated 08.06.2001 in Appeal No.87/97, by which the Tribunal has allowed the claim of the respondent, Shri Atar Singh, and has held that the order of termination passed against him during the extended period of probation, was stigmatic in nature, and was thus violative of Section 18 of the Rajasthan Non-Government Educational Institutions Act, 1989 (in short, 'the Act of 1989'). The Tribunal, allowed the Appeal and set aside the order of termination, dated 07.02.1997, and directed the respondent-Institution to give the benefit of continuity of service, as well as the pay and allowance to the appellant. The Tribunal further observed that if the respondent-Institution is still of the opinion that the services of the appellant were not satisfactory, it will be open to them to pursue the legal proceedings, in accordance with law. 3. The petitioner has also prayed to declare the expression “with prior approval of the authority competent to approve the appointment (Appendix IX)”, occuring in Rule 30(b) of the Rajasthan Non-Government Educational Institutions (Recognition, Grant-in-aid and Service Conditions etc.) Rules, 1993 (in short, 'the Rules of 1993'), to be illegal and strike it down. 4. Brief facts, giving rise to the writ petition, are that the respondent was appointed on an un-aided post of Teacher on 02.08.1995, by the management of Vishwambharlal Senior Higher Secondary School, Bagar, Jhunjhunu, after a regular process of selection, and was placed on probation, for the period upto the end of academic session. The period of probation was extended on 01.07.1996, upto 30.04.1997. Before the period could come to an end, by an order dated 07.02.1997, his services were terminated. The order of termination reads as follows:- **mi;qZDr izlaxkUrxZr ys[k gS fd vkius vius dk;Z o O;ogkj esa vHkh rd dksbZ lq/kkj ugha fd;k gS rFkk Nk=ksa ds v/;kiu dk;Z esa vc Hkh ykijokgh dj jgs gSaA vr% vkidks vc lsokvksa esa j[kuk Nk= fgr o laLFkk fgr esa ugha gSA** 5. In the Appeal filed before the Tribunal, the order was challenged on the ground that the appellant's services were terminated by an order, which is stigmatic in nature. In the Appeal filed before the Tribunal, the order was challenged on the ground that the appellant's services were terminated by an order, which is stigmatic in nature. The order was not an order simplicitor, terminating his services during the probation period, on the ground that his services were not satisfactory. The petitioner relied on the judgments of the Supreme Court in V.P. Ahuja Vs. State of Punjab And Others, (2000) 3 SCC 239 , and Deepti Prakash Banerjee Vs. Satyendra Nath Bose, 1999(3) SCC 60 , in submitting that the background, in which the order was passed, and the language of the order, clearly suggests that the order was passed by way of punishment, and thus, it could not have been passed without holding disciplinary enquiry under the Proviso to Section 18 of the Act of 1989, against which an appeal lies under sub-section (2) of Section 19. In addition, it was alleged that the order did not receive prior approval of the competent authority under Rule 30(b) of the Rules of 1993. 6. The petitioner-Institution defended the order on the ground that Shri Atar Singh was appointed as Teacher on probation, with a stipulation in his appointment order/letter, dated 02.08.1995, that if he violates any of the conditions of appointment order or the Rules, the School reserves the right to remove him from service, without giving any prior information. It was submitted that the work and conduct of the respondent was not found satisfactory. The Session In-charge of the School, gave a report to the Secretary of the Managing Committee of the School, that the teaching, discipline, and conduct of Shri Atar Singh is not upto the standards of the Institution, but that since he has given an assurance that in the next session, he will improve his conduct, the period of his probation be extended upto next academic session. By an order dated 01.07.1996, the Principal of the School extended the period of his probation upto 30.04.1997. A report was thereafter received from Shri Hari Ram Sharma, Session In-charge, on 19.08.1996 in the next session, that on an inspection, it was found that in English medium class of Class-IX, the respondent was teaching in Hindi; the book of English medium was not available; the teacher did not take any interest in translating it in English language in explaining the students on the blackboard. A question of Mathematics was found solved on the blackboard, attracting the attention of the students, who were making noise; and that the teacher had no control over the class. He reported that complaints were received against the teacher from the previous session, and that now it will no longer possible, in the interest of teaching work and discipline, to allow him to continue. On these reports, a meeting of the Managing Committee was called, in which it was unanimously resolved to dispense with the services of the respondent. 7. The order of termination was defended on the ground that it was an order simplicitor dispensing with services of the probationer. It was not stigmatic in nature, and thus, the Management was not required to give him an opportunity of hearing. The services of the respondent were terminated in terms of his appointment letter. 