JUDGMENT : 1. The petitioner is aggrieved against the order of suspension issued by the second respondent dated 01.09.2014. 2. The petitioner was appointed as B.T. Assistant in English, by an order of appointment issued by the first respondent on 25.09.2009. It is not in dispute that the first respondent is the appointing authority of the petitioner and therefore, he is the authority competent to take the disciplinary proceedings against him. However, the impugned order of suspension was issued by the second respondent, which is challenged by the petitioner mainly on the ground of want of jurisdiction. 3. The learned Government Advocate appearing for the respondents submitted that though the second respondent has passed the order of suspension, the same was ratified by the first respondent through proceedings dated 27.10.2014 and therefore, this court need not interfere with the said order on the ground of want of jurisdiction. 4. Heard both sides. 5. In this case, admittedly, the suspension order was issued by the second respondent on 01.09.2014 and challenging the same, the petitioner filed this writ petition on 18.09.2014. On 19.09.2014, the matter was taken up for hearing and notice was ordered to the respondents. Only thereafter, the first respondent has ratified the order of suspension through proceedings dated 27.10.2014. The very same issue was taken up by this Court in another writ petition in W.P(MD)No.1047 of 2015, wherein at paragraph 7, this court has observed as follows: “7. In this case, the petitioner, who was working as Headmaster, was suspended from service on 21.01.2015 on the ground that an enquiry into grave charges is contemplated against him. The said order was passed by the second respondent, who is the chief Educational Officer, Kanyakumari District. It is not in dispute that the Director of School Education is the appointing authority as well as the disciplinary authority insofar as the petitioner's post viz., Headmaster of High School is concerned. It is well settled that only the appointing authority can initiate disciplinary proceedings and impose the order of punishment. Admittedly in this case the order of suspension was issued not by the appointing authority. However, the development that had taken place in this case, that too subsequent to the filing of the writ petition is that the second respondent, who passed the impugned order, had obtained a ratification from the competent authority viz., first respondent later. Admittedly in this case the order of suspension was issued not by the appointing authority. However, the development that had taken place in this case, that too subsequent to the filing of the writ petition is that the second respondent, who passed the impugned order, had obtained a ratification from the competent authority viz., first respondent later. In my considered view, such ratification, as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, cannot be taken into consideration, since the said action had admittedly taken place not only after filing of the writ petition, but also after getting time from this Court on 03.02.2015 to nullify the jurisdictional point raised by the petitioner. Seeking such ratification thereafter and obtaining the same from the competent authority is nothing, but an over reaching act only to defeat the point of jurisdiction raised by the petitioner and hence such act cannot be justified. As it is observed in the order made by the Honourable Supreme Court reported in AIR 1978 SC 851 (Mohinder Singh vs. Chief Commissioner), that the validity of the order must be judged by the reason so mentioned therein including its competency, this Court is fully satisfied that the second respondent was not having the jurisdiction to pass the order of suspension on the date when it was passed. Accordingly, the impugned order of suspension is set aside. However, this order setting aside the order of suspension will not preclude the respondents from proceeding against the petitioner in accordance with law.” 6. Considering the above stated facts and circumstances of the case and considering the fact that the first respondent has ratified the order of suspension only after filing of the present writ petition, I am of the view that the petitioner is justified in contending that the order passed by the second respondent is solely without jurisdiction. As already held in the other decision, the ratification obtained by the first respondent during the pendency of the writ petition is nothing but, an over reaching act only to defeat the point of jurisdiction at the prayer sought for in this writ petition. Accordingly, I find every justification to allow the writ petition only on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. 7. Accordingly, this Writ Petition is allowed and the impugned order of suspension is set aside. Accordingly, I find every justification to allow the writ petition only on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. 7. Accordingly, this Writ Petition is allowed and the impugned order of suspension is set aside. However, this order setting aside the order of suspension will not preclude the respondents from proceeding against the petitioner in accordance with law. No costs. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed.