JUDGMENT : A.V. Ramakrishna Pillai, J. 1. Under challenge in these writ petitions is the constitutional validity of the Kerala Local Authorities Entertainment Tax (Amendment) Act, 2013, as per which, a new provision has been introduced for levying collection of a cess for the Kerala Cultural Activists' Welfare Fund constituted under the Kerala Cultural Activists' Welfare Fund Act. 2. WP(C) No. 4195/2013 is filed by an association of film exhibitors. The 1st petitioner represents the Film Exhibitors Federation and the 2nd petitioner is an exhibitor of films. 3. WP(C) No. 12705/2013 is filed by certain persons, who are having active interest in viewing different kinds of films exhibited at different cinemas in and around their localities. 4. WP(C) No. 5465/2013 is filed by a regular viewer of films. 5. The State Legislature has enacted the Kerala Cultural Activists' Welfare Fund Act, 2010, referable to Entry 23 of the Concurrent List to the 7th schedule of the Constitution of India, containing provisions relating to the constitution of a welfare fund, the establishment of the Welfare Fund Board, the manner of augmentation of resources of the fund and other connected and related matters. By ordinance No. 61/2012, the Kerala Local Authority Entertainments Tax Act, 1961 was amended for the sole purpose of enabling the State Government to levy a cess for the purposes of the welfare fund constituted under the Kerala Cultural Activists' Welfare Fund Act, 2010; and consequently, the Principal Secretary to the Local Self Government (RD) Department issued GO(Ms) No. 15/13/LSGD - SRO No. 28/2013 dated 15.01.2013. Later, the above ordinance was replaced by the Kerala Local Authorities Entertainments Tax (Amendment) Act, 2013 (Act 21 of 2013), containing identical provisions, on the basis of which, a circular dated 14.05.2013 was issued by the Principal Secretary to Local Self Government (RD) Department. The ordinance as well as the Act provides for a responsibility of collecting Rs. 3/- extra from each viewer of films in theatre, which have to be deposited to the Welfare Fund Board by the 15th of every month. According to the petitioners, the provisions proposed to be implemented by the new ordinance are extremely harsh and impose unreasonable restrictions on film exhibition through theaters leading to crippling of their business altogether and further closing down the existing theatres by the oppressive measures contemplated under the Act. According to the petitioners, the provisions proposed to be implemented by the new ordinance are extremely harsh and impose unreasonable restrictions on film exhibition through theaters leading to crippling of their business altogether and further closing down the existing theatres by the oppressive measures contemplated under the Act. Therefore, the petitioners are challenging the validity of the said Act on the following grounds; (a) no tax could be imposed by a State on a matter referable to the Concurrent List; (b) that an Ordinance/Act cannot be promulgated to amend the Kerala Local Authority Entertainments Tax Act, 1961, empowering the State to impose, levy and collect a cess on each admission to cinema for the sole purpose of the augmentation of the resources of welfare fund constituted under the Kerala Cultural Activists' Welfare Fund Act, 2010, a legislation traceable to Entry 23 of the Concurrent List, under the Constitution of India. The petitioners allege that they, who are the exhibitors/viewers of films, cannot be burdened with a cess for the purposes of the welfare fund intended to benefit cultural activists as there is no nexus between the petitioners and cultural activists, following the principle laid down by the apex court in a decision reported in Koluthara Exports Ltd. v. State of Kerala & Others [ (2002) 2 SCC 459 ]. 6. The State as well as the Kerala Cultural Activists' Welfare Fund Board have filed detailed counter affidavits, justifying the action of the State in promulgating the Act. According to them, the levy of cess as contained in the Act falls under Entries 5 and 62 of the State List, whereby the Local Government can collect tax on business including taxes on entertainment. According to them, the amendment is not violative of the Constitution of India as alleged by the petitioners. It was further contended that the owners of theatres, who exhibit films, are not adversely affected by the new Act and as such, the writ petitions filed by them are not maintainable. 7. In WP(C) No. 4195/2013, the 10th respondent, who is the President of National Association of Malayalam Artists, has filed a counter affidavit, justifying the action of the Government. 