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2015 DIGILAW 1349 (RAJ)

Jagmal Singh v. State of Rajasthan

2015-07-21

NIRMALJIT KAUR

body2015
ORDER : The petitioner herein has challenged the Order dated 27.07.1999 withholding 100% pension of the petitioner in pursuance to the report of the Enquiry Officer holding 27 charges as proved against him. The petitioner was appointed as Lower Division Clerk with the respondent department on 13.06.1960. He was promoted to the post of Inspector on 27.10.1960 and subsequently to the posts of Naib Tehsildar and Tehsildar on 06.01.1963 and 03.01.1976, respectively. Thereafter, the petitioner was granted Junior Scale of Rajasthan Administrative Services on 01.07.1986 and later on, was promoted to Senior Scale of Rajasthan Administrative Services w.e.f. 16.02.1992. However, he was placed under suspension on 05.11.1992 but no charge-sheet was served upon him for almost 06 months. Accordingly, he was reinstated in service on 31.07.1993 and superannuated on the same day i.e. 31.07.1993. After his retirement, a notice was issued to him on 30.08.1993 asking him to file reply to the charge-sheet which is purported to have been sent on 30.07.1993. The petitioner immediately vide his letter dated 10.09.1993, responded to the notice by stating therein that he has not received the charge-sheet. Hence, another charge-sheet was handed over to him on 13.10.1993. The petitioner duly submitted his reply to the charge-sheet. The Enquiry Officer held him guilty of all the 27 charges vide his enquiry report. Thereafter, the State Government vide Notice dated 11.09.1998 asked the petitioner to submit his representation which he duly submitted on 06.10.1998. However, his representation was rejected and the respondent authorities passed an Order dated 27.07.1999 withholding the entire pension of the petitioner. While praying for setting aside the impugned Order dated 27.07.1999, some of the arguments raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner are as under:- (A) The petitioner having superannuated from the Government service on 31.07.1993, no enquiry could have been initiated against him as he ceased to be a Government Servant as defined in the Rule 2(e) of the Rajasthan Civil Service (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1958 (for short the Rules of 1958). As per the Rule 2(e) of the Rules of 1958, the Government Servant does not include a person who had already superannuated from the government service. As per the Rule 2(e) of the Rules of 1958, the Government Servant does not include a person who had already superannuated from the government service. The only provision which permitted the State Government to continue with an enquiry against the government servant was Rule 170 of the Rajasthan Service Rules, 1951 (for short the Rules of 1951) and under the Rule 170 of the Rules of 1951, the only punishment that could have been imposed was for recovery of the loss alleged to have been caused by such government servant to the Government. Under the Rule 170 of the Rules of 1951, such an order of recovery cannot be passed, unless a notice under that rule is given to the petitioner by the Governor proposing to withhold the pension. Thus, the petitioner was governed under Rule 170 of the Rules of 1951 only. However, neither of the provisions of Rule 170 of the Rules of 1951 have been complied with, which require a notice under Rule 170 by the Governor and moreover, the loss has also to be quantified. In the present case, the loss has not been quantified. Hence, the order of withholding the entire pension was unreasonable and without jurisdiction. Further, order of punishment cannot be passed under the Rules of 1996 as the enquiry was initiated much prior to the coming of the rules. (B) It was further submitted that enquiry has been conducted against the petitioner by breaching the principles of natural justice. The copies of all the relied upon documents were not made available to the petitioner, although, the petitioner was permitted to inspect the same. Although, the petitioner admitted the passing of the orders by him, unless the copies were made available to the petitioner, he could not effectively defend the enquiry. (C) That the petitioner discharged his quasi judicial/judicial functions while disposing of the application for allotment, granting khatedari rights etc. No allegations of bad faith or corrupt motive was made in the charge-sheet issued to the petitioner. In absence of allegations of bad faith or corrupt motive in the charge-sheet, the petitioner cannot be said to have committed any misconduct. (C) That the petitioner discharged his quasi judicial/judicial functions while disposing of the application for allotment, granting khatedari rights etc. No allegations of bad faith or corrupt motive was made in the charge-sheet issued to the petitioner. In absence of allegations of bad faith or corrupt motive in the charge-sheet, the petitioner cannot be said to have committed any misconduct. Assuming without admitting that the orders passed in the 27 charges were erroneous or for that matter not in accordance with law, the remedy of appeal, revision or reference was available to the aggrieved party but the orders passed by the petitioner were not challenged before any competent forum. Thus, the orders have attained finality and could not have been made subject matter of the departmental enquiry. There is not an iota of evidence that the petitioner passed these orders on corrupt motives. (D) The State Government passed the impugned order without examining the record. Under Sub-Rule 9 of Rule 16 of the Rules of 1958, it is the bounden duty of the State Government to record the findings on each charge. However, in the present case, evidence produced by the parties have not been referred to by the State Government and straightway, conclusions have been arrived at by the State Government. The State Government has passed the said order without application of mind and without taking the representation, the record and the evidence into consideration. (E) It was further contended that in relation to Charge Nos. 1, 3, 4, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 17, 19, 21, 22, 26 & 27, the State Government has travelled beyond the scope of the charge and has recorded a finding without any evidence and material. The petitioner has been charged of causing unlawful gain to himself as well as the applicants but no such charge was ever leveled against the petitioner. Not only this, the finding has been recorded by the State Government holding the petitioner guilty of bad faith whereas neither any charge was levelled against the petitioner nor any evidence has been led by the State Government to substantiate this charge. Further, the entire disciplinary action taken against the petitioner is vitiated for the reason that the charges Nos. Not only this, the finding has been recorded by the State Government holding the petitioner guilty of bad faith whereas neither any charge was levelled against the petitioner nor any evidence has been led by the State Government to substantiate this charge. Further, the entire disciplinary action taken against the petitioner is vitiated for the reason that the charges Nos. 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26 & 27 have been sought to be proved by producing the concerned Tehsildars. The petitioner had passed the orders in most of these cases on the basis of the report submitted by the concerned Tehsildar. Under such circumstances, if the report of the Tehsildar is challenged by the State Government then the action was required to be taken against the Tehsildar and not the petitioner but in a totally unusual manner, the charge against the petitioner is sought to be proved by the evidence of the concerned Tehsildar. Although, the petitioner submitted that none of the concerned Tehsildars who have appeared as witnesses have stated that the orders passed by the petitioner were not in accordance with law. Under such circumstances, holding the petitioner guilty of the charge on the basis of this type of evidence is absolutely illegal and unwarranted. Reply has been filed. As per one of the preliminary objections in the reply, the writ petition ought to be dismissed on the ground of availability of alternative remedy. The petitioner had the remedy of review under Rule 33 before the State Government and thereafter, a further review under Rule 34 of the Rules of 1958 before His Excellency the Governor. As per the reply and the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents, it was contended that Charge Nos. 3, 5, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 & 17 were proved beyond any doubt not only by the Enquiry Officer but also by the appellant/disciplinary authority. The Enquiry Officer after taking into consideration the material available on record and the written statement submitted by the petitioner, submitted his report. Secondly, the charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner through registered post on 28.07.1993 and a memorandum of charges was also issued on the very day. The petitioner was superannuated on 31.07.1993 and as such, he was in service at the time of issuance of charge-sheet. Secondly, the charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner through registered post on 28.07.1993 and a memorandum of charges was also issued on the very day. The petitioner was superannuated on 31.07.1993 and as such, he was in service at the time of issuance of charge-sheet. Hence, the averments raised by the petitioner that enquiry could be held only under Rule 170 of the Rules of 1951 are not tenable. It was further contended that the jurisdiction of this Court is circumscribed by limits of judicial review to correct errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice. Judicial review is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an appellant authority. Further, this Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence and substitute its own findings. This Court while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. A bare perusal of the enquiry officer's report, in which the petitioner has fully participated and the order of the disciplinary authority would go to show that the order passed by them are very detailed, well considered and well reasoned verdict. The conclusion arrived at by the disciplinary authority are exhaustive in nature incorporating the correct and relevant facts of the case and conclusion based on the appreciation of the evidence on record and supported by legally irrefutable reasons. Learned counsel for the parties were heard at length. The conclusion arrived at by the disciplinary authority are exhaustive in nature incorporating the correct and relevant facts of the case and conclusion based on the appreciation of the evidence on record and supported by legally irrefutable reasons. Learned counsel for the parties were heard at length. Taking up the preliminary objection raised by the respondents with respect to the alternative remedy of review under Rule 33 before the State Government and thereafter, a further remedy of review under Rule 34 of the Rules of 1958 before His Excellency the Governor, it would be relevant to reproduce the short judgment passed by the Apex Court in the case of V. Vellaswamy vs. Inspector General of Police, Tamil Nadu, Madras and Another, AIR 1982 SC 82 vide which the order of the High Court dismissing the writ petition on the ground of alternative remedy was set aside and the matter was remanded back to the High Court to decide the writ petition on merits by holding as under:- “The only point that survives for consideration at this stage is whether the High Court was right in dismissing the writ petition on the only ground that there was an alternative remedy, namely, that a review petition could have been filed before the Government under Rule 15-A of the Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955. May be, there was considerable substance in this view under Article 226 of the Constitution as amended by the Forty second Constitution (Amendment) Act. But Article 226 has undergone a further amendment. As the article now stands, it would be a serious question whether a right to review a proceeding by itself would provide such alternative efficacious remedy to disentitle a petitioner to move the High