JUDGMENT : Sanjay Karol, J. Assailing the judgment dated 18.2.2008, passed by learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Solan, Distt. Solan, H.P., in Sessions Trial No. 3-NL/7 of 2007/06, titled as State of Himachal Pradesh v. Hanif & others, whereby respondents accused stand acquitted, State has filed the present appeal under the provisions of Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 2. It is the case of prosecution that on 31.10.2004 at about 11.00 a.m. accused Hanif, Sikander, Roshani and Shamina pelted stones on the house of Gulam Mohammad and threatened to kill his son Hassan Din. Same day at about 8.00 p.m. accused again came armed with dandas and hurled abuses. At about 10.30 p.m. they burnt the thatched roof of the house of Gulam Mohammad. On 1.11.2004 Gulam Mohammad (PW-1) reported the matter to the police which led to registration of F.I.R. No. 74/2004, dated 1.11.2004 (Ext. PW-5/A) at Police Station Ramshehar, Distt. Solan, against the accused persons under the provisions of Sections 436, 451, 506 all read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The matter was investigated by SI Balbir Singh (PW-10). With the completion of investigation, which prima facie revealed complicity of the accused in the alleged crime, challan was presented in the Court for trial. 3. Accused Hanif, Roshni and Sikander were charged for having committed offences punishable under the provisions of Sections 451, 506, 436 all read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, to which they did not plead guilty and claimed trial. Shamina, being juvenile, was separately tried by the Juvenile Court for the aforesaid offences. 4. In order to prove its case, in all, prosecution examined ten witnesses and statements of the accused under Section 313 Cr. P.C. were also recorded, in which they took plea of false implication on account of land dispute with Gulam Mohammad. No evidence in defence was led by the accused. 5. Court below acquitted the accused for the reason that prosecution could not prove its case, beyond reasonable doubt. Hence the present appeal. 6. We have heard Mr. Ashok Chaudhary, learned Addl. Advocate General ably assisted by Mr. V. S. Chauhan, learned Addl. A.G. and Mr. J. S. Guleria, Asstt. A.G., on behalf of the State as also Mr. J. R. Poswal, learned counsel for the accused. Hence the present appeal. 6. We have heard Mr. Ashok Chaudhary, learned Addl. Advocate General ably assisted by Mr. V. S. Chauhan, learned Addl. A.G. and Mr. J. S. Guleria, Asstt. A.G., on behalf of the State as also Mr. J. R. Poswal, learned counsel for the accused. We have also minutely examined the testimonies of the witnesses and other documentary evidence so placed on record by the prosecution. Having done so, we are of the considered view that no case for interference is made out at all. We find that the judgment rendered by the trial Court is based on complete, correct and proper appreciation of evidence (documentary and ocular) so placed on record. There is neither any illegality/infirmity nor any perversity with the same, resulting into miscarriage of justice. 7. It is a settled principle of law that acquittal leads to presumption of innocence in favour of an accused. To dislodge the same, onus heavily lies upon the prosecution. Having considered the material on record, we are of the considered view that prosecution has failed to establish essential ingredients so required to constitute the charged offences. 8. In Prandas v. The State, AIR 1954 SC 36 , Constitution Bench of the apex Court, has held as under: "(6) It must be observed at the very outset that we cannot support the view which has been expressed in several cases that the High Court has no power under Section 417, Criminal P.C., to reverse a judgment of acquittal, unless the judgment is perverse or the subordinate Court has in some way or other misdirected itself so as to produce a miscarriage of justice. In our opinion, the true position in regard to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 417, Criminal Procedure Code in an appeal from an order of acquittal has been stated in - 'Sheo Swarup v. Emperor', AIR 1934 PC 227 (2) at pp.229, 230 (A), in these words: "Sections 417, 418 and 423 of the Code give to the High Court full power to review at large the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded, and to reach the conclusion that upon that evidence the order of acquittal should be reversed. No limitation should be placed upon that power, unless it be found expressly stated in the Code. No limitation should be placed upon that power, unless it be found expressly stated in the Code. But in exercising the power conferred by the Code and before reaching its conclusions upon fact, the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses, (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial, (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt, and (4) the slowness of an appellate Court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses. To state this, however, is only to say that the High Court in its conduct of the appeal should and will act in accordance with rules and principles well known and recognised in the administration of justice." 