JUDGMENT : Sanjay Karol, J. Assailing the judgment dated 21.03.2009, passed by Special Judge, Una District Una, H.P., in Sessions Case No. 7/08/06/Sessions Trial No. 11/08/07, titled as State v. Shiv Kumar, whereby accused stands acquitted, State has filed the present appeal under the provisions of Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 2. It is the case of prosecution that on 08.11.2004, Ram Gopal (PW.1), posted at CIT Staff, Una, received secret information that accused Shiv Kumar was dealing in sale of contraband substance, which fact he disclosed to ASI Darshan Singh (PW.13), who recorded his statement under the provisions of Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Ex.PW.10/B). Reasons for belief recorded under the provisions of Section 42 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as NDPS Act) were forwarded through Constable Khushwinder Pal Singh (PW.5) to the superior officer, which were received by Mohinder Sen (PW.8). Accused gave his consent vide memo (Ex.PW.2/G) of being searched by the raiding party. After associating Raj Kumar (PW.3) and Mohinder Singh (PW.12), ASI Darshan Singh along with other police officials, including Jagtar Singh (PW.2) and Mohinder Kumar (PW.6) conducted the search. From the bag carried by the accused, 800 grams of charas was recovered. Two samples of 10 grams each were drawn and samples as also the bulk parcel were sealed with seal having impression ‘B’. NCB form (Ex.PW.9/B) was filled up on the spot. On the basis of Rukka (Ex.PW.1/A) taken by Constable Mohinder Kumar (PW.6), FIR No.773 of 2004, dated 08.11.2004 (Ex.PW.10/A) was registered at Police Station, Una, H.P., under the provisions of Section 20 of the NDPS Act, against the accused. With the completion of proceedings on the spot, contraband substance was produced before Pritam Chand (PW.9), who resealed the same with seal having impression ‘O’. Where after, case property was entrusted to MHC Rajesh Kumar (PW.10), who sent the sample through Jagan Nath (PW.4) to CTL, Kandaghat, for chemical analysis and report (Ex.PW.13/E) was obtained by the police. With the completion of investigation, which prima facie revealed complicity of the accused in the alleged crime, Challan was presented in the Court for trial. 3. The accused was charged for having committed an offence punishable under the provisions of Section 20 of the NDPS Act, to which he did not plead guilty and claimed trial. 4. With the completion of investigation, which prima facie revealed complicity of the accused in the alleged crime, Challan was presented in the Court for trial. 3. The accused was charged for having committed an offence punishable under the provisions of Section 20 of the NDPS Act, to which he did not plead guilty and claimed trial. 4. In order to establish its case, in all, prosecution examined as many as fifteen witnesses. Statement of the accused, under the provisions of Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, was also recorded, in which he took defence of false implication. No evidence in defence was led. 5. Trial Court, after appreciating the testimony of prosecution witnesses acquitted the accused. Hence the present appeal. 6. We have heard Mr. Kush Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, assisted by Mr. J.S. Guleria, learned Assistant Advocate General, on behalf of the State as also Mr. Vijay Chaudhary, Advocate, on behalf of the accused. We have also minutely examined the testimonies of the witnesses and other documentary evidence so placed on record by the prosecution. Having done so, we are of the considered view that no case for interference is made out at all. We find that the judgment rendered by the trial Court is based on complete, correct and proper appreciation of evidence (documentary and ocular) so placed on record. There is neither any illegality/infirmity nor any perversity with the same, resulting into miscarriage of justice. 7. It is a settled principle of law that acquittal leads to presumption of innocence in favour of an accused. To dislodge the same, onus heavily lies upon the prosecution. Having considered the material on record, we are of the considered view that prosecution has failed to establish the essential ingredients so required to constitute the charged offence. 