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2015 DIGILAW 1334 (MAD)

S. Ravi v. District Collector

2015-03-06

M.VENUGOPAL, V.DHANAPALAN, V.M.VELUMANI

body2015
Judgment V.Dhanapalan,J. The issue before the single Judge in these matters was, whether the suspension of the petitioner on the ground that he was involved in a criminal case under the Prevention of Corruption Act can be set aside on the ground of prolonged suspension ? 2. Since, according to the single Judge, there were conflicting judgments of two Division Benches, he referred the matter to a Larger Bench. Accordingly, the Registry was directed to list the matter before the Larger Bench, after getting necessary orders from the Hon'ble Administrative Judge, along with the matter under reference. 3. The point posed by the single Judge for reference before this Larger Bench is : Whether the decision in C.Balasubramanian vs. The Commissioner, Tiruchirapalli Corporation, Tiruchirapalli and another, in W.A.(MD) No.964 of 2010 dated 04.01.2011, is the correct position of law or the decision in The Deputy Inspector General of Police vs. S.Govindaraj, reported in 2012 (1) CTC 124 , is the exposition of the correct position of law ? 4. Coming to the facts of the case, the petitioner, a Village Administrative Officer of Koviloor Village, Alangudi Taluk, Pudukottai District, was arrested on 05.01.2012, in connection with a case in Crime No.1 of 2012 on the file of the Inspector of Police, Vigilance and Anti-Corruption, Pudukottai, for the offences punishable under Sections 7, 13 (2) read with Section 13 (1) (d) of Prevention of Corruption Act,1988 and remanded to judicial custody. Later, he was released on bail. The Revenue Divisional Officer, Pudukottai District, thereafter, passed an order, placing the petitioner under suspension. Subsequently, the petitioner gave a representation to the Revenue Divisional Officer, seeking revocation of the suspension order, which was not considered. Pursuant thereto, he filed a Writ Petition in W.P.(MD)No.5154 of 2012 on the file of this Court and the same was disposed of by an order dated, 18.04.2012, directing the second respondent to consider the request of the petitioner for revocation of suspension. Having considered the said request, the Revenue Divisional Officer, by his proceedings in Na.Ka.No.A3/181/2012, dated 10.09.2012, rejected the request and declined to revoke the order of suspension. Hence, the petition in W.P.(MD) No.17007 of 2012, which led to the reference before this Full Bench. 5. Having considered the said request, the Revenue Divisional Officer, by his proceedings in Na.Ka.No.A3/181/2012, dated 10.09.2012, rejected the request and declined to revoke the order of suspension. Hence, the petition in W.P.(MD) No.17007 of 2012, which led to the reference before this Full Bench. 5. Mr.Veera Kathiravan, learned counsel appearing for the respondent in W.A.No.510 of 2012, who was permitted to argue on behalf of the Petitioners in W.P.Nos.17007 of 2012 and 8555 of 2009, would submit that the Petitioner in W.P.No.17007/2012, who was arrested by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vigilance and Anti Corruption, Pudukkottai for alleged demanding and acceptance of Rs.2500/- as gratification other than legal remuneration from one K.Rajendran, was released on bail by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Pudukkottai and the petitioner was kept under prolonged suspension for one year which could not be justified and in fact, there is no bar in proceeding with the departmental enquiry pending the criminal case and also that, everyone is presumed to be innocent, until the guilt is proved against him as per the procedure known to law and the speedy trial is also a fundamental right enshrined under the Constitution of India. He would further submit that the petitioner in W.P.No.17007 of 2012 is entitled to 50% of his salary for 90 days subsistence allowance and now he is entitled to entire salary without any work and instead of paying the entire salary without extracting any work, it would just and proper to reinstate him in service. 6. He would further submit that the petitioner in W.P.No.17007 of 2012 is entitled to 50% of his salary for 90 days subsistence allowance and now he is entitled to entire salary without any work and instead of paying the entire salary without extracting any work, it would just and proper to reinstate him in service. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner strenuously contended that different views were taken by the two Hon'ble Division Benches of this Court and the view taken by the Division Bench in C.Balasubramanian's case reported in 2011 (1) CWC 319 is not a correct view and in paragraph 14 of the said Judgment, there is a reference to the Hon'ble Supreme Court decision in Surain Singh v. State of Punjab reported in 2009 (1) Supreme 458 , wherein it was held that 'corruption in the administration has hampered the development of the Nation and the persons, who involved in the corruption cases, should be dealt with firmly and the persons indulging in corruption practices cannot be allowed to be in public employment to maintain purity of administration, as such attitude will definitely affect public interest' and that there cannot be a different yardstick in a criminal case and in fact, the Hon'ble High Court cannot create a class of Government servants in criminal cases. According to the learned counsel, the Judgment in C.Balasubramanian's case is not applicable to the present cases on hand and it is not a good law and the High Court cannot discriminate between two persons because of the reason that in the decision The Deputy Inspector General of Police V. S.Govindaraj, reported in 2012 (1) CTC 124 , this Court had taken a different view that pending trial of a criminal case applying Rule 3(e)(5) of the Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955, the suspension of the respondent therein shall be revoked etc. In effect, the plea taken on behalf of the petitioner is that in a criminal case all allegations are to receive the same treatment and the Prevention of Corruption Act cannot be treated differently. 7. In effect, the plea taken on behalf of the petitioner is that in a criminal case all allegations are to receive the same treatment and the Prevention of Corruption Act cannot be treated differently. 