9. It be only observed that independent witnesses namely Babu Ram (PW-6) Nambardar of the area, Inder Singh (PW-7) Pradhan of the Gram Panchayat and Surjeeto (PW-8) have not supported the prosecution. Despite their extensive cross examination, nothing fruitful could be elicited from their testimonies. Consistently and convincingly all these witnesses have shown their ignorance with respect to the alleged acts attributed to the accused as also having any knowledge of the real culprits. 10. Crucially Surjeeto (PW-8) is the real sister-in-law of complainant Gulam Mohammad. She had no reason to depose falsely. She admits that both the complainant and the accused are not in good terms. Babu Ram (PW-6) states that none informed him as to who the real culprits were. So is the testimony of Inder Singh (PW-7). Thus two view with regard to the act and conduct of the accused have emerged on record. 11. She admits that both the complainant and the accused are not in good terms. Babu Ram (PW-6) states that none informed him as to who the real culprits were. So is the testimony of Inder Singh (PW-7). Thus two view with regard to the act and conduct of the accused have emerged on record. 11. It is well established principle of law that (i) the appellate Court should not ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where two views are possible, though the view of the appellate court may be more probable; (ii) while dealing with a judgment of acquittal, the appellate court must consider entire evidence on record, so as to arrive at a finding as to whether views of the trial court are perverse or otherwise unsustainable; (iii) the appellate court is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, trial Court failed to take into consideration any admissible fact; and (iv) the trial Court failed to take into consideration any admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration evidence brought on record contrary to law. (See: Balak Ram & Anr. v. State of U.P., AIR 1974 SC 2165 ; Allarakha K Mansuri v. State of Gujarat, (2002) 3 SCC 57 ; Raghunath v. State of Haryana, (2003) 1 SCC 398 : 2003 (2) AIC 229 (SC) : 2003 (46) ACC 139; State of U.P. v. Ram Veer Singh & Ors., (2007) 13 SCC 102 : 2007 (58) AIC 111 (SC); S. Rama Krishna v. S. Rami Reddy (D) by his LRs. & Ors., AIR 2008 SC 2066 ; Sambhaji Hindurao Deshmukh & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 11 SCC 186 ; Arulvelu & Anr. v. State, (2009) 10 SCC 206 : 2009 (83) AIC 253 (SC); Perla Somasekhara Reddy & Ors. v. State of A.P., (2009) 16 SCC 98 ; and Ram Singh alias Chhaju v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2010) 2 SCC 445 : 2010 (87) AIC 129 (SC) : 2010 (68) ACC 722. 12. In Sheo Swaroop and Ors. v. State, (2009) 10 SCC 206 : 2009 (83) AIC 253 (SC); Perla Somasekhara Reddy & Ors. v. State of A.P., (2009) 16 SCC 98 ; and Ram Singh alias Chhaju v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2010) 2 SCC 445 : 2010 (87) AIC 129 (SC) : 2010 (68) ACC 722. 12. In Sheo Swaroop and Ors. v. King Emperor, AIR 1934 PC 227 , the Privy Council held that: "...the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses, (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial, (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt, and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses...." 13. In Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 : 2007 (54) AIC 172 (SC) : 2007 (58) ACC 402, the apex Court observed as under : "(1) An appellate court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, "substantial and compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of language" to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court." 14. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Banne @ Baijnath & Ors., (2009) 4 SCC 271 : 2009 (76) AIC 103 (SC) : 2009 (65) ACC 261, the apex Court gave illustrations of certain circumstances in which the Court would be justified in interfering with a judgment of acquittal by the High Court, which principle, in our considered view, would squarely apply to the judgment under review by us. The circumstances include; (i) The High Court's decision is based on totally erroneous view of law by ignoring the settled legal position; (ii) The High Court's conclusions are contrary to evidence and documents on record; (iii) The entire approach of the High Court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal leading to grave miscarriage of justice; (iv) The High Court's judgment is manifestly unjust and unreasonable based on erroneous law and facts on the record of the case; (v) Apex Court must always give proper weight and consideration to the findings of the High Court; and (vi) the apex Court would be extremely reluctant in interfering with a case when both the Sessions Court and the High Court have recorded an order of acquittal. The apex Court further held that "Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial Court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial Court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference with the decision of the trial court in a routine manner, where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for such interference." (Emphasis supplied) 15. Complainant Gulam Mohammad (PW-1) states that on 31.10.2004, accused started pelting stones on his house. They also threatened to kill his son Hassan Din. At about 10.30 p.m. accused again came and he saw accused Hanif burning the thatched roof of his house. At that time he was alone at home. When he raised hue and cry Surjeeto came. On 1.11.2004 he telephonically informed the police from the house of Babu Ram (PW-6). He also informed Inder Singh (PW-7) about the incident. 16. Hassan Din (PW-2) has supported his father Gulam Mohammad with regard to the incident which took place in the morning of 31st October, 2004. 17. Now significantly both the witnesses admit that they are not in good terms with the accused. Hassan Din admits that for the last 10 to 12 years he has been residing separately from his father. Presence of this person on the spot thus appears to be doubtful. Version of Gulam Mohammad of having informed the police on 1.11.2004 is not supported by SI-Balbir Singh (PW-10) who neither recognises the voice of Gulam Mohammad nor has recorded number of the telephone from which the call was received. He recorded statement of Gulam Mohammad only on 1.11.2004. It appears that the statement (Ext. PA) was prepared later on and F.I.R. registered earlier. Further this witness admits that there is dispute with regard to land with the accused. Significantly in the village there are 13 to 14 houses, as is so admitted by Gulam Mohammad, yet none from the village came forward to depose in his favour 18. At this juncture it be also observed that Gulam Mohammad states that the police had reached the village on 31.10.2004 itself. Obviously the witness has contradicted himself. If the complaint was lodged on 1.11.2004 then how is it that police reached the spot a day prior thereto. Version of the witness cannot be said to be inspiring in confidence. 19. It be also observed that the fourth accused, who was a juvenile, stands acquitted by the Juvenile Court. Obviously the witness has contradicted himself. If the complaint was lodged on 1.11.2004 then how is it that police reached the spot a day prior thereto. Version of the witness cannot be said to be inspiring in confidence. 19. It be also observed that the fourth accused, who was a juvenile, stands acquitted by the Juvenile Court. 20. Having perused the testimony of the prosecution witnesses on record it cannot be said that prosecution has been able to prove its case, beyond reasonable doubt, to the effect that accused in furtherance of their common entered into the house of Gulam Mohammad with intent to cause the offence of criminal intimidation and criminally intimidated Hassan Din and also committed mischief by setting his house on fire, by leading clear, cogent, convincing and reliable material on record. 21. The Court below, in our considered view, has correctly and completely appreciated the evidence so placed on record by the prosecution. It cannot be said that the judgment of trial Court is perverse, illegal, erroneous or based on incorrect and incomplete appreciation of material on record resulting into miscarriage of justice. 22. The accused has had the advantage of having been acquitted by the Court below. Keeping in view the ratio of law laid down by the Apex Court in Mohammed Ankoos and others v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, (2010) 1 SCC 94 : 2009 (84) AIC 255 (SC) : 2009 (67) ACC 909, since it cannot be said that the Court below has not correctly appreciated the evidence on record or that acquittal of the accused has resulted into travesty of justice, no interference is warranted in the instant case. For all the aforesaid reasons, present appeal, devoid of merit, is dismissed, so also pending applications, if any. Bail bonds, if any, furnished by the accused are discharged. Records of the Court below be immediately sent back. Appeal Dismissed.