8. The Tribunal recorded a finding that the language used in the order, terminating the respondent/appellant's services, is the same, as in the case of V.P. Ahuja(supra). The order of termination not only commented on the work and conduct, but also the allegations of negligence in teaching. The order, therefore, cannot be treated to be an order simplicitor, terminating the services of the appellant. The Management was thus required to comply with the provisions of Section 18 of the Act of 1989, by holding an enquiry and giving him an opportunity of hearing. 9. Mr. M.S. Singhvi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, submits that the appeal was not maintainable against the order, terminating the services of the respondent on an un-aided post, for which there is no requirement to seek approval of the authorities. The work and conduct of the respondent was not found satisfactory. The period of probation was extended on the assurance given by the respondent, that he will improve his work in the next session, but on inspections, it was found that he was not only negligent in teaching, he also did not have the disciplinary control over the class. The Managing Committee considered the reports and unanimously resolved to terminate the services on the ground that the work and conduct of the respondent-Teacher was unsatisfactory. The order does not come within the purview of Section 18 of the Act of 1993, and consequently, the appeal was not maintainable under sub-section (2) of Section 19. 10. The Managing Committee considered the reports and unanimously resolved to terminate the services on the ground that the work and conduct of the respondent-Teacher was unsatisfactory. The order does not come within the purview of Section 18 of the Act of 1993, and consequently, the appeal was not maintainable under sub-section (2) of Section 19. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in D.B. Civil Writ Petition N.3610/2003-Shri Jain Swetambar Terapanthi Manav Hitkari Sangh and Ors. Vs. The Rajasthan Non-Government Educational Institutions Tribunal & Ors., dated 29.04.2014, in which this Court set aside the order of Tribunal interfering with the termination of the services of the teacher on the ground that he had been replaced by an eligible candidate, whose academic qualification and experience were not disclosed. According to the Tribunal, the impugned action was violative of Section 18 of the Act and Rule 39(2) of the Rules. It was held that an appeal was not maintainable in the Tribunal against the order under Section 19(2) of the Act. Relying on The Principal and ors. Vs. The Presiding Officer and ors., (1978) 1 SCC 498 , the Division Bench held, with reference to Section 8(3) of the Delhi School Education Act, 1973, that where the order of termination was not dismissal, removal, or reduction in rank, an appeal was not maintainable. 11. In Dhanroop Chand Vs. The State of Rajasthan, (2000) 3 WLN 15, a Division Bench of this Court held that where the services of the probationer were terminated on payment of two months salary on the unsatisfactory performance of his work and conduct by the Managing Committee, no interference was to be called for as no stigma was caused by the order. A simple order of the Managing Committee terminating the services of the probationer, does not cast a stigma on his career. 12. Mr. M.S. Singhvi, learned Senior Counsel further submits that the requirement of Rule 30(b) of the Rules of 1993, of prior approval of the authority competent to approve the appointment, in case the Managing Committee discharges or terminates a probationer from service on the ground that the probationer has not made sufficient use of his opportunities, or has failed to give satisfaction, is ultra vires the provisions of the Act of 1989. He submits that the Rule-making power did not authorize the legislature to provide for prior approval of the authority, in case of an un-aided post. The general powers under Section 43 of the Act of 1989, do not empower the legislature to frame the Rules beyond the provisions of the Act. The Act of 1993 does not regulate the service conditions of an un-aided teacher, and does not provide, as in the scheme of the Act, the conditions on which the services of a probationer may be terminated. The service of the respondent-Teacher on an un-aided post, did not require approval of the competent authority before appointment, and that there was no such requirement where under the terms and conditions of the appointment order, the period of probation was curtailed on unsatisfactory services, by making termination order with the approval of the Managing Committee. The restriction on seeking approval of the competent authority is not coupled with any condition in exercise of the powers, such as the period within which the approval has to be applied for, and the manner in which the approval has to be obtained, and the period, within which the power, may be of approval, may be exercised by the competent authority. In absence of the machinery provisions, the powers which are unguided and uncanalised, must be struck down. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Committee of Management, St. John Inter College Vs. Girdhari Singh And Others, (2001) 4 SCC 296 (para 6), in which it was held as follows:- “...... But notwithstanding the same, if the so called regulatory measures confer power on any specified authority, without indicating any guidelines for exercise of that power, then exercise of such power by the appropriate authority would offend the provisions of Article 14 and would not be allowed to be retained, as that would amount to an arbitrary inroad into the right of the minority, in the matter of administering its institutions. In another words, if the regulatory provision conferring power on the educational authority is uncanalised and unguided and does not indicate any guidelines under which the educational authority could exercise the said power, then in such a case, the conferment of a blanket power on the educational authority would interfere with the right of control of the employer minority institution in the matter of exercising disciplinary control over the employees of the institution. So adjudged, we are unable to find any guideline in Section 16-G(3)(a) of the Uttar Pradesh Intermediate Education Act to be followed by the Inspector in the matter of approving or disapproving the order of termination of service of an employee of the aided educational institution. We are unable to accept the reasoning of the majority judgment of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court that Regulation 44 provides the guidelines. The said Regulation 44 merely prescribes the period within which the Inspector or Regional Inspectress is required to communicate his/her decision to the Management and further in a case where all the papers have not been received from the Management, the said Inspector/ Inspectress could call for the papers from the Management. But that by no stretch of imagination can be held to be providing the guidelines for exercise of power in the matter of approval or disapproval of the order of termination passed by the Management. Since no appropriate guidelines have been provided for exercise of power under Section 16-G(3)(a) of the Act, it must be held that such an uncanalised power on the Inspector or the Inspectress would tantamount to an inroad into the power of disciplinary control of the Managing Committee of the minority institution over its employees and as such the said provision would not apply to the minority institution, as was held by this Court in Frank Anthonys case. In this view of the matter, the majority view in the Full Bench judgment of the Allahabad High Court must be held to be erroneous and cannot be sustained.” 14. On the general delegation of the Rule-making power, Mr. M.S. Singhvi has relied on a judgment in Union of India And Others Vs. S.Srinivasan, (2012) 7 SCC 683 , in which the Supreme Court, referring to its earlier judgments in General Officer Commanding-in-Chief Vs. Subhash Chandra Yadav, (1988) 2 SCC 351 ; Delhi Admn. Vs. On the general delegation of the Rule-making power, Mr. M.S. Singhvi has relied on a judgment in Union of India And Others Vs. S.Srinivasan, (2012) 7 SCC 683 , in which the Supreme Court, referring to its earlier judgments in General Officer Commanding-in-Chief Vs. Subhash Chandra Yadav, (1988) 2 SCC 351 ; Delhi Admn. Vs. Siri Ram, (2000) 5 SCC 451 ; Sukhdev Singh Vs. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi, (1975) 1 SCC 421 ; State of Karnataka Vs. H.Ganesh Kamath, (1983) 2 SCC 402 ; Kunj Bihari Lal Butail Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2000) 3 SCC 40 ; St. Johns Teachers Training Institute Vs. National Council for Teacher Education, (2003) 3 SCC 321 ; and Global Energy Limited Vs. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission, (2009) 15 SCC 570 , held that if a rule goes beyond rule-making power conferred by the parent statute or supplants any provision for which power is not conferred, it become ultra vires. The basic test is to determine and consider the source of power which is relatable to the rule. The Rule must be accord with the parent statute as it cannot travel beyond it. 15. In Global Energy Limited Vs. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (supra), it was held in para 25, as follows. “25. It is now a well-settled principle of law that the rule-making power 'for carrying out the purpose of the Act' is a general delegation. Such a general delegation may not be held to be laying down any guidelines. Thus, by reason of such a provision alone, the regulation-making power cannot be exercised so as to bring into existence substantive rights or obligations or disabilities which are not contemplated in terms of the provisions of the said Act.” 16. