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2015 DIGILAW 140 (MP)

Jani v. State of M. P.

2015-02-03

A.M.KHANWILKAR, SANJAY YADAV

body2015
JUDGMENT : Sanjay Yadav, J. 1. At the outset, it may be mentioned that batch of these appeals arising out of judgment dated 30.8.2003 passed in S.T. No.218/1997 and S.T. No.219/1997 being clubbed with batch of other appeals viz. Cri. Appeal Nos.1436/2003, 1514/2003, 1527/2003, 1586/2003, 1626/2003, 1690/2003, 1720/2003, 1782/2003, 1871/2003 and No.516/2006, arising out of S.T. No. 220/1997, are analogously heard and are, therefore, being decided by two separate judgments. The present judgment will govern disposal of Criminal Appeal Nos.1437/2003, 1513/2003, 1528/2003, 1625/2003, 1648/2003, 1649/2003, 1691/2003, 1707/2003, 1708/2003, 1771/2003 and 1876/2003. 2. Additional Sessions Judge, Rewa vide judgment dated 30.8.2003 in Sessions Trials No.218/1997 and 219/1997, indicted ten persons for the murder and other allied offences. One person namely Ramju @ Ramjan Ali was acquitted. Persons convicted were for the offences under Sections 148 and 302 read with 149 IPC (on two counts) and sentenced to undergo R.I. for two years and life imprisonment respectively & also to pay fine of Rs.1000/- with default stipulation, for committing murder of two persons by forming unlawful assembly. 3. On 12.2.1997, Vijay alias Pappu, son of Sunder Naidu and Rajjan Patel, son of Ramdhar Patel, were found murdered at Vyankat Road near Khanna Chouraha and Nagar Nigam Bagia. 4. The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 12.2.1997 at or about 6 p.m. and 6.10 p.m., all the accused persons formed themselves into an unlawful assembly, armed with sword, gupti, katar, road and katta (country made pistol) & with a common object, had beaten Vijay @ Pappu and Rajjan Patel by stopping them near Khanna Chouraha, as a result whereof, Vijay @ Pappu died at the spot. Rajjan Patel, who tried to escape, was also beaten by deadly weapons, causing grievous injuries to which he succumbed in the hospital at 8 p.m. The miscreants then left the place. 5. Dehati Nalishi (Ex.P/1) lodged at 19.50 at Police Station Civil Lines by Leela Naidu, the mother of Vijay @ Pappu (since deceased), led to merge intimation vide Ex.P/2, culminating in FIR (Ex.P/11) vide Crime No.93/1997. In respect of death of Rajjan Patel, offence was registered vide FIR (Ex.P/17) vide Crime No.44/1997 at the instance of Ramadhar Patel. Parmeshwar Deen Urmalia (PW20), Station House Officer Police Station Civil Lines, took up investigation. He held the inquest upon the dead bodies and sent requisition to the Medical Officer for post-mortem examination. In respect of death of Rajjan Patel, offence was registered vide FIR (Ex.P/17) vide Crime No.44/1997 at the instance of Ramadhar Patel. Parmeshwar Deen Urmalia (PW20), Station House Officer Police Station Civil Lines, took up investigation. He held the inquest upon the dead bodies and sent requisition to the Medical Officer for post-mortem examination. He then went to the scene of offence, prepared the map, seized some bloodstained earth and seized jeep, motorcycle said to be used by the miscreants in perpetration of the offence. In the course of investigation, he arrested accused persons and pursuant to the statement made by them, recovered some swords and iron rods. On completion of investigation, he submitted the charge sheet against them. 6. Previous enmity and the election rivalry was attributed in motivation of crime. 7. The accused persons pleaded not guilty to the charges levelled against them and contended that they were falsely implicated. 8. In support of its case, prosecution examined 20 witnesses. Defence also examined their witnesses. Out of the witnesses examined by the prosecution, PW2 Gengla Kol, PW12 Suresh Kumar Saket, PW16 Ramniwas Sharma and PW18 Sunil Kumar Shukla, figured as eyewitnesses. These eyewitnesses narrated the prosecution case. The trial Judge, after analyzing the evidence threadbare and negativing the defence version, held that so far as the place and the overt act attributed to the accused persons, there were no material discrepancies except few minor omissions, having no adverse impact on substantial evidence. The trial Court found the eyewitness' version corroborating with the short post mortem report and port mortem report (Ex.P/7, P/8, P/9 and P/10) and evidence of PW8 Dr. Vijay Tiwari and PW9 Dr. S.K. Pathak, who conducted postmortem examination upon the deceased Rajjan Patel and Vijay @ Pappu respectively. 