Court under Article 226. We think it would be rather harsh.” Moreover, this Court cannot loose sight of the fact that the writ petition was admitted way back on 22.02.2000. To send the petitioner at this stage after almost 15 years to file a review petition under Rule 33 of the Rules of 1958 would be highly unjust and unfair specially when the review is not the same thing as the statutory appeal. In the circumstances, this Court is of the opinion that the alternative remedy of review is not a bar for filing the present writ petition. Learned counsel for the respondents raised yet another objection. In the circumstances, this Court is of the opinion that the alternative remedy of review is not a bar for filing the present writ petition. Learned counsel for the respondents raised yet another objection. It was contended that the judicial review is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an appellate authority. Reliance was also placed on the judgments rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. vs. Ashok Kumar, 1997 (3) SCC 72 , Tara Chand Vyas vs. Chairman Disciplinary Authority, H.N.E. 1997 (4) SCC 565 , UPSRTC and Others vs. Har Narain Singh and Others, 1998 (7) JT 437 and B.C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India, 1995 (5) SLR 778 wherein it is held that the High Court cannot sit as an appellate court to re-appreciate the evidence recorded before the Disciplinary Authority and cannot judicially review the matter while exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Further, the Apex Court in the case of State of U.P. vs. Nand Kishore Shukla, 1996 (3) SC 242 has held that Court is not a Court of appeal to go into the question of imposition of punishment or its proportionality. Even if one of the charges was proved and sufficient for imposition of penalty, the Court would be loath to interfere with the part of order. The Apex Court in the case of Anil Kumar vs. Presiding Officer and Others, (1985) 3 SCC 378 set aside the findings of the enquiry report while holding that the reasoned report was essential more so when the enquiry resulted in loss of livelihood or attached stigma. Para 6 of the said judgment is relevant which reads thus:- “6. Where a disciplinary enquiry affects the livelihood and is likely to cast a stigma and it has to be held in accordance with the principles of natural justice, the minimum expectation is that the report must be a reasoned one. The Court then may not enter into the adequacy or sufficiency of evidence. But where the evidence is annexed to an order sheet and no correlation is established between the two showing application of mind, we are constrained to observe that it is not an enquiry report at all. The Court then may not enter into the adequacy or sufficiency of evidence. But where the evidence is annexed to an order sheet and no correlation is established between the two showing application of mind, we are constrained to observe that it is not an enquiry report at all. Therefore, there was no enquiry in this case worth the name and the order of termination based on such proceeding disclosing non-application of mind would be unsustainable.” Similarly, the Apex Court in the case of Kashinath Dikshita vs. Union of India and Others, (1986) 3 SCC 229 set aside the enquiry on the ground that the same was vitiated because the appellant in that case was refused the relevant portions of the documents extracted with the help of a stenographer. The Apex Court in the case of Roop Singh Negi vs. Punjab National Bank and Others, (2009) 2 SCC 570 too held the enquiry report to be bad as it was based on conjectures and surmises. Moreover, it is own case of the State that jurisdiction of the Court extends to judicial review for correcting errors of law and procedural errors which lead to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice. In the present case, the petitioner has specifically pleaded denial of opportunity and violation of natural justice and therefore, this Court proceeds to decide. Coming to the first argument that the petitioner is not a government employee as envisaged under Rule 2(e) of the Rules of 1958 as he stood superannuated on 31.07.1993 does not help him in any way. The charge-sheet is dated 28.07.1993. It was sent to the petitioner on 30.07.1993. On the said date, the petitioner was still in service and hence, was a government servant. The argument that he did not receive the charge-sheet is refuted by the learned counsel for the respondents who is stated to have pasted the same on the house of the petitioner as he was not available and a copy of the same was also offered to his family members who showed their inability to accept the same. The Letter of the District Collector, Bikaner dated 30.07.1993 enclosed with the report regarding refusal by the family members of the petitioner and the report regarding pasting of the charge-sheet on the house of the petitioner has been placed on record as Annexure-R/2. The Letter of the District Collector, Bikaner dated 30.07.1993 enclosed with the report regarding refusal by the family members of the petitioner and the report regarding pasting of the charge-sheet on the house of the petitioner has been placed on record as Annexure-R/2. This Court has no reason to disbelieve the same. As such, the petitioner was still in service and a government servant on the day the charge-sheet was issued. In these circumstances, the argument that the enquiry could be held only under Rule 170 is not tenable. The next argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that copies of the documents were not made available to the petitioner, although, he was allowed to inspect them, has resulted in the breach of natural justice and vitiated the enquiry, has been effectively contradicted by the learned counsel for the respondents. It is pointed out that the petitioner was allowed to inspect the entire record. After inspection, the petitioner had specifically given in writing on 17.12.1993 that he has inspected the record and shall be submitting his reply. There was no request or demand for supply of any document by the petitioner. Moreover, it is evident from the petition as well as synopsis on