JUDGMENT KS JHAVERI 1. We have heard Mr. B.B. Naik, learned Senior Counsel appearing with Mr. P.S. Champaneri for the appellant and Mr. P.K. Jani, learned Additional Advocate General appearing with Mr. Rohan Yagnik, learned AGP appearing for the respondent – State. With the consent of the parties, the matter is taken up for final hearing today. 2. This intra-court Letters Patent Appeal has been filed challenging the order dated 02.02.2015 passed by the learned Single Judge in Special Civil Application No. 2063 of 2015 whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition. 3. The facts in brief leading to the filing of the writ petition before the learned Single Judge and this appeal are stated as under: 3.1 The appellant who is presently Chairman of the Mehsana District Cooperative Milk Producers' Union Limited (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Union’) and also the Chairman of the Gujarat Cooperative Milk Marketing Federation (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Federation’) had by way of the writ petition challenged the show cause notice dated 12.01.2015 issued by respondent no.2 under section 76B(1)(2) of the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act, 1961 ('the Act' for short). 3.2 On 21.10.2013, the Managing Director of the Federation had furnished certain information attributing accusation to the appellant on the basis of which the Secretary, Government of Gujarat directed the Registrar to collect information. Thereafter, he issued a communication/agenda notice to the members of the Board of Directors of the Federation for transacting a business of approving the motion of no confidence against the Chairman of the Federation – present appellant. 3.3 The meeting was scheduled to be held on 26.10.2013 and the appellant received the agenda notice on 24.10.2013. Thereafter on 25.10.2013, the appellant filed Special Civil Application No. 16515 of 2013 and this Court vide order dated 25.10.2013 stayed the convening and holding of meeting to approve the motion of no confidence against the appellant. 3.4 Thereafter in the said writ petition the interim relief continued and in the meanwhile a Public Interest Litigation being Writ Petition (PIL) No. 302 of 2013 was filed. On 29.11.2013, this Court granted interim relief against holding of meeting of Federation against the appellant. Pursuant to the order in W.P. (PIL), a Special Investigation Team was constituted under the Chairmanship of the Joint Registrar. 3.5 On 23.01.2014, respondent no. On 29.11.2013, this Court granted interim relief against holding of meeting of Federation against the appellant. Pursuant to the order in W.P. (PIL), a Special Investigation Team was constituted under the Chairmanship of the Joint Registrar. 3.5 On 23.01.2014, respondent no. 1 passed an order to file a complaint against the members of the Managing Committee of the Union for the alleged financial irregularities and breach of trust and for the said purpose he directed the District Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Patan to lodge a criminal complaint. Accordingly, complaint was filed before Mehsana City ‘B’ Division Police Station. 3.6 Thereafter, on 12.01.2015, respondent no. 2 issued show cause notice to the appellant under section 76B(1)(2) of the Act. The appellant on 16.02.2015 submitted an application for supply of copies of documents which were supplied to him on or about 23.01.2015. The appellant was required to file reply to the show cause notice on 29.01.2015 but respondent no. 2 postponed the hearing to 03.02.2015. 3.7 The appellant therefore, apprehending the action of not only removal order but future disqualification as indicated in the notice approached this Court by way of filing Special Civil Application No. 2063 of 2015 which came up for hearing on 02.02.2015. The learned Single Judge vide order dated 02.02.2015 dismissed the writ petition and therefore, being aggrieved by the same, the appellant has approached this Court. 4. Mr. B.B. Naik, learned Senior Counsel appearing with Mr. Champaneri, learned advocate for the appellant contended that the orders passed in writ petitions and appeals by this Court are subject matter of SLP before the Apex Court. He submitted that the question as to whether in absence of a statutory provision either in the Act or in the Rules whether a motion of no confidence can be passed against any person of a cooperative society or not is the main controversy in the said proceedings and that the hearing of SLP lead matter being SLP No. 5270 of 2014 is on the verge of conclusion as the rejoinder and the submissions are now to be made on 05.02.2015. 4.1 Mr. Naik submitted that the proceedings initiated against the appellant are not bonafide. He submitted that the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate and consider that respondent no. 4.1 Mr. Naik submitted that the proceedings initiated against the appellant are not bonafide. He submitted that the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate and consider that respondent no. 2 has formed an opinion to issue show cause notice in absence of jurisdictional facts for initiation of action while forming the opinion as contemplated under the provisions of section 76B of the Act. Section 76B of the Act reads as under: 76B. Removal of officer. -(1) If, in the opinion of the Registrar, any officer makes persistent default or is negligent in performance of the duties imposed on him by this Act or the rules or the byelaws or does anything which is prejudicial to the interests of the Society or where he stands disqualified by or under this Act, the Registrar may, after giving the officer an opportunity of being heard, by order remove such officer and direct the Society to elect or appoint a person or a qualified member in the vacancy caused by such removal and the officer so elected or appointed shall hold office so long only as the officer in whose place he is elected or appointed would have held if the vacancy had not occurred. (2) The Registrar may, by order, direct that the officer so removed shall be disqualified to hold or to contest election for any office in the society from which he is removed and in any other society for a period not exceeding four years from the date of the order and such officer may stand disqualified accordingly." 