7. The learned counsel contends that the order of suspension is not a punishment, but the view taken in the Division Bench decision of C.Balasubramanian's case that since the appellant therein is facing a criminal case and charge sheet is filed under the Prevention of Corruption Act etc., is not correct and proper and further, the Appellant therein just because he was involved in a bribery case had no right to seek revocation merely because the criminal trial was pending for 3 years also cannot be the correct view. 8. The learned counsel projects an argument that when 'Suspension' is not a punishment, it cannot be characterized as stigmatic one and in fact, in S.Goindarajau's case reported in 2011 (1) CTC 124, it was observed that the Respondent therein was kept under prolonged suspension for a period of nearly 5 years with salary in the form of Subsistence Allowance without extracting any work from him, which is nothing but waste of money and according to him, the Judgment in Govindarajan's case will prevail over the Judgment in C.Balasubramanian's case reported in 2011 (1) CWC 319. 9. It is also the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that looking at a person with a tainted glass is a stigma and when suspension is not a punishment, then, the view taken, in C.Balasurabmanian's case that the concerned person had no right to seek revocation for suspension order because of pendency of criminal case for 3 years was not proper. 10. Learned counsel refers to G.O.Ms.No.40, Personnel & Administrative Reforms (N) Department, dated 30.01.1996 and emphatically submits that if the Judgment of C.Balasubramanian's case is treated as good law, then the G.O.Ms.No.40 will be taken away and in fact, G.O.Ms.No.40 which is an executive order speaks of a monthly review and that the said G.O. was upheld by this Court. He refers to Rule 17(6) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules. He refers to Rule 17(6) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules. He places heavy reliance on the order in W.P.No.413 of 2014 dated 07.01.2014 wherein in paragraph 5, the Learned Single Judge referred to the order dated 27.08.2009 in W.P.No.15723 of 2009 in regard to an identical issue whereby the suspension order was set aside and the same was confirmed by the Hon'ble Division Bench in W.A.No.566 of 2011 dated 23.11.2011. Added to the above, he also refers to the decision reported in R.Christohpher Raja V. Commissioner of Municipal Administration, Chepauk, Chennai, (2011) 2 MLJ 7 at special page 8, wherein it is held that 'Suspension of an employee cannot be prolonged on the ground of pendency of criminal proceedings and it is the duty of the concerned Authority to expedite the criminal case and complete the departmental proceeding in accordance with law.' The learned counsel also places reliance on a decision of this Court in Chairman, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, Chennai and another V. S.Venkatesan and another, (2014) 5 MLJ 769 at special page 773, wherein in paragraph 13, it is observed as follows: ''13.Regulation 9(e) speaks about deemed suspension and it gives discretion to the concerned authority to revoke the same. Admittedly, the case of the first respondent/writ petitioner is one of deemed suspension for the reason that he was said to have received bribe from one Murugan and at that time, he was trapped and arrested by the officials of DVAC and kept in custody for about 3 days and since his period of custody exceeded 48 hours, he was placed under suspension in terms of Regulation 9(b). A clarification has also been issued by TNEB/TANGEDCO in Memorandum (Per) No.1938M.18/A181/2010-1 dated 24.02.2010 and Chapter II(3)speaks about implications of suspensions and as per the said instructions, in cases involving corruption, if the matter has been referred to DVAC, the suspension may be revoked after consulting the DVAC not only as a measure to avoid hardship to the Board employee concerned, but also to reduce additional expenditure to Board and the competent authority should make a review of such cases and examine whether suspension need not be revoked pending disciplinary proceedings, in the light of the crieteria laid down in the matter of suspension. As per para 2 sub-clause (1) of the said circular, it is stated that if the period of suspension of an employee exceeds five years and the criminal proceeding is not yet finalized, then, such case may be considered for revocation of suspension, after following the due process, subject to the outcome of the order of the Criminal Court.'' 11. The learned counsel refers to Rule 3(e)(5) of the Tamil Nadu Police (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1955 which speaks to the effect that 'An order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under this rule may at any time be revoked by the authority which made or is deemed to have made the order or by any authority to which that authority is subordinate'. 12. Conversely, Mr.K.Chellapandian, Learned Additional Advocate General assisted by A.K.Baskarapandian, learned Special Government Pleader appearing for the Respondents/Department in W.P.Nos.17007 of 2012 and 8555 of 2009 and the appellant in W.A.No.510/2012, by placing reliance on G.O.Ms.No.40, Personnel & Administrative Reforms (N) Department, dated 30.01.1996 and Rule 17(e)(6) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, would contend that the Rules 1 (i) and (ii) and 5 of Rule 17(e) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules speak of suspending a person in public interest in view of both criminal case and departmental proceedings and that the time limit for the suspension cases would not be applicable to cases of Government servants against whom criminal proceedings were initiated as per Guidelines issued in para 4 of (ix) of G.O.Ms.No.40 dated 30.01.1996. 