7. In WP(C) No. 4195/2013, the 10th respondent, who is the President of National Association of Malayalam Artists, has filed a counter affidavit, justifying the action of the Government. It was contended that the Kerala Cultural Activists' Welfare Fund Act, 2010 was promulgated by the legislature to grant relief to the entire cultural activists of the State, who had or has been engaged in cultural activities, and to promote their welfare and to pay pension to them and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto, which is mentioned in the preamble of the Act itself. According to them, the State is well within its competence to amend the Act and collection of cess. Therefore, according to the 10th respondent, the writ petitions are devoid of any merit and liable to be dismissed. 8. I have heard the learned senior counsel, Mr. K. Ramakumar as well as Mr. T.G. Rajendran & Mr. K.S. Bharathan, appearing for the petitioners; Mr. C.S. Manilal, the learned senior Government Pleader; and the learned senior counsel, Mr. M.R. Rajendran Nair ably assisted by Mr. C. Unnikrishnan appearing for the Kerala State Cultural Activists' Welfare Fund Board quite in extenso. 9. Mr. Ramakumar would submit that the Local Authorities Entertainment Tax Act provides for admission to an entertainment including payment for admission to an entertainment, which includes the price for admission and any payment for any purpose connected with an entertainment. It was pointed out that this Court has taken the view that the price for admission shall only be by way of reservation charges or otherwise in Padmanabhan v. Corporation of Thiruvananthapuram [ 2006 (2) KLT 603 ]. It was argued that the expression, 'admission fee', has not been amended and no film exhibitor, therefore, can charge anything other than what is prescribed under the Act 20 of 1961. It was pointed out that even after the amendment of Section 5 of the Kerala Cultural Activists' Welfare Fund Act 6 of 2011, no amendment has been brought about regarding the expression, 'admission fee', as simultaneously there cannot exist two contradictory statutes, one forbidding anything other than admission fee under the Local Authorities Entertainment Tax Act and the other for levying of a levy or cess under the new Act. According to Mr. According to Mr. Ramakumar, the new Act would not fall within Entry 33 of Schedule 7 of List 2 of the Constitution of India and in that, it is not a legislation on theatre and dramatic purposes or films, entertainments or amusements. It, on the other hand, is a cess for welfare measure, which is not provided for under anyone of the entries in the State list. It was also pointed out that the legislation cannot fall under Entry 5 Local Government as there are already enactments like the Kerala Panchayath Raj Act, the Kerala Municipality Act, the Local Authorities Entertainment Act etc. regulating the same. Therefore, according to the learned senior counsel for the petitioners, the present Act cannot be supported or related to any of the entries in the State List. It was also argued that the Kerala Panchayath Raj Act being a provision governed by the 73rd amendment of the Constitution of India, the State has no authority to legislate on matters covered under that Act in the guise of collecting a levy. Therefore, it was submitted that the impugned Act is beyond the legislative competence of the State and it is a piece of colourable legislation wholly lacking in power and cannot be traced to anyone of the list in Schedule 7 of the Constitution. 10. The legislative competence is assailed for the main reason that the new Act is beyond the vires of the statute and there is no quid pro quo from the ultimate beneficiary to the payees of the so called cess. Mr. Manilal, the learned senior Government Pleader would submit that the present legislation is enacted in exercise of powers under Entry 62 of List 2. It was pointed out that the subject matter of the present litigation comes within the exclusive legislative competency of the State. 11. Mr. Manilal, the learned senior Government Pleader would submit that the present legislation is enacted in exercise of powers under Entry 62 of List 2. It was pointed out that the subject matter of the present litigation comes within the exclusive legislative competency of the State. 11. However, the learned counsel for the petitioners heavily relied on the decision of the apex court in Koluthara's case (supra), wherein it was held that the State cannot, in an Act under Entry 23 of List III, place the burden of an impost by way of contribution for giving effect to the Act and the Scheme made thereunder for the social security and social welfare of a section of society upon a person, who is not a member of such section of society nor an employer of a person, who is a member of such section of society. 