record that the petitioner moved the application for production of copies of certain documents for the first time on 12.08.1999 and 07.10.1999 i.e. after passing of the order impugned by the disciplinary authority. Therefore, the petitioner cannot complain that the documents were not supplied to him for the purpose of filing his reply before the enquiry officer or his representation before the appellate authority. However, this Court finds much merit in the argument that no finding can be recorded qua on allegation for which no charge has been framed. It is not disputed by the respondents that the said orders were quasi judicial orders passed by the petitioner while allotting, granting khatedari rights etc. An enquiry was initiated with respect to the orders passed by the petitioner while discharging his quasi judicial functions. The various charges in short are as under:- “Charge No. 1 - That the case of State vs. Banarsi Das was dismissed in default by the petitioner on 31.07.1990 & on 04.10.1990. An enquiry was initiated with respect to the orders passed by the petitioner while discharging his quasi judicial functions. The various charges in short are as under:- “Charge No. 1 - That the case of State vs. Banarsi Das was dismissed in default by the petitioner on 31.07.1990 & on 04.10.1990. Thereafter, on the application of the claimant, the land was allotted wrongfully under Rule 13(5)(b) of the Rajasthan Colonization (Allotment & Sale of Government Land in Indira Gandhi Nahar Pariyojana) Rules, 1975. Further, the land was allotted on reserved price instead of market price in violation of the notification dated 09.09.1986. Hence, he passed the orders against the instructions, caused loss to the State and misused his authority. Charge No. 2 - That the order of the petitioner dated 03.12.1990 is illegal as being contrary to Rules. The application of applicant for granting of khatedari rights was rejected on 08.10.1990 but thereafter, the review application was allowed on 03.12.1990 reviewing the Order dated 08.10.1990. Hence, he passed the orders against the instructions and misused his authority. Charge No. 3 - That vide order dated 06.04.1991, the petitioner allotted 24 bighas of land as well as a patch of 2 bighas of land to one Sh. Manoharlal who was in possession of land as trespasser. The petitioner charged reserve price instead of market value in violation of the order of the State Government dated 09.09.1986. Hence, he caused loss to the State and misused his authority. Charge No. 4 - That the Case No. 237 of 1986 was ordered to proceed ex-parte on 06.12.1990, however, after the applicant was present, the allotment was made in his favour on 06.04.1991. The land was supposed to be allotted on market rate as the father of the applicant was holding the land as trespasser, however, it was allotted on reserved price in violation of the notification dated 09.09.1986. Hence, he caused loss to the State and misused his authority. Charge No. 5 - That despite the fact that the application for grant of khatedari rights was moved only by Kashi Ram S/o Ladhu Ram, the petitioner in his order dated 27.10.1990 conferred khatedari rights on Keshar widow of Ladhu Ram, Kashi Ram S/o Ladhu Ram and six married daughters of Ladhu Ram so that the land may not become surplus. Land was allotted to Ladhuram as temporary cultivation lease holder so married daughters are not eligible for grant of khatedari rights over such land. Hence, he passed the orders against the instructions and misused his authority. Charge No. 6 - That the petitioner illegally decided the Case No. 19 of 1990 and allotted 25 bighas of uncommand land to Har Lal as an adult son of Dungar, in spite of the fact that the applicant was occupying the land as trespasser. Further, reserved price was charged instead of prevailing market price. Hence, he passed the orders against the rules and misused his authority. Charge No. 7 - That this charge has been proved by the Enquiry Officer but the finding has not been accepted by the disciplinary authority. Charge No. 8 - That the Case No. 85/86 of Nandlal is alleged to have been decided illegally. As alleged, the petitioner illegally clubbed the file No. 156/87 with 85/86 on the request of applicant Chetram S/o Nandlal who did not show to be his son. Vide Order dated 24.09.1990, petitioner made an irregular allotment of 25 bighas to Nandlal although Nandlal was holding 4/4 bighas of land and was not entitled to allotment. The petitioner did not verify the photographs of Nandlal which were of different persons. Further, the land was allotted on reserve price instead of market price. Hence, he passed the orders against the rules and misused his authority. Charge No. 9 - That in the Case No. 16/90 of Bholaram S/o Jamnaram with connected case No. 1/90, the petitioner vide Order dated 07.08.1990, rejected the application of the applicant for allotment of land on the ground that applicant has sold the land prior to allotment. This order was made on the basis of an agreement entered into between Bholaram and Jaskaran Singh, however, by treating the same agreement to be illegal the allotment proceedings were undertaken. Hence, he misused his authority. Charge No. 10 - That in the Case No. 428/87 of State vs. Foza Singh, the petitioner vide Order dated 13.02.1991 allotted the land to the applicant in spite of the fact that there was stay order in the revision petition filed by the applicant before the Hon'ble High Court on 19.12.1990 against the dismissal of the application of the applicant in default on 16.01.1990 by the Revenue Board. The order of the Board of Revenue as well as the stay order of the Hon'ble High Court was not available in the file of Sub Divisional Officer's office. Also, the application was rejected once prior to its grantings. Hence, he misused his authority. Charge No. 11 - That the petitioner in breach of principles of natural justice and in violation of the law, first, cancelled the allotment on 03.09.1990 on the ground that application for allotment was moved by the advocate of the applicant not personally by him. Moreover, the order of cancellation was served on the counsel instead of the applicant. Further, on appearance of the applicant himself, the allotment was restored on 27.11.1990, however, no enquiry was made by the petitioner while the cancellation of application for allotment and while its restoration. Hence, he passed the orders against the rules and misused his authority. Charge No. 12 - That the petitioner after having appointed Tehsildar as receiver in an ex-parte proceedings, recorded the order of appointment of receiver on the appearance of the applicant in Case No. 25/87. The petitioner further consigned the file to record without there being authority to do so. Hence, he misused his authority. Charge No. 13 - That the petitioner acting beyond his jurisdiction, cancelled the allotment which was already restored by the Revenue Appellate Authority in Case No. 465/87 of State vs. Gurdut Singh. Hence, he passed orders beyond the jurisdiction and misused his authority. Charge No. 14 - That the petitioner ordered ex-parte proceedings against the applicant without serving any notice upon him in Case No. 15/86 of Ramswaroop vs. Thakar Ram. Hence, he misused his authority. Charge No. 15 - That the petitioner in Case No. 20/86 of Major Singh illegally dismissed the application in default without getting the notices served. Hence, he passed the orders against the rules and misused his authority. Charge No. 16 - That this charge has not been found to be proved by the State Government. Charge No. 17 - That the petitioner on receiving of a complaint of illegal allotment in case Nos. 256/87, 248/87, 250/87 and 259/87, first made an order of appointment of receiver but later on, on 25.09.1990 illegally rejected the complaint considering as baseless. Hence, he passed the orders while ignoring the rules and misused his authority. Charge No. 17 - That the petitioner on receiving of a complaint of illegal allotment in case Nos. 256/87, 248/87, 250/87 and 259/87, first made an order of appointment of receiver but later on, on 25.09.1990 illegally rejected the complaint considering as baseless. Hence, he passed the orders while ignoring the rules and misused his authority. Charge No. 18 - That the applicant on 30.08.1988 applied only for one bigha of land, however, the petitioner vide his Order dated 18.02.1991 allotted five bighas of command and uncommand land to him. Moreover, the land allotted belonged to the Forest Department. Hence, he misused his authority. Charge No. 19 - That the petitioner made an illegal allotment in Case No. 20/91 of 09 bighas and 04 biswas of land vide Order dated 18.02.1991 by way of a small patch. Initially, the land was sought in Murabba No. 101/40 but subsequently, it was made as 102/40, however, along with the report of the Patwari, the plan shows the land as Murabba No. 101/40 which is of the Forest Department. Hence, he caused loss to the State and misused his authority. Charge No. 20 - That the petitioner passed an illegal Order dated 20.03.1991 of allotment of small patch of land in Case No. 32/91 which has been shown as land of Forest Department in the letter of Assistant Commissioner, Anoopgarh which was addressed to the petitioner dated 27.07.1989. Further, the total land in Murabba No. 101/38 in Chak No. 10 MD was 25 bighas, hence, a piece could not be allotted out of that land as a small patch. Hence, he passed the orders against the rules causing loss to the State and misused his authority. Charge No. 21 - That the applicant was allotted 12 bighas 10 biswas of land on 20.11.1976 but he could not acquire the possession as the same was in the possession of Forest Department. The file was called from the record room. Applicant was heard and the file was pursued. The Assistant Conservator of the Forest, Anoopgarh vide his letter informed to the S.D.O. Raisinghnagar that the land allotted to Bhera Ram was in the possession of Forest Department, on which a nursery and a colony was constructed so the land be allotted to the Forest Department and Bhera Ram be allotted another land. Thereafter, 25 bighas of land was allotted to Bhera Ram by the petitioner. Thereafter, 25 bighas of land was allotted to Bhera Ram by the petitioner. It is alleged that the land was allotted in absence of any application of Bhera Ram to this effect. It is further alleged that the letter of Assistant Conservator of Forest, Anoopgarh appears to be forged one. Further, as per the letter of Assistant Collector, Anoopgarh, no land of Chak No. 2 ND is of the Forest Department, however, the land allotted to Bhera Ram on 24.06.1991 pertains to the Forest Department. Hence, he misused his authority. Charge No. 22 - That the petitioner by wrongly recording that the file has been sent to him for allotment of land measuring 25 bighas, made an illegal allotment in Case No. 23/91 vide Order dated 24.06.1991. Further, the land allotted was already under the ownership of another person and it was allotted illegally as the cancellation of the prior allotment was not done. Moreover, the person to whom the petitioner allotted 12 bighas and 10 biswas of land was already allotted 15 bighas of land by the Additional Colonization Commissioner. Hence, he passed the orders against the rules and misused his authority. Charge No. 23 - That the charge states that the petitioner misusing his post has illegally allotted a small patch of land in Case No. 74/91 vide Order dated 25.07.1991. Hence, he misused his authority. Charge No. 24 - That the petitioner passed illegal orders in the Case Nos. 75/91, 76/91, 71/91, 72/91, 77/91, 73/91 and 70/91 by making allotment of land out of the land of the Forest Department as small patch of land. It is further alleged that the land allotted was not a small patch of land but actually was excluded small pieces of land from the entire murabba of 25 bigha. Hence, he passed the orders against the rules causing loss to the State and misused his authority. Charge No. 25 - That the petitioner illegally allotted 05 bighas of uncommand land in Case No. 83/91 which belonged to the Forest Department. Moreover, the petitioner did not follow Rules 8 and 9 of the Rules of 1975. Hence, he passed the orders without following the rules and misused his authority. Charge No. 26 - That the petitioner illegally allotted the