Judgment 1. Rule. Heard finally with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties. 2. By the present petition, the petitioner challenges the order passed by respondent No.1 whereby the representation filed on behalf of the petitioner stands disposed of by maintaining the disqualification of the petitioner under provisions of Section 44(e) of the Maharashtra Universities Act, 1994 (for short the said Act). 3. The relevant facts are that the petitioner had appeared for the M. A. examination in the year 1987 wherein he was found guilty of having indulged in unfair means in the conduct of the examination. After an enquiry was held, the punishment of debarring him from the examination came to be imposed for said misconduct. The petitioner at that point of time was working as a Lecturer in a College that was affiliated to respondent No.2 – University. Subsequently, in the year 2001, the petitioner was elected as a Dean to the faculty of Commerce which is one of the authorities of the University under Section 24 of the said Act. The petitioner was subsequently elected to the Board of Studies and was also a Member of the Management Council. On 29-9-2011, the Vice Chancellor of the respondent No.1 – University disqualified the petitioner from the membership of the Senate in view of provisions of Section 44(e) of the said Act. In the light of said disqualification, a representation dated 24-10-2011 came to be addressed to respondent No.1 seeking necessary action in that regard. By the order dated 20-11-2013, the Hon'ble Vice Chancellor while disposing of the said representation maintained the disqualification of the petitioner under Section 44(e) of the said Act. Said order is under challenge in the present writ petition. 4. Shri M. M. Sudame, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner could not have been held disqualified under Section 44(e) of the said Act. He submitted that Direction No.10 had been issued by the Vice Chancellor wherein the procedure for disqualification from membership of an authority of the University had been prescribed wherein it was specified that debarment would be operative only for the period mentioned while imposing the punishment. It was submitted that the unfair means for which the petitioner was held guilty pertained to the year 1987 when the petitioner was a student and hence, in 2011 said misconduct could not be used for disqualifying the petitioner. It was submitted that the unfair means for which the petitioner was held guilty pertained to the year 1987 when the petitioner was a student and hence, in 2011 said misconduct could not be used for disqualifying the petitioner. He submitted that provisions of Section 44(e) of the said Act would be applicable only when the person disqualified commits the acts mentioned therein while holding a particular office of any authority of the University. As the petitioner was not holding any office in the year 1987 said misconduct could not be used for disqualifying the petitioner. He then submitted that aforesaid Direction No.10 had been referred by the Vice Chancellor to the Chancellor in terms of Section 108 of the said Act. However, the same was not supported by a requisition signed by 25 members of the Senate. He, therefore, submitted that the Hon'ble Chancellor could not have entertained the representation made by the Vice-Chancellor and the matter of disqualification had to be considered by giving effect to Direction No.10 by virtue of which the petitioner could not have been disqualified. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bihar State Council of Ayurvedic and Unani Medicine vs State of Bihar and others (2007) 12 SCC 728 and especially para – 51 thereof. He therefore, submitted that the impugned order cannot be sustained and same deserves to be set aside. 5. Smt. B. H. Dangre, learned Government Pleader appearing for respondent No.1 supported the impugned order. According to her, the respondent No.1 was legally justified in holding the petitioner disqualified under provisions of Section 44(e) of the said Act. She submitted that aforesaid provisions were required to be interpreted in a wide manner considering the object behind enacting the same. According to her, provisions of Section 44(e) have been enacted so as to disqualify any person who has been punished for indulging in any unfair practices in the conduct of any examination in any form anywhere. Thus, even a student who has been punished for indulging any unfair means would be disqualified for membership of any authority of the University. In support of her submissions, she placed reliance upon the judgment of the Division Bench in Anil Ganpat Lohar vs. State of Maharashtra 2010(5) Mh.L.J. 442. Thus, even a student who has been punished for indulging any unfair means would be disqualified for membership of any authority of the University. In support of her submissions, she placed reliance upon the judgment of the Division Bench in Anil Ganpat Lohar vs. State of Maharashtra 2010(5) Mh.L.J. 442. It was then submitted that respondent No.1 had rightly invoked powers under Section 108 of the said Act while entertaining the representation made by the Vice Chancellor in respect of Direction No.10. She submitted that the legal effect of the provisions of Section 44(e) of the said Act could not be whittled down by means of Direction No.10. It was also brought to the notice of the Court that the present petitioner had also sought to challenge Notification dated 19-11-2010 issued by the Vice-Chancellor keeping Direction No.10 in abeyance but said challenge was not entertained and Writ Petition No.6675 of 2013 had not been entertained. She, therefore, submitted that Direction No.10 had been rightly found to be not applicable considering the provisions of Section 44(e) of the said Act. She, therefore, submitted that the writ petition was liable to be dismissed. 