4.2 Mr. Naik further contended that the learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate and consider that the order of disqualification as provided under sub-section (2) of Section 76B of the Act is not per se to follow. He submitted that there has to be an order of removal first and only thereafter he may exercise the power for initiation of action under sub-section (2) of section 76-B of the Act in respect of the officer who has been ordered to be removed under sub-section (2) of section 76B of the Act. 4.3 Mr. He submitted that there has to be an order of removal first and only thereafter he may exercise the power for initiation of action under sub-section (2) of section 76-B of the Act in respect of the officer who has been ordered to be removed under sub-section (2) of section 76B of the Act. 4.3 Mr. Naik submitted that there has to be at the first instance the order of removal under sub-section (1) of section 76B of the Act and only thereafter he can act at law to initiate proceedings for future disqualification of the officer so removed under sub-section (2) of Section 76B of the Act and not otherwise. He submitted that the learned Single Judge has therefore committed an error in holding that it cannot be said that the show cause notice is without jurisdiction to initiate action under section 76B of the Act. He, therefore, urged that the impugned notice which is a joint notice under section 76B(1) and (2) is illegal and deserves to be quashed and set aside. 4.4 Mr. Naik contended that the learned Single Judge in absence of any material on record has committed error in holding that this Court finds that the appellant as a Chairman is alleged to have acted against the interest of the society inspite of the fact that no act is attributed individually to the appellant save and except as an administrative head in a society which concept is unknown to the cooperation, cooperative movement, cooperative society and cooperative societies Act 1961 and has failed to appreciate and consider the provisions contained in sections 73 and 74 of the Act. 4.5 Mr. Naik submitted that in fact there are various provisions in the Act for initiation of appropriate action against the society and only when it is found that a particular officer is responsible for the act of default or causing any loss to the society, action could be taken under section 76B of the Act against him. He has relied upon sections 73, 74 and 81 of the Act and submitted that if all actions were taken by collective wisdom by the society, it could not be said that the appellant had personally defaulted in performing duty or has acted prejudicially against the interest of the society. Section 81 of the Act reads as under: 81. He has relied upon sections 73, 74 and 81 of the Act and submitted that if all actions were taken by collective wisdom by the society, it could not be said that the appellant had personally defaulted in performing duty or has acted prejudicially against the interest of the society. Section 81 of the Act reads as under: 81. Supersession of committee : (1) If in respect of a committee of a society having the Registrar as its member, the State Government and in respect of a Committee of a Society which does not have the Registrar as its member, the Registrar is of the opinion that the committee (a) persistently makes default or, is negligent in the performance of the duties imposed on it by this Act or the rules or the bye-laws, or does anything which is prejudicial to the interest of the society or its members. then subject to the rules the State Government or, as the case may be the Registrar may, after giving the committee an opportunity of stating its objections, if any, within fifteen days from the date of issue of notice, by order in writing, remove the Committee, and appoint. (i) a committee, consisting of one or more members of the society not being the members of the committee removed under this sub-section in its place, or (ii) one or more administrators from amongst the members of the society, not being the members of the committee removed under this sub-section, or from amongst the officers of the co-operative department of the State Government. to manage the affairs of the society for a period not exceeding one year as may be specified in the order which period may at the discretion of the Registrar be extended from time to time, so however, that the total period does not exceed two years in aggregate. (2) The committee or administrator so appointed shall, subject to the control of the Registrar and to such instruction as he may from time to time give, have power to exercise all or any of the function of the committee or of any officer of the society, and take all such action as may be required in the interests of the society. (3) If at any time during any period or extended period referred to in sub-section (1), it appears to the Registrar that it is no longer necessary to continue to carry on the affairs of the society as aforesaid, he may, by an order published in the Official Gazette direct that the management shall terminate; and on such order being made, the management of the society shall be handed over to a new committee duly constituted. (4) The committee or adminstrator shall, at the expiry or termination of its or his term of office, arrange, for the constitution of a new committee in accordance with the bye-laws of the society. Provided that the committee or the administrator shall make arrangements for constitution of a new committee of a society in the co-operative credit structure within a period of two months from the date of the order of removal of the said committee.; (5) All acts done or purported to be done by the committee or administrator during the period which the affairs of the society are carried on by the committee or administrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be binding on the new committee. (6) Before making an order in writing removing the committee and appointing another committee inits place or one or more administrators under sub-section (1) in respect of a society, the Registrar shall consult any co-operative financing institution to which it is indebted. (7) The remuneration of the Administrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be such as may be determined by the Registrar and the same shall be paid from the fund of the society. 4.6 Section 73 provides that subject to the provisions of the Act and the rules, the final authority of every Society shall vest in the general body of members in general meeting, summoned in such a manner as may be specified in the byelaws. Section 74 provides that the management of every society shall vest in a committee, constituted in accordance with this Act, the rules and bye-laws, which shall exercise such powers and perform such duties as may be conferred or imposed on it respectively by this Act, the rules and the byelaws. 