Judgment This Writ Petition has been filed to quash the order of the third respondent herein in RMK/Blacklisting/2010/1128, dated 24.04.2010. 2. The petitioner is a Non-Governmental Organization, registered under the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act 27 of 1975 in the year 1982. The petitioner is registered with the Commissioner of Income Tax under Section 12-A and exempted under Section 80-G of the Income Tax Act. The petitioner also registered with the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India under the Foreign Contribution Regulation Act, 1976. The aim and object of the petitioner is to undertake Rural Development Activities for the socio economic development of poor downtrodden and weaker sections of the Society and to implement the various charitable projects for the benefit of Women Self Help Groups (SHG). The petitioner is implementing various projects for the past 30 years. The petitioner availed grant-in-aid schemes evolved by Government Departments under which various programmes are being funded. 3. During March 1993, Rashtriya Mahila Kosh (RMK) was established by the Government of India. It is an Apex Micro Credit Organization under the Government of India to give micro loans to the poor women in un-organized sectors for their social and economic development. The loans to the beneficiaries are being distributed through various Non-Government Organizations, like the petitioner. 4. The petitioner and the respondents 2 and 3 entered into an agreement, dated 21.09.2006. The petitioner has been sanctioned with the amount for distribution to the various beneficiaries. A sum of Rs.60,00,000/- was granted under revolving fund scheme to be distributed to the Women Self Help Group and under the house loan scheme Rs.45,00,000/- was sanctioned, in which Rs.22,50,000/- was granted to the petitioner. The petitioner has also availed similar loans from RMK and the same has been repaid regularly. 5. The Income Tax Department advised the petitioner that they would not get exemption under Section 80-G of the Income Tax Act, if they carry on the lending activities. The petitioner was finding very difficult to collect the loans distributed to Women Self Help Groups, as they were very poor and downtrodden women. Therefore, the petitioner decided to close the lending activities. 6. In spite of these difficulties, the petitioner paid a sum of Rs.70,34,574/-. During the period of nine months, i.e., from 15.04.2009 to 21.12.2009, the petitioner has re-paid a sum of Rs.23,75,159/- and Rs.4,00,000/- on 09.04.2010. Therefore, the petitioner decided to close the lending activities. 6. In spite of these difficulties, the petitioner paid a sum of Rs.70,34,574/-. During the period of nine months, i.e., from 15.04.2009 to 21.12.2009, the petitioner has re-paid a sum of Rs.23,75,159/- and Rs.4,00,000/- on 09.04.2010. In spite of these payments, the third respondent, by his communication, dated 24.04.2010 informed the petitioner that they have been blacklisted the petitioner for default in payment and debarred from availing any future financial assistance from the Government Departments. According to the petitioner, the said order has been passed without notice to them. The petitioner has stated that the agreement between the petitioner and the respondents 2 and 3 stipulates that if default in payment continues for more than six months without any sufficient or cogent reasons then only the respondents 2 and 3 can blacklist the petitioner. In the present case, the respondents 2 and 3 receive payment of Rs.4,00,000/- on 09.04.2010 and hence, blacklisting the petitioner by the communication, dated 24.04.2010, without notice is invalid and illegal. 7. The Rashtriya Mahila Kosh also informed the same to other Government Organizations. In view of such information, other Organizations have stopped granting funds to the petitioner. Therefore, the petitioner could not implement the projects and is unable to recover the monies from the Women Self Help Groups due to the act of blacklisting the petitioner. 8. Respondents 2 and 3 have acted in an arbitrary manner and contrary to the terms of agreement, dated 24.04.2010 and hence, the order is ex facie illegal. 9. Respondents 2 and 3 filed counter affidavit. In the counter affidavit, they have taken the following two preliminary objections: (i) The entire cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of High Court of Delhi. No cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. (ii) Clause 30 of the Memorandum of Undertaking-cum-Guarantee Deed provides for referring the disputes between the parties to the Sole Arbitrator, who shall be appointed by the Secretary, Department of Women and Child Development, Ministry of HRD (now Ministry of Women & Child Development), Government of India. The petitioner has approached this Court without exhausting such remedy. 10. The petitioner assured that they recovered 90% of the loans granted to Women Self Help Group. Based on the said assurance only, the respondents 2 and 3 have granted the loan facilities. The petitioner has approached this Court without exhausting such remedy. 10. The petitioner assured that they recovered 90% of the loans granted to Women Self Help Group. Based on the said assurance only, the respondents 2 and 3 have granted the loan facilities. The petitioner failed to repay the amounts due and thereby committed default. The respondents 2 and 3 made several demands particularly, by letters dated 14.01.2009 and 01.12.2009. The petitioner did not respond to those two letters. 