9. The trial Court further found that the FIR was promptly lodged and it contained gist of prosecution case. Yet, trial Court acquitted accused A-10 Ramju @ Ramjan from the charges for conspiracy under Section 120B IPC. 10. Principal submissions were led by learned Senior Counsel Shri P.R. Bhave. We have also heard Shri Anil Khare, Senior Counsel with Ms. Namrata Keserwani, Shri Siddharth Datt, Shri G.S. Baghel, Shri J.L. Mishra, Shri S.A. Khan, Shri V.K. Mishra and Shri Deepak Panjwani, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respective appellant. 11. 10. Principal submissions were led by learned Senior Counsel Shri P.R. Bhave. We have also heard Shri Anil Khare, Senior Counsel with Ms. Namrata Keserwani, Shri Siddharth Datt, Shri G.S. Baghel, Shri J.L. Mishra, Shri S.A. Khan, Shri V.K. Mishra and Shri Deepak Panjwani, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respective appellant. 11. Critising the judgment recording conviction, it is contended that the trial Court committed grave error in relying on the eyewitness of version of PW2, PW12, PW16 and PW18. These witnesses, it is urged, were not a wholly reliable as their conduct has been so unnatural that it would be unsafe to rely on their version of prosecution case to record conviction. Referring to case diary statement of these witnesses and the contradictions and omissions which have occurred during examination in the Court, it is contended that it will be highly unsafe to rely on the version of these witnesses because of certain improvements made during examination in Court to suit the prosecution case. Learned counsels appearing for A-4, A-5, A-6, A-9 and A-11 viz. Fyuz @ Mahfuz, Yakoob @ Popu, Suleman son of Abdul Hafeez, Jani @ Firdous and Raju son of Sherali Musalman, while adopting the submissions of learned Senior Counsel in addition has to submit that A-4, A-5, A-6, A-9 and A-11 though did not find mention in both the FIRs were roped in on the basis of the case diary statement by PW2 and the statement having been recorded after ten days from the date of incident i.e. on 23.2.1997. It is contended that PW12, PW16 and PW18, the eyewitnesses to the incident, did not name in their examination-in-chief A-4, A-5 and A-6 creates doubt of they being at the scene of crime. It is urged that since the prosecution has relied on these eyewitnesses, incumbent it was upon it to have established beyond any pale of doubt their presence and the prosecution having utterly failed to do so, the trial Court grossly erred in holding A-4, A-5 and A-6, A-9 and A-11 guilty of the offence. It is urged that the trial Court ought to have recorded their acquittal. 12. Learned counsel appearing for A-2 Chunnu has to submit that though Chunnu's name appear in both the FIRs; however, it is not clear as to which Chunnu, the FIR relates to. It is urged that the trial Court ought to have recorded their acquittal. 12. Learned counsel appearing for A-2 Chunnu has to submit that though Chunnu's name appear in both the FIRs; however, it is not clear as to which Chunnu, the FIR relates to. It is contended that while PW2 does not name Chunnu in his evidence, PW12 and PW18 talks about Chunnu, son of Sherali; whereas, it is Chunnu @ Mairajul Haq son of Inamul Haq, who has been framed as an accused. It is contended that, since the prosecution has failed to establish the presence of Chunnu @ Mairajul Haq, son of Inamul Haq at the scene of occurrence, the trial Court ought to have recorded his acquittal. 13. Learned counsel for the State, on his turn, supports the convictions recorded by impugned judgment and contends inter alia that minor contradictions and omissions which have occurred in the course of ocular evidence of prosecution witness do not sweep away the prosecution case based on substantive evidence led by eyewitnesses who have vividly described the prosecution case in bringing home the offences committed by the accused persons. It is urged that the eyewitness version of the deceased being beaten by the accused-assailants get corroborated with the medical evidence and the postmortem report of both the deceased, the injuries found on their bodies. It is further contended that though A-4, A-5, A-6, A-9 and A-11 do not appear in the FIR; however, the statement of eyewitnesses recorded at first instance within close proximity of time of incident and the absence of evidence of eyewitnesses having any previous enmity does not rule out their participation in commission of crime. As regard to A-2, it is urged that the prosecution did not falter in brining Chunnu son of Inamul Huq rather than Chunnu son of Sherali to the books. It is urged that the conviction being based on credible evidence, does not warrant any interference. 