land of the Forest Department to Ladhu Ram S/o Sheo Karan Mirasi on 16.08.1991 for which he was not authorized. Moreover, the petitioner did not follow Rules 8 and 9 of the Rules of 1975. Hence, he passed the orders without following the rules and misused his authority. Charge No. 26 - That the petitioner illegally allotted the land of the Forest Department to Ladhu Ram S/o Sheo Karan Mirasi on 16.08.1991 for which he was not authorized. Hence, he passed the orders against the rules causing loss to the State and misused his authority. Charge No. 27 - That the petitioner has illegally allotted 25 bighas of land in case No. 675/82 which actually belonged to the Forest Department vide his Order dated 23.08.1991. Hence, he passed the orders against the rules causing loss to the State and misused his authority.” While making charge-wise submissions and challenging the enquiry report, it was submitted:- (i) The findings of the Enquiry Officer and the State Government on Charge No. 1 were illegal inasmuch as Rules of 1975 do not prohibit allotment of land to adult son in the event of land earlier allotted on temporary basis to his father and the notification dated 09.09.1986 did not apply to the allotment of land to adult son. (ii) With respect to the Charge No. 2, it was stated that Khatedari rights were given in order with the law as the land for which the khatedari rights were claimed was not more than 46 bighas. (iii) With respect to the Charge No. 3, once again it was submitted that the Circular dated 09.09.1986 did not apply to the allotment of land to the adult son and therefore, no question can be raised regarding charging of the market price of the land. (iv) Similarly, it was stated so with respect to the Charge Nos. 4 & 6 as well. (v) The findings on the Charge No. 5 were stated to be incorrect as under the Hindu Succession Act, married daughters of a male dying intestate are entitled to the property of their father. (vi) The Charge No. 7 was of course not accepted by the disciplinary authority. (vii) The findings on Charge No. 8 were said to be wrongly recorded. Nandlal had only 4 bighas & 4 biswas of land at the time of the allotment and 414 bighas of land has wrongly been noticed. The allegation that there are two different photographs of Nandlal, is not proved by the Department. (vii) The findings on Charge No. 8 were said to be wrongly recorded. Nandlal had only 4 bighas & 4 biswas of land at the time of the allotment and 414 bighas of land has wrongly been noticed. The allegation that there are two different photographs of Nandlal, is not proved by the Department. (viii) Similarly, the findings of the Enquiry Officer on Charge No. 9 have also been challenged on the ground that the authority has gone beyond the charge by recording that the allotment was made for causing gain to the allottee without there being any such charge against the petitioner. (ix) The findings on the Charge Nos. 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 & 17 have also been challenged on similar grounds. (x) With respect to the Charge Nos. 18 to 27 that the land of the Forest Department has wrongly been allotted, it was contended that no notification or allotment order of the competent authority vesting the land in the forest department has been produced on the record. Unless a land is notified to be a forest land or it is allotted by the competent authority to the forest department, it cannot be said that such land is a forest land. Under such circumstances, the findings of the enquiry officer that the petitioner has allotted forest land is based on no evidence. A perusal of all the charges show that the only allegation which is common to all is that while passing these orders, the petitioner acted beyond his jurisdiction and they were passed in violation of the rules/administrative instructions which was a misuse of his official capacity resulting in illegal allotments. There was no allegation and no charge that the said orders were passed either for illegal gratification or with mala-fide intention and nor is there any allegation of corruption. The petitioner duly filed his reply to the charge-sheet bringing to the notice that the allotments were rightfully done and on the basis of the reports produced before him. In spite of the same, a finding has been recorded with respect to the various charges that the petitioner allotted the land in haste and with mala-fide intention causing loss to the State. Thus, the Enquiry Officer has proceeded to record the said findings without any such charge having been framed against him, which is against the principles of natural justice. Thus, the Enquiry Officer has proceeded to record the said findings without any such charge having been framed against him, which is against the principles of natural justice. While relying on the judgment rendered in the case of Narinder Mohan Arya vs. United India Insurance Co. Limited, (2006) 4 SCC 713 , the Apex Court in the case of Roop Singh Negi vs. Punjab National Bank and Others (supra) allowed the appeal of the appellant with costs and reversed the decision of the High Court by holding that in a departmental enquiry, suspicion, howsoever high, cannot be a substitute for a legal proof and has to be conducted according to the principles of natural justice. In Narinder Mohan Arya vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and Others (supra), which both the learned counsel relied upon, the Apex Court held:- “26. In our opinion the learned Single Judge and consequently the Division Bench of the High Court did not pose unto themselves the correct question. The matter can be viewed from two angles. Despite limited jurisdiction a civil court, it was entitled to interfere in a case where the report of the Enquiry Officer is based on no evidence. In a suit filed by a delinquent employee in a civil court as also a writ court, in the event the findings arrived at in the departmental proceedings are questioned before it should keep in mind the following:- (1) The enquiry officer is not permitted to collect any material from outside sources during the conduct of the enquiry. State of Assam and Another vs. Mahendra Kumar Das and Others, (1970) 1 SCC 