11. The respondents 2 and 3 advance loans on meagre interest to various Non-Government Organizations for the welfare of Women. While so, the petitioner deliberately and wilfully defaulted in repayment of dues, and hence the respondents 2 and 3 could not further advance the loans to various organizations. 12. The petitioner has failed to pay Rs.20,61,210/- and Rs.26,07,278/-. Therefore, the order blacklisting the petitioner is proper and valid. In order to avoid wastage of Government Funds, blacklisting the petitioner was communicated to other Government Agencies, who lent monies to the petitioner for uplifting the downtrodden Women. 13. The petitioner filed reply affidavit. It is stated that the respondents 2 and 3 have not denied the various payments made by the petitioner as stated in the affidavit. They have denied the various demands alleged to be made by the respondents 2 and 3. 14. The petitioner could not recover the amounts due from the beneficiaries. In spite of these difficulties, the petitioner re-paid various amounts. The petitioner paid Rs.4,00,000/- on 09.04.2010 by Demand Drafts, bearing D.D.Nos.688466345 and 688466338, drawn on Indian Overseas Bank, Pudukkottai. 15. The petitioner challenging the impugned order of blacklisting on two grounds: (i) No notice was given to the petitioner before blacklisting. (ii) As per Clause 25 of the Agreement-cum-Guarantee Deed, the respondents 2 and 3 can blacklist the petitioner only if the default continues for more than six months without any sufficient and cogent reasons. 16. In support of his submission, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the following Judgments: (i) M/s.Erusian Equipment & Chemicals Ltd. Vs. State of West Bengal and another [ 1975 (1) SCC 70 ], wherein in paragraph 20, it has been held as follows: "20. Blacklisting has the effect of preventing a person from the privilege and advantage of entering into lawful relationship with the Government for purposes of gains. State of West Bengal and another [ 1975 (1) SCC 70 ], wherein in paragraph 20, it has been held as follows: "20. Blacklisting has the effect of preventing a person from the privilege and advantage of entering into lawful relationship with the Government for purposes of gains. The fact that a disability is created by the order of blacklisting indicates that the relevant authority is to have an objective satisfaction. Fundamentals of fair play require that the person concerned should be given an opportunity to represent his case before he is put on the blacklist." (ii) Joseph Vilangandan Vs. The Executive Engineer (P.W.D.), Ernakulam and others [ AIR 1978 SC 930 ], wherein in paragraph 18, it has been held as follows: 18. This being the position, the rule in Erusian Equipment's case (ibid) [ AIR 1975 SC 266 ] will be attracted with full force. While conceding that the State can enter into contract with any person it chooses and no person has a fundamental right to insist that the Government must enter into a contract with him, this Court observed (in the said case) (at p. 269): “Blacklisting has the effect of preventing a person from the privilege and advantage of entering into lawful relationship with the Government for purposes of gains. The fact that a disability is created by the order of blacklisting indicates that the relevant authority is to have an objective satisfaction. Fundamentals of fair play require that the person concerned should be given an opportunity to represent his case before he is put on the blacklist.” (iii) Raghunath Thakur Vs. State of Bihar and Others [1989 (1) SCC 229], wherein in paragraph 4, it has been held as follows: "4. Indisputably, no notice had been given to the appellant of the proposal of blacklisting the appellant. It was contended on behalf of the State Government that there was no requirement in the rule of giving any prior notice before blacklisting any person. Insofar as the contention that there is no requirement specifically of giving any notice is concerned, the respondent is right. But it is an implied principle of the rule of law that any order having civil consequence should be passed only after following the principles of natural justice. Insofar as the contention that there is no requirement specifically of giving any notice is concerned, the respondent is right. But it is an implied principle of the rule of law that any order having civil consequence should be passed only after following the principles of natural justice. It has to be realised that blacklisting any person in respect of business ventures has civil consequence for the future business of the person concerned in any event. Even if the rules do not express so, it is an elementary principle of natural justice that parties affected by any order should have right of being heard and making representations against the order. In that view of the matter, the last portion of the order insofar as it directs blacklisting of the appellant in respect of future contracts, cannot be sustained in law. In the premises, that portion of the order directing that the appellant be placed in the blacklist in respect of future contracts under the Collector is set aside. ...." (iv) K.V.S.Palanivel Vs. The District Collector, Pudukottai District and others [2010 (1) CWC 108], wherein in paragraphs 8 to 10, it has been held as follows: "8. The issue to be considered in the present matter is as to whether the impugned order dated 09.07.2009 is legally valid and whether it is vitiated on any of the grounds as stated by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner. Admittedly, the impugned order is an order which has the effect of removing the name of the petitioner from the list of registered contractors. It is the serious matter as it involved civil consequences and the contractor is shut out from being able to participate in any of the bids or auction. Therefore, the Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court have consistently held that when a department or an agency decides to either blacklist or remove a contractor, it is incumbent that the principles of natural justice should scrupulously followed. 