4.7 Mr. Section 74 provides that the management of every society shall vest in a committee, constituted in accordance with this Act, the rules and bye-laws, which shall exercise such powers and perform such duties as may be conferred or imposed on it respectively by this Act, the rules and the byelaws. 4.7 Mr. Naik submitted that in view of the above provisions of section 81 of the Act, the entire Managing Committee is responsible for any action, and that the decisions are taken collectively by the managing committee and therefore a particular member of the managing committee cannot be held responsible under section 81 of the Act for the default of the Managing committee. 4.8 Mr. Naik further contended that the Registrar is a member of the Managing Committee and therefore he cannot issue notice against the appellant. He submitted that there is gross delay in issuance of notice i.e. from 2013 to 2015 and that the time when election is due in the year 2015, after the reconstitution of the committee and finalisation of voter’s list, these proceedings are initiated with ulterior motive. 4.9 Mr. Naik contended that the learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate and consider that it is apparent on the face that the show cause notice is issued under political pressure just to see that in the forthcoming election the appellant may not be permitted to take part. 4.10 In support of his submissions, Mr. Naik has relied upon the following decisions: (i) Calcutta Discount Company Limited vs. Income Tax Officer, Companies District I, Calcutta reported in AIR 1961 SC 372 wherein it is observed as under: “26. Mr. Sastri argued that the question whether the Income-tax Officer had reason to believe that under assessment had occurred "by reason of nondisclosure of material facts" should not be investigated by the courts in an application under Art. 226. Learned Counsel seems to suggest that as soon as the Income-tax Officer has reason to believe that there has been under assessment in any year he has jurisdiction to start proceedings under s. 34 by issuing a notice provided 8 years have not elapsed from the end of the year in question, but whether the notices should have been issued within a period of 4 years or not is only a question of limitation which could and should properly be raised in assessment proceedings. It is wholly incorrect however to suppose that this is a question of limitation only not touching the question of jurisdiction. The scheme of the law clearly is that where the Income-tax Officer has reason to believe that an under assessment has resulted from non-disclosure he shall have jurisdiction to start proceedings for re. assessment within a period of 8 years; and where he has reason to believe that an under assessment has resulted from other causes he shall have jurisdiction to start proceedings for re-assessment within 4 years. Both the conditions, (i) the Income-tax Officer having reason to believe that there has been under assessment and (ii) his having reason to believe that such under assessment has resulted from nondisclosure of material facts, must co-exist before the Income-tax Officer has jurisdiction to start proceedings after the expiry of 4 years. The argument that the Court ought not to investigate the existence of one of these conditions, viz., that the Income-tax Officer has reason to believe that under assessment has resulted from 33 258 nondisclosure of material facts cannot therefore be accepted. 27. Mr. Sastri next pointed out that at the stage when the Income-tax Officer issued the notices he was not acting judicially or quasi-judicially and so a writ of certiorari or prohibition cannot issue. It is well settled however that though the writ of prohibition or certiorari will not issue against an executive authority, the High Courts have power to issue in a fit case an order prohibiting an executive authority from acting without jurisdiction. Where such action of an executive authority acting without jurisdiction subjects or is likely to subject a person to lengthy proceedings and unnecessary harassment, the High Courts, it is well settled, will issue appropriate orders or directions to prevent such consequences. 28. Mr. Sastri mentioned more than once the fact that the company would have sufficient opportunity to raise this question, viz., whether the Income-tax Officer had reason to believe that under assessment had resulted from non-disclosure of material facts, before the Income-tax Officer himself in the assessment proceedings and, if unsuccessful there, before the appellate officer or the appellate tribunal or in the High Court under section 66(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act. The existence of such alternative remedy is not however always a sufficient reason for refusing a party quick relief by a writ or order prohibiting an authority acting without jurisdiction from continuing such action. 29. In the present case the company contends that the conditions precedent for the assumption of jurisdiction under s. 34 were not satisfied and come to the court at the earliest opportunity. There is nothing in its conduct which would justify the refusal of proper relief under Art. 226. When the Constitution confers on the High Courts the power to give relief it becomes the duty of the courts to give such relief in fit cases and the courts would be failing to perform their duty if relief is refused without adequate reasons. In the present case we can find no reason for which relief should be refused. (ii) Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai reported in 1998 (8) SCC 1 wherein it is held as under: “In the instant case, it has already been indicated above that when the Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks dismissed appellant's opposition to the registration of respondent's Trade Mark by its order dated 12.8.1992, it filed an appeal in the Delhi High Court, which was admitted on 1.2.1993 and has since been registered as C.M.