14. We have carefully gone through the entire evidence on record and the judgment by the trial Court and heard the learned counsel for the parties at length. 15. Credibility of eyewitnesses has been seriously doubted. And, even the presence of PW2 at the scene of crime has been questioned. 16. 14. We have carefully gone through the entire evidence on record and the judgment by the trial Court and heard the learned counsel for the parties at length. 15. Credibility of eyewitnesses has been seriously doubted. And, even the presence of PW2 at the scene of crime has been questioned. 16. The incident having taken place at 5.30 p.m. at a busy market place, it cannot be gainsaid that a rickshaw puller, a resident of vicinity cannot be expected to not to be at the scene of crime. PW12, PW16 and PW18 are all local residents and in absence of any material evidence to suggest their presence elsewhere, their witnessing of the commission of crime is beyond any pale of doubt. 17. Much has been said about the credibility of PW2 Gengla Kol, the eyewitness to the incident. 18. The credibility is doubted, firstly on the count that in paragraph 7 of his examination, PW2 has stated of his being present at the sight of incident and has also stated to have visited the hospital and of narrating the incident to the police personnel present in the hospital. He also states that he got his statement recorded next day i.e. 13.2.1997 at Police Station Civil Lines. However, these facts get contradicted from the statement of PW20 P.D. Urmaliya, the investigating officer who, in paragraph 39 of his cross examination, confirmed of having recorded the statement of PW2 vide Ex.D/7 on 23.2.1997. It is further contended that in his re-examination on 17.9.1998 in paragraph 14 in his cross examination; though he denies of having given an affidavit on 8.7.1997 (Ex.D/10), it is urged that the acceptance of his signature in the order sheet dated 13.7.1998 and subsequent denial, create a doubt of his being present at the place of incident when the incident had taken place. Laying emphasis on the statement in paragraph 18, it is contended that when this eyewitness categorically states of having not reporting incident at Police Station Civil Lines and that he did not go to the Police Station Civil Lines. Laying emphasis on the statement in paragraph 18, it is contended that when this eyewitness categorically states of having not reporting incident at Police Station Civil Lines and that he did not go to the Police Station Civil Lines. It is urged that when these facts are cumulatively assessed suggest the only conclusion that PW2 is a made up witness who was not present at the spot when incident took place and therefore, when confronted with vital facts as could have ensured that he was present at the time of incident, he faulters in giving satisfactory answer. 19. State Counsel, on his turn, however contradicts the contentions made on behalf of the appellants, doubting PW2's credibility. It is contended that viewed from defence version, there appear some omissions and contradictions but they are trivial enough to be ignored and belie his non-presence as suggested. 20. Taking us through the statement of PW20, the Investigating Officer, it is urged that he has tendered cogent explanation, though in cross-examination for belated recording of the statement of PW2. Placing reliance on the statement of PW20 in paragraph 41, 42, 51, 112 and 115, it is contended on behalf of the State that it was because of non-co-operation of local shopkeepers in investigation, some delay, however, had occurred in recording the statement of PW2. 21. Relying on the statement made by PW20, Investigating Officer, in paragraphs 3, 53 and 95, it is contended by learned Government Advocate that the presence of PW2 at the spot and witnessing the entire incident, cannot be doubted. Learned counsel further states that the ocular statement as regard to nature of injuries sustained to the deceased having corroborated with the injuries depicted in post-mortem report and short post- mortem report (Ex.P-7, Ex.P-8, P-9 and P-10) further strengthens the fact that PW2 was present at the sight when the incident had occurred. 