9. The learned senior counsel placed reliance upon a decision in Erusian Equipment & Chemicals Ltd., v. State of West Bengal reported in 1975 (1) SCC 70 , wherein the Hon'ble Supreme court has held in paragraph 20 as follows: "Blacklisting has the effect of preventing a person from the privilege and advantage of entering into lawful relationship with the Government for purpose of gains. The fact that a disability is created by the order of blacklisting indicates that the relevant authority is to have an objective satisfaction. Fundamentals of fair play require that the person concerned should be given an opportunity to represent his case before he is put on the blacklist. (ii) In J.Vilangandan v. Executive Engineer (P.W.D.), Ernakulam (cited supra), has stated that while conceding that the State can enter into contract with any person it chooses and no person has a fundamental right to insist that the Government must enter into a contract with him, held that the fact that a disability is created by the order of black listing indicates that the relevant authority is to have an objective satisfaction. Fundamentals of fair-play require that the person concerned should be given an opportunity to represent his case before he is put on the black-list. (iii) In Raghunath Thakur v. State of Bihar reported in 1989 (1) SCS 229, while considering a case where the person granted a right to vend liquor was placed in a black listing in respect of future contracts, the Honourable Supreme Court has observed that even if the rules do not express so, it is an elementary principle of nature justice that parties affected by any order should have right of being heard and making representations against the order. In that view of the matter, the last portion of the order in so far as it directs blacklisting of the appellant in respect of future contracts, cannot be sustained in law. Further, the decisions in the case of Raghunath Thakur and Erusian Equipment as referred supra have been followed by the Honourable Supreme Court in B.S.N.Joshi & Sons Ltd., v. Nair Coal Services Ltd. & Ors reported in 2006 (2) SCC 548, and reiterated the principles laid down. 10. In view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforementioned decision, it is necessary that the petitioner should be afforded an opportunity and making a representation against the order, even though the rules do not specifically provided for. That apart, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that any order should be a speaking order and supported by reasons. That apart, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that any order should be a speaking order and supported by reasons. It is relevant to note that the Honourable Supreme Court in a decision reported in S.N.Mukherjee v. Union of India ( AIR 1990 SC 1984 ), observed that in view of the expanding horizon of the principles natural justice, the requirement to record reasons can be regarded as one of the principles of natural justice which govern exercise of power by administrative authorities. The rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. The extent of their application depends upon the particular statutory framework where under jurisdiction has been conferred on the administrative authority. With regard to the exercise of a particular power by an administrative authority including exercise of judicial or quasi judicial functions the legislator, while conferring the said power, may feel that it would not be in the larger public interest that the reasons for the order passed by the administrative authority be recorded in the order and be communicated to the aggrieved party and it may dispense with such a requirement." (v)A.Gnanaboominathan Vs. The District Collector, Ramanathapuram and another [2011 (1) CWC 555], wherein in paragraphs 41 and 42, it has been held as follows: "41. Though the learned Additional Advocate General by pointing out the decisions of the Supreme Court in matters relating to maintainability of the Writ Petition, especially, in contractual matters, this Court ordinarily does not invoke the Writ jurisdiction, the balance of convenience has to be looked into and it is more equally, important that the decision relied on by the Petitioner in the case of Erusian Equipment & Chemicals Ltd. V. State of W.B., 1975 (1) SCC 70 , has to be taken into consideration, especially, on the face of it, when violation of Principles of Nature Justice is established before this Court. When the power of judicial review is available to this Court by invoking the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and this Court is of the considered view that it can very well invoke its jurisdiction and rescue the Petitioner and provide appropriate relief. 