Binod Tiwari v. State of Jharkhand through Director General of Police
2015-10-30
PRAMATH PATNAIK
body2015
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : Pramath Patnaik, J. I.A. No. 2390 of 2015 This Interlocutory Application has been filed for amendment in the writ petition by adding prayer seeking quashing of appellate order passed by D.I.G, dated 08.07.2003, whereby appeal against dismissal order has been affirmed. Prayer is allowed. For adjudication of the writ application, this application shall form part of this writ application. I.A. No. 2390 of 2015 stands disposed of. W.P. (S) No. 5601 of 2012 1. In the accompanied writ application, the petitioner has inter-alia prayed for issuance of a writ of certiorari for quashing of the order dated 06.06.2001(Annexure-2) passed by Superintendent of Police, Pakur whereby the petitioner has been dismissed from the services and also for quashing of appellate order passed by D.I.G, dated 08.07.2003, whereby appeal preferred by the petitioner against the order of dismissal has been dismissed. 2. The facts, as delineated in the writ application, in a nutshell is that the petitioner initially was posted as a Police Driver at Vaishali on February 3, 1982 thereafter transferred to Pakur in the year 1998. On 13.04.2000, the petitioner was deputed for collecting the alloted clothes, goods etc. with Police vehicle No. BR-12A/0524, accordingly the petitioner set out for Patna and reached on 14.04.2000 at 7:00 a.m. and was directed to stand by the vehicle in the premises of Central Clothes Store for the purpose of protection of vehicle and goods. On 15.04.2000 when the in-charge officer of Escort reached the office for the purpose of collecting the clothes, goods etc. then he came to know that the petitioner has departed the place without giving any information to the Escort-In-Charge and the petitioner remained absent from his duty from 15.04.2000 to 18.07.2000 i.e. 94 days without any information to the respondents. Thereupon, a departmental proceeding was initiated against the petitioner. It has been submitted that the petitioner was suffering from 'Jaundice' and was advised from doctor to take bed rest. After recovering from the said ailments, when the petitioner approached to the office of respondent with the medical certificate dated 14.07.2000 explaining valid reason for remaining absent, he came to know that he has been discharged/dismissed from his duty and the order of dismissal was served upon the petitioner vide order dated 06.06.2001 as evident from Annexure-2 to the writ application.
It has further been submitted that without giving any opportunity to the petitioner, charge-sheet was submitted against the petitioner and even the petitioner denied the allegation yet the inquiry officer found the petitioner guilty and submitted his report to the disciplinary authority, vide report dated 30.04.2001 (Annexure-3 to the writ application), who passed the impugned order of dismissal. Thereafter, the petitioner filed an appeal before D.I.G., Santhal Pragana region, Dumka on 25.06.2001 vide Annexure-5 to the writ application, which too has been dismissed vide order dated 08.07.2003 affirming the order passed by the disciplinary authority. 3. Being aggrieved by the impugned order for dismissal from services as well as the appellate order, the petitioner left with no other alternative, efficacious and speedy remedy has approached this Court invoking extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for redressal of their grievances. 4. Heard Mr. Pramod Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Ms. Shruti Shreshtha, J.C. to A.G., learned counsel appearing for the respondents and perused the records. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently submitted that the charge was never served on the petitioner and the petitioner was not given opportunity to show cause and the departmental proceeding No.19/2001 has been conducted behind the back of the petitioner. Therefore, there has been procedural irregularity in conducting the departmental proceeding. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that the order of punishment of dismissal from services is grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the charges. Learned counsel further submits that the action of respondents in dismissing the petitioner from services is violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India and the impugned order of dismissal is harsh and excessive. 6. In support of this case, learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to the judgments passed by this Court in W.P.(S) No. 5098 of 2004 dated 12.04.2010 in the case of Kameshwar Singh Vs. The State of Jharkhand & Ors.; C.W.J.C. No. 11912 of 1998P dated 23.02.2012 in the case of Shiv Kumar Singh Vrs. State of Bihar & Ors.; 2005 (2) BLJR 1415 in the case of Braj Kishor Singh Vs. State of Jharkahnd & Ors.; C.W.J.C. No. 1252 of 2004 dated 09.03.2011 in the case of Nand Bihari Pandey Vs. The State of Bihar and Ors. and 2003(1) JCR 457 (Jhr) in the case of Bhim Dubey Vs.
