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2015 DIGILAW 134 (ALL)

Vikkar Singh v. State of U. P.

2015-01-19

SUDHIR AGARWAL

body2015
JUDGMENT Sudhir Agarwal,J. 1. Heard Sri K.D.Tripathi, learned counsel for the revisionist. 2. This criminal revision has come up against judgment dated 11.12.1990 passed by Ist Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rampur, convicting revisionist under Section 304-A IPC and sentencing him to undergo three months Rigorous Imprisonment and fine of Rs.5,000/-, and, on non payment of fine, revisionist is also required to undergo Simple Imprisonment of two months. Thereagainst, revisionist preferred Criminal Appeal No.75 of 1990, which has also been dismissed by Sessions Judge, Rampur vide judgment dated 08.02.1991. Both the Courts below have recorded concurrent findings that accused-revisionist was driving vehicle i.e. truck negligently causing death of Manjoo. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant could not point out any manifest illegality or error in the impugned judgments regarding concurrent findings against revisionist. He, however, submitted that this revision has come up after 23 years and, therefore, sentence of three months be reduced to the extent of punishment already undergone, and if the Court finds proper may impose fine for the period of unserved sentence of imprisonment. 4. I have considered the submissions and perused record. Km. Manjoo died on the spot due to rash and negligent driving of revisionist. The prosecution has also succeeded in proving the case beyond doubt as a result whereof accused has been convicted and punished. It is true that he is able to prevent serving the sentence not on account of any other reason but due to pendency of this revision before this Court for the last 23 years and odd. The order-sheet shows that after admission of this revision on 19.02.1991, it has been listed in the Court for disposal only on 19.01.2015 and even then the courts below record have not been received. 5. This is really very unfortunate and shows the state of affairs with which the administration of justice, due to long pendency of case, is suffering. On the one hand, principle of law is well recognized that act of Court should prejudice none and on the other side, proven case of guilt do not result in making guilty persons to serve the sentence, merely on account of pendency of the case before this Court and even non-listing of case in Court for decades together. This is a sorry state of affairs on the administrative side of this Court. 6. Even on judicial side we cannot escape from the responsibilities. This is a sorry state of affairs on the administrative side of this Court. 6. Even on judicial side we cannot escape from the responsibilities. Repeatedly and frequently the people of this Country are crying for speedy justice reminding this Court that delayed justice is nothing but denial of justice, but for one or the other reason or many a times without any reason, we find it not easy to get the cases decided expeditiously, and, in any case, within a reasonable time. This gives an alibi to the accused persons to seek mercy of the Court in the matter of sentence etc. The accused and guilty persons take the place of victim and they tried to plead as if they would be prejudiced greatly in case they are required to serve sentence, awarded by the court below, after conviction under the relevant provisions in which they have been found guilty, if such sentence is required to be served after a very long time. If this is not the travesty of justice what else can be. The victims continued to wait for adequate punishment to the guilty person but the system of administration of justice intervenes. Many a times at lower level the conviction and sentence takes place within a reasonable time but then on the higher level it gets delayed, some times for extraordinary longer period, like 26 years in the present case. Should the delay in disposal of appeals and revisions against the orders of Trial Court be moulded in favour of accused, whose guilt has been found proved to the hilt so as to give the benefit of delay to the accused guilty person, and, will it not amount to denial of justice to the victim, who has not only suffered but has waited that some day justice would be done and guilty persons would be punished adequately. 7. The sentence awarded by Trial Court under Section 304-A IPC has been maintained by Lower Appellate Court. These provisions refer to the offences which are quite serious in nature and the revisionists having been found guilty have been suitably punished. 7. The sentence awarded by Trial Court under Section 304-A IPC has been maintained by Lower Appellate Court. These provisions refer to the offences which are quite serious in nature and the revisionists having been found guilty have been suitably punished. The mere fact that revision in its disposal has got delayed before this Court for no fault of victim, I am clearly of the view that one sided discretion and sympathy, if shown in favour of guilty and accused, that would also be an injustice to the victims in person and society in general. 8. Everyone should know that when he has done something wrong, one day he would be punished adequately and suitably and would not escape therefrom. To my mind sympathy in such cases would be a misplaced sympathy shown in favour of accused guilty persons ignoring the view point of the victims and the society on the other side. 9. Even otherwise, while exercising revisional jurisdiction, once I do not find any manifest error or illegality in the impugned order as also in the matter of sentence, in my view, it would not be within the jurisdiction of Revisional Court to interfere with the quantum of sentence merely on account of the period for which a revision has remained pending before this Court, though there is no illegality in the sentence awarded to accused revisionists. 