42. In the above stated position and taking into account of the various decisions and the ratio laid down in Erusian Equipment & Chemicals Ltd. Vs. State of W.B., 1975 (1) SCC 70 ; E.Mohan Vs. 42. In the above stated position and taking into account of the various decisions and the ratio laid down in Erusian Equipment & Chemicals Ltd. Vs. State of W.B., 1975 (1) SCC 70 ; E.Mohan Vs. Madras Fertilizers Ltd., 2010 (2) CWC 52 ; and K.V.S.Palanivel Vs. The District Collector, Pudukottai District, 2010 (1) CWC 108, cited supra, an order blacklisting the Petitioner has Civil consequences for future business of the person concerned and the person affected by an order has a right of being heard and making his representation against any order of defend his case effectively. In this case also, in the absence of a Show Cause Notice being served on the petitioner, the decision of the authority in cancellation of contract and also forfeiting the security deposit and additional security deposit of the Petitioner, besides entrusting the balance work to another contractor cannot be sustained in the eye of law. Therefore, the impugned order is liable to be set aside." (vi) Oil and Natural Gas Commission Vs. Utpal Kumar Basu and Others [ 1994 (4) SCC 711 ], wherein in paragraph 25, it has been held as follows: "25. Clause (1) of Article 226 begins with a non obstante clause — notwithstanding anything in Article 32 — and provides that every High Court shall have power “throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction”, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, “within those territories” directions, orders or writs, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose. Under clause (2) of Article 226 the High Court may exercise its power conferred by clause (1) if the cause of action, wholly or in part, had arisen within the territory over which it exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. Under clause (2) of Article 226 the High Court may exercise its power conferred by clause (1) if the cause of action, wholly or in part, had arisen within the territory over which it exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. On a plain reading of the aforesaid two clauses of Article 226 of the Constitution it becomes clear that a High Court can exercise the power to issue directions, orders or writs for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution or for any other purpose if the cause of action, wholly or in part, had arisen within the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat of the Government or authority or the residence of the person against whom the direction, order or writ is issued is not within the said territories. In order to confer jurisdiction on the High Court of Calcutta, NICCO must show that at least a part of the cause of action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of that Court. That is at best its case in the writ petition." (vii) Om Prakash Srivastava Vs. Union of India and another [ 2006 (6) SCC 207 ], wherein in paragraphs 6 and 8, it has been held as follows:- "6. Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution is of great importance. It reads as follows: “226. (2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories.” 8. Two clauses of Article 226 of the Constitution on plain reading give clear indication that the High Court can exercise power to issue direction, order or writs for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution or for any other purpose if the cause of action wholly or in part had arisen within the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction notwithstanding that the seat of the Government or authority or the residence of the person against whom the direction, order or writ is issued is not within the said territories. (See ONGC v. Utpal Kumar Basu [ 1994 (4) SCC 711 ]" (viii) Harbanslal Sahnia and another Vs. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and others [ 2003 (2) SCC 107 ], wherein in paragraph 7, it has been held as follows: "7. So far as the view taken by the High Court that the remedy by way of recourse to arbitration clause was available to the appellants and therefore the writ petition filed by the appellants was liable to be dismissed is concerned, suffice it to observe that the rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction by availability of an alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion. In an appropriate case, in spite of availability of the alternative remedy, the High Court may still exercise its writ jurisdiction in at least three contingencies: (i) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights; (ii) where there is failure of principles of natural justice; or (iii) where the orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. (See Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks [ 1998 (8) SCC 1 ]. The present case attracts applicability of the first two contingencies. Moreover, as noted, the petitioners’ dealership, which is their bread and butter, came to be terminated for an irrelevant and non-existent cause. In such circumstances, we feel that the appellants should have been allowed relief by the High Court itself instead of driving them to the need of initiating arbitration proceedings." (ix) Ex.Rect (MP) A.Madurai Veeran Vs. Union of India, Rep. by its Secretary to Government, Ministry of Defence, New Delhi and others [ 2006 (2) MLJ 61 ], wherein in paragraph 9, it has been held as follows:- "9. In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas observed: "34. Union of India, Rep. by its Secretary to Government, Ministry of Defence, New Delhi and others [ 2006 (2) MLJ 61 ], wherein in paragraph 9, it has been held as follows:- "9. In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas observed: "34. When the Constitution was framed, Article 226, as it originally stood therein provided that "every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs...". Some of the decisions rendered by different High Courts during the earlier years of the Post-Constitution period have given a wider perspective regarding the jurisdiction of the High Court and pointed out that a High Court can exercise powers under Article 226 even in respect of Tribunals or authorities situated outside the territorial limits of its jurisdiction if such Tribunal