8. In Prandas v. The State, AIR 1954 SC 36 , Constitution Bench of the apex Court, has held as under: “(6) It must be observed at the very outset that we cannot support the view which has been expressed in several cases that the High Court has no power under Section 417, Criminal P.c., to reverse a judgment of acquittal, unless the judgment is perverse or the subordinate Court has in some way or other misdirected itself so as to produce a miscarriage of justice. In our opinion, the true position in regard to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 417, Criminal Procedure Code in an appeal from an order of acquittal has been stated in – 'Sheo Swarup v. Emperor’, AIR 1934 PC (2) 227 at pp.229, 230 (A), in these words: “Sections 417, 418 and 423 of the Code give to the High Court full power to review at large the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded, and to reach the conclusion that upon that evidence the order of acquittal should be reversed. No limitation should be placed upon that power, unless it be found expressly stated in the Code. But in exercising the power conferred by the Code and before reaching its conclusions upon fact, the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses, (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial, (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt, and (4) the slowness of an appellate Court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses. To state this, however, is only to say that the High Court in its conduct of the appeal should and will act in accordance with rules and principles well known and recognised in the administration of justice.” 9. In the instant case, we find independent witnesses Raj Kumar (PW.3) and Mohinder Singh (PW.12) have not supported the prosecution. They were declared hostile and despite their extensive cross-examination, nothing fruitful could be elicited from their testimonies. Both the witnesses have denied any recovery having been effected in their presence. 10. It is a settled proposition of law that sole testimony of police official, which if otherwise is reliable, trustworthy, cogent and duly corroborated by other witnesses or admissible evidence, cannot be discarded only on the ground that he is a police official and may be interested in the success of the case. It cannot be stated as a rule that a police officer can or cannot be a sole eyewitness in a criminal case. It will always depend upon the facts of a given case. It cannot be stated as a rule that a police officer can or cannot be a sole eyewitness in a criminal case. It will always depend upon the facts of a given case. If the testimony of such a witness is reliable, trustworthy, cogent and if required duly corroborated by other witnesses or admissible evidences, then the statement of such witness cannot be discarded only on the ground that he is a police officer and may have some interest in success of the case. It is only when his interest in the success of the case is motivated by overzealousness to an extent of his involving innocent people; in that event, no credibility can be attached to the statement of such witness. 11. It is not the law that Police witnesses should not be relied upon and their evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars by other independent evidence. The presumption applies as much in favour of a police officer as any other person. There is also no rule of law which lays down that no conviction can be recorded on the testimony of a police officer even if such evidence is otherwise reliable and trustworthy. Rule of prudence may require more careful scrutiny of their evidence. If such a presumption is raised against the police officers without exception, it will be an attitude which could neither do credit to the magistracy nor good to the public, it can only bring down the prestige of police administration. 12. Wherever, evidence of a police officer, after careful scrutiny, inspires confidence and is found to be trustworthy and reliable, it can form basis of conviction and absence of some independent witness of the locality does not in any way affect the creditworthiness of the prosecution case. No infirmity attaches to the testimony of the police officers merely because they belong to the police force and there is no rule of law or evidence which lays down that conviction cannot be recorded on the evidence of the police officials, if found reliable, unless corroborated by some independent evidence. Such reliable and trustworthy statement can form the basis of conviction. Such reliable and trustworthy statement can form the basis of conviction. [See: Govindaraju alias Govinda v. State by Srirampuram Police Station and another, (2012) 4 SCC 722 ; Tika Ram v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2007) 15 SCC 760; Girja Prasad v. State of M.P., (2007) 7 SCC 625 ); and Aher Raja Khima v. State of Saurashtra, AIR 1956 (SC) 217 . 