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2015 DIGILAW 1342 (PAT)

Ram Naresh Rai v. State of Bihar

2015-10-16

ASHWANI KUMAR SINGH

body2015
ASHWANI KUMAR SINGH, J.:–The present Interlocutory Application has been filed for suspension of order of conviction passed against the appellant by judgment dated 02.06.2015 in Sessions Trial No. 573 of 2004/ 130 of 2009 arising out of Dumra P.S.Case No. 111 of 1998 by the learned Adhoc Additional Sessions Judge I, Sitamarhi convicting the appellant along with 14 other accused persons under Sections 323, 324, 333, 307/149 of the Indian Penal Code (for short ‘IPC’) and sentencing them to undergo R.I. for one year for the offence punishable under Section 323 IPC and in addition thereto a fine of Rs.1000/- each and, in default thereof, they have been directed to undergo simple imprisonment for two weeks. They have further been sentenced to undergo R.I. for three years under Section 324 IPC and, in addition thereto, a fine of Rs.2000/- each has also been imposed and, in default thereof, to undergo simple imprisonment for three weeks. Further the convicted accused persons have been sentenced to undergo R.I. for seven years under section 323 IPC and in addition thereto, each of them have been directed to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- each and, in default thereof, to undergo R.I. for three months. They have further been sentenced to undergo R.I. for ten years and a sum of Rs.25,000/- each for the offence punishable under Section 307 IPC and, in default thereof, to undergo R.I. for six months. However, the sentences have been ordered to run concurrently. 2. Mr. Jitendra Singh, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant, has contended that the trial court has completely ignored the mandatory provisions as contained in Sections 273 and 276 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short ‘Cr.P.C.’) in conducting the trial of the appellant which has caused miscarriage of justice, and as a result thereof, the entire trial of Sessions Trial No.337 of 2014 stood vitiated. The examination-in-Chief of not even a single prosecution witness was recorded in presence of the accused persons in Sessions Trial No. 337 of 2014, rather, the photocopy of the examination-in-Chief of the witnesses examined in Sessions Trial No. 573 of 2004 has been used in Sessions Trial No.337 of 2004 and the appellant has been prejudicially been affected thereby. 3. Mr. Singh has further contended that in the aforesaid case charges were framed separately on different dates against different sets of accused persons in three Sessions Trial. 3. Mr. Singh has further contended that in the aforesaid case charges were framed separately on different dates against different sets of accused persons in three Sessions Trial. The three Sessions Trial were never clubbed/amalgamated right from the stage of framing of charge till recording of statements of the accused persons under Section 313 Cr.P.C. However, a common judgment and order of conviction and sentence was passed on 02.06.2015 and 04.06.2015 respectively by the learned trial court and on 02.06.2015 whereby the appellant along with other convicted accused persons was taken into custody after canceling their bail bonds. Mr. Singh has contended that by order dated 23.06.2015 the appellant’s sentence has been suspended and he has been granted bail by this Court. He submits that at the relevant time when the judgment of conviction was passed the appellant was a sitting Member of Bihar Legislative Assembly. Due to conviction recorded by the trial court, he has been disqualified to contest the election in view of the provisions prescribed under Section 8 of the Representation of People Act, 1951 (for short ‘the Act’). 4. Mr. Singh has further contended that the reason for seeking suspension of conviction arises on account of the provisions as contained in the Act, by operation of which the appellant has incurred disqualification for being chosen as, and for being a Member of the Bihar Legislative Assembly. According to him, he wants to seek a fresh mandate from the electorate and wants to contest the election for membership of the Bihar Legislative Assembly, which is due to take place shortly before the end of the year 2015. 5. Mr. Singh has referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Lily Thomus Vs. Union of India [ (2013) 7 SCC 653 ], whereby Section 8(4) of the Representation of People Act, which guaranteed a sitting legislature stay of conviction for three months to enable him to approach the appellate court, has been declared ultra vires and struck down by the Supreme Court. He submits that after the decision in Lily Thomus (supra), both sitting legislatures and others intending to stand for election face disqualification in terms of Section 8(1)(m) read with 8(1)(2) of the Act. He submits that after the decision in Lily Thomus (supra), both sitting legislatures and others intending to stand for election face disqualification in terms of Section 8(1)(m) read with 8(1)(2) of the Act. He has contended that conviction of the appellant is apparently bad due to non-observance of the mandatory provisions of the Cr.P.C. and there is a strong prima facie case and there is every likelihood of the appeal being allowed. He has submitted that if the conviction is not suspended during pendency of the appeal and the disqualification is allowed to operate, the appellant, who enjoys substantial support in his constituency notwithstanding his conviction, is bound to suffer irreparable loss. Mr. Singh has submitted that failure to stay the conviction of the appellant would lead to injustice and irreversible consequences. In support of his submission, Mr. Singh has placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Ravi Kant S. Patil Vs. Sarvabhouma S. Bagali [ (2007) 1 SCC 673 ] and Navjot Singh Sidhu Vs. State of Punjab [ (2007) 2 SCC 574 ]. 