12. Mr. Manilal, the learned senior Government Pleader, per contra, would submit that the aforesaid decision is not applicable to the fact situation of this case. It was pointed out by Mr. Manilal that the impugned legislation was enacted in exercise of the power under Entry 62 of the State List as the subject matter of the legislation comes within the exclusive legislative competence of the State. 13. Mr. M.R. Rajendran Nair, the learned senior counsel for the respondent Board as well as Mr. Manilal, the learned senior Government Pleader would point out that in the statute impugned in Koluthara's case (supra), there was a provision for contribution thereby making it a cess, which is conspicuously absent in the present Act. In support of their argument, they have made a reference to para 12 & 18 of the judgment in Koluthara's case (supra). Mr. Rajendran Nair, referring to the definition of 'Cultural Activists' under Section 2(d) of the Kerala Cultural Activists' Welfare Fund Act, 2010, pointed out that the beneficiaries therein would include a wide spectrum of persons ranging from artists in the field of films to persons engaged in the recitation of Holy books and in view of the large section of the society that is sought to be benefited by the fund, the levy is justifiable. 14. 14. The argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that though Entry 23 enables the State to enact a law in respect of social security and social insurance or dealing with employment and unemployment, the State cannot in an Act under Entry 23 of List III place the burden of an impost by way of contribution for giving effect to the Act and the Scheme made thereunder for the social security and social welfare of a section of society upon a person, who is not a member of such section of society nor an employer of a person, who is a member of such section of society. It was pointed out that the film viewers are being compelled to contribute to the welfare of a large category of persons, whose connection to films is too remote. 15. Here, the learned counsel for the petitioners were giving thrust to the absence of quid pro quo in the present case in the light of Koluthara's case (supra). In Koluthara's case (supra), the decision of a Division Bench of this Court, upholding the constitutional validity of Section 4(2) read with Section 2(d) of the Kerala Fishermen Welfare Fund Act, 1985, was challenged before the apex court. Section 4 of the said Act contained a list of contributors to the fund. Section 4(2) mandates that a dealer shall contribute to the Fund, every year, one per cent of his sale proceeds in the year. Section 2(d) defined 'dealer' as any person, who carries on, within the State of Kerala, the business of buying or selling or processing fish or exporting fish (in raw or processed form) or fish products and includes, - (i) a commission agent, a broker or any other mercantile agent, by whatever name called; and (ii) a non-resident dealer or an agent of non-resident dealer or a local branch of a firm or company or association situated outside the State of Kerala. The appellant before the apex court in Koluthara's case (supra) contended that he was a purchaser and exporter of fishes; and therefore, there was no employer-employee relationship between the appellant and the fishermen; and therefore, the State cannot levy impost by way of contribution on it under Section 4(2) of the Act. The said argument was accepted by the apex court. However, as pointed out by Mr. M.R. Rajendran Nair and Mr. The said argument was accepted by the apex court. However, as pointed out by Mr. M.R. Rajendran Nair and Mr. Manilal, there is no provision of contribution in the present case. This takes me to the difference between cess and tax. Here, I would like to refer to certain observations made by the apex court in Vijayalakshmi Rice Mill & Others v. Commercial Tax Officers, Palakol & Others [ (2006) 6 SCC 763 ]. Para 12 & 13 of the judgment read as follows; "12. Ordinarily, a cess means a tax which raises revenue, which is applied to a specific purpose. Thus in Guruswamy and Co. v. State of Mysore Hidayatullah, J., in his dissenting judgment observed; (SCR p. 571 D-E) "The word 'cess' is used in Ireland and is still in use in India although the word rate has replaced it in England. It means a tax and is generally used when the levy is for some special administrative expense which the name (health cess, education cess, road cess, etc.) indicates. When levied as an increment to an existing tax, the name matters not for the validity of the cess must be judged of in the same way as the validity of the tax to which it is an increment." (emphasis applied) The aforesaid observations have been referred to by the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in India Cement Ltd. v. State of T.N. vide SCC para 19. 