13. Apex Court in Tahir v. State (Delhi), (1996) 3 SCC 338 , dealing with a similar question, held as under:- "6. ... .In our opinion no infirmity attaches to the testimony of the police officials, merely because they belong to the police force and there is no rule of law or evidence which lays down that conviction cannot be recorded on the evidence of the police officials, if found reliable, unless corroborated by some independent evidence. The Rule of Prudence, however, only requires a more careful scrutiny of their evidence, since they can be said to be interested in the result of the case projected by them. Where the evidence of the police officials, after careful scrutiny, inspires confidence and is found to be trustworthy and reliable, it can form basis of conviction and the absence of some independent witness of the locality to lend corroboration to their evidence, does not in any way affect the creditworthiness of the prosecution case." 14. Independently, we find the prosecution not to have established its case, beyond reasonable doubt. Mohinder Kumar (PW.6) states that Investigating Officer (PW.13) was in the process of sealing and as such, he is not a witness of recovery. Ram Gopal (PW.1) is also not a witness of recovery. 15. This leaves us with the testimonies of Jagtar Singh (PW.2) and ASI Darshan Singh (PW.13). Having perused the same, we are of the considered view that there is contradiction, which is material on the question of place, where accused was apprehended and searched. Also there is contradiction with regard to the time when documents were prepared on the spot. According to Jagtar Singh, they were prepared prior to registration of FIR. Whereas, according to Darshan Singh, NCB forms were filled up thereafter. 16. What further renders the prosecution case to be doubtful is the fact that sample is stated to have been deposited with the CTL, Kandaghat on 10.11.2004, as is evident from the NCB form (Ex.PW.9/B). According to Jagtar Singh, they were prepared prior to registration of FIR. Whereas, according to Darshan Singh, NCB forms were filled up thereafter. 16. What further renders the prosecution case to be doubtful is the fact that sample is stated to have been deposited with the CTL, Kandaghat on 10.11.2004, as is evident from the NCB form (Ex.PW.9/B). Whereas, according to Jagan Nath (PW.4) and Rajesh Kumar (PW.10), the sample was taken from the Police Station on 09.11.2004 and deposited same day. Testimonies of these witnesses stand contradicted by documentary evidence and there is no mistake with regard to the date as the witnesses are categorical. Further report of the Chemical Examiner is on the NCB form and as has been held by this Court in Mohammad Rafik v. State of H.P., 2014 (3) Him L.R. (DB) 1391, is fatal to the prosecution case. Contradictions do not end here. Pritam Chand (PW.9) initially states that at the time when contraband substance was resealed, columns No.9 to 11 of the NCB form were filled up by him, but however, later resiles by stating it not to be in his handwriting. 17. Reliance on the testimony of Jagtar Singh (PW.2) further renders prosecution case to be fatal. This is with regard to the shape of the contraband substance, so recovered by the police, which fact is evident from memo (Ex.PW.2/D), which records the contraband substance in the form of battis unlike chapattis, which the witnesse has orally deposed. 18. In view of the law laid down in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Gurpreet Singh & Connected Matter, 2014 (3) Him L.R.(DB) 1897, no ground for interference is made out. 19. We do not find prosecution to have proved its case, beyond reasonable doubt, by leading clear, cogent, convincing piece of evidence with regard to recovery of contraband substance from the conscious possession of the accused. Contradictions in the statements of police officials are glaring, material and relevant, totally shaking the edifice of prosecution story. Witnesses are unreliable and their testimonies not free from embellishments/contradictions/variations. 20. The Court below, in our considered view, has correctly and completely appreciated the evidence so placed on record by the prosecution. It cannot be said that judgment of trial Court is perverse, illegal, erroneous or based on incorrect and incomplete appreciation of material on record resulting into miscarriage of justice. 21. 20. The Court below, in our considered view, has correctly and completely appreciated the evidence so placed on record by the prosecution. It cannot be said that judgment of trial Court is perverse, illegal, erroneous or based on incorrect and incomplete appreciation of material on record resulting into miscarriage of justice. 21. The accused person has had the advantage of having been acquitted by the Court below. Keeping in view the ratio of law laid down by the Apex Court in Mohammed Ankoos and others v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad (2010) 1 SCC 94 , since it cannot be said that trial Court has not correctly appreciated the evidence on record or that acquittal of the accused has resulted into travesty of justice, no interference is warranted in the instant case. For all the aforesaid reasons, present appeal, being devoid of merit, is dismissed, so also the pending applications, if any. Bail bonds furnished by the accused are discharged. Record of the trial Court be immediately sent back. Appeal dismissed.