(Main) 414 of 1992. Thereafter, on 4.8.1993, the appellant filed a rectification petition under Sections 45 and 46 of the Act for removing the entry relating to the Trade Mark for which Registration Certificate was granted to the respondents on 30.11.1992. The appellant has also filed a suit for passing-off (Suit No. 1705 of 1994) in the Delhi High Court against the respondents in which an order of temporary injunction has been granted in favour of the appellant which has been upheld by the Division Bench of the High Court as also by this Court. In that suit, an amendment application has also been filed so as to include the ground of infringement of the appellant's Trade Mark but that application has not yet been disposed of. It is, however, obvious that if the application is allowed, the amendments will relate back to the date of the application, if not to the date of plaint. In that suit, an amendment application has also been filed so as to include the ground of infringement of the appellant's Trade Mark but that application has not yet been disposed of. It is, however, obvious that if the application is allowed, the amendments will relate back to the date of the application, if not to the date of plaint. In view of the pendency of these proceedings in the High Court and specially in view of Section 107 of the Act, the Registrar could not legally issue any suo motu notice to the appellant under Section 56(4) of the Act for cancellation of the Certificate of Registration/Renewal already granted. The appeal is consequently allowed and the show-cause notice issued by the Deputy Registrar (respondent No.2) on 26th of Sept. 1997 under Section 56(4) of the Act is hereby quashed. The appellants shall be entitled to their costs. “ (iii) Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Calcutta Division vs. National Tobacco Company of India Limited reported in 1972 (2) SCC 560 wherein it is held as under: “Before proceeding further we will deal with the question whether the Division Bench correctly refused to permit an argument that the impugned notice of 24-4-1960 fell under Rule 10-A. The ground given for this refusal was that such a case was neither taken before 'the learned Single Judge nor could be found in the grounds of appeal despite the fact that the appellant had ample opportunity of amending its Memorandum of appeal. The appellant has, however, relied on a previous intimation given to the counsel for the respondent that such a contention would be advanced at the hearing of the appeal and also on an application dated 21-3-1966 praying for permission to add the alternative ground that the impugned notice fell under Rule 10-A. We think that this refusal was erroneous for several reasons. Firstly the Company having come to Court for a Writ of Prohibition on the ground that the impugned notice was issued without jurisdiction had necessarily to establish the case which it sets, up in paragraph 25 of its Writ Petition, that the notice was not authorised by the rules including Rule 10-A. As the notice of 21-4-1960 was followed on 4-5-1960 by a correction by another notice of certain statements both the notices were assailed in paragraph 25 (ii) in the following words "The respondent has mala fide and without jurisdiction issued the said impugned notices pretending to falsely state that the aggregate sum therein mentioned has been provisionally debited in your petitioner's account and pretending to intimate, to your petitioner that the respondent proposed to complete the assessment, And thereby, he is seeking, under the guise of completing an alleged assessment which had already been completed and duty in respect whereof had already been paid, to do indirectly what he could not do directly inasmuch as Rule 10A of the said Rules has no application to the facts of the case and inasmuch as recovery of any duty which might have been short levied under Rule 10 of the Rules is barred by limitation". This assertion was met by a categorical denial by the Collector in paragraph 26(ii) of the Collector's affidavit in reply where it was stated that it was denied "that Rule 10-A of the said Rules had no application to the facts of the case as alleged or that the recovery of any duty which had been short levied was barred by limitation under Rule 10 of the said Rules as alleged or at all". Thus, the applicability of Rule 10-A was very much in issue. Secondly, We find, from the Judgment of the learned Single Judge that, as the burden lay upon the petitioning Company to demonstrate, for obtaining a Writ of Prohibition, that the impugned notice was not authorised by any rule, its counsel had contended',, inter-alia, that the notice did not fall under Rule 10-A. The question was thus considered by the learned Single Judge. Thirdly, the question whether the Collector did or did not have the power to issue the impugned notice under or with the aid of Rule 10-A was a question of law and of jurisdiction. Thirdly, the question whether the Collector did or did not have the power to issue the impugned notice under or with the aid of Rule 10-A was a question of law and of jurisdiction. going to the root of the case, which could be decided without taking further evidence. Indeed, as the burden was upon the petitioning Company to show that the impugned notice was issued without jurisdiction, a finding that the notice did not fall even within Rule 10-A was necessary before a Writ of Prohibition could issue at all. We think that the Division Bench ought to have permitted the question to be argued, subject to giving due opportunity to the petitioning Company to meet it on such, 832 terms as the Court thought fit, even if the point was not taken in the grounds of appeal. Therefore, we will consider this question also. (iv) State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Sanjay Nagayach reported in 2013 (7) SCC 25 wherein it is observed as under: 29. Statutory functionaries like Registrar/Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies functioning under the respective Co-operative Act must be above suspicion and function independently without external pressure. When an authority invested with the power purports to act on its own but in substance the power is exercised by external guidance or pressure, it would amount to non-exercise of power, statutorily vested. Large number of cases are coming up before this Court and the High Courts in the country challenging the orders of supersession and many of them are being passed by the statutory functionaries due to external influence ignoring the fact that they are ousting a democratically elected Board, the consequence of which is also grave because the members of the Board of Directors would also stand disqualified in standing for the succeeding election as well. 30. The Registrar/Joint Registrar, while exercising powers of supersession has to form an opinion and that opinion must be based on some objective criteria, which has nexus with the final decision. A statutory authority shall not act with pre-conceived notion and shall not speak his masters voice, because the formation of opinion must be his own, not