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2015 DIGILAW 142 (ORI)

Bharat Motors v. Ramesh Kumar Bhawasinka

2015-02-25

SANJU PANDA

body2015
JUDGMENT : Sanju Panda, J. 1. This Civil Miscellaneous Petition has been filed by the petitioners challenging the order dated 09.12.2014 passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, 1st Court, Cuttack in C.S No. 6785 of 2014 rejecting the application filed under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The brief facts of the case are that the opposite party as plaintiff filed C.S No. 6785 of 2014 before the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), 1st Court, Cuttack against the petitioners for eviction from the suit premises. In the plaint the plaintiff inter alia pleaded that he is the owner of Hal Plot No. 558/834 corresponding to Khata No. 38/13 of Mouza - Machua Bazar, Cuttack bearing Holding No. 843 comprising an area of Ac.0.200 decimals out of an area of Ac.0.630 decimals in a compact area consisting of four rooms with other pucca constructions under Cuttack Municipal Corporation. The suit premises was given on rent by a lease agreement executed on 28.11.1946 in favour of one Ganesh Lal Didwania, one of the Director of petitioner No. 1-M/s. Bharat Motors for utilization of the land and the building for showroom garage, workshop etc. The said rent agreement was for a period of 21 years w.e.f. 01.12.1946. After completion of the period of lease agreement the Partners of M/s. Bharat Motors started making correspondences with the plaintiff who became the owner of the property by then for fresh agreement of tenancy. Accordingly a tenancy agreement was executed between the plaintiff in one hand and M/s. Bharat Motors represented through its Partners on 19.7.1985. The aforesaid agreement was for a period of four years w.e.f. 01.8.1984 till 31.7.1988 @ Rs. 2,100/- as monthly rent with increase of 20 % after expiry of the lease period subject to execution of fresh agreement. Subsequently on 28.2.1998 another agreement was executed for the period from August, 1988 to July, 1992 @ Rs. 2,520/- per month and from August, 1992 to July, 1996 @ Rs. 4,000/- per month. On 06.4.1998 another agreement was executed for the period from August, 1996 to July, 2000 @ Rs. 5,000/- per month and from August, 2000 to July, 2004 @ Rs. 6,000/- per month. On expiry of the aforesaid agreement dated 06.4.1998 another house rent agreement was executed between the parties on 06.8.2007 for the period from August, 2004 till March, 2007 @ Rs. 5,000/- per month and from August, 2000 to July, 2004 @ Rs. 6,000/- per month. On expiry of the aforesaid agreement dated 06.4.1998 another house rent agreement was executed between the parties on 06.8.2007 for the period from August, 2004 till March, 2007 @ Rs. 6,000/- per month and from April, 2007 to July, 2008 @ Rs. 10,000/- per month. In the said agreement it was stipulated that petitioner No. 1 tenant would continue to occupy and enjoy the plot of land, showroom, workshop and other premises situated on the suit plot till completion of the period of tenancy. While matter stood thus prior to completion of the aforesaid period of tenancy the plaintiff on 02.7.2008 requested petitioner No. 1 to vacate the premises and handover possession of the schedule premises on or before 01.8.2008. After receiving the said letter, petitioner No. 1 through one of his Partner written a letter to the plaintiff requesting him to enter into a fresh negotiation for execution of a new agreement and expressed their intention to continue with the tenancy as they are not in a position to vacate the same and they went on paying Rs. 10,000/- towards monthly rent which was received by the plaintiff on protest. The tenancy agreement expired on 31.7.2008 and prior to that the plaintiff issued letter to the petitioners requesting them to give vacant possession of the premises but in spite of such letter the petitioners continued therein and went on sending Rs. 10,000/- per month towards monthly rent though the monthly rent of the premises in question was much more. Since the petitioners intention not to accede to the request of the plaintiff was clear, the plaintiff sent a notice under Section106 of T.P. Act through his lawyer on 07.3.2014 for terminating the tenancy and to vacate the premises of the same on or before 31.3.2014. The petitioners in spite of receipt of the notice gave as usual evasive reply for which the plaintiff was constrained to file the suit for eviction of the petitioners. 2. After receiving notice the petitioners-defendants appeared in the suit and before filing their written statement they filed an application under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to refer the matter for Arbitration. 2. After receiving notice the petitioners-defendants appeared in the suit and before filing their written statement they filed an application under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to refer the matter for Arbitration. In the said application they have taken a stand that in the concluding paragraph of the agreement dated 06.8.2007 entered into between the parties it is stipulated that any dispute between the Tenant and the Landlord arising out of this agreement would be referred to the Arbitration of Sri K.P. Mishra, Advocate, Tulsipur, Cuttack, whose decision would be final and binding on both the parties. 