JUDGMENT Ashwani Kumar Mishra, J. 1. This petition is directed against the orders passed by the courts below, whereby landlord's application under Section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 has been allowed. 2. Sri Jafar Nayyer, learned Senior Advocate, appearing on behalf of the tenant-petitioner submits that interse between parties, there had been a compromise in a previous suit, according to which the landlord was prevented from seeking tenant's eviction from premises so long as petitioner remains alive. 3. The second limb of challenge to the orders impugned is that the aspect of comparative hardship has not been properly considered by both the courts below, inasmuch as the landlord was in possession of accommodation, far in excess of his need, whereas the tenant had no accommodation available to him, but this aspect of the matter has been completely omitted from consideration by the courts below. 4. Submission aforesaid is opposed by Sri A.N. Sinha, advocate who appeared for the landlord. He submits that there infact existed no decree, which prevented the landlord from seeking eviction of tenant on the ground of his personal need and, therefore, the finding returned by both the courts below, on this aspect, does not suffer from any legal infirmity. On the second aspect, he submits that the tenant had an alternative accommodation, which was clearly noticed in the report of the Commissioner vide Paper No. 55-C, but such premises in the name of the tenant's wife has been allegedly disposed of, during the pendency of the present proceedings, merely to set up a plea of need, which lacks bonafide. Contention is that hardship is created by tenant himself. 5. This court finds that inter-se between the parties there had been a previous suit filed in 1982, in which a compromise was arrived at between the parties and a decree was passed. Contention is that hardship is created by tenant himself. 5. This court finds that inter-se between the parties there had been a previous suit filed in 1982, in which a compromise was arrived at between the parties and a decree was passed. Clauses-1,2 and 3 of the compromise, which is a part of the compromise decree, is reproduced: - ^^ 1& ;g fd izfroknh us eq0 53500@& : i;s vius ftEes nsuk eku fy;k gSA ftlesa ls izfroknh us edku ua0 94@2] ubZ lM+d dkuiqj dk fdjk;k eq0 24640@& : i;s fdj;k feubOrnk 1&2&79 yxk;r 31&10&82 cljg 560@: i;s ekgokj bl jde eq0 53500@& : Ik;s esa ls eqtjk ns nh vkSj bl rkSj ij vc izfr0 dks eq0 28860@& : i;k nsuk okdh jg x;k gSA rkjh[k 1&11&82 ls rkjh[k 31&3&83 rd fdjk;k ckcr nks fdrk nqdkukr o ,d fgLlk fjgk;'kh edku ua0 94@2 ubZ lM+d dkuiqj tks fdjk;snkjh oknh gSA cljg fdjk;k eq0 425@& : i;k ekgokj ds fglkc ls 2125@& : Ik;k vkSj eqofyx 28860@& esa ls eqtjk gksxk blds i'pkr 31&3&83 rd eq0 26735@&: 0 izfroknh dks nsuk 'ks"k jgsxkA rkjh[k 1&4&83 ls cljg fdjk;k eq0 425@& : Ik;k izfrekg vnk djrk jgsxk vkSj ;g flyflyk r vnk;xh jde eq0 26735@& : 0 pyrk jgsxkA 2& ;g fd izfroknh us fdjk;k edku etdwj dk eq0 560@& : Ik;k ekgokj dks ctk; eq0 425@& : i;k ekgokj rkjh[k 1&11&82 ls dj fn;k gS D;ksa fd oknh eUtwj lqnk jde ij lwn ugh fy;k gSA 3& ;g fd izfroknh vkbUnk dHkh fdjk;k eq0 425@& : i;s ls T;knk c<+kus dk bdnkj u gksxk vkSj oknh dh fdjk;snkjh nekeh eqYljoj gksxh vkSj vxj xojUesUV ds gkml VSDl vkfn c<+rk gS rks mlh nj ls ekfyd edku fdjk;k c<+kus dk gdnkj gksxkA^^ 6. A perusal of the aforesaid compromise goes to show that certain amount was payable by the landlord to the tenant and for such purposes, the parties decided the manner of return/ adjustment of such amount. It was provided that after adjusting certain amount, the remaining amount was to be adjusted from part of the monthly rent, and an monthly amount of Rs. 225/- was to be appropriated for such purposes. It is not in dispute that the entire amount, which was payable by landlord has already been utilised and adjusted as per the terms of the decree. 7. 225/- was to be appropriated for such purposes. It is not in dispute that the entire amount, which was payable by landlord has already been utilised and adjusted as per the terms of the decree. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that by virtue of Clause-3 of the compromise, the landlord was prevented from initiating any eviction proceedings during the life time of the tenant. It is also submitted that the courts below have wrongly construed the compromise to be illegal on the ground of it being violative of Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act. Sri Nayyer, learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon the decision of Apex Court in Y. Sleebachen etc. Vs. Superintending Engineer, WRO/PWD and others, 2014 AIR SCW ,4898, Paras-15 and 16 to contend that once the parties have entered into compromise, contrary stand cannot be taken by them as the parties are parties are bound by the principle of estopple. Reliance has also been placed upon para-29 of the judgment reported in 2003(6 SCC,230 Dwarka Prasad Agrawal Vs. B.D. Agrawal and others. 8. So far as legal proposition , which is sought to be canvassed by the learned counsel for the petitioner is concerned, there are no two views. Law is settled that once parties have entered into a settlement, on the basis of compromise, parties are bound by its terms. However, in the facts of the present case, this court finds that there is no such settlement, which prevents or restrict the landlord from seeking eviction of tenant on the ground of personal need, under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act. As such, the decision relied upon by Sri Nayyer has no relevance at all. A perusal of the orders passed by both the courts below would go to show that the agreement was discarded by the courts below on the ground that such an agreement was contrary to law. Much argument had been advanced on the reasoning so assigned by both the courts below. However, a careful scrutiny of the agreement goes to show that infact there exists no such clause in the agreement, whereby, the landlord had given up his right to seek eviction of the tenant even on the ground of personal need. Much argument had been advanced on the reasoning so assigned by both the courts below. However, a careful scrutiny of the agreement goes to show that infact there exists no such clause in the agreement, whereby, the landlord had given up his right to seek eviction of the tenant even on the ground of personal need. It appears that construction, which is sought to be made out by the tenant, on the basis of the agreement that landlord had given up his right to seek eviction, was rejected, as it was found that such a clause was, otherwise, hit by Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act. In the facts of the present proceedings, however, this court finds that there is infact, no such clause in the compromise, whereby, the landlord has given up his right to seek eviction of the tenant on account of personal need and, as such, the argument advanced by Sri Nayyer, on the first score, is not liable to be accepted. 9. Coming to the second limb of petitioner's submission with regard to aspect of comparative assessment of hardship, it is not in dispute that during the pendency of the proceedings under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act, it was found, as a matter of fact, that the tenant had sufficient accommodation in the form of House No. 11-E(3) Pokherpurva, Kanpur Nagar, which was in the name of the tenant's wife. This accommodation was found to be sufficient for tenant's need, as per Commissioner's report, which was on record as Paper No. 55-C. This premise is allegedly transferred by the tenant, during the pendency of present proceedings. Once the proceedings for eviction, at the instance of the landlord, was pending and it was found that the tenant had sufficient accommodation available, which was in the name of his wife, tenant's decision to transfer the property, during the pendency of dispute, was at his own risk. Hardship, if any, of tenant is self generated, and he has only himself to blame for it. The aspect of the tenant's need, which is sought to be protected by Act No. 13 of 1972, was adequately protected, and once the tenant had his own personal property where he could live, he cannot be permitted to dispose of such property and thereafter seek continuance of tenancy on the ground of personal hardship. The aspect of the tenant's need, which is sought to be protected by Act No. 13 of 1972, was adequately protected, and once the tenant had his own personal property where he could live, he cannot be permitted to dispose of such property and thereafter seek continuance of tenancy on the ground of personal hardship. In such circumstances, the reasons assigned in the orders passed by both the courts below, holding that the tenant had sufficient accommodation, and the aspect of comparative hardship is in favour of landlord, cannot be said to be perverse. 10. No other point has been pressed. 11. Petition fails and is consigned to records.