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent-Teacher submits that the order passed by the Management of the School, was not an order simplicitor, terminating his services on unsatisfactory work and conduct. The order was stigmatic in nature, in the background in which the petitioner had requested the Management to pay him salary of the post commensurate to the classes he was required to teach. The respondent, with degrees in B.Sc. and M.Sc., was required to teach the classes upto class-VIII, but that he was asked to take classes of class-XI in Science subject. The respondent, with degrees in B.Sc. and M.Sc., was required to teach the classes upto class-VIII, but that he was asked to take classes of class-XI in Science subject. He was not taking the classes in Biology subject and, thus, results of the School in Science were not wholly attributable to him. The background, in which the respondent's services were terminated, is narrated in paragraph 4 of the counter affidavit, as follows:- “4. That in reply to para No.4 of the writ petition, it is submitted on behalf of the answering respondent No.3 that it is wrong to say that the answering respondent had failed to improve his performance nor he could improve discipline in his class. Since the answering respondent No.3 was served with letter dated 15-11-1996 alleging therein that though the answering respondent No.3 has given the class 12th D to teach on 1-10-1996 but the administration had failed to teach a single chapter to the students. It would not be out of place to mention here that the notice/letter dated 15-11-1996 was nothing but an action to demolish the demand of the answering respondent No.3 in as much as the answering respondent No.3 placed on record, the Schedule of the relevant date to show that the allegation made in the above letter is absolutely false and incorrect because the answering respondent No.3 was not asked to take class 12th D at the time mentioned in the letter. The daily diary so maintained and counter sign dated 1-10-1996 was produced before the learned Tribunal to show that the allegation made in the letter dated 15-11-1996 is absolutely false and incorrect. In fact, the answering respondent No.3 was through-out given class 10th and 11th which he was teaching continuously. The answering respondent No.3 had clarified the position to the Management but for the reason that the petitioner-school authorities were not agreeable to the demand of the answering respondent for higher pay scale, therefore, no further order in regard to the letter dated 15-11-1996 was taken but again, the answering respondent No.3 was served with a letter dated 2-12-1996 wherein some more allegations have been leveled so as to show that the allegations made in the letter dated 15-11-1996 are not only the allegations. In fact, the allegation made in the letter dated 2-12-1996 was also false and incorrect in as much as the answering respondent No.3 used to teach Physics and Chemistry whereas subject of Biology was being taught by some other teacher who was newly recruited by the petitioners and it is material to submit here that the paper of science is consisting of three subjects i.e. Physics, Chemistry and Biology and the paper of Class 9th was of 10 marks and out of which paper subject of Biology were having question of 6 marks whereas the question of Chemistry and Physics were only 4 marks. Therefore, the answering respondent No.3 was erroneously been held guilty for the lower result, though the paper of science consist of 3 parts as submitted above. Further, at the time when IInd test was conducted, the school has organised Centanary Celebration of the completion of 100 years of age of late Shri Vishmbhar Lal. Therefore, the students were busy in preparation of such celebration, otherwise, in the half yearly examination, the result of subject taught by the answering respondent No.3 was excellent and none had failed in such subject.” 17. It is submitted that on the face of it, the order by which the respondent's services were terminated, was stigmatic in nature, which affected the chances of his re-employment in future, in any other institution. The termination order stated that the respondent is still negligent in teaching the students, and that his services are not in the interest of the students and the Institution. These allegations attributed to the respondent, were by way of stigma on his competence to teach, and were not based only on his work and performance. The allegations made in the order were by way of charges, which require a disciplinary enquiry, and which was not saved by clause (iii) of Section 18 of the Act of 1989. In the circumstances, the respondent was required to be given a show cause notice, and on which, an enquiry should have been conducted, giving an opportunity to the respondent to defend himself. 18. Learned counsel for the respondent has relied on a Full Bench judgment of this Court in Central Academy Society Vs. In the circumstances, the respondent was required to be given a show cause notice, and on which, an enquiry should have been conducted, giving an opportunity to the respondent to defend himself. 