6. Shri R. D. Bhuibhar, learned Counsel appearing for respondent No.2 also supported the impugned order. He submitted that provisions of Section 44(e) of the said Act intend to cover situations wherein a student has been punished for indulging in unfair means as well as a teacher who is found promoting such unfair means. According to him, by use of the expression “person” in Section 44 of the said Act, the intention of the Legislature was clear and said expression took into its compass a student as well as a teacher. To buttress said submission, the learned Counsel placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in B. N. Muttoo v. T K. Nandi AIR 1979 SC 460 . He thus submitted that expression “person” not having been defined in the said Act, the ordinary dictionary meaning of said expression ought to be taken into account while interpreting said provision. In that regard, reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in R. D. Saxena vs. Balram Prasad Sharma 2001(1) Mh.L.J. 23 , and decision of the Division Bench in Nitin vs. President of India 2012(5) Mh.L.J. 452 . In that regard, reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in R. D. Saxena vs. Balram Prasad Sharma 2001(1) Mh.L.J. 23 , and decision of the Division Bench in Nitin vs. President of India 2012(5) Mh.L.J. 452 . It was then submitted that respondent No.1 acted within his jurisdiction while deciding the representation moved under Section 108 of the said Act. The respondent No.1 had jurisdiction to interpret provisions of Section 44(e) of the said Act. He, therefore, supported the impugned order and prayed for dismissal of he writ petition. 7. I have carefully considered respective submissions and I have also gone through the relevant material placed on record. Considering the aspect of exercise of jurisdiction by respondent No.1 under Section 108 of the said Act, it can be seen that a power has been conferred on the Chancellor to decide any question regarding interpretation of any provision of the said Act or of any statute, ordinance, regulation or rule. Similarly, the question regarding entitlement of a person to be a member of any authority can also be decided by the Chancellor. The mode of taking cognizance is by way of a petition by any person or body directly effected or suo motu by the Vice Chancellor to the Chancellor. Under the proviso to Section 108 of the said Act, upon a requisition signed by not less than 25 members of the Senate, a reference can also be made by the Vice Chancellor to the Chancellor. The aforesaid proviso, therefore, confers jurisdiction on the Chancellor to take cognizance either on a petition by a person aggrieved or suo motu by the Vice Chancellor. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioner as the reference made by the Vice Chancellor in respect of Direction No.10 was not upon a requisition signed by atleast 25 members of the Senate, adjudication of validity of Direction No.10 was without jurisdiction. Accepting said submission would result in interpreting the proviso in such a manner that would negate the provisions of Section 108 of the said Act. It is well settled that a proviso is merely an exception to the main provision and it cannot be read in a manner that would take away the effect of the main provision. In other words, the stream cannot rise higher than its source. It is well settled that a proviso is merely an exception to the main provision and it cannot be read in a manner that would take away the effect of the main provision. In other words, the stream cannot rise higher than its source. The mode of making a reference upon a requisition signed by atleast 25 members of the senate is just another mode of making a reference in addition to one being made by way of petition by any person affected or suo motu cognizance being taken by the Vice Chancellor. In the present case, such reference was made by the Vice Chancellor on 18-11-2010 and said reference, therefore, entitled respondent No.1 to decide the question regarding interpretation of said Act vis a vis Direction No.10. Thus, the exercise of jurisdiction by the respondent No.1 on the representation made by the Vice Chancellor suo motu cannot be faulted as being without jurisdiction. 8. Coming to the aspect of disqualification of the petitioner, it must be noted that Division Bench in Anil Ganpat Lohar (supra) had occasion to consider very same provision and it was held by the Division Bench that the period of disqualification not being specified in Section 44, said provision cannot be limited in its operation to the duration of punishment undergone by the person concerned. Thus, even if punishment has been suffered by a student, it has been held to be a disqualification incurred by such person which is a stigma of having committed malpractice in an examination that is to continue for his life and in perpetuity. Hence, the submission made on behalf of the petitioner that though he was punished in the year 1987 he was being disqualified in the year 2011 does not deserve acceptance in view of the law laid down by the Division Bench. Said stigma continues to operate and it has the effect of disqualifying the petitioner under Section 44(e) of the said Act. 9. Coming to the next submission made on behalf of the petitioner that the act in question as contemplated by Section 44 of the said Act must have been done while holding office, it must be kept in mind that Section 44 employs the expression “person” who is sought to be disqualified from being a member of any authority of the University. Said provision has been couched in the widest of terms indicating intention of the Legislature of disqualifying persons mentioned in categories (a) to (f) of Section 44 of the said Act. The reliance placed by the learned Counsel for respondent No.2 on the decision in B. N. Mottu (supra) in the context of considering the meaning of the expression “person” is apposite in the present facts. As observed by the Supreme Court in R.D. Saxena (supra), the expression “person” not having been defined in the said Act, its ordinary dictionary meaning ought to be taken into consideration. To the same effect is the decision in Nitin Shankar Deshpande (supra) and Sangita Suryawanshi (supra). Thus, the object is clear and the operation of provisions of Section 44 (e) of the said Act cannot be restricted to mean that only if a teacher indulges in promoting unfair means and has been punished that such person shall stand disqualified. The provisions of Section 44(e) of the said Act take into its compass a student who has been punished for indulging in any unfair means as well as a teacher who has been punished for promoting unfair practices. This is further evident from the use of expression “in any form anywhere” in Section 44(e). Hence, said submission made on behalf of the petitioner also cannot be accepted. 10. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, there is neither any jurisdictional error committed by the respondent No.1 in considering the representation forwarded by the Vice Chancellor in respect of Direction No.10 nor is the conclusion arrived at by the Hon'ble Chancellor while interpreting Section 44(e) of the said Act legally unsustainable. Consequently, the writ petition fails. Hence, the following order: ORDER The writ petition is dismissed with no order as to costs. Rule stands discharged.