somebody else in power, to achieve some ulterior motive. A statutory authority shall not act with pre-conceived notion and shall not speak his masters voice, because the formation of opinion must be his own, not somebody else in power, to achieve some ulterior motive. There may be situations where the Registrar/Joint Registrar are expected to act in the best interest of the society and its members, but in such situations, they have to act bona fide and within the four corners of the Statute. In our view, the impugned order will not fall in that category. Judicial Precedents 31. Registrar/Joint Registrar is bound to follow the Judicial Precedents. Ratio decidendi has the force of law and is binding on all statutory authorities when they deal with similar issues. The Madhya Pradesh High Court in several judgments has explained the scope of the second proviso to Section 53(1) of the Act. Reference may be made to the judgments in Radheshyam Sharma v. Govt. of M.P. through C.K. Jaiswal and Ors. 1972 MPLJ 796 , Board of Directors of Shri Ganesh Sahakari Vipnan (Marketing) Sanstha Maryadit and Another v. Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Khargone and Others 1982 MPLJ 46 and Sitaram v. Registrar of Co-operative Societies and another 1986 MPLJ 567. 35. Further, we are inclined to give the following general directions in view of the mushrooming of cases in various Courts challenging orders of supersession of elected Committees: 1) Supersession of an elected managing Committee/Board is an exception and be resorted to only in exceptional circumstances and normally elected body be allowed to complete the term for which it is elected. 2) Elected Committee in office be not penalised for the short-comings or illegalities committed by the previous Committee, unless there is any deliberate inaction in rectifying the illegalities committed by the previous committees. 3) Elected Committee in Office be given sufficient time, say at least six months, to rectify the defects, if any, pointed out in the audit report with regard to incidents which originated when the previous committee was in office. 4) Registrar/Joint Registrar are legally obliged to comply with all the statutory formalities, including consultation with the financing banks/Controlling Banks etc. Only after getting their view, an opinion be formed as to whether an elected Committee be ousted or not. 4) Registrar/Joint Registrar are legally obliged to comply with all the statutory formalities, including consultation with the financing banks/Controlling Banks etc. Only after getting their view, an opinion be formed as to whether an elected Committee be ousted or not. 5) Registrar/ Joint Registrar should always bear in mind the consequences of an order of supersession which has the effect of not only ousting the Board out of office, but also disqualify them for standing for election in the succeeding elections. Registrar/Joint Registrar therefore is duty bound to exercise his powers bona fide and not on the dictation or direction of those who are in power. 6) Registrar/Joint Registrar shall not act under political pressure or influence and, if they do, be subjected to disciplinary proceedings and be also held personally liable for the cost of the legal proceedings. 7) Public money not to be spent by the State Government or the Registrar for unnecessary litigation involving disputes between various factions in a co-operative society. Tax payers money is not expected to be spent for settling those disputes. If found necessary, the same be spent from the funds available with the concerned Bank.” 5. As against the contentions raised by Mr. Naik, Mr. P.K. Jani, learned Additional Advocate General appearing with Mr. Yagnik, learned AGP on advance copy submitted by the appellant to the Government Pleader’s office contended that the notice was issued on 12.01.2015 and application was tendered on 15.01.2015 thereafter the matter was adjourned to 22.01.2015 and after the appellant appeared before the authority, the writ petition was filed on 27.01.2015. 5.1 Mr. Jani submitted that in view of many representations made by the farmers, the Division Bench disposed of the writ petition on 26.09.2014 and the Government had thought it fit not to take any action pending the writ petition. The relevant portion of the order dated 26.09.2014 in the PIL reads as under: “12 In exercise of the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, when jurisdiction is invoked by filing a PIL, a duty is cast upon the Court to see whether the grievances raised in the writ petition (PIL) can be redressed by a mechanism available under the provisions of the statute in existence. Upon perusal of the provisions of Co-operative Societies Act, from section 71 onwards, an inbuilt mechanism is provided empowering various authorities to take action in case of irregular or illegal functioning of cooperative societies and further to take appropriate remedies, including action in accordance with law after issuance of show cause notice and complying with the principles of natural justice. Accordingly, it is clear on perusal of the affidavit-in-reply dated 19.9.2014 filed by Joint Registrar (Marketing), Cooperative Societies that notices are issued by the competent authorities under various provisions of the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act, 1961, namely, under sections 76 (b)(i)(ii), 86, 89 and 93. Thus, when concerned statutory authorities have acted under the provisions of the Act of 1961 and the respondents have ample opportunity to submit their reply and to represent their case, various disputed facts including allegations about irregularities and illegalities in performance of duties by respective respondents including Chairman for which appropriate decisions can be taken, provided the procedure laid down under various provisions viz. Sec.71 onwards of the Act of 1961 is followed. We are of the view that the steps taken by the respondent State of Gujarat by taking recourse to the above provisions of the Act of 1961 appeared to be sufficient enough to redress the grievances of the petitioners and accordingly, at this stage, we are not inclined to issue any direction as prayed for in para 12 of the petition, keeping it open for the State of Gujarat to pursue legal action on any issues related to the subject-matter strictly in accordance with law.” 5.2 Mr. Jani has drawn the attention of this Court to the representations dated 21.10.2013, 07.11.2013, 08.11.2016 and 16.11.2013 which were made prior to the initiation of proceedings against the appellant. Mr. Jani submitted that the allegations of mala fide are easy to be made by any person facing proceedings under section 76B of the Act or any penal action and simply because mala fide are alleged, that does not mean that the concerned authority has not acted independently. Mr. Jani submitted that the contents of show cause notice would clearly fall within four corners of section 76B of the Act and therefore, this Court may not entertain this appeal. 