22. On these submissions, learned Govt. Advocate counters the contentions by the appellants as to credibility of PW2. 23. Trite it is that the credibility of witness has to be tested on the touchstone of truthfulness and trustworthiness. Whether the evidence of PW2 inspires such confidence is the question. 22. On these submissions, learned Govt. Advocate counters the contentions by the appellants as to credibility of PW2. 23. Trite it is that the credibility of witness has to be tested on the touchstone of truthfulness and trustworthiness. Whether the evidence of PW2 inspires such confidence is the question. PW12 Suresh Kumar Saket, another eyewitness when cross-examined on behalf of accused A-1 Afsar Ali and A-9 Jani alias Firdous in paragraph 3 categorically states of having seen Gengla Kol (PW2) on the spot This fact is corroborated by the statement by PW2 who, in paragraph 6, when cross-examined on behalf of A-1, specifically states of having spotted Suresh Kumar Saket (PW12) And, though he states that he could not converse with Suresh , but a non-conversation ipso facto is not such an omission as would lead to presume non-presence or to doubt the truthfulness or trustworthiness. There is one more reason not to doubt the presence of PW2 at the scene of incident. There is no material on record to suggest that this PW2 had an occasion to personally see the victims in the hospital to ascertain the injuries sustained nor that he had an access to the post-mortem report; however, the ocular description of the overt act of the accused persons, the weapon used and the injuries sustained is corroborative with post-mortem report as would suggest any tutoring by the investigating agency. And, merely because his statement is recorded after 10 days will not mean that he has not seen the incident happening. It is out of fear he avoided informing the police. This is also borne out from Ex.D/8. The statement of Investigating Officer reveals the situation which got built up after the incident. There was law and order situation involving two communities and in such charged atmosphere, there is every likelihood of a local who happens to be a rickshaw-puller to have taken some time to have gathered the courage to narrate the incident and the investigating agency also having investigating in the atmosphere charged with hostility, as the shopkeepers were not coming forward to co-operate, came forward to co-operate. For these reasons, he cannot be disbelieved. On the contrary, his presence gets cemented with the revelation of facts sequenced in a natural way, despite of certain minor contradictions and omissions which itself is the proof of his being not tutored. 24. For these reasons, he cannot be disbelieved. On the contrary, his presence gets cemented with the revelation of facts sequenced in a natural way, despite of certain minor contradictions and omissions which itself is the proof of his being not tutored. 24. Accordingly, PW2's credibility cannot be doubted. There is no iota of doubt of his being present at the spot and witnessed the entire incident. He is a natural eyewitness. 25. Similarly, the presence of PW12, PW16 and PW18 at the spot cannot be doubted which will be evident from their evidence. They being eyewitnesses have meticulously ascribed the role by each individual accused in their examination and are not shaken by long cross examination. 26. The injuries on Rajjan Patel, as evident from Ex.P/7 post- mortem report, were - "bruise on right back chest level 10th and 11th rib; bruise over right shoulder, muscle ecchymosis; bruise on right iliac fossa with muscle ecchymosis; injury on removal of stitches; the wound on 2" lateral to 9'o clock of the anus is directed downward, upward to abdominal cavity, corresponding area muscle tear and ecchymosis measured about 13½ inches, three stitches on removal of stitch appear to be stab in nature. 27. Cause of death Rajjan Patel was shock and haemorrhage as a result of tear to liver mesentery and rectum. The injuries in the opinion of Dr. Vijay Tiwari (PW8) were caused by hard, blunt and sharp edged object and were sufficient to cause death. 