6. Per contra, Mr. Binod Bihari Singh, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, has vehemently opposed the prayer made on behalf of the appellant. He has submitted that on the prayer of the prosecution the examination-in-chief of some of the witnesses examined in Sessions Trial No. 573 of 2004 was adopted in Sessions Trial No. 337 of 2014. The defence being represented through lawyer, consented to the prayer of the prosecution and thereafter the trial court adopted their examination-in-chief in Sessions Trial No. 337 of 2014. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor has further contended that on 22.11.2014 the statement of the appellant and other accused persons facing trial in Sessions Trial No. 337 of 2014 was recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and on the same day, with consent of the parties, Sessions Trial No. 337 of 2014 was amalgamated with Sessions Trial No. 573 of 2004. He submits that in that view of the matter, no illegality much less irregularity occurred in holding trial of the appellant as no prejudice has been caused. 7. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor has further contended that no exceptional case for suspending the conviction of the appellant has been made out. According to him, the appellant has failed to make out a case where failure to suspend the conviction would lead to injustice and irreversible consequences. 7. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor has further contended that no exceptional case for suspending the conviction of the appellant has been made out. According to him, the appellant has failed to make out a case where failure to suspend the conviction would lead to injustice and irreversible consequences. He has submitted that times without number the Supreme Court has cautioned that only in exceptional cases the power of suspension of conviction should be exercised. In support of his submission, reliance has been placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Sanjay Dutt Vs. State of Maharashtra [ (2009) 5 SCC 787 ]. 8. I have heard respective counsel for the parties and carefully perused the record. 9. Before I deal with the merits of the present application, it is necessary that certain material facts leading to this application are taken note of. However, let it be noted that for the purpose of decision on the prayer made by the appellant for suspending the order of conviction, it is not necessary to minutely examine the merits of the case. 10. The case of the prosecution, as contained in the FIR, in brief, is as follows. On 11.08.1998 the informant along with other Executive Magistrates and Police officials was deputed at the gate of Sitamarhi Collectorate to maintain the law and order in connection with the demonstration of Janta Dal. At about 10.30 a.m. the volunteers of Janta Dal started delivering their speeches near the gate of Sitamarhi Collectorate. Gradually, by 12 O?Clock about 8-10 thousand people assembled there. The workers of C.P.M. (Male) had also assembled at the gate of Sitamarhi Collectorate and they had erected their tents adjacent north to the tent of Janta Dal. The leaders of C.P.I. (Male) group had also been delivering their speeches. At about 1.00 p.m. the crowd became unmanageable and unruly. The unruly crowd was led by different leaders of Janta Dal including the sitting M.L.As and Ex-M.L.As. The agitated crowd were shouting slogans and instigating the mob against the district administration. The mob after breaking open the lock of the Collectorate’s gate, pushed the Magistrates and police force and started brick-batting. The mob also entered the rooms of the Collectorate and damaged the articles. They also assaulted the employees and officials and damaged the government vehicles, which resulted into a complete chaotic situation among the employees and officials of the district administration. The mob also entered the rooms of the Collectorate and damaged the articles. They also assaulted the employees and officials and damaged the government vehicles, which resulted into a complete chaotic situation among the employees and officials of the district administration. In the meantime, the District Magistrate, Sitamarhi arrived there from his official chamber and tried to pacify the crowd but that was of no avail. The mob intensified brick-batting and they also hurled lathis, as a consequence of which the District Magistrate, Superintendent of Police and other officials became injured. The mob was declared as unlawful by the District Magistrate and the members of the mob were ordered to disperse but that proved to be a futile attempt. Thereafter, the police resorted to lathi charge on the order of the district administration and when that too seemed to be ineffective, six