5.3 Mr. Mr. Jani submitted that the contents of show cause notice would clearly fall within four corners of section 76B of the Act and therefore, this Court may not entertain this appeal. 5.3 Mr. Jani has tried to distinguish the decision of the Apex Court so far as the jurisdiction of Registrar is concerned and submitted that the Registrar in the present case has not attended any meeting and only his nominee has appeared. He submitted that when the Registrar himself has not participated in any of the meetings, he cannot be barred from exercising his jurisdiction. 5.4 Mr. Jani, in support of his submissions has relied upon the following decisions: (a) Union of India vs. Hindalco Industries reported in (2003) 5 SCC 194 , the relevant portion of which reads as under: “12. There can be no doubt that in matter of taxation, it is inappropriate for the High Court to interfere in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution either at the stage of show cause notice or at the stage of assessment where alternative remedy by way of filing a reply or appeal, as the case may be, is available but these are the limitations imposed by the courts themselves in exercise of their jurisdiction and they are not matters of jurisdictional factors. Had the High Court declined to interfere at the stage of show cause notice, perhaps this court would not have been inclined to entertain the special leave petition; when the High Court did exercise its jurisdiction, entertained the writ petition and decided the issue on merits, we do not think it appropriate to upset the impugned order of the High Court under Article 136 of the Constitution on a technical ground.” (b) State of Orissa and Others vs. Mesco Steels Limited and Another reported in (2013) 4 SCC 340 wherein it is held as under: “18. The writ petition, as already noticed above, was directed against a communication that had emanated from the office of Director of Mines and brought forward certain factual aspects relevant to the question whether a lease deed could be immediately executed in favour of the respondent-company. A careful reading of the said communication would show that it was issued in pursuance of a letter dated 12th January, 2006 from the Joint Secretary, Government of Orissa to the Director of Mines and another letter dated 29th August, 2006. A careful reading of the said communication would show that it was issued in pursuance of a letter dated 12th January, 2006 from the Joint Secretary, Government of Orissa to the Director of Mines and another letter dated 29th August, 2006. By the former letter the Joint Secretary to the Government had instructed the Director of Mines to take action pursuant to certain directions issued by the Chief Minister of Orissa. This included making a real assessment of the requirement of respondent-company and permitting execution of a lease deed subject to clearance of the Ministry of Environment and Forest, Government of India. The instructions issued to the Director of Mines also required him to resume the excess area for reallocation of the same to other deserving parties. The Director of Mines had responded to the said communication and assessed the mineral deposits in the area by reference to maps and surveys and made a recommendation back to the State Government. 19. It is obvious from a conjoint reading of letter dated 12th January, 2006 and communication dated 19th September, 2006 sent by the Director of Mines in response thereto that a final decision on the subject had yet to be taken by the Government, no matter the Government may have provisionally decided to follow the line of action indicated in its communication dated 12th January, 2006 issued under the signature of the Joint Secretary, Department of Steel and Mines. It is noteworthy that there was no challenge to the communication dated 12th January, 2006 before the High Court nor was any material placed before us to suggest that any final decision was ever taken by the Government on the question of deduction of the area granted in favour of the respondent so as to render the process of issue of show cause notice for hearing the respondent-company an exercise in futility. (c) Union of India and another vs. Vicco Laboratories reported in (2007) 13 SCC 270 wherein it is held as under: “31. Normally, the writ court should not interfere at the stage of issuance of show cause notice by the authorities. In such a case, the parties get ample opportunity to put forth their contentions before the concerned authorities and to satisfy the concerned authorities about the absence of case for proceeding against the person against whom the show cause notices have been issued. In such a case, the parties get ample opportunity to put forth their contentions before the concerned authorities and to satisfy the concerned authorities about the absence of case for proceeding against the person against whom the show cause notices have been issued. Abstinence from interference at the stage of issuance of show cause notice in order to relegate the parties to the proceedings before the concerned authorities is the normal rule. However, the said rule is not without exceptions. Where a Show Cause notice is issued either without jurisdiction or in an abuse of process of law, certainly in that case, the writ court would not hesitate to interfere even at the stage of issuance of show cause notice. The interference at the show cause notice stage should be rare and not in a routine manner. Mere assertion by the writ petitioner that notice was without jurisdiction and/or abuse of process of law would not suffice. It should be prima facie established to be so. Where factual adjudication would be necessary, interference is ruled out.” (d) Vavdi Road Seva Sahakari Mandal Ltd. & Anr. vs. District Registrar and Anr. reported in 2010 (3) GLH 92 wherein it is observed as under: “22. The principles of law laid down in the above-quoted judgment apply squarely to the facts of the present case. None of the grounds where a writ of prohibition can be issued are made out in this case. The competent authority i.e. respondent No.1 has not yet adjudicated upon the Show Cause