28. Similarly, injuries found on the body of Vijay @ Pappu as per post mortem report (Ex.P-9) were - stab wound on right side of chest 1 1/2 x 1/2 x cavity deep, muscle ecchymosis; bruise right side of shoulder size 2" x 1", bruise right side of elbow size 1 1/2" x 1/2", bruise on occipital region size 3" x 2". 29. The cause of death as per the doctors was of shock due to injuries to vital organs, right lungs and precardiac with excess blood loses. The injuries in the opinion of Dr. S.K. Pathak (PW9), were caused by hard, blunt and sharp edged object and were sufficient to cause death. 30. The injuries sustained by the deceased and the vivid description by eyewitnesses of PW2, PW12, PW16 and PW18, leaves no iota of doubt of they being present at the scene of crime having witnessed the same. 31. S.K. Pathak (PW9), were caused by hard, blunt and sharp edged object and were sufficient to cause death. 30. The injuries sustained by the deceased and the vivid description by eyewitnesses of PW2, PW12, PW16 and PW18, leaves no iota of doubt of they being present at the scene of crime having witnessed the same. 31. Common object of the unlawful assembly can be gathered from the nature of the assembly, arms used by them and the behaviours of the assembly at or before scene of occurrence. The facts and circumstances help in deducting the element of common object. The question as to what is required to be proved against a person who is alleged to be a member of an unlawful assembly came up for consideration in Masalti v. State of U.P. : AIR 1965 SC 202 wherein it is held - "While determining this question, it becomes relevant to consider whether the assembly consisted of some persons who were merely passive witnesses and had joined the assembly as a matter of idle curiosity without intending to entertain the common object of the assembly. In fact. S. 149 makes it clear that if an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, every person who, at the time of the committing of that offence, is a member of the same assembly, is guilty of that offence; and that emphatically brings out the principle that the punishment prescribed by S. 149 is in a sense vicarious and does not always proceed on the basis that the offence has been actually committed by every member of the unlawful assembly." 32. In Lalji v. State of U.P. : (1989) 1 SCC 437 , it is held - "8. Section 149 IPC provides that if an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such as the members of the assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, every person, who at the time of committing of that offence is a member of the same assembly, is guilty of that offence. As has been defined in S. 141 IPC, an assembly of five or more persons is designated an 'Un-lawful Assembly', if the common object of the persons composing that assembly is to do any act or acts stated in clauses 'First', 'Second', 'Third', 'Fourth, and 'Fifth' of that section. An assembly, as the explanation to the section says, which was not unlawful when it assembled, may subsequently become an unlawful assembly. Whoever being aware of facts which render any assembly an unlawful assembly intentionally joins that assembly, or continues in it, is said to be a member of an unlawful assembly. Thus, whenever so many as five or more persons meet together to support each other, even against opposition, in carrying out the common object which is likely to involve violence or to produce in the minds of rational and firm men any reasonable apprehension of violence, then even though they ultimately depart without doing anything whatever towards carrying out their common object, the mere fact of their having thus met will constitute an offence. Of course, the alarm must not be merely, such as would frighten any foolish or timid person, but must be such as would alarm person of reasonable firmness and courage. The two essentials of the section are the commission of an offence by any member of an unlawful assembly and that such offence must have been committed in prosecution of the common object of that assembly or must be such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed. Not every person is. necessarily. guilty but only those who share in the common object. The common object of the assembly must be one of the five objects mentioned in S. 141 IPC Common object of the unlawful assembly can be gathered from the nature of the assembly, arms used by them and the behaviour of the assembly at or before scene of occurrence. It