709 . (2) In a domestic enquiry fairness in the procedure is a part of the principles of natural justice Khem Chand vs. Union of India and Others, 1958 SCR 1080 and State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Om Prakash Gupta, (1969) 3 SCC 775 . (3) Exercise of discretionary power involve two elements (i) Objective and (ii) subjective and existence of the exercise of an objective element is a condition precedent for exercise of the subjective element. K.L. Tripathi vs. State of Bank of India and Others, (1984) 1 SCC 43 . (4) It is not possible to lay down any rigid rules of the principles of natural justice which depends on the facts and circumstances of each case but the concept of fair play in action is the basis. K.L. Tripathi vs. State of Bank of India and Others, (1984) 1 SCC 43 . (4) It is not possible to lay down any rigid rules of the principles of natural justice which depends on the facts and circumstances of each case but the concept of fair play in action is the basis. Sawai Singh vs. State of Rajasthan, (1986) 3 SCC 454 . (5) The enquiry officer is not permitted to travel beyond the charges and any punishment imposed on the basis of a finding which was not the subject matter of the charges is wholly illegal. Director (Inspection & quality Control) Export Inspection Council of India and Others vs. Kalyan Kumar Mitra and Others, 1987 (2) Cal. LJ 344. (6) Suspicion or presumption cannot take the place of proof even in a domestic enquiry. The writ court is entitled to interfere with the findings of the fact of any tribunal or authority in certain circumstances. Central Bank of India Ltd. vs. Prakash Chand Jain, (1969) 1 SCR 735 and Kuldeep Singh vs. Commissioner of Police and Others, (1999) 2 SCC 10 .” The Apex Court while relying on the judgment rendered in the case of Surath Chandra Chakrabarty vs. State of West Bengal, AIR 1971 SC 752 held in the case of Shri Anant R. Kulkarni vs. Y.P. Education Society and Others, Civil Appeal No. 3935 of 2013 decided on 26.04.2013 that the enquiry is vitiated in case, the charges are vague and are not specific. Para 9 and 10 of the said judgment read thus:- “9. In Surath Chandra Chakravarty vs. State of West Bengal, AIR 1971 SC 752 this Court held, that it is not permissible to hold an enquiry on vague charges, as the same do not give a clear picture to the delinquent to make out an effective defence as he will be unaware of the exact nature of the allegations against him and what kind of defence he should put up for rebuttal thereof. The Court observed as under:- “The grounds on which it is proposed to take action have to be reduced to the form of a definite charge or charges which have to be communicated to the person charged together with a statement of the allegations on which each charge is based and any other circumstance which it is proposed to be taken into consideration in passing orders has to be stated. This rule embodies a principle which is one of the specific contents of a reasonable or adequate opportunity for defending oneself. If a person is not told clearly and definitely what the allegations are on which the charges preferred against him are founded, he cannot possibly, by projecting his own imagination, discover all the facts and circumstances that may be in the contemplation of the authorities to be established against him.” (Emphasis added) 10. Where the charge-sheet is accompanied by the statement of facts and the allegations are not specific in the charge-sheet, but are crystal clear from the statement of facts, in such a situation, as both constitute the same document, it cannot be held that as the charges were not specific, definite and clear, the enquiry stood vitiated. Thus, nowhere should a delinquent be served a charge-sheet, without providing to him, a clear, specific and definite description of the charge against him. When statement of allegations are not served with the charge-sheet, the enquiry stands vitiated, as having been conducted in violation of the principles of natural justice. Evidence adduced should not be perfunctory, even if the delinquent does not take the defence of, or make a protest with against that the charges are vague, that does not save the enquiry from being vitiated, for the reason that there must be fair-play in action, particularly in respect of an order involving adverse or penal consequences. What is required to be examined is whether the delinquent knew the nature of accusation. What is required to be examined is whether the delinquent knew the nature of accusation. The charges should be specific, definite and giving details of the incident which formed the basis of charges and no enquiry can be sustained on vague charges.” Similarly, the learned Single Bench of this Court in the case of Govind Sahai Bhardwaj vs. State of Rajasthan and Others, Civil Writ Petition No. 3965 of 1996 decided on 20.09.2004 while relying on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar vs. Union of India, AIR 1999 SC 2881 set aside the order of termination on the ground that there was no allegation against the petitioner that while adjudicating the application under Section 144 CPC, the petitioner was having any connivance with the applicant or he adopted any corrupt practice as under:- “The main contention of the counsel for the petitioner is that the allegation No. 1 is misconceived as the petitioner while adjudicating the application under Section 144 CPC was exercising quasi-judicial powers. Any error while deciding an application in quasi judicial jurisdiction if same is not an outcome of mala-fides or is not having mensrea then the same does not constitute any misconduct. To support the contention the counsel for the petitioner relied upon a judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar vs. Union of India, AIR 1999 SC 2881 . Hon'ble Supreme Court while adjudicating the same question pleased to hold as under:- “If, every error of law were to constitute a charge of misconduct, it would impinge upon the independent functioning of quasi judicial officers like the appellant. Since in sum and substance misconduct is sought to be inferred by the appellant having committed an error of law, the