13. The learned Additional Advocate General refers to the decision in Allahabad Bank and another v. Deepak Kumar Bhola, (1997) 4 SCC 1 , at page 6 in paragraph 11, wherein it is held as follows: ''11.We are unable to agree with the contention of learned counsel for the respondent that there has been no application of mind or the objective consideration of the facts by the appellant before it passed the orders of suspension. As already observed, the very fact that the investigation was conducted by the C.B.I which resulted in the filing of a charge-sheet, alleging various offences having been committed by the respondent, was sufficient for the appellant to conclude that pending prosecution the respondent should be suspended. As already observed, the very fact that the investigation was conducted by the C.B.I which resulted in the filing of a charge-sheet, alleging various offences having been committed by the respondent, was sufficient for the appellant to conclude that pending prosecution the respondent should be suspended. It would be indeed inconceivable that a bank should allow an employee to continue to remain on duty when he is facing serious charges of corruption and mis-appropriation of money. Allowing such a employee to remain in the seat would result in giving him further opportunity to indulge in the acts for which he was being prosecuted. Under the circumstances, it was the bounden duty of the appellant to have taken recourse to the provisions of clause 19.3 of the First Bipartite Settlement, 1966. The mere fact that nearly 10 years have elapsed since the charge-sheet was filed. can also be no ground for allowing the respondent to come back to duty on a sensitive post in the bank, unless he is exonerated of the charge.'' 14. He also invites the attention of this Court to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India V. Rajiv Kumar, (2003) 6 SCC 516 at special page 527 wherein in paragraph 29, it is observed as follows: ''29.Another plea raised relates to a suspension for a very long period. It is submitted that the same renders the suspension invalid. The plea is clearly untenable. The period of suspension should not be unnecessarily prolonged but if plausible reasons exist and the authorities feel that the suspension needs to be continued, merely because it is for a long period that does not invalidate the suspension.'' 15. He brings to the notice of this Court yet another decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in U.P.Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parrishad and others V. Sanjiv Rajan, 1993 Supp (3) Supreme Court Cases 483, wherein in paragraph 10, it is observed as follows: ''10. We find from the charge-sheet that the allegations against the 1st respondent are grave in as much as they indicate that the amounts mentioned there in are not deposited in the bank and forged entries have been made in the pass book of the relevant accounts and the amounts are shown as having been deposited. In the circumstances, the High Court should not have interfered with the order of suspension passed by the authorities. In the circumstances, the High Court should not have interfered with the order of suspension passed by the authorities. The Division Bench has given no reason for upholding the learned Single Judge's order revoking the suspension order. In matters of this kind, it is advisable that the concerned employees are kept out of the mischief's range. If they are exonerated, they would be entitled to all their benefits from the date of the order of suspension. Whether the employees should or should not continue in their office during the period of inquiry is a matter to be assessed by the concerned authority ordinarily, the Court should not interfere with the orders of suspension unless they are passed mala fide and without there being even a prima facie evidence on record connecting the employees with the misconduct in question. In the present case, before the preliminary report was received, the Director was impressed by the 1st respondent-employee's representation. However after the report, it was noticed that the employee could not he innocent. Since this is the conclusion arrived at by the management on the basis of the material in their possession, no Conclusions to the contrary could be drawn by the Court at the interlocutory stage and without going through the entire evidence on record In the circumstances, there was no justification for the High Court to revoke the order of suspension." 16. The learned Additional Advocate General refers to G.O.Ms.No.40, Personnel & Administrative Reforms(N) Department, dated 30.01.1996 wherein a reference to Rule 17(e)(3) to (6) was made and also in the very same G.O., he points out that in paragraph 3, there is a reference to G.O.Ms.No.1692, Public (Services), dated 17.08.1968. 17. Further, it is represented on behalf of the Respondent/ Department that G.O.Ms.No.40, in paragraph 7, shows that there is a reference to the Government Letter No.107821/91-4, Personnel and Administrative Reforms (Per.N) Department, dated 23.11.1992 (communicating the revised format of suspension orders), whereby and whereunder, instructions were issued in regard to the resorting of suspension specifying time limit for initiation, finalisation of departmental proceedings including the matter referred to the Directorate of Vigilance and Anti Corruption; reviewing of cases etc. and fixing the time limit in regard to the finalisation and disciplinary proceedings wherein the item (ii) to (ix) of paragraph 5 of G.O.Ms.No.211, Personnel and Administrative Reforms Department, 27.02.1980 were substituted with necessary instructions/guidelines as specified thereto. 18. and fixing the time limit in regard to the finalisation and disciplinary proceedings wherein the item (ii) to (ix) of paragraph 5 of G.O.Ms.No.211, Personnel and Administrative Reforms Department, 27.02.1980 were substituted with necessary instructions/guidelines as specified thereto. 18. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and also gone through the records. 19. At the outset, it is to be stated that consequent to suspension, a Government Servant/Public Servant or an employee concerned does not forgo his office nor he suffers any demotion or degradation. As a matter of fact, he continues to remain in the same rank and his pay and allowances are also the same, unless punishment is awarded as a result of disciplinary proceedings. In effect, he continues to be subject to the same discipline under the same authority under whom he was working before suspension. 