notice. No exceptional or compelling reasons have been made out by the petitioners to show that any legal or fundamental right has been violated, or that there is a lack of jurisdiction, or that the impugned notice has been issued as a result of colourable exercise of power, at the behest of respondent No.2. In the above circumstances, there is no justifiable reason for this Court to entertain the petition.” (e) Vipul Mansingbhai Chaudhry vs. G.C. Murmu or his successor in office, Registrar, Co-op Societies and Anr. reported in 2007 (3) GLR 2204 wherein it is held as under: “38. In the above circumstances, there is no justifiable reason for this Court to entertain the petition.” (e) Vipul Mansingbhai Chaudhry vs. G.C. Murmu or his successor in office, Registrar, Co-op Societies and Anr. reported in 2007 (3) GLR 2204 wherein it is held as under: “38. Section 76B of the Act permits removal of an officer if, in the opinion of the Registrar, any officer ‘ (i) makes persistent default in performance of the duties imposed on the officer by the Act, or the Rules or the Bye-laws; (ii) is negligent in performance of the duties imposed on the officer by the Act, or the Rules or the Bye-laws; (iii) does anything which is prejudicial to the interests of the society; and (iv) stands disqualified by or under the Act, the Registrar may, after giving officer an opportunity of being heard, remove such officer. Each of the four defaults are in the alternative and though in given set of circumstances there may be some overlapping, yet there could be a situation where any one of the defaults may exist on its own. The contention that there was no breach of any duty on the petitioner in absence of any obligation may be correct in so far as the first two defaults are concerned. However, in relation to a default relatable to an action which is prejudicial to the interests of the society it is not necessary that there should be any duty/obligation cast upon the officer either under the Act or the Rules or the Byelaws. The petitioner, as head of the Union, was holding a post in fiduciary capacity. Even if there has been no persistent default or negligence in discharge of his duties as chairman of the Union the petitioner has definitely acted in a manner which is prejudicial to the interests of the society. Employment of a person entails financial liability for a substantial period of time on a permanent basis. Employment of 461 persons would definitely be adverse to or prejudicial to the interests of the Union, unless and until it is shown that the recruitment of these many persons was warranted by facts and circumstances; it is shown that not only was the recruitment necessary and in interest of the Union, but the persons so employed were qualified and capable of handling the work assigned to each one of them. In absence of any such details being provided by the petitioner, despite having been called upon to do so, the respondent authority was justified in raising an adverse presumption and exercising powers under Section 76B of the Act.” (f) Amreli District Co Operative Sale and Purchase Union Limited vs. State of Gujarat reported in 1984 (2) GLR 1244 wherein it is observed as under: “75. So far as the challenge to Section 76-B is concerned we must reject it forthwith. The reasons are obvious. The provision is an enabling provision since in its absence the whole committee would expose itself to the extreme penalty of supersession for the persistent default or negligence of one of the officers of the society. It is only in order to locate the fault of that particular officer and for taking action against him so that the whole committee may not be exposed to supersession that the new provision is made by insertion of Section 76-B. It cannot be said to be in any way denying or circumscribing the right to form association. It also does to not curtail the right to carry on business or trade guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) having regard to the purpose of the section. The challenge to this Section 76-B is therefore rejected. 76. However as regards Section 76-A, we are afraid that no case has been made out by the State Government as to why such a provision was found necessary in public interest. The arbitrary, capricious or unauthorised removal of the Managing Director can always be challenged by an aggrieved party in a court of law and any mala fide or illegal action can be impugned by a Court. No public interest can, therefore, be served by enjoining previous approval of the Registrar before exercising such power of Managing Director or Chief Executive Officer of any society. “ 6. The learned Single Judge while passing the impugned order has observed as under: “[7] In the show cause notice, in each of the issues, alleged act of Chairman is described. From the allegations, it appears that the concerned authority issuing show cause notice is prima facie satisfied to initiate action under section 76B(1) (2) of the Act. It is not the case of the petitioner that respondent no.2 Cooperation Commissioner and Registrar has no authority to issue show cause notice. From the allegations, it appears that the concerned authority issuing show cause notice is prima facie satisfied to initiate action under section 76B(1) (2) of the Act. It is not the case of the petitioner that respondent no.2 Cooperation Commissioner and Registrar has no authority to issue show cause notice. What is sought to be contended is that all the allegations made in the show cause notice are as regards decision taken by the society and there is no allegation against the petitioner that in individual capacity, the petitioner has acted in prejudicial manner against the interest of the society. [8] This Court has gone through the show cause notice. In issue no.1 of the show cause notice, it is stated that the Chairman has acted against the interest of the members of the society by withdrawing increase in the price of commodity. In issue no.2 of the show cause notice, it is stated that the petitioner is the same person who is Chairman of the GCMMF and Chairman of Mehsana District Cooperative Milk Producers' Union Limited and took illegal decision for the purpose of supply of seeds to Maharashtra and by such decision he has acted against the interest of members of the society. Similarly in issue nos.3 to 5, there are allegations of petitioner acting against the interest of the society. From issue no.6 to 8, it appears that the allegations as regards making illegal recruitment is made against the petitioner. In issue no.9, it is alleged that the petitioner was