is an inference to be deduced from the facts and circumstances of each case. 9. Section 149 makes every member of an unlawful assembly at the time of committing of the offence guilty of that offence. Thus this section created a specific and distinct offence. It is an inference to be deduced from the facts and circumstances of each case. 9. Section 149 makes every member of an unlawful assembly at the time of committing of the offence guilty of that offence. Thus this section created a specific and distinct offence. In other words, it created a constructive or vicarious liability of the members of the unlawful assembly for the unlawful acts committed pursuant to the common object by any other member of that assembly. However, the vicarious liability of the members of the unlawful assembly extends only to the acts done in pursuance of the common object of the unlawful assembly, or to such offences as the members of the unlawful assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object. Once the case of a person falls within the ingredients of the section the question that he did nothing with his own hands would be immaterial. He cannot put forward the defence that he did not with his own hands commit the offence committed in prosecution of the common object of the unlawful assembly or such as the members of the assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object. Everyone must be taken to have intended the probable and natural results of the combination of the acts in which he joined. It is not necessary that all the persons forming an unlawful assembly must do some overt act. When the accused persons assembled together, armed with lathis, and were parties to the assault on the complainant party, the prosecution is not obliged to prove which specific overt act was done by which of the accused. This section makes a member of the unlawful assembly responsible as a principal for the acts of each, and all, merely because he is a member of an unlawful assembly. While overt act and active participation may indicate common intention of the person perpetrating the crime, the mere presence in the unlawful assembly may fasten vicariously criminal liability under S. 149. It must be noted that the basis of the constructive guilt under S. 149 is mere membership of the unlawful assembly, with the requisite common object or knowledge." 33. While overt act and active participation may indicate common intention of the person perpetrating the crime, the mere presence in the unlawful assembly may fasten vicariously criminal liability under S. 149. It must be noted that the basis of the constructive guilt under S. 149 is mere membership of the unlawful assembly, with the requisite common object or knowledge." 33. Coming now to the facts as to whether A-2 Chunnu has been rightly identified to be the part of unlawful assembly having participated in commission of crime and whether the prosecution has beyond any doubt succeeded in establishing his guilty. 34. Evidently, in both the FIRs (Ex.P/11 and P/17), Chunnu has been named as accused which fact is affirmed by PW3 and PW11. They, however, are not the eyewitness and had named the accused persons on the basis of information received. PW2, PW12, PW16 and PW18, though name Chunnu in their case diary statement (Ex.D-7, D-2, D-3 and D-4). In his statement in Court, PW2 does not name any of the Chunnus. In the Court during course of evidence when called upon to identify Chunnu @ Mirajul Haq who was present in Court he identifies him as Raju whereas, PW12 in his examination-in-chief mentions the name of Chunnu son of Sherali (See. Paragraph 1). Similarly, PW16 in paragraph 12 in evidence stated . In paragraph 56, he states This statement is made by him in cross examination on behalf of A-2. That, PW18, in paragraph 2 mentions Chunnus, son of Sherali. In paragraph 35, he states The prosecution thus utterly failed in establishing A-2 being the member of unlawful assembly participating in commission of crime. Thus, having made out a fair case, conviction of A-2 cannot be upheld, as it is not proved beyond doubt that he was one of the members of unlawful assembly who committed murder of Vijay @ Pappu and Rajjan Patel. 