20. It cannot be gainsaid that an employer has a right to take disciplinary action against the employee who is believed to have committed misconduct. An employer, who has contemplated disciplinary action against an employee, may place him under suspension. After suspending an employee, the matter rests there. As such, an employee suffers and it results in unnecessary expenses to the Employer/State by way of payment of subsistence allowance in lieu of nothing. In those circumstances, it was felt that the Rule 10 of CCS (CC & A) Rules, 1965 required a re-look and the DOPT through their 0.M.No.11012/4/2003-Estt. (A) dated 07.01.2004 issued certain instructions ensuring periodical review of suspension orders by a Review Committee so that unnecessary continuation of suspension is avoided. The aforesaid Official Memorandum on the subject of 'Suspension of Government servants-Review of Instructions' reads as under : ''The undersigned is directed to say that Rule 10(Suspension) of the CCS (CCA) Rules 1965 is being amended to provide that an order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under this Rule shall be reviewed by the competent authority on recommendation of the Review Committee constituted for the purpose. It is also being provided in the Rules that an order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under sub-rules (1) or (2) of Rule 10 shall not be valid after 90 days unless it is extended after review for a further period before the expiry of 90 days. It is also being provided in the Rules that an order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under sub-rules (1) or (2) of Rule 10 shall not be valid after 90 days unless it is extended after review for a further period before the expiry of 90 days. It is further being provided that extension of suspension shall not be for a period exceeding 180 days at a time (copy of Notification is enclosed). ''2.It is, therefore, necessary to constitute Review Committee(s) to review the suspension cases. The composition of Review committee(s) may be as follows: (i) The disciplinary authority, the appellate authority and another officer or the level of disciplinary/appellate authority from the same office or from another Central Government Office (in case another officer of same level is not available in the same office), in a case where the President is not the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority. (ii) The disciplinary authority and two officers of the level of Secretary/Addl. Secretary/Joint Secretary who are equivalent or higher in rank than the disciplinary authority from the same office or another Central Government Office (in case another officer of same level is not available in the same office), in a case where the appellate authority is the President. (iii) Three officers of the level of Secretary/Addl. Secretary/Joint Secretary who are higher in rank than the suspended official from the same Department/Office or from another Central Government Department/Office (in case another officer of same level is not available in the same office), in a case where the disciplinary authority is the President. The administrative ministry/ department/office concerned may constitute the review committee as indicated above on a permanent basis or ad hoc basis. ''3.The Review Committee(s) may take a view regarding revocation/ continuation of the suspension keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case and also taking into account that unduly long suspension, while putting the employee concerned to undue hardship, involve payment of subsistence allowance without the employee performing any useful service to the Government. Without prejudice to the foregoing, if the officer has been under suspension for one year without any charges being filed in a court of law or no charge-memo has been issued in departmental enquiry, he shall ordinarily be reinstated in service without prejudice to the case against him. Without prejudice to the foregoing, if the officer has been under suspension for one year without any charges being filed in a court of law or no charge-memo has been issued in departmental enquiry, he shall ordinarily be reinstated in service without prejudice to the case against him. However, in case the officer is in police/judicial custody or is accused of a serious crime or a matter involving national security, the Review Committee may recommend the continuation of the suspension of the officer concerned. 4. In so far as persons serving in the Indian Audit and Accounts Department are concerned, these instructions are based in consultation with the Comptroller and Auditor General of India. 5. All Ministries/Departments are requested to bring the above instructions to the notice of all disciplinary authorities under their control and ensure that necessary Review Committees are constituted accordingly. It may also be impressed upon all concerned that lapsing of any suspension order on account of failure to review the same will be viewed seriously.'' 21. Placing an employee under suspension is the discretion of an authority and where the directions is properly exercised for good and sufficient grounds, the order cannot be held bad in law merely because the reasons were not communicated. 22. It cannot also be brushed aside that the concept of 'Speedy Trial' is imbibed in Section 309 of Cr.P.C. In reality, a fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit under Article 21 of the Constitution of India conferring a right in favour of an accused to be tried speedily. No wonder, right to speedy trial flowing from Article 21 of the Constitution of India encompasses all stages viz., the stage of Investigation, Enquiry, Trial, Appeal, Revision and Re-trial. It is in the interest of everyone that the guilt or innocence of an accused is decided early. In the circumstances, if the prosecution is kept pending for a long/ indefinite period, a vital piece of evidence may be obliterated by long lapse of time with the result that the evidence may not be available at the time of conducting trial. Also that, a mere delay, however short or long it may be, cannot be a sole justification for quashing the proceedings by a competent Court. In fact, a piecemeal recording of evidence of witnesses ought to be avoided by a Court of Law, since it may have an impact on the prosecution. Also that, a mere delay, however short or long it may be, cannot be a sole justification for quashing the proceedings by a competent Court. In fact, a piecemeal recording of evidence of witnesses ought to be avoided by a Court of Law, since it may have an impact on the prosecution. Further, when witnesses are present in Court, they must be examined except for 'special reasons' which are to be mentioned in the adjudication papers of the concerned Court at the time of passing of an order of an adjudication. 