18. Learned counsel for the respondent has relied on a Full Bench judgment of this Court in Central Academy Society Vs. Rajasthan Non-Government Educational Institutions Tribunal, Jaipur & Ors., 2010(3) WLC(Raj) 21, in which it was posed with the question, as to whether Section 18 requires an unaided institution to seek prior or posterior approval for initiating any disciplinary action and powers to take such action. It was held that the first proviso to Section 18 of the Act of 1989 does not apply in relation to the disciplinary action by private unaided recognised institution but the other provisions of Section 18 including the second proviso do apply to such unaided private recognised educational institutions too. Clause (iii) of second Proviso to Section 18 of the Act of 1989, provides that where the managing committee is of unanimous opinion that the services of an employee cannot be continued without prejudice to the interest of the institution, the services of such employee are terminated after giving him six months notice or salary in lieu thereof and the consent of the Director of Education is obtained in writing. 19. Learned counsel for the respondent has also relied on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Janta Balika Senior Secondary School And Ors. Vs. Smt. Manju Sharma & Ors., 2012 WLC(Raj.) UC 696, in which it was held that prior approval cannot be substituted, by post decisional approval of the Director before terminating the services of an employee. 20. We have considered the respective submissions and do not find any eror of law in the judgment of the Tribunal, inasmuch as the background in which the respondent's probation period was curtailed and his services were terminated, and the language used in the order, by which his services were terminated during the extended period of probation, clearly demonstrates that the services of the respondent were not terminated on the ground of unsatisfactory service. The Management had received complaints against him, based on the inspections, in which it was found that he was not teaching properly, and was unable to maintain discipline in the class. The Management had received complaints against him, based on the inspections, in which it was found that he was not teaching properly, and was unable to maintain discipline in the class. On his assurance that he will improve his teaching in the next session, the period of probation was extended. His services were terminated during the extended period of probation on the ground of negligence in performance of his duties. The order passed by the Management, is not an order simplicitor, in which the services of the respondent were terminated on the ground of unsatisfactory services. The order stated that the respondent has not improved his work and conduct and is still negligent in his teaching work, and thus, it is not proper to continue him in the service, in the interest of the students and the Institution. The language of the order is the same, as in the case of V.P. Ahuja (supra), in which Shri V.P. Ahuja, a probationer, appointed on probation for two years, as Chief Executive in the establishment of Punjab Cooperative Cotton Marketing & Spinning Mills Federation Limited, was found to have failed in performance of his duties, administratively and technically. The Apex Court found the termination of Shri V.P. Ahuja to be punitive in nature. 21. The respondent was appointed as probationer for teaching in the School. If his work and conduct was not satisfactory, which included teaching the students, an order simplicitor, without mentioning about his abilities to teach, or that he has not made any improvement in his teaching despite assurance, could be passed against him. The order under challenge clearly refers to the competence of the respondent, and his abilities to teach, which is likely to affect his future as any institution, to which he applies in future, would find the observations made against him by the previous employer in the termination order to be disqualification for any teaching post. The order is clearly stigmatic in nature, and would, thus, be an order of termination, which is not saved under clause (iii) of second Proviso to Section 18 of the Act of 1989. An appeal under sub-section (2) of Section 19, was thus maintainable against the order passed under Section 18 of the Act of 1989. The heading of Section 18, refers to 'Removal, dismissal or reduction in rank of employees'. An appeal under sub-section (2) of Section 19, was thus maintainable against the order passed under Section 18 of the Act of 1989. The heading of Section 18, refers to 'Removal, dismissal or reduction in rank of employees'. The contents of Section 18 however includes the order of termination also, inasmuch as termination of the services, is mentioned in clause (iii) of second Proviso to Section 18 of the Act of 1989, that on the opinion of the Managing Committee, an employee cannot be continued without prejudice to the interest of the institution. The heading of Section 18 is, thus, conclusive of the actions, which were taken under Section 18, and which includes termination of a probationer, in respect of which, the order passed would be appealable under subsection (2) of Section 19 of the Act of 1989. In Raichurmatham Prabhakar And Another Vs. Rawatmal Dugar, (2004) 4 SCC 766 , the Supreme Court held as follows:- “14. The view is now settled that the Headings or Titles pre-fixed to sections or group of sections can be referred to in construing an Act of the Legislature. But conflicting opinions have been expressed on the question as to what weight should be attached to the Headings or