rounds of tear gas were fired. At around 1.30 p.m. the body guards of Anwarul Haque and Nawal Kishore Rai were seen firing from their service revolvers. Due to brick-batting, the Deputy Collector and some armed guards had sustained injuries. Ultimately, the District Magistrate, Sitamarhi ordered for firing pursuant thereto the armed force opened 17 rounds of firing, as a result thereof, two persons, one male and one female died on the spot. Due to heavy brick-batting by the mob, altogether ten persons, who were members of the mob, also became injured and thereafter the mob started dispersing. Forty persons named in the FIR were arrested by the officials deputed there. Some of the members of the mob had left their vehicles while retreating and one of the vehicles was Armada Van bearing Registration No. BR-30-0333, which, later on, was identified to be the vehicle of Nawal Kishore Rai. It has been stated that the members of the mob were responsible for causing damage of several lakhs of rupees of the government properties, besides many government officials were injured due to brick-batting. The police personnel and Executive Magistrates, deputed near Sitamarhi Collectorate Gate identified other unknown members of the mob by their faces. 11. It has been stated that the members of the mob were responsible for causing damage of several lakhs of rupees of the government properties, besides many government officials were injured due to brick-batting. The police personnel and Executive Magistrates, deputed near Sitamarhi Collectorate Gate identified other unknown members of the mob by their faces. 11. On the basis of the typed report of one D.K.Verma, Executive Magistrate, Sitamarhi, a formal FIR was drawn instituting Dumra P.S.Case No. 111 ofd 1998 against 63 named accused persons and several other unknown persons for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 452, 323, 324, 325, 326, 307, 333, 353, 337, 427 of the IPC and 27 of the Arms Act and its investigation was taken up by the then Officer-in-Charge of Dumra Police Station. 12. It would appear from the record that after completing the investigation, charge-sheet bearing Charge-sheet No. 135 of 1998 was submitted against 61 accused persons showing two of them as absconders. However, the further investigation continued. On the basis of the charge-sheet, cognizance was taken by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sitamarhi and the case was committed to the court of Sessions and the same was transferred in the court of Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No.3, Sitamarhi for trial and disposal, which was numbered as Sessions Trial No. 573 of 2004. In the aforesaid Sessions Trial No. 573 of 2004 charges were framed against 60 charge-sheeted accused persons on 09.02.2007 for the offences punishable under Sections 307/149, 323, 324, 333, 353 and 337 IPC and two of the accused persons, namely, Shamim and Suryadeo Rai were further charged for the offence punishable under Section 27 of the Arms Act. 13. Subsequently, a supplementary charge-sheet was submitted against 12 accused persons including the appellant, showing three of them as absconders and on the basis thereof cognizance was taken and the case was committed to the court of Sessions, which was numbered as Sessions Trial No. 337 of 2014 and ultimately, the case was transferred to the court of Adhoc Additional Sessions Judge-1, Sitamarhi, where charges were framed on 05.07.2014 for the offences punishable under Sections 307/149, 323, 324, 353 and 337 IPC against seven accused persons including the appellant. 14. 14. It would further appear from the record that the case of the accused Munna Prasad @ Abhimanyu Prasad was transferred to the court of Adhoc Additional Sessions Judge-I, Sitamarhi after commitment separately and the same was numbered as Sessions Trial No.455 of 2014. 15. It would further appear from the record of original Sessions Trial No. 573 of 2004 that P.Ws. 1 to 7 were examined on behalf of the prosecution in Sessions Trial No. 573 of 2004 between 13.10.2011 and 03.07.2014, whereas in Sessions Trial No.337 of 2014 charges were framed by the trial court on 05.07.2014. It would further appear that 20 common witnesses were examined on behalf of the prosecution in the aforesaid two Sessions Trials, namely, Sessions Trial No. 573 of 2004 and Sessions Trial No. 337 of 2014. It would further appear from the record that the witnesses did appear in Sessions Trial No.337 of 2014 for deposition. However, the prosecutor conducting trial requested the court to adopt the examination-in-chief of some of the witnesses already examined in Sessions Trial No. 573 of 2004, to which the counsel appearing for the defence consented and thus the examination-in-chief of those witnesses recorded in Sessions Trial No.573 of 2004 were taken on record in Sessions Trial No. 337 of 2014. It would also transpire from the record that the dates on which the witnesses on behalf of the prosecution appeared before the trial court, the attendance of the appellant was dispensed with under Section 317 Cr.P.C. The counsel for the appellant did not raise any objection before the trial court at any point of time in respect of any irregularity or illegality in conducting the trial. It would further appear from the record that by order dated 22.12.2014, with the consent of the parties, the two trials mentioned hereinabove were amalgamated. 