23. It is true that the prosecution should not be allowed to become a persecution. However, when does the prosecution become persecution will certainly depend upon the facts and circumstances of a given case. It is the primordial duty of the Court concerned to dispose of a case concerning corruption by holding the trial on day to day basis as per Section 4 (4) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. In fact, as per Section 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, a special Judge appointed under the Act is to try offences specified in Section 3(1) of the Act. The word 'only' shows the exclusive jurisdiction of the special Judge to try all offences specified in Section 3(1) of the Act. 24. Article 162 of the Constitution of India does not confer any power on the State Government to frame rules and it only indicates the scope of executive power of the State. 0f course, under such executive power the State certainly can give administrative instructions to its servants how to act in certain circumstances, but that will not make such instructions, statutory rules which are justiciable in certain circumstances. Further, in order that such executive instructions have the force of statutory rules, it must be shown that they have been issued either under the authority conferred on the State Government by some statute or under some provision of the Constitution providing therefor. In this connection, it can aptly be stated that if there is a statutory rule, the executive cannot ignore or act contrary to the rule in exercise of the executive power under Article 162 of the Constitution of India. 25. An order of suspension is neither one of dismissal nor of removal within the meaning of Article 311 of the Constitution of India. 25. An order of suspension is neither one of dismissal nor of removal within the meaning of Article 311 of the Constitution of India. In addition, 'Suspension is an unqualified right of an employer and the same cannot be exercised for trivial lapse nor should be authorities concerned be conflict by 'suspension' syndrome and place employees under suspension just for nothing' as per decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Captain M. Paul Antony V. Bharat Gold Lines Limited (SC), (1999) 3 Supreme Court Cases 679. 26. When the rules provided for deemed suspension, the effect is that even without passing an order of suspension, an employee would be treated as suspended as per decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India Vs. Rajiv Kumar, AIR 2003 SC 2917 . That apart, if the order of suspension is an appeal able one, then, the interference by judicial review will not be a proper one, as per decision SA.Khan Vs. State of Haryana, AIR 1993 SC 1152 . Moreover, the rules may confer express power on the authorities to modify or revoke the order of suspension vide Rule 10(5) of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. In this connection, it may not be out of place to point out that it is necessary for an employer to review periodically as to whether the continued suspension is necessary as per decision S.Sarala Kumari V. Government of India, 1995-I-L.L.N.- 25 (AP). 27. In the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India and others V. Udai Narain, (1998) 5 Supreme Court Cases 535, at special page 536, in paragraph 4, it is held as follows: ''4.A bare look at Rule 10 of CCS (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 would show that the interpretation placed by the Tribunal does not appear to be correct. An unduly narrow technical view has been taken by the Tribunal to quash the order of suspension. The view of the Tribunal that the expression ''investigation, inquiry or trial'' would not include the stage of filing of the charge-sheet in the Court and since investigation was over and the trial had not yet commenced, the respondent could not be placed under suspension, we are unable to accept. The view of the Tribunal that the expression ''investigation, inquiry or trial'' would not include the stage of filing of the charge-sheet in the Court and since investigation was over and the trial had not yet commenced, the respondent could not be placed under suspension, we are unable to accept. The delinquent cannot be considered to be any better off after the charge-sheet has been filed against him in the Court after completion of the investigation, than his position during the investigation of the case itself. It has been brought to our notice that sanction for prosecution has already been obtained and case has been fixed for framing of charges by the trial Court. In this view of the matter we find that the view taken by the Tribunal in the impugned order is not sustainable and the order of suspension was not liable o be quashed on the ground that the case was neither at the stage of investigation or enquiry or trial.'' 28. It is relevant to point out that in the decision in Ramankutty V. State of Kerala, ILR 1970 (2) Kerala at page 4, it is held that 'The order of suspension should not normally depend moral on the gravity of charges but should depend upon a consideration of the question whether it is necessary to keep him away from the post or office that he occupies'. 29. In the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vice Chancellor Jammu University V. D.K.Rampaul, AIR 1977 Supreme Court 146, it is observed that 'It is immaterial that evil effects flow from an order of suspension, as it causes real hardship and inconvenience to a civil servant due to stigma, attached to it. In fact, by placing an employee under suspension without proper application of mind Government is a looser because it has to pay heavy amount by way of subsistence allowance and other payments without taking any service from the employee.' 30. In the decision in P.Rajender V. Union of India, 2002 (2) ATJ 332, it is held that with a view to balancing the public interest and the private interest of the employee, continuance of suspension in respect of an employee requires application of mind taking into consideration all the attendant circumstances. 