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2015 DIGILAW 138 (CAL)

Lalita Almal (Dec. ), Through Her Legal Representatives v. State of West Bengal

2015-02-18

JOYMALYA BAGCHI, MANJULA CHELLUR

body2015
JUDGMENT : The appellants before us are the legal representatives of the writ petitioner who fought the litigation upto Apex Court in the first round and several rounds of litigation before this Court. 2. So far as erstwhile owner becoming the owner of Premises no.2, Garstin Place, Police Station Hare Street, there is no dispute. Way back in 1965 the First Land Acquisition Collector of Calcutta requisitioned an area of 1253 sq.ft. lying on the northern portion of the first floor of the said premises under the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Requisition and Control (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1947. Said portion of the property was allotted to the Election authority of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation. It is also not in dispute that in the year 1986 further area of 1079 sq.ft. lying on the southern portion of the third floor of the premises too was requisitioned for the same purpose of beneficiary to the Election authority of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation. 3. At this juncture, the first writ petition came to be filed in the year 1986, being Matter No.2407 of 1986. By virtue of the order dated 28.7.88 the Learned Single Judge of this Court opined that the requisition of the areas totalling three portions, that is, 1253 sq.ft., 1047 sq.ft. and 1370 sq.ft. on different floors of the property was upheld but the continuance of the requisitioned premises in question was permitted subject to several conditions. We are not concerned with all the conditions though second condition is very important and relevant for the purpose of deciding the controversy before us, which reads as under:- "2. The Respondents are directed to take steps to acquire the said portions of the premises in question under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act 1598 within a period of one year from today, if the Government wants to continue the use of the premises for the purpose for which it was requisitioned." 4. The Respondents are directed to take steps to acquire the said portions of the premises in question under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act 1598 within a period of one year from today, if the Government wants to continue the use of the premises for the purpose for which it was requisitioned." 4. At the time of disposal of the writ petition on 28.7.88, Section 49 was very much available in the enactment and in spite of the option that could be exercised by owner of the premises, direction was to acquire portions of the premises in question under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act at the behest of the owner and if the Government wants to continue with the use of the premises for the purpose for which it was requisitioned. Apparently, this order reached finality as neither the beneficiary nor the owner challenged the same. Subsequent to this order, a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 came to be published on 27.7.89 in terms of the directions of the order dated 28.7.88 followed by notification published in Anandabazar Patrika on 7.8.89 in terms of the procedure. On 31.8.89 and 11.12.89 objections under Section 5A of the Act were filed by the deceased erstwhile owner and there was no dispute regarding consideration of those objections by the Acquisition Collector. Meanwhile, on 10.1.90, declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act came to be issued and the same was published in Anandabazar Patrika. On 14.2.90 amendment to the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 by inserting Section 49A came to be made. Subsequently, the writ petition of the erstwhile owner being W.P. No.953 of 1990, pointing out non-consideration of the applications at Annexures B and C, that is, the objections mentioned above, came to be disposed of on 15.5.01, directing the authority concerned to consider the objections and dispose of the applications within a period of six weeks from the date of communication of the order. This was held by the Learned Single Judge and the same became final as there was no challenge to this order. Subsequently, a reasoned order came to be passed on 12.6.01 by the Land Acquisition Collector in terms of the order of this Court passed on 15.5.01. This was held by the Learned Single Judge and the same became final as there was no challenge to this order. Subsequently, a reasoned order came to be passed on 12.6.01 by the Land Acquisition Collector in terms of the order of this Court passed on 15.5.01. Again, this order of the First Land Acquisition Collector dated 12.6.01 came to be questioned in a writ petition W.P. No.2305 of 2001 and the same came to be dismissed on 23.3.09. Against the said dismissal, appeal APO 104 of 2009 came to be filed and the said appeal came to be disposed of on 1.2.10. The Division Bench in its order dated 1.2.10 directed the First Land Acquisition Collector to determine the issues as regards Section 49 and 49A of the First Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 5. We have gone through the judgment of the Division Bench in detail and it is relevant to mention that as on the date of disposal of this appeal, both Sections 49 and 49A were in existence. It is also relevant to mention here, as on the date of order dated 28.7.88 directing partial acquisition of the property, Section 49 was very much in existence though Section 49A came to be inserted later. In other words, as on the date of disposal of first writ petition, the statute provided option to the owner seeking acquisition of the entire property and in spite of such option the Learned Judge directed the authorities concerned to acquire portions of the properties mentioned above within a year from 28.7.88. With this the right of the writ petitioner seeking any benefit under Section 49 came to an end and we had to proceed further from that date onwards. In that view of the matter, one has to see whether the owner could have re-agitated the matter that the entire property requires to be acquired as his option under Section 49 was very much available prior to insertion of Section 49A with effect from 14.2.90. 