charge-sheet on the face of it does not proceed on legal premise rendering it liable to be quashed. In other words, to maintain any charge-sheet against a quasi judicial authority something more has to be alleged than a mere mistake of law, e.g. in the nature of some extraneous consideration influencing the quasi judicial order. Since nothing of the sort is alleged herein the impugned charge-sheet is rendered illegal. The charge-sheet, if sustained, with thus impinge upon the confidence and independent functioning of a quasi judicial authority. Since nothing of the sort is alleged herein the impugned charge-sheet is rendered illegal. The charge-sheet, if sustained, with thus impinge upon the confidence and independent functioning of a quasi judicial authority. The entire system of administrative adjudication whereunder quasi judicial powers are conferred on administrative authorities, would fall into disrepute if officers performing such functions are inhibited in performing their functions without fear or favour because of the constant threat of disciplinary proceedings. From the perusal of allegation in the present case it is apparent that at the most petitioner can be termed to be guilty of committing a judicial error. Such an error by no stretch of imagination can be alleged as a misconduct under the Conduct Rules of 1971 or in any other rules if not otherwise prescribed. It is relevant to mention here that there is no allegation against the petitioner that while adjudicating the application under Section 144 CPC the petitioner was having any connivance with the applicant or he adopted any corrupt practice. Infact the adjudication of the application under Section 144 CPC is a judicial act and, therefore, any person aggrieved may approach to the competent judicial forum to assail validity of such an order. Such kind of action as taken by the petitioner at the most may be a judicial error but not a misconduct.” In the present case, the allegation was that the petitioner has passed the orders of allotment illegally by misusing his authority and in violation of the instructions. The correctness of the orders passed by the petitioner has been questioned here in a departmental enquiry without availing the remedy of appeal and revision against such orders, whereas, even a correct order can be passed with ulterior motive. Hence, it is necessary to frame the charge of ulterior motive etc. before concluding that it has been passed with wrong intention. A wrong order in itself cannot be held as passed with ulterior motive. There was no such charge against the petitioner regarding his integrity, embezzlement or misappropriation. Thus, he had no opportunity to defend himself. If a delinquent employee is not clear about the charges against him, he cannot possibly imagine the same against himself. Hence, he cannot properly defend himself. Therefore, order impugned deserves to be quashed on this ground alone. There was no such charge against the petitioner regarding his integrity, embezzlement or misappropriation. Thus, he had no opportunity to defend himself. If a delinquent employee is not clear about the charges against him, he cannot possibly imagine the same against himself. Hence, he cannot properly defend himself. Therefore, order impugned deserves to be quashed on this ground alone. As already noticed above, in the absence of any specific charge that the petitioner acted in a mala-fide manner or for illegal gratification, there was no evidence led from either side either to prove or defend the said charge. It amounts to denial of reasonable opportunity to defend himself. To conclude otherwise in absence of any such charge or evidence is unjust, unfair, arbitrary and against the principles of natural justice. No evidence worth the name that the same was on account of mala-fides or for illegal gratification or he adopted corrupt practice was produced. Therefore, a finding that the said actions were mala-fide cannot be sustained. The findings of the enquiry become more doubtful in the face of the admitted fact that no appeal or revision was filed against the orders passed by the petitioner in his official capacity. All the orders passed by the petitioner, which were subject matter of the charges, are either appealable or revisable. However, the department has never challenged the same till date. Under these circumstances, the said quasi judicial orders attained finality. There being no allegation of corrupt motive against the petitioner, the entire disciplinary action for passing the orders was, therefore, not called for. In view of the well settled proposition of law, it is impossible for this Court to take any other view. There is not an iota of evidence of mala-fide or extraneous consideration against the petitioner. Therefore, to pass an order of withholding the entire pension for having passed the orders while exercising his quasi judicial orders without the charge of having passed them with ulterior or mala-fide motive is not only a dangerous trend but shall put fear in the mind of an officer not to act without favour or fear. Therefore, to pass an order of withholding the entire pension for having passed the orders while exercising his quasi judicial orders without the charge of having passed them with ulterior or mala-fide motive is not only a dangerous trend but shall put fear in the mind of an officer not to act without favour or fear. Once this Court is satisfied that the order withholding the entire pension is unsustainable, it need not go into the remaining questions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner that as to whether the punishment was in violation of provisions of Rule 170 of the Rules of 1951 or whether the same could be passed under Rule 7 of the Rules of 1996 and the question as to whether the disciplinary authority has passed the impugned order without application of mind and without taking into account the evidence, record and the representation of the petitioner. Accordingly, the present writ petition is allowed. The impugned Order dated 27.07.1999 is set aside. The petitioner is held entitled to the payment of his full pension. The arrears of pension shall be released to him forthwith.