31. In the decision in P.Rajender V. Union of India, 2002 (2) ATJ 332, it is held that with a view to balancing the public interest and the private interest of the employee, continuance of suspension in respect of an employee requires application of mind taking into consideration all the attendant circumstances. 31. In the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Principal, J.D. Patil Sangludkar and another V. Ganesh, (2003) 9 Supreme Court Cases 164, at page 165, in paragraph 5, it is observed and held as follows: ''5.The provision to increase the rate of subsistence allowance pending suspension after a certain stipulated period is normally envisaged to ensure that the employer or the management concerned does not indefinitely keep an employee under the pretext of suspension out of his office without completing the inquiry and take advantage of its own lapse or delay in completing the disciplinary proceedings. In a case of the nature where the accused is charged with a serious criminal offence and is facing prosecution for the same at the instance of the police before competent criminal courts and the adjudication in respect of the same by the competent criminal court which is seized of the matter has to be awaited as a matter of necessity and the service rule does not permit as such, the court cannot allow full subsistence allowance amounting to full pay and allowances. Unless the respondent could substantiate that in cases of the nature pertaining to him, where for any lapse or delay, the employer cannot be found fault with at all, the High Court could not have passed such an order of the nature under challenge. We therefore, set aside the order of the High Court on this ground alone. The respondent will be allowed only 50% of the salary towards his subsistence allowance, which seems to have been already paid to him.'' 32. In the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ramanand Chaudhary V. State of Bihar and others, AIR 1994 Supreme Court 948, at page 949, in paragraph 5, it is observed as follows: ''5.It is not necessary to go into the legal points raised by Mr.Jain as we are inclined to quash the prosecution against the appellant in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case. After the raid no action was taken by the prosecution for six years. After the raid no action was taken by the prosecution for six years. The Public Prosecutor consistently opined that no criminal case was made out against the appellant. The Commissioner on independent consideration refused to grant the sanction but later on at the asking of the DIG (Vigilance) he changed his view. The prosecution against the appellant is pending for over a period of thirteen years and it would be travesty of justice to permit the prosecution at this stage which would mean that the appellant would suffer the trial/appeal for another decade. In view of the facts and circumstances of this case we quash the prosecution pending against the appellant and also the proceedings before the Special Judge (Vigilance South Bihar), Patna who took cognizance of the case on November 21, 1990.'' 33. Be that as it may. Now, the only task before this Full Bench is the analysis of two decisions of this Court, one in C.Balasubramanian vs. The Commissioner, Tiruchirapalli Corporation, Tiruchirapalli and another, in W.A.(MD) No.964 of 2010, dated 04.01.2011 and the other in The Deputy Inspector General of Police vs. S.Govindaraj, reported in 2012 (1) CTC 124 . 34. Be that as it may. Now, the only task before this Full Bench is the analysis of two decisions of this Court, one in C.Balasubramanian vs. The Commissioner, Tiruchirapalli Corporation, Tiruchirapalli and another, in W.A.(MD) No.964 of 2010, dated 04.01.2011 and the other in The Deputy Inspector General of Police vs. S.Govindaraj, reported in 2012 (1) CTC 124 . 34. In the case of C.Balasubramanian, the appellant was suspended because of his involvement in corrupt practices and facing trial in C.C.No.15 of 2007 under the Prevention of Curruption Act,1988, whereupon, a Division Bench of this Court, after considering various judgments of this Court and also the decisions of the Supreme Court in Surain Singh v. State of Punjab, 2009 (1) Supreme 458 , wherein it was held that corruption in the administration has hampered the development of the nation and the persons, who are involved in the corruption cases, should be dealt with firmly and the persons indulging in corruption practices cannot be allowed to be in public employment to maintain purity of administration, as such attitude will definitely affect public interest and that day in and day out the gigantic problem of curruption in the public servants is on the increase; large scale corruption retards the nation building activities and every one has to suffer on that count; corruption is corroding like cancerous lymph nodes, the vital veins of the body politics, social fabric of efficiency in the public service and moralizing the honest officers; the efficiency in public service would improve only when the public servant devotes his sincere attention and does the duty diligently, truthfully, honestly and devotes himself assiduously to the performance of the duties of his post, which was earlier held in the cases of Swatantar Singh v. State of Haryana, 1997 (4) SCC 14 and State of M.P. v. Shambhu Dayal Nagar, 2002 (1) SCC 1 , has held that in the light of the above categorical pronouncements of this Court as well as the Supreme Court and having regard to the undisputed fact that the appellant is involved in a criminal case, that too, in a bribery case, he has no right to seek revocation of the suspension order, merely because the criminal trial is pending for three years. It was also observed therein that on four occasions, the first respondent-Corporation passed orders rejecting the request of the appellant seeking revocation of suspension order. Accordingly, the said Division Bench declined to interfere with the order of suspension passed against the appellant therein. No one, as a matter of right, can claim revocation of suspension order. Generally, a court of law cannot interfere with the order of suspension, unless it is passed on trivial reasons or mala fides and without there being ex facie/prima facie evidence on record connecting him with the misconduct. Therefore, in our considered opinion, the said Division Bench had correctly concluded the issue. 