15A. Whether or not the manner in which the evidence was recorded and the separate trials were amalgamated by the trial court has vitiated the trial is a point to be considered and decided at the stage of final hearing of the appeal. Can the issue raised in the present application be a ground for suspension of execution of conviction or not during pendency of the appeal is the point to be decided in the present application. 16. In the Crl. Can the issue raised in the present application be a ground for suspension of execution of conviction or not during pendency of the appeal is the point to be decided in the present application. 16. In the Crl. I.A. application, the prayer of the appellant is to suspend the conviction during pendency of the appeal in order to contest the ongoing election of the Bihar Legislative Assembly. Thus, the issue for consideration before this Court is as to whether or not the conviction of the appellant should be stayed in order to enable him to contest the assembly election. 17. Section 389 Cr.P.C. provides that the Appellate Court may suspend the execution of sentence or order appealed against, and, also, if the person convicted is in confinement, direct for his release on bail. Does the power to suspend “order appealed against” in Section 389 Cr.P.C. includes the power to suspend the conviction itself, or is it limited to suspension of the sentence awarded by the trial court is a debatable issue. 18. In the matter of Rama Narang Vs. Ramesh Narang [ (1995) 2 SCC 513 ], the Supreme Court has answered this question by declaring that there is no reason to place a narrow interpretation on Section 389(1) Cr.P.C. not to extend it to an order of conviction. In the aforesaid case, Rama Narang was convicted for conspiracy, cheating and abatement under Sections 120-B, 420 and 114 IPC. The Companies Act prohibits employment of a person who has been convicted by a court for an offence involving moral turpitude. The offences under which the conviction was recorded involved moral turpitude. While admitting his appeal, the High Court released him on bail and directed stay of operation of the sentence. Later on, he was appointed as Managing Director of the Company. His appointment was successfully challenged in a separate proceeding on the ground that it was in violation of Section 267 of the Companies Act. After hearing the parties, the Supreme Court observed in paragraph 19 as under :— “19. That takes us to the question whether the scope of Section 389(1) of the Code extends to conferring power on the Appellate Court to stay the operation of the order of conviction. After hearing the parties, the Supreme Court observed in paragraph 19 as under :— “19. That takes us to the question whether the scope of Section 389(1) of the Code extends to conferring power on the Appellate Court to stay the operation of the order of conviction. As stated earlier, if the order of conviction is to result in some disqualification of the type mentioned in Section 267 of the Companies Act, we see no reason why we should give a narrow meaning to Section 389(1) of the Code to debar the court from granting an order to that effect in a fit case. The appeal under Section 374 is essentially against the order of conviction because the order of sentence is merely consequential thereto; albeit even the order of sentence can be independently challenged if it is harsh and disproportionate to the established guilt. Therefore, when an appeal is preferred under Section 374 of the Code the appeal is against both the conviction and sentence and therefore, we see no reason to place a narrow interpretation on Section 389(1) of the Code not to extend it to an order of conviction, although that issue in the instant case recedes to the background because High Courts can exercise inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code if the power was not to be found in Section 389(1) of the Code. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay was not right in holding that the Delhi High Court could not have exercised jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code if it was confronted with a situation of there being no other provision in the Code for staying the operation of the order of conviction. In a fit case if the High Court feels satisfied that the order of conviction needs to be suspended or stayed so that the convicted person does not suffer from a certain disqualification provided for in any other statute, it may exercise the power because otherwise the damage done cannot be undone; the disqualification incurred by Section 267 of the Companies Act and given effect to cannot be undone at a subsequent date if the conviction is set aside by the Appellate Court. But while granting a stay of (sic or) suspension of the order of conviction the Court must examine the pros and cons and if it feels satisfied that a case is made out for grant of such an order, it may do so and in so doing it may, if it considers it appropriate, impose such conditions as are considered appropriate to protect the interest of the shareholders and the business of the company.” 