responsible as a head of the institution to pay more price for purchase of sugar. In issue no.10, it is stated that one Mr. Khengarbhai Desai who was not member of the society was allowed to spend from the society for his journey / travel. Issue no.11 speaks about decision to make unauthorized donation. In all the issues stated in the show cause notice, the petitioner's involvement as a Chairman is alleged. [9] During the course of hearing, Mr. Champaneri, learned advocate for the petitioner drew attention of the Court to the documents annexed with the draft amendment so as to point out that action taken by the petitioner was for the benefit of the members of the society. Mr. Champaneri submitted that for all the allegations made in the show cause notice there is lack of inherent jurisdiction of respondent no.2. Mr. Champaneri submitted that for all the allegations made in the show cause notice there is lack of inherent jurisdiction of respondent no.2. However, on going through the show cause notice, this Court finds that the petitioner as a Chairman is alleged to have acted against the interest of the society. [10] In above such view of the matter, it cannot be said that the show cause notice is without jurisdiction to initiate action under section 76B of the Act.” 7. From the records of the case, it is borne out that the learned Single Judge declined to exercise discretionary jurisdiction in the present case and therefore, at the appellate stage, we have limited jurisdiction as whether the discretion refused is justified or not. We are of the opinion that the learned Single Judge has not committed any error in declining discretionary jurisdiction in favour of a person against whom there are serious charges and allegations of mishandling and financial irregularities in the Society where poor farmers are members through their primary societies. We are not inclined to express any opinion on the allegation aspect but prima facie we are of the view that there is some substance in the allegations made which is subject matter of the proceedings before the authority which is required to be inquired into. Therefore it will not be appropriate to observe anything against the appellant at this stage otherwise the same shall prejudice the case of the appellant. We are of the opinion that looking to the prima facie allegations levelled against the appellant, it will not be appropriate to exercise discretionary power otherwise, the very object of cooperative movement will be frustrated. 8. It has been contended that the proceedings are initiated at a belated stage. However, we find much substance in the submissions canvassed by Mr. Jani that though the report was ready, in view of the PIL pending before this Court, the respondent authorities waited for final disposal so as to initiate proceedings. Therefore we are of the opinion that the so called delay cannot come in the way of the respondent authority. 9. It has also been canvassed that the Registrar has no jurisdiction to initiate proceedings. We are not much convinced by the said submission. Therefore we are of the opinion that the so called delay cannot come in the way of the respondent authority. 9. It has also been canvassed that the Registrar has no jurisdiction to initiate proceedings. We are not much convinced by the said submission. When the Registrar has not participated in the decision making process of the Managing Committee, he is competent to issue notice under section 76B of the Act. 10. It has to be borne in mind that the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act, 1961 is enacted with a noble object of giving boost to the Co-operative movement and to uplift the living conditions of poor farmers. If a person like the appellant who is at the helm of affairs of such society indulges into mass scale financial irregularities for his personal benefits as depicted in the impugned notice then the purpose of forming cooperative society shall be frustrated. Therefore, if this Court at this juncture interjects and quashes and sets aside the impugned notice then it would amount to perpetuating the sordid illegal and irregular financial activities allegedly indulged into by the appellant. It is required to be mentioned herein that the appellant had an occasion earlier to challenge similar notices which is evident from the decision of this Court in the case of . In our view this speaks volume about the quality of leadership of the appellant. 11. At this stage, we make it clear that we are not expressing any opinion on the merits of the impugned notice and not for a moment we should be misunderstood to have accepted the allegations made in the impugned notice against the appellant as true. We do not propose to condemn the appellant for the so called irregularities alleged against him in the impugned notice. In our considered opinion, the appellant should reply to the impugned show cause notice and try to convince the authorities that the allegations levelled against him in the impugned notice are not tenable on the grounds which are available to him under the law. We are therefore not inclined to disturb the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge. 12. No doubt Mr. Naik has taken this Court to various decisions of the Apex Court and this Court. We are therefore not inclined to disturb the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge. 12. No doubt Mr. Naik has taken this Court to various decisions of the Apex Court and this Court. However, in our view going by the documentary and factual findings which have been arrived at by the Registrar, it cannot be said that the proceedings are politically motivated or that this litigation requires interference by this Court at this stage in any manner. 13. We are in complete agreement with the reasonings adopted and findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge. The appeal is therefore devoid of merit and is accordingly dismissed. Civil Application also stands disposed of accordingly. 14. It goes without saying that such litigations have now become order of the day. These proceedings are initiated at the cost of Society and for such frivolous litigations considerable amount of judicial time is wasted and therefore such litigations call for serious consideration and in such cases high costs are required to be imposed personally on the litigants and not from the Society. We are of the opinion that at this juncture, if not high costs, a token cost of Rs. 7500/-is required to be imposed upon the appellant as a deterrent. Accordingly, cost of Rs. 7500/-is imposed upon the appellant.