35. As far as the case of Govindaraj is concerned, the delinquent was placed under suspension on account of pendency of a corruption case under the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act. A learned Single Judge was pleased to quash the order of suspension inter alia that prolonged suspension was bad in law. Aggrieved over the order of the learned single Judge, the Police Department had filed the Writ Appeal. In the said appeal, from the materials produced, it was seen that the delinquent had been kept under suspension for five years and though investigation was already over and charge-sheet filed before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Coimbatore, which was taken on file in Spl.C.C.No.7 of 2008, no progress was made in the trial except examining P.W.1, who sanctioned the prosecution against the delinquent, which showed that it would take a considerable time to complete the criminal trial. Therefore, the Division Bench therein was of the view that continued suspension of the respondent/delinquent was not necessary during the trial of the criminal case. Further, it was not in dispute that the name of the respondent did not find place in the First Information Report nor was there any specific allegation against the respondent. 0n the other hand, there was a specific allegation in the FIR only against the Sub-Inspector of Police. Also, in that case, admittedly, there was no allegation against the respondent with regard to the alleged corruption charge. It was also noted therein by the Division Bench that after a period of six months from the date of suspension, the employee had to be paid 75% of the salary by way of Subsistence Allowance. Also, in that case, admittedly, there was no allegation against the respondent with regard to the alleged corruption charge. It was also noted therein by the Division Bench that after a period of six months from the date of suspension, the employee had to be paid 75% of the salary by way of Subsistence Allowance. In that case, as the respondent had been kept under prolonged suspension for a period of nearly five years with salary in the form of Subsistence Allowance without extracting any work from him, the Division Bench felt that it was nothing but wasting of Government money. As such, applying Rule 3 (e) (5) of the Rules, pending trial of the criminal case, the suspension of the respondent therein was to be revoked and as held by the learned single Judge, the respondent was ordered to be posted in a far away place in a non-sensitive post and work could be extracted from him for the salary paid. Therefore, the said Division Bench, in our standpoint, rightly did not find any illegality or infirmity in the order passed by the learned single Judge. 36. Therefore, we hold that both the laws laid down by two different Division Benches of this Court, one in C.Balasubramanian v. The Commissioner, Tiruchirapalli and the other in The Deputy Inspector General of Police v. S.Govindarajan, which are referred to in the point for reference before this Full Bench, are the correct laws, considering the different facts and circumstances involved therein and, as such, in our viewpoint, there is no conflict of decisions between them. 37. In this context, we may also add the rule position prevailing in the departmental proceedings in the case of suspension being continued for a prolonged period without revocation. Rule of Law : 38. In exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India and of all other powers hereunto enabling and in super session of The Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, dated 14.10.1953, the present Rules, namely, The Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, in short, "the Rules" have been enacted, which came into force from 01.01.1955. The Classification embodied in Part II read with Schedule I and Schedule II of the Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules was omitted by the Government Order in G.O.Ms.No.450, Public (Services-B), dated 05.03.1963, because of the general classification of the members of the services as belonging to State Services or Subordinate Services, as the case may be. Inasmuch as the classification has been generalised, the Government considered that the title of the Rules, namely, Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules was not in tune with the present day context and, therefore, changed the title of the said Rules as ''Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules''. 39. Prior to the said Rules, the Government examined the provisions of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules,1965, with a view to issue suitable amendments to the Madras Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules and, accordingly, various amendments have been made, including renaming Madras as Tamil Nadu. After these Rules coming into force, they shall have application to every member of the Civil Service of the State and to every person holding a civil post under the State except to the extent otherwise expressly provided. 40. Vide the present rules, namely, Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, under Rule 17 (e) (6), an order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under this rule may at any time be revoked by the authority which made or is deemed to have made the order or by any authority to which that authority is subordinate, thereby empowering the competent authority to take a decision as to the revocation of suspension at any time. The said rule framed in exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution shall be exercised in the manner as contemplated. A reading of the said rule would unambiguously indicate that there cannot be any distinction between an ordinary case and a criminal case as to the involvement of the delinquent employee. 41. The said rule framed in exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution shall be exercised in the manner as contemplated. A reading of the said rule would unambiguously indicate that there cannot be any distinction between an ordinary case and a criminal case as to the involvement of the delinquent employee. 