10. In the matter of judicial review in criminal revision I find that this Court does not sit in appeal but the scope is very limited. It is a supervisory jurisdiction which is exercised by the Court to correct the manifest error in the orders of subordinate courts but should not be exercised in a manner so as to turn the Revisional court in a Court of Appeal. The legislature has differently made provisions for appeal and revision and the distinction of two jurisdictions has to be maintained. 11. Construing old Section 439 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, pertaining to revisional jurisdiction, the Court in D. Stephens Vs. Nosibolla, AIR 1951 Sc 196 said that revisional jurisdiction under Section 439 of the Code ought not to be exercised lightly particularly when it is invoked by private complainant against an order of acquittal which could have been appealed against by the Government under Section 417. Nosibolla, AIR 1951 Sc 196 said that revisional jurisdiction under Section 439 of the Code ought not to be exercised lightly particularly when it is invoked by private complainant against an order of acquittal which could have been appealed against by the Government under Section 417. It could be exercised only in exceptional cases where the interests of public justice require interference for the correction of a manifest illegality, or the prevention of a gross miscarriage of justice. In other words, the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be invoked merely because the lower court has taken a wrong view of law or misappreciated the evidence on record. 12. In K. Chinnaswamy Reddy Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1962 SC 1788 it was held that revisional jurisdiction should be exercised by the High Court in exceptional cases only when there is some glaring defect in the procedure or a manifest error on a point of law resulting in flagrant miscarriage of justice. However, this was also a case in which revisional jurisdiction was invoked against an order of acquittal. If the Court lacks jurisdiction or has excluded evidence which was admissible or relied on inadmissible evidence or material evidence has been overlooked etc., then only this Court would be justified in exercising revisional power and not otherwise. 13. The above view has been reiterated in Mahendra Pratap Singh Vs. Sarju Singh, AIR 1968 SC 707 ; Khetrabasi Samal Vs. State of Orissa, AIR 1970 SC 272 ; Satyendra Nath Dutta and another Vs. Ram Narain, AIR 1975 SC 580 ; Jagannath Choudhary and others Vs. Ramayan Singh and another, 2002(5) SCC 659 ; and, Johar and others Vs. Mandal Prasad and another, 2008 Cr.L.J. 1627 (S.C.). 14. In Duli Chand Vs. Delhi Administration, 1975(4) SCC 649 the Court reminded that jurisdiction of High Court in criminal revision is severely restricted and it cannot embark upon a re-appreciation of evidence. While exercising supervisory jurisdiction in revision the Court would be justified in refusing to re-appreciate evidence for determining whether the concurrent findings of fact reached by learned Magistrate and Sessions Judge was correct. 15. In Pathumma and another Vs. Muhammad, 1986(2) SCC 585 reiterating the above view the Court said that in revisional jurisdiction the High Court would not be justified in substituting its own view for that of a Magistrate on a question of fact. 16. 15. In Pathumma and another Vs. Muhammad, 1986(2) SCC 585 reiterating the above view the Court said that in revisional jurisdiction the High Court would not be justified in substituting its own view for that of a Magistrate on a question of fact. 16. In Munna Devi Vs. State of Rajasthan and another, 2001(9) SCC 631 the Court said: "The revision power under the Code of Criminal procedure cannot be exercised in a routine and casual manner. While exercising such powers the High Court has no authority to appreciate the evidence in the manner as the trial and the appellate courts are required to do. Revisional powers could be exercised only when it is shown that there is a legal bar against the continuance of the criminal proceedings or the framing of charge or the facts as stated in the First Information Report even if they are taken at the face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence for which the accused has been charged." 17. In Ram Briksh Singh and others Vs. Ambika Yadav and another, 2004(7) SCC 665 , in a matter again arising from the judgment of acquittal, the revisional power of High Court was examined and the Court said: "4. Sections 397 to 401 of the Code are group of sections conferring higher and superior courts a sort of supervisory jurisdiction. These powers are required to be exercised sparingly. Though the jurisdiction under Section 401 cannot be invoked to only correct wrong appreciation of evidence and the High Court is not required to act as a court of appeal but at the same time, it is the duty of the court to correct manifest illegality resulting in gross miscarriage of justice." 18. Looking to the matter in the case in hand I find that the virtual ground taken in this revision is that the Courts have not properly appreciated evidence led on behalf of accused though both the courts below have recorded concurrent findings of fact holding revisionist guilty for the offence and have sentenced accordingly. Despite repeated query, learned counsel for the revisionists could not point out any manifest illegality in the concurrent findings of fact and also could not show that any relevant evidence has been ignored or omitted or inadmissible evidence has been relied or there is any other manifest error in the judgment. 19. Despite repeated query, learned counsel for the revisionists could not point out any manifest illegality in the concurrent findings of fact and also could not show that any relevant evidence has been ignored or omitted or inadmissible evidence has been relied or there is any other manifest error in the judgment. 19. In view of the above discussion, this revision must fail. Accordingly, the revision is dismissed. 20. The accused, Vikkar Singh is on bail. His bail bonds and surety bonds are cancelled. The Chief Judicial Magistrate concerned shall cause him to be arrested and lodged in jail to serve out the sentence passed against him. The compliance shall be prepared within two months. 21. Certify this judgment to the lower court immediately.