3. The plaintiff filed his objection to the said application stating that none of the terms and conditions of the agreement dated 06.8.2007 survives after the period of tenancy indicated in the said agreement is over. The tenancy was till 31.7.2008 and thereafter the period of tenancy referring to the agreement has not been extended between the parties. Notice of termination of the agreement has been issued to the tenant. A tenant holding over after cessation of the tenancy agreement cannot refer to the non-existent agreement for the purpose of referring the matter for Arbitration. The application has been filed with a mala fide intention in order to prolong the proceeding without any justifiable reason. The defendants are no more the tenants under the plaintiff and are the trespassers in respect of the premises in question and are liable to be evicted in accordance with law. The Civil Court is competent to pass a decree of eviction under the T.P. Act. 4. The court below after hearing the parties by the impugned order rejected the application with a finding that the defendants as per the plaint averments are trespassers and it is not a fit case where court should exercise its power as provided under Section 8of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that in view of the clause stipulated in the agreement dated 06.8.2007 entered into between the parties the matter should be referred for Arbitration instead of continuation of the suit. He further submitted that the petitioners continued to pay the monthly rent to the plaintiff which was received by him. In support of his contention he has relied on the decisions reported in AIR 1972 SC 819 , AIR 1973 SC 508 and (2011) 14 SCC 66 . He further submitted that the petitioners continued to pay the monthly rent to the plaintiff which was received by him. In support of his contention he has relied on the decisions reported in AIR 1972 SC 819 , AIR 1973 SC 508 and (2011) 14 SCC 66 . 5.1 In the case of Bhawanji Lakhamshi and others Vs. Himatlal Jamnadas Dani and others reported in AIR 1972 SC 819 the Apex Court held that acceptance of rent may waive claim of landlord to evict the tenant. 5.2 In the case of Badrilal Vs. Municipal Corporation of Indore reported in AIR 1973 SC 508 the Apex Court held that the appellant being merely a tenant by sufferance there is no need for any notice before he could be evicted. 5.3 In the case of SMS Tea Estates Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Chandmari Tea Company Pvt. Ltd. the Apex Court held that an arbitration agreement in an unregistered but compulsorily registrable document could be acted upon and enforced for the purpose of dispute resolution by arbitration. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the opposite party supported the impugned order and submitted that none of the terms and conditions of the agreement dated 06.8.2007 survives after the period of tenancy indicated in the said agreement is over. He further submitted that the petitioners filed the application with a mala fide intention to prolong the proceeding and to harass the opposite party. Hence the impugned order need not be interfered with as the Civil Court is competent to adjudicate the matter in dispute between the parties. 7. Law has been well settled by the Apex Court in the case of Atul Singh and others Vs. Sunil Kumar Singh reported in AIR 2008 SC 1016 that an application under Section 8(1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 shall not be entertained unless it accompanied by the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy thereof and Court has to first decide whether there was an agreement between the parties to refer the matter for arbitration before filing of their first statement. Further in the case of Sukanya Holdings Private Ltd. Vs. Further in the case of Sukanya Holdings Private Ltd. Vs. Jayesh H. Pandya and another reported in (2003) 5 SCC 531 it was held that where a suit is commenced in respect of a matter which falls partly within the arbitration agreement and partly outside and which involves parties some of whom are parties to the arbitration agreement while some are not so Section 8 is not attracted. The words 'a mater' in Section 8 indicate that the entire subject matter of the suit should be subject to arbitration agreement. There is no provision in the Act for bifurcating the suit into two parts, one to be referred to arbitration for adjudication and the other to be decided by Civil Court. In view of the aforesaid settled position of law and after going through the materials available on record, it appears that the plaintiff has already issued a notice under Section 106 of T.P. Act through his lawyer to the defendants terminating the tenancy. Since the lease period has already been over, the lessee has no further right over the suit properties. As there is no error apparent on the face of the record, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the impugned order 09.12.2014 passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, 1st Court, Cuttack in C.S No. 6785 of 2014 in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Accordingly this Civil Miscellaneous Petition along with Misc. Case is dismissed.