41. The Government of Tamil Nadu had come out with an order in G.O.Ms.No.40, dated 30.01.1996, Personnel & Administrative Reforms (N) Department, dated 30.01.1996, regarding the provisions of the Rules, as to the suspension of State Government servants, embodied in Rule 17 (e), following a decision rendered by the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal in 0.A.Nos.3000-3002 of 1990 and also the implications of the orders in G.O.Ms.No.211, Personnel and Administrative Reforms Department, dated 27.02.1980, dealing with the provision that the period of suspension should not exceed 3/6 months and that extension should be ordered by Head of Department or Government thereafter are not mandatory and have no binding force, thereby stipulating the circumstances under which revocation of suspension can be ordered. 42. Clause 6 (iii) of the G.O. indicates that in cases where a Government servant has been suspended and the matter referred for investigation to the Director of Vigilance and Anti-corruption for enquiry, the latter should complete the enquiry and send his report to Government through the Vigilance Commission within one year. 43. Sub-Clause (iv) is to the effect that in respect of cases referred to under items (ii) and (iii) above, the authority who ordered the suspension/Director of Vigilance and Anti-corruption should, before the expiry of the periods mentioned, report the matter to the Head of the Department/ Government, indicating the progress of the disciplinary action/investigation by the Director of Vigilance and Anti-corruption, the reasons for non-completion of the work and the further time required for completing the disciplinary action/ investigation and furnish reasons for continuing the suspension if continued suspension is felt essential. If the authority which initiated action in the first instance is the Head of the Department, the report will be sent to Government. 44. If the authority which initiated action in the first instance is the Head of the Department, the report will be sent to Government. 44. As per Sub-Clause (v), after the initial report referred to in item (iv) above, reports should be sent to Government at the end of every six months, indicating the further progress, so as to enable the Government to review the progress of the case, for such action as may be necessary to ensure expeditious disposal. 45. Sub-Clause (vi) would enunciate that the Head of the Department or the Government, as the case may be, will examine the cases with reference to the subject matter of the disciplinary action/investigation in progress and the reported stage of progress and permit the continued suspension beyond six months/one year. Where the Government have themselves ordered suspension, they will examine the case on the same lines and accord similar permission. 46. The above executive order has been made by the Governor of the State of Tamil Nadu, making it clear that the Government have already instructed that as far as possible the factual details and the reasons for suspension should be specified in the order of suspension, except in cases where such requirements are dispensed with expressly or by necessary implication or is not desirable in the larger public interest to communicate the reasons for suspension and also that while issuing orders of suspension, the period of suspension shall not be specified. 47. A comprehensive reading of the rule and the executive order would lead to a conflict of situation. Though the executive order is in furtherance of Rule 17 (e), Clause (6) contemplates that it is the authority's wisdom to take a decision to revoke the suspension. 48. Tracing the rule from 1930, the first one Madras Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules; thereafter called as Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1953 and then the present rules, namely, Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955, having been experienced by the administrative set up, the order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under the rule may at any time be revoked by the authority which made or is deemed to have made the order or by any authority to which that authority is subordinate. When the dominant position of the rules from 1930 does not distinguish the conflicting interest of the delinquent employee of revocation at any time and not categorising the clauses, the executive order, which has been brought into action on 30.01.1996, has not been incorporated in the rules till now. Therefore, the force of law as to the application of rule is that notwithstanding the pendency of any case and the Government servant is placed under suspension, the authority competent is empowered to revoke the suspension at any point of time. Keeping the Government servant in a hanging position of prolonged suspension without revocation or review of such order, taking into account various factors, such as, investigation and the other mechanism involved in the process of conclusion of the enquiry for certain reasons not to conclude the enquiry, may not be right on the executive authority and, therefore, we feel, the said issue needs to be considered either by amending the rules or by bringing a proper legislation in regulating the order of suspension. 49. The Constitution of India guarantees the right of public employment and the equality thereof guaranteed to every one under Article 16 (1) shall be made available to every citizen, including the delinquent employee. Such a right has to be enjoyed by the Government servant during the pleasure of the Governor of the State. Therefore, the executive order, taking away the rights conferred upon the citizens, without making necessary amendment to the rules or bringing proper legislation, is bad in law and the review of the order of suspension by the authority without giving any distinction of the category of cases shall be made as a mandatory requirement by prescribing a period of review, otherwise, there will be a serious prejudice and continued apathy over the issue of keeping the Government servant for an unending period under suspension. 50. Following our answer to the point under reference in para 36, the Registry is directed to list these matters before the appropriate Bench for hearing in usual course.