13. Hence, ordinarily a cess is also a tax, but is a special kind of tax. Generally tax raises revenue which can be used generally for any purpose by the State. For instance, the income tax or excise tax or sales tax are taxes which generate revenue which can be utilised by the Union or the State Governments for any purpose e.g. for payment of salary to the members of the armed forces or civil servants, police, etc. or for development programmes, etc. However, cess is a tax which generates revenue which is utilized for a specific purpose. For instance, health cess raises revenue, which is utilized for health purposes e.g. building hospitals, giving medicines to the poor, etc. Similarly, education cess raises revenue which is used for building schools or other educational purposes." 16. In United Provinces v. Mt. However, cess is a tax which generates revenue which is utilized for a specific purpose. For instance, health cess raises revenue, which is utilized for health purposes e.g. building hospitals, giving medicines to the poor, etc. Similarly, education cess raises revenue which is used for building schools or other educational purposes." 16. In United Provinces v. Mt. Atiqa Begum & Other [AIR 1941 Federal Court 16], their Lordships upheld the principle that the question whether any impugned Act is within any of the three lists or in none at all, is to be answered by considering the Act as a whole and deciding whether in pith and substance the Act is with respect to particular categories or not and held that in doing so, the relevant factors are the design and the purport of the Act, both as disclosed by its language, and the effect, which, it would have in its actual operation. The pith and substance of the impugned legislation is collection of an amount from the viewers for the collective welfare of the artists. As Letham, C.J., pointed out in Bank of New South Wales v. Common Wealth [1948) 76 CLR 1 at p. 186], "A power to make laws 'with respect to' a subject matter is a power to make laws, which in reality and substance are laws upon the subject matter. It is not enough that the law should refer to the subject matter or apply to the subject matter; for example, income tax laws apply to clergyman and to hotel keepers as members of the public, but no one would describe an income tax law as being, for that reasons a law with respect to clergyman or hotel keepers....." 17. On a view of the Act as a whole, I am of the view that the substance of the legislation is within the powers conferred under Entry 62 of State List. Even if the charge levied is construed as a cess, it appears to me to be justifiable as it is not capable of any controversy that the benefits are indeed meant to be and are bound to be conferred on the cultural activists including those artists in the film world. This would be an incentive to attract more capable persons to the field and ultimately the viewers would be benefited. 18. This would be an incentive to attract more capable persons to the field and ultimately the viewers would be benefited. 18. It has been held by the apex court in The Check Post Officer & Others v. K.P. Abdulla & Bros. [ AIR 1971 SC 792 ] that an entry confers power upon the legislature to legislate for matters ancillary or incidental thereto. As long as the legislation is within the permissible field in pith and substance, the objection would not be entertained merely on the ground that while enacting legislation, provision has been made for a matter, which, though germane for the purpose, for which, competent legislation is made, it covers an aspect beyond it. In a series of decisions, the apex court has opined that if an enactment substantially falls within the powers expressly conferred by the Constitution upon the legislature enacting it, it cannot be held to be invalid merely because it incidentally encroaches on matters assigned to another legislature. Viewed in that profile, this Court is of the view that the challenge put forward by the petitioners is on a misconception of facts and law. 19. A legislative entry does not merely enunciate powers. It specifies a field of legislation and the widest import and significance should be attached to it. Power to legislate on a specified topic includes power to legislate in respect of matters, which may fairly and reasonably said to be comprehended therein. Therefore, the collection of Rs. 3/- as provided by the Amendment Act, according to me, is within the legislative competence of the State; and therefore, the same does not call for any interference of this Court in exercise of powers conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In the result, the writ petitions fail; and accordingly, they are dismissed.