6. So far as the remand order dated 1.2.10 to determine the issues once again with regard to applicability of Section 49A, became the obligation of the First Land Acquisition Collector. 6. So far as the remand order dated 1.2.10 to determine the issues once again with regard to applicability of Section 49A, became the obligation of the First Land Acquisition Collector. Subsequently the matter was taken up before the First Land Acquisition Collector, Kolkata on different dates wherein the deceased petitioner was allowed to submit several documents and he was also given an opportunity of being heard before the Collector. On 22.3.10 a reasoned order came to be passed rejecting the claim of the petitioner that Section 49 of the Act alone is applicable since the acquisition commenced at the time when Section 49A was not yet inserted and therefore, question of**** considering the dispute with reference to Section 49A would not arise. 7. Aggrieved by the rejection of claim of the appellant favourably, the present writ petition being W.P. No.193 of 2011 came to be filed. 8. In the meanwhile, challenging the orders of the Division Bench dated 1.2.10, Special Leave Petitions filed before the Apex Court came to be disposed of on 22.10.10 and later on 15.11.10. The Apex Court by orders dated 22.10.10 and 15.11.10, clearly declined to interfere in the matter since the challenge was against an order of remand but, however, liberty was granted to the deceased petitioner to argue all aspects connected with the issue. Much prior to this direction the reasoned order of the Land Acquisition Collector in terms of the Division Bench order came to be passed, that is, on 22.3.2010. Since there was no modification or setting aside of the order of the Division Bench of this Court by the Apex Court, they have no impact on the impugned order of the Collector. Ultimately, we have to see whether the procedure adopted by the Collector concerned, being the First Land Acquisition Collector, is in accordance with the procedure contemplated and also in terms of the directions given by the Court. 9. As narrated above, the order of the Learned Single Judge dated 28.7.88 inter se between the parties reached finality whereby categorically the Learned Judge opined, at the instance of the petitioner only that portions of the properties referred above could be acquired since the requisition by the beneficiary continues. 9. As narrated above, the order of the Learned Single Judge dated 28.7.88 inter se between the parties reached finality whereby categorically the Learned Judge opined, at the instance of the petitioner only that portions of the properties referred above could be acquired since the requisition by the beneficiary continues. Having taken such direction from the Court, which was never challenged, now it is not open to the appellant/writ petitioner to contend that only in Section 49 his objections could have been considered and his option seeking acquisition of the entire property has to be entertained. When specific direction was to acquire portions of the property at a time only when Section 49 was in existence, now having kept quiet without challenging the said order it does not lie in the mouth of the petitioner/appellant to contend the said issue. 10. Then coming to the direction of Learned Single Judge in the year 2001 in the second round of litigation and also the observations made by the Division Bench in 2010, there was no positive benefit or declaration of entitlement or right so far as the appellant/writ petitioner. The Learned Single Judge and the Division Bench simply remanded the matter for fresh consideration and to consider the applicability of Section 49A. Section 6 declaration dated 10.1.90 was not set aside. Therefore, whatever was available under the statute prior to 14.2.90 was applicable and alone would be considered. The claim and the direction in the order dated 28.7.88 would remain and bind the appellant/writ petitioner. In other words, even if he were to have the benefit of Section 49, the same cannot be agitated in the light of positive direction to acquire portions of the property by order dated 28.7.90. 11. Then coming to the directions of the Division Bench, the Acquisition Officer in strict compliance has looked into the matter and opined that since the matter was to be reconsidered in terms of the directions of the Learned Single Judge, which merged with the order of the Division Bench which was not interfered by the Apex Court, considered the matter and passed afresh a reasoned order which became the subject matter of challenge in the third round. 12. 12. In the light of above factual situation and finality to the rights of the parties under earlier provisions of law prior to insertion of Section 49A and with the insertion of Section 49A, right of the appellant/petitioner cannot be expanded or considered afresh totally ignoring the earlier decision by this Court, which binds the parties inter se. Over and above this, if subsequent change of law Section 49A were to be considered to the facts of the case, the very provisions of Section 49A came to be inserted in order to remove any doubts or ambiguity with the wordings used in Section 49. 13. Therefore, no fresh right can be created in favour of the appellant/petitioner by virtue of Section 49 and Section 49A does not expand the rights which came to be determined in the earlier writ petition by order dated 28.7.88. 14. In that view of the matter, Learned Single Judge was justified in opining that since the matter had to be considered in terms of the direction of the Division Bench which came to be affirmed by the Apex Court, Section 49A, the changed version has to be applied and not reopen the issue with reference to Section 49, which was concluded earlier. Therefore, viewed from any angle, the contentions raised by the appellant cannot be entertained and the Learned Judge was justified in approving the reasoned order of the First Land Acquisition Collector. Accordingly, both the appeal and application are dismissed.