19. In the matter of State of T.N. Vs. A. Jaganathan [ (1996) 5 SCC 329 ], the Supreme Court dealt with a case wherein the High Court stayed the order of conviction for the sole reason that, in the absence of such a stay, the accused was likely to lose his job. The Supreme Court reversed the impugned order therein observing:— “3. … the High Court though made an observation but did not consider at all the moral conduct of the respondents inasmuch as respondent Jaganathan who was the Police Inspector attached to Erode Police Station has been convicted under Sections 392, 218 and 466 IPC, while the other respondents who are also public servants have been convicted under the provision of Prevention of Corruption Act. In such a case the discretionary power to suspend the conviction either under Sections 389(1) or under Section 482 Cr.P.C. should not have been exercised. The orders impugned thus cannot be sustained.” 20. In K.C. Sareen Vs. C.B.I. [ (2001) 6 SCC 584 ], the appellant, a bank officer, was convicted by the Special Judge interalia under Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and was sentenced to undergo R.I. for one year and a fine of Rs.500/-. The appellant preferred appeal against his conviction and sentence before the High Court, which admitted the appeal and suspended the sentence passed against him. Meanwhile, disciplinary proceeding was initiated and on the strength of conviction recorded by the trial court, the Bank authorities dismissed the appellant. The appellant moved the High Court to have his conviction also suspended. The High Court dismissed the prayer of the appellant for suspension of conviction observing that no ground was made out therefor. The appellant challenged the order of the High Court before the Supreme Court. The appellant moved the High Court to have his conviction also suspended. The High Court dismissed the prayer of the appellant for suspension of conviction observing that no ground was made out therefor. The appellant challenged the order of the High Court before the Supreme Court. In the aforesaid case, the Supreme Court held that the power to suspend conviction should be exercised by the revisional or appellate court in a very exceptional case. It held that the court has a duty to look at all aspects including the ramifications of keeping such conviction in abeyance. It further observed that when conviction is of corruption charges against a public servant, the appellate court or the revisional court should not suspend the order of conviction during pendency of the appeal even if the sentence of imprisonment is suspended. It observed “It would be a sublime public policy that the convicted public servant is kept under disability of the conviction in spite of keeping the sentence of imprisonment in abeyance till the disposal of the appeal or revision”. 21. In the State of Maharashtra Vs. Gajanan [(2003) 12 SCC 434], the Supreme Court reiterated a similar view, placing reliance upon the judgments in K. C. Sareen Vs. CBI (supra) and Union of India Vs. Atar Singh (supra). The Supreme Court held that an order of conviction should not be suspended merely on the ground that non-suspension of such conviction may entail the removal of the government servant from service. 22. In Ravikant S. Patil Vs. Sarvabhouma S. Bagali [ (2007) 1 SCC 673 ], the Supreme Court held in paragraphs 15 and 16.5 as under :— “15. It deserves to be clarified that an order granting stay of conviction is not the rule but is an exception to be resorted to in rare cases depending upon the facts of a case. Where the execution of the sentence is stayed, the conviction continues to operate. But where the conviction itself is stayed, the effect is that the conviction will not be operative from the date of stay. An order of stay, of course, does not render the conviction non-existent, but only non-operative. Be that as it may. Where the execution of the sentence is stayed, the conviction continues to operate. But where the conviction itself is stayed, the effect is that the conviction will not be operative from the date of stay. An order of stay, of course, does not render the conviction non-existent, but only non-operative. Be that as it may. Insofar as the present case is concerned, an application was filed specifically seeking stay of the order of conviction specifying the consequences if conviction was not stayed, that is, the appellant would incur disqualification to contest the election. The High Court after considering the special reason, granted the order staying the conviction. As the conviction itself is stayed in contrast to a stay of execution of the sentence, it is not possible to accept the contention of the respondent that the disqualification arising out of conviction continues to operate even after stay of conviction. 16. xxxx xxxx xxxx 16.1. xxxx xxxx xxxx 16.2. xxxx xxxx xxxx 16.3. xxxx xxxx xxxx 16.4. xxxx xxxx xxxx 16.5. All these decisions, while recognising the power to stay conviction, have cautioned and clarified that such power should be exercised only in exceptional circumstances where failure to stay the conviction, would lead to injustice and irreversible consequences.” 