Titles. According to one view, the Headings might be treated as preambles to the provisions following them so as to be regarded as giving the key to opening the mind of the draftsman of the clauses arranged thereunder. According to the other view, resort to Heading can only be taken when the enacting words are ambiguous. They cannot control the meaning of plain words but they may explain ambiguities. (See: Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, 9th Edn., 2004, pp.152 and 155). In our opinion, it is permissible to assign the Heading or Title of a section a limited role to play in the construction of statutes. They may be taken as very broad and general indicators of the nature of the subject-matter dealt with thereunder. The Heading or Title may also be taken as a condensed name assigned to indicate collectively the characteristics of the subject-matter dealt with by the enactment underneath; though the name would always be brief having its own limitations. They may be taken as very broad and general indicators of the nature of the subject-matter dealt with thereunder. The Heading or Title may also be taken as a condensed name assigned to indicate collectively the characteristics of the subject-matter dealt with by the enactment underneath; though the name would always be brief having its own limitations. In case of conflict between the plain language of the provision and the meaning of the Heading or Title, the Heading or Title would not control the meaning which is clearly and plainly discernible from the language of the provision thereunder.” 22. In Maxwell on Statutes 11th Edition, pp. 48, 49, quoted with approval in Bhinka & Ors. Vs. Charan Singh, AIR 1959 SC 960 , the learned author has observed; “The headings prefixed to sections or sets of sections in some modern statutes are regarded as preambles to those sections. They cannot control the plain words of the statute, but they may explain ambiguous words.” 23. We are not satisfied with the submissions of learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner that the requirement of prior approval under Rule 30(b) of the Rules of 1993, is ultra vires as it does not provide guidelines for the authority which approves the appointment, to give prior approval to the Managing Committee for discharge or termination of the services of a probationer. The words 'prior approval' is clear and unambiguous. The period within which prior approval has to be sought, has to be anterior to the order of discharge or termination. The manner and method in seeking and in granting prior approval will not make the provisions ambiguous, or liable to be struck down, inasmuch as the object of seeking approval and the language of Rule 30, clearly indicates the purpose, for which approval has to be sought. Further, we are of the view that if no time period is prescribed during which approval may be given, the requirement of prior approval cannot be struck down. It is clear from the language of Rule 30 of the Rules of 1993, that the Managing Committee is not allowed to discharge or terminate an employee, until prior approval is sought, which is required to be given prior to discharge or termination of services. The powers in such case per se are to be exercised within reasonable period, within which such order may be passed. 24. The powers in such case per se are to be exercised within reasonable period, within which such order may be passed. 24. In any case, vague allegations on the exercise of powers and apprehensions that the delay may defeat the object of allowing the respondent to continue, cannot be a ground, on which this Court may declare a rule for protection of services providing a check on arbitrary powers of Management to be ultra vires. 25. We may observe here that the requirement of approval is provided under Section 18 of the Act of 1989, in case of removal, dismissal or reduction in rank of employees. The second Proviso to Section 18, providing for exceptions however mandates that before terminating the services in the excepted cases, the consent of the Director of Education has to be obtained. The termination of the services of a probationer is also one of the classes of termination, on unsatisfactory service, which requires approval of the competent authority. The consent of Director of Education is provided in the statute to avoid arbitrary exercise of powers by the private Managements, which may give rise to the tendency of hiring and firing the employees. 26. We do not find that the power of prior approval, provided under the provisions of the Act, is in violation of the provisions of the Act, which authorises the legislature to make the rules. The general powers to make rules to carry out the object and purpose of the Act, includes the powers of prior approval of authority competent to appoint in case of probationer on an unaided post of teacher. The power of prior approval, in fact, supplements the power, and does not supplant the power in the competent authority, providing safeguard to the teachers against any arbitrary action of the Management. 27. We do not find any error in the judgment of the Tribunal, to interfere in the matter. 28. The writ petition is dismissed.