35. As to A-4 Fyuz @ Mahfooz is concerned, he was not named in either of the FIR. Nor, do the eyewitnesses A-2, A-12, A-16 and A-18 mention in their examination-in-chief his presence at the scene of crime. Prosecution having failed to commend at plausible and cogent evidence as to A-4's presence and participation in the commission of crime, his conviction is not free from doubt. Nor, do the eyewitnesses A-2, A-12, A-16 and A-18 mention in their examination-in-chief his presence at the scene of crime. Prosecution having failed to commend at plausible and cogent evidence as to A-4's presence and participation in the commission of crime, his conviction is not free from doubt. Though, it is contended by learned counsel for the State that the iron rod was seized from A-4 at his own instance and there is evidence to that effect led by PW16 (paragraph 72 of his cross examination). A fair reading of the statement by this eyewitness as regard to seizure however does not inspire much confidence as would lead to inevitable conclusion that A-4 was at the scene of crime and has committed the crime. Consequently, A-4 deserves to be acquitted. 36. As to A-5, A-6, A-9 and A-11 are concerned, these accused persons though not named in FIR; however, on the basis of case diary statement of the eyewitness i.e. PW12, PW16, PW18 recorded on 13.2.1997 and of PW2 on 23.2.1997 and the evidence in the Court and the role ascribed to these accused persons, their presence at the scene of crime and participation in commission of offence, cannot be doubted. Minor omission does not substantiate the defence's claim of they being wrongly implicated. The law is fairly well settled that FIR is not supposed to be an encyclopedia of the entire events and cannot contain the minutest details of the events. When essentially material facts are disclosed in the FIR that is sufficient. FIR is not substantive evidence and cannot be used for contradicting testimony of the eye witnesses except that may be used for the purpose of contradicting maker of the report. Though the importance of naming the accused persons in the FIR cannot be ignored, but names of the accused persons have to be named at the earliest possible opportunity. The question is whether a person was impleaded by way of afterthought or not must be judged having regard to the entire factual scenario in each case. Therefore, non naming of one or few of the accused persons in the FIR is no reason to disbelieve the testimony of crucial witnesses (Kirender Sarkar v. State of Assam AIR 2009 SC 2513 relied on). 37. In this view of the matter, no interference in the conviction of A-5, A-6, A-9 and A-11 is warranted. 38. Therefore, non naming of one or few of the accused persons in the FIR is no reason to disbelieve the testimony of crucial witnesses (Kirender Sarkar v. State of Assam AIR 2009 SC 2513 relied on). 37. In this view of the matter, no interference in the conviction of A-5, A-6, A-9 and A-11 is warranted. 38. Regarding remaining accused viz. A-1, A-3, A-7 and A-8, these being named in the FIR and there being direct evidence against by four eyewitnesses, PW2, PW12, PW16 and PW18, their conviction for the offences under Sections 148, 302 read with 149 and 302read with 149 IPC, being based on material evidence and the prosecution having proved the offence beyond doubt, does not call for any interference. 39. In the result, - (i) Criminal Appeal No.1625/2003 [Mahfyuj @ Fyuj (A-4) vs. State of M.P.] and Criminal Appeal No.1648/2003 and 1649/2003 [Chunnu @ Mirajul Haq (A-2) vs. State of M.P.] are allowed. The impugned convictions and consequent sentences are set aside. They are acquitted of the offences under Sections148, 302 read with 149 and 302 read with 149 IPC. If on bail, they need not surrender and they are discharged of the bail bonds. (ii) Criminal Appeal No.1437/2003 [Jani @ Firdous Khan (A-9) vs. State of M.P.], Criminal Appeal No.1513/2003 [Afsar Ali (A-1) vs. State of M.P.], Criminal Appeal No.1528/2003 [Yakoob @ Popu (A-5) and Suleman (A-6) vs. State of M.P.], Criminal Appeal No.1691/2003 [Raju (A- 11) vs. State of M.P.], Criminal Appeal No.1707/2003 & 1708/2003 [Bhaiyu (A-8) vs. State of M.P.], Criminal Appeal No.1771/2003 [Khajanchi @ Mohammad Farookh (A-3) vs. State of M.P.] and Criminal Appeal No.1876/2003 [Neemoo @ Noushad Haq (A-7) vs. State of M.P.] are dismissed. Impugned convictions of these appellants and consequent sentences are hereby upheld. If on bail, they should surrender to their bail bonds forthwith to serve out the sentence imposed by the trial Court. 40. Copy of the judgment be retained in the connected criminal appeals.