23. In Navjot Singh Sidhu Vs. State of Punjab [(2007), 2 SCC 574], the Case on which Mr. Singh, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant has placed reliance, the appellant Navjot Singh Sidhu was charged under Sections 302 and 323/34 IPC in a road rage-cum-death case, but was acquitted by the learned Sessions Judge, which order was challenged by the State of Punjab by filing an appeal, which was allowed and the appellant was convicted under section 304 Part-II IPC and sentenced to three years imprisonment by the Punjab and Haryana High Court for culpable homicide not amounting to murder. He could have used Section 8(4) of the Representation of People Act, 1951 and avoided resigning as a Member of Lok Sabha as under the Representation of People Act, 1951, Section 8(4) gave immunity for three months so that the convict could appeal against his conviction or sentence in an appellate court. Yet, the appellant resigned and set high standards in public life. In this background, the Supreme Court in paragraph 11 observed as under :— “11. Yet, the appellant resigned and set high standards in public life. In this background, the Supreme Court in paragraph 11 observed as under :— “11. … As already stated, it was not necessary for the appellant to have resigned from the membership of the Parliament as he could in law continue as M.P. by merely filing an appeal within a period of 3 months and had he adopted such a course he could have easily avoided incurring any disqualification at least till the decision of the appeal. However, he has chosen to adopt a moral path and has set high standards in public life by resigning from his seat and in seeking to get a fresh mandate from the people. In the event prayer made by the appellant is not granted he would suffer irreparable injury as he would not be able to contest for the seat which he held and has fallen vacant only on account of his voluntary resignation which he did on purely moral grounds. Having regard to the entire facts and circumstances mentioned above we are of the opinion that it a fit case where the order of conviction passed by the High Court deserves to be suspended.” 24. In Sanjay Dutt Vs. State of Maharashtra (supra), the case on which the learned counsel for the State has placed reliance, the appellant had filed an application under Section 389 Cr.P.C. before the Supreme Court praying that the execution of the order of conviction and sentence be suspended pending final hearing of the appeal. It was argued that the appellant belongs to a family which has been in long public service in the country and the appellant is desirous in contesting the election to the House of People from Lucknow Parliamentary constituency. Therefore, it was prayed that conviction of the appellant be suspended to enable him to contest the election. In that case, a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court dismissed the application with following observations :— “10. … Though our attention was drawn to the various findings recorded by the Special Judge and also the nature of evidence adduced by the prosecution, we do not propose to consider these facts at this stage as it may seriously prejudice either of the parties when the appeal filed by the petitioner is considered by this Court. 11. … Though our attention was drawn to the various findings recorded by the Special Judge and also the nature of evidence adduced by the prosecution, we do not propose to consider these facts at this stage as it may seriously prejudice either of the parties when the appeal filed by the petitioner is considered by this Court. 11. The petitioner is a well-known cine artist and because of his contribution to art and cinema he has got a large number of fans throughout the country and abroad. His father was also a well-known film actor and he was deeply involved in politics. At one point of time, the petitioner’s father was a Minister in the Union Cabinet. The petitioner is not a habitual criminal nor has it been brought to our notice that he had been involved in any other criminal case. 12. Despite all these favourable circumstances, we do not think that this is a fit case where conviction and sentence could be suspended so that the bar under Section 8(3) of the Representation of People Act, 1951 will not operate against the petitioner. Law prohibits any person who has been convicted of any offence and sentenced to imprisonment for not less than two years from contesting the election and such person shall be disqualified for a further period of six years since his release. In the face of such a provision, the power of the Court under Section 389 CrPC shall be exercised only under exceptional circumstances. 13. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Navjot Singh Sidhu case. But in that case, the petitioner was a sitting MP and he could have continued as an MP even after his conviction and sentence in view of Section 8(4) of the Representation of People Act, 1951. The petitioner in Navjot Singh Sidhu case resigned and expressed his desire to contest the election. In fact, that was a case where the trial court acquitted the petitioner and the High Court, in reversal, found the petitioner guilty. It was in those circumstances that this Court granted stay of the order of conviction and sentence in that case. 14. In the present case, no such circumstances are in favour of the petitioner. In fact, that was a case where the trial court acquitted the petitioner and the High Court, in reversal, found the petitioner guilty. It was in those circumstances that this Court granted stay of the order of conviction and sentence in that case. 14. In the present case, no such circumstances are in favour of the petitioner. In view of the serious offence for which he has been convicted by the Special Judge, we are not inclined to suspend the conviction and sentence awarded by the Special Judge in the present case. We make it clear that we do not express any opinion on the merits and, if any of the observations made in this order, even if it has remote possibility to prejudice either parties, we state that the same is only made for the purpose of disposal of Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 4087 of 2009—application for suspension/stay of conviction. 