State of Bihar & Ors.; 2005 (2) BLJR 1415 in the case of Braj Kishor Singh Vs. State of Jharkahnd & Ors.; C.W.J.C. No. 1252 of 2004 dated 09.03.2011 in the case of Nand Bihari Pandey Vs. The State of Bihar and Ors. and 2003(1) JCR 457 (Jhr) in the case of Bhim Dubey Vs. State of Bihar & Ors. 7. Learned counsel for the respondents has strenuously countered to the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner by referring to the averments made in the counter-affidavit. Learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that the petitioner never approached to the concerned authority for leave and remained absent, as evident charge-sheet annexed as Annexure-A to the counter affidavit. It has further been submitted that the matter was inquired into and as per the report of the enquriy officer, the disciplinary authority passed the punishment order dated 06.06.2001, which was affirmed by the Appellate Authority. Learned counsel for the respondents has further referred to supplementary counter affidavit filed in pursuance of order dated 16.04.2015 passed by this Court. Learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that the Superintendent of Police, Pakur issued letter no. 1004 dated 01.07.2000 for ascertaining the native place or his permanent address of the constable-petitioner vide Annexure A to the supplementary counter affidavit. It has further been submitted that a report was submitted in this respect vide Annexure -B to the counter affidavit. Thereafter, the respondents started departmental proceeding against the petitioner and issued letter to the petitioner for participating in the departmental proceeding and also issued second show cause to the petitioner, which was received by the petitioner on 15.05.2001, as evident from Annexure-C to the counter affidavit. Therefore, the respondents have followed the principle of natural justice and after considering the entire material impugned order of punishment has been passed on 06.06.2001. 8. In support of his argument, learned counsel for the respondents has referred the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in the case of Union of India & Others Vrs. Datta Linga Toshatwad as reported in (2005) 13 SCC 709 and also referred to the decision rendered in the case of Anil Kumar Ram Vrs. The State of Jharkhand & Ors., as reported in 2015(2) JLJR 27 . 9.
Datta Linga Toshatwad as reported in (2005) 13 SCC 709 and also referred to the decision rendered in the case of Anil Kumar Ram Vrs. The State of Jharkhand & Ors., as reported in 2015(2) JLJR 27 . 9. Having heard learned counsel for the respective parties and on perusal of the relevant documents on records, the prayer made in the writ application is not legally sustainable due to the following facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements:- (a) Admittedly, due to unauthorized absence, a proceeding was initiated against the petitioner and the matter has been inquired into and charge being fully proved, the impugned order of punishment has been passed vide order dated 06.06.2001 and, thereafter, appeal preferred by the petitioner has also been rejected. Therefore, there appears to be no procedural illegality and irregularity so as to warrant any interference by this Court. (b) Moreover, members of the uniformed forces cannot remain absent themselves on frivolous pleas, having regard to the nature of duties entrusted to them. Such indiscipline, if it goes unpunished, will greatly affect the discipline of the forces. In such forces desertion is a serious matter. Member of a uniformed forces who overstays his leave by a few days must be able to give a satisfactory explanation. However, a member of the force who goes on leave and never reports for duties thereafter, cannot be said to be one merely overstaying his leave. He must be treated as a deserter. In such case of dismissal from the force is a justified disciplinary action and cannot be described as disproportionate to the misconduct alleged. This view has been illuminatively discussed in the case of Union of India and Ors. Vrs. Datta Linga Toshatwad as reported in (2005) 13 SCC 709 . (c) On perusal, it appears that there is a concurrent finding in the orders of the disciplinary authority and appellate authority. This Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot reappraise the evidence and cannot disturb the facts and finding given by the disciplinary authority as has been held by the Apex Court in case of State of U.P. and others Vrs. Raj Kishore Yadav and Another as reported in (2006) 5 SCC 673 at paragraph 4 held as follows:- “….......
Raj Kishore Yadav and Another as reported in (2006) 5 SCC 673 at paragraph 4 held as follows:- “…....... It is a settled law that the High Court has limited scope of interference in the administrative action of the State in exercise of extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, the findings recorded by the enquiry officer and the consequent order of punishment of dismissal from service should not be disturbed.” (d) In the case at hand, it appears that the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner are not applicable to the case of the petitioner and those judgments were rendered in different context. Moreover, the finding of guilt has already been recorded by the inquiry officer which culminated in the impugned order of dismissal and has been confirmed by the Appellate Authority. The High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has limited scope of interference so as to appraise order passed by the disciplinary as well as appellate authority concerned. 10. On the cumulative effect of aforesaid facts, reasons and judicial pronouncement and as logical sequitur to the discussion made in the foregoing paragraphs, the impugned order of dismissal from services vide Annexure-2 dated 06.06.2001 being confirmed by the Appellate Authority does not warrant any interference by this Court. 11. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed being devoid of any merit.