15. In the result, Criminal Miscellaneous Petitions Nos. 4087, 5229-30, 5237 and 5314 of 2009 are dismissed.” 25. In Jalal Ahmad Mazumdar Vs. State of Assam [AIR 2008 (2) Gauhati 509], the Guwahati High Court has held that the conviction of appellant cannot be suspended merely to enable him to contest the election. 26. In Cr.Appeal No.1535 of 2014 (Md. Dilawar Mir Vs. CBI) disposed of on 19.11.2014, the appellant, who was convicted under Sections 120-B IPC and 13(1)(d)(ii) read with 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and sentenced to three years rigorous imprisonment had prayed for suspension of conviction in order to contest the election to Jammu & Kashmir Legislature. He had been elected six times in past to that Assembly. However, taking into consideration the facts of the case and the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Rama Narang (supra), K.C.Sareen (supra), Navjot Singh Sidhu (supra) and Sanjay Dutt (supra), the Delhi High Court declined to stay the conviction merely because the appellant intended to contest election. 27. In Babanrao Shankar Gholap Vs. State of Maharashtra decided on September 4, 2014, [2015 All MR (Cri) 77], the appellant, who was five times MLA, was convicted under Section 13(1)(e) read with 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three years and a fine of Rs.1,00,000/- by the learned Special Judge vide judgment dated 21.03.2014. State of Maharashtra decided on September 4, 2014, [2015 All MR (Cri) 77], the appellant, who was five times MLA, was convicted under Section 13(1)(e) read with 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three years and a fine of Rs.1,00,000/- by the learned Special Judge vide judgment dated 21.03.2014. He filed an appeal before the High Court of Bombay being aggrieved by the judgment of the learned Special Judge. The appeal was admitted and the substantive sentence of the appellant was suspended. The appellant was a sitting Member of the Legislative Assembly of the State Legislature of the State of Maharashtra on the date of judgment. He filed an application for suspension of his conviction on the ground that he had contested the election to the State Legislature in 1990, 1995, 1999, 2004 and 2009. He was a Minister of Social Welfare, Women and Child Welfare and Ex -Army Man Welfare Committee. It was contended that in the absence of suspension of conviction, the applicant, who has worked for social cause, would be deprived of, to contest ensuing elections for the period 2014 to 2019. It was also contended that there was no valid sanction to prosecute him and the learned Special Judge had not appreciated the evidence in its proper perspective. Further, the Judgment awarding conviction is based on surmises and conjecture and hence, the same is liable to be suspended during the pendency of the appeal. After taking into consideration the relevant facts of the case and the law involved, the Bombay High Court declined to suspend the conviction merely because the appellant intended to contest the election. 28. As noted above, Mr. Singh, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, has placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Navjot Singh (supra), but in that case, the facts were quite different. In that case, the appellant was a sitting M.P. and he could have continued as M.P. even after his conviction and sentence in view of Section 8(4) of the Act. However, he resigned and expressed his desire to contest the election. As a matter of fact, that was a case where the trial court had acquitted Navjot Singh Sidhu and in appeal against acquittal he was convicted under Section 304 Part-II IPC. However, he resigned and expressed his desire to contest the election. As a matter of fact, that was a case where the trial court had acquitted Navjot Singh Sidhu and in appeal against acquittal he was convicted under Section 304 Part-II IPC. Taking into consideration high moral standard set by Navjot Singh Sidhu, the Supreme Court granted stay of the order of conviction in that case. 29. In the present application, the ground on which the appellant seeks suspension of conviction is that he intends to contest the ongoing election of the Bihar Legislative Assembly. In view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court and different High Courts in the decisions, as discussed hereinabove, I am not inclined to suspend the conviction of the appellant merely to enable him to contest the election. Accordingly, Cr. I.A. No. 1576 of 2015 is dismissed. 30. I make it clear that I have not expressed any opinion on the merit of the case. The observations made in this order are only made for the purpose of disposal of Cr. I.A. No. 1576 of 2015. 31. Let the hearing of the appeal be expedited.