or authority exercises powers in such a manner as to affect the fundamental rights of persons residing or carrying on business within the jurisdiction of such High Court vide., K.S.Rashid Ahmed v. Income Tax Investigation Commission, AIR 1951 Punj. 74; M.K.Ranganathan v. Madras Electric Tramways (1904) Ltd., AIR 1952 Mad.659; Aswini Kumar Sinha v. Deputy Collector of Central Excise and Land Customs, AIR 1952 Ass. 91. It was Subba Rao, J. (as the learned Chief Justice then was) who observed in M.K.Ranganathan v. Madras Electric Tramways (1904) Ltd., AIR 1952 Mad.659 that: "If a Tribunal or authority exercises jurisdiction within the territories affecting such rights it may reasonably be construed that the authority or the Tribunal functioned within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court and, therefore, is amenable to its jurisdiction." 35. But a Constitution Bench of this Court has held in Election Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao ( AIR 1953 SC 210 ) thus: The power of the High Court to issue writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is subject to the two-fold limitation that such writs cannot run beyond the territories subject to its jurisdiction and the person or authority to whom the High Court is empowered to issue such writs must be amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court either by residence or location within the territories subject to its jurisdiction." 36. It was the said decision of the Constitution Bench which necessitated Parliament to bring the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution by which Clause (1-A) was added to Article 226. That Clause was subsequently renumbered as Clause (2) by the Constitution Forty-Second Amendment. Now Clause (2) of Article 226 reads thus: "226. (2) the power conferred by Clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories." 37. The object of the amendment by inserting Clause (2) in the article was to supersede the decision of the Supreme Court in Election Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao, AIR 1953 SC 2010,and to restore the view held by the High Courts in the decisions cited above. Thus the power conferred on the High Courts in the decisions cited above. Thus the power conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 could as well be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which "the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises" and it is no matter that the seat of the authority concerned is outside the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of that High Court. The amendment is thus aimed at widening the width of the area for reaching the writs issued by different High Courts." (x) E.Mohan Vs. Madras Fertilizers Limited, Rep. by its Dy. General Manager (Acting) No.2, Manali, Chennai and others [ 2010 (2) CWC 52 ], wherein in paragraph 24, it has been held as follows: "24. The other contention which was raised by the learned Senior counsel appearing for the respondents is that the petitioner has to resort to arbitration and cannot approach the Writ Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has time and again held that the exclusion of writ jurisdiction on account of availability of alternate remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has time and again held that the exclusion of writ jurisdiction on account of availability of alternate remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion. In the instant case, it has been already held that action of the respondents were arbitrary and violative of the fundamental rights of the petitioner and the action of the respondents was not justified and it was unreasonable. ...." 17. The respondents 2 and 3 had taken two preliminary objections, viz., (i) This Court has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the present writ petition. (ii) The Agreement provides for Arbitration to resolve the dispute between the parties. Therefore, the writ petition is not maintainable, since the petitioner has failed to avail the remedy under Arbitration Clause. 18. In support of his submission, the learned counsel for the respondents relied on the following Judgments: (i) M/s.Shriram City Union Finance Corporation Ltd., Vs. Rama Mishra [ AIR 2002 SC 2402 ], wherein in paragraph 12, it has been held as follows: "12. Hence we hold this second question in favour of the appellant that in view of Cl.34 of the agreement it is the Courts at Calcutta alone would be competent Court to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and hence finding to the contrary given by the Courts below is hereby set aside." (ii) S.Sakthivel Vs. Manager, Vijay Hemant Finances Estate Ltd., Chennai [ 2013 (5) MLJ 886 ], wherein in paragraph 20, it has been held as follows: "20. In the light of the discussion when the existence of an arbitration clause is pointed out at the first instance, in the suit, the Court below was right in directing the parties to take recourse of arbitral proceedings. It is for the revision petitioner/plaintiff to work out his remedy under the provisions of the Arbitration Act. There is no manifest illegality in the impugned order warranting intervention and hence, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, the connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed." (iii) Tecco & R.D. (JV), Rep. by its Authorized Signatory, Mr.S.Jambunathan, Chennai Vs. The Chief Administrative Officer/Construction, Southern Railways, Egmore, Chennai [W.P.No.31977 of 2012, dated 01.04.2013], wherein in paragraph 18, it has been held as follows: "18. No costs. Consequently, the connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed." (iii) Tecco & R.D. (JV), Rep. by its Authorized Signatory, Mr.S.Jambunathan, Chennai Vs. The Chief Administrative Officer/Construction, Southern Railways, Egmore, Chennai [W.P.No.31977 of 2012, dated 01.04.2013], wherein in paragraph 18, it has been held as follows: "18. In the present case, what is under challenge is, the order of termination of contract passed by the fourth respondent in terms of clause 62 of the General Conditions of the Contract is being challenged. A lot of allegations and shortcomings were raised and attributed by the petitioner against the respondents herein which were stoutly denied by the respondents, who in turn accused the petitioner of delay, shortcomings and for other deficiencies. It is not in dispute that clauses 63 and 64 of the general conditions of contract provide for arbitration in case of disputes and a case of this nature should be more effectively canvassed before an arbitrator, where elaborate evidence could be let in by both parties in support of their contentions. The very fact that affidavit and counter affidavit are filed disputing the facts and further reply affidavit and rejoinder were filed sticking to their own stand, refusing to budge even an inch would make it very clear that such an onerous task could not be performed and completed before the contract period under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Further, the relief sought for will amount to specifically enforcing the contract and whether the petitioner is entitled to such a specific relief is also a question that can be more effectively decided before the Arbitral Tribunal only." 19. Both these contentions are devoid of merits. A writ petition can be initiated as per Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Article 226 was amended by Fifteenth and Forty second Amendments. Before these amendments, writs can be maintained in a High Court, if the person or authority against whom the High Court is empowered to issue such writs, must either reside or locate within the territory of such High Court. After amendments and introduction of Article 226 (2) of the Constitution of India, a writ is maintainable in a High Court within whose jurisdiction whole or part of cause of action arises. The cause of action is factual or facts. Each fact gives rise to cause of action. After amendments and introduction of Article 226 (2) of the Constitution of India, a writ is maintainable in a High Court within whose jurisdiction whole or part of cause of action arises. The cause of action is factual or facts. Each fact gives rise to cause of action. As per Article 226 (2) of the Constitution of India, a writ petition is maintainable in a High Court within whose jurisdiction whole or part of cause of action had arisen. Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India reads as under:- “226. (2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories.” 20. The petitioner and the respondents 2 and 3 have entered into an agreement at Delhi. According to the respondents 2 and 3, the petitioner had committed breach of terms of agreement and hence, the petitioner was blacklisted. Therefore, as per Clause 31 of agreement, only Delhi High Court has jurisdiction. 21. It is seen that the impugned order blacklisting the petitioner is sent to the petitioner's address at Samathuvapuram, Purivalam Post, Thirumaiyam Taluk, Pudukkottai District, Tamil Nadu and the petitioner received the same in that address within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. Therefore, a part of cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court. This issue had been considered and decided in the following cases and the relevant portions had already been extracted. (i) Oil and Natural Gas Commission Vs. Utpal Kumar Basu and Others [ 1994 (4) SCC 711 ] (ii) Om Prakash Srivastava Vs. Union of India and another [ 2006 (6) SCC 207 ] (iii) Ex.Rect (MP) A.Madurai Veeran Vs. Union of India, Rep. by its Secretary to Government, Ministry of Defence, New Delhi and others [ 2006 (2) MLJ 61 ]. 22. In view of the well settled law, I hold that part of cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court and the writ petition is maintainable before this Court. 23. Union of India, Rep. by its Secretary to Government, Ministry of Defence, New Delhi and others [ 2006 (2) MLJ 61 ]. 22. In view of the well settled law, I hold that part of cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court and the writ petition is maintainable before this Court. 23. As far as second contention of the respondents 2 and 3 is concerned, the petitioner is challenging the order of respondents 2 and 3 blacklisting them. The petitioner is not raising any dispute with regard to agreement. Hence, Arbitration clause is not applicable to the facts of the present case. Exclusion of writ jurisdiction by availability of an alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion. In an appropriate case, in spite of availability of the alternative remedy, the High Court may still exercise its writ jurisdiction. This issue had already been considered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the Judgment reported in 2003 (2) SCC 107 [Harbanslal Sahnia and another Vs. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and others] and 2010 (2) CWC 52 [E.Mohan Vs. Madras Fertilizers Ltd.,] and held that High Courts can entertain a writ petition, even if alternative remedy of arbitration is available. In view of the settled proposition of law, the contentions of the respondents 2 and 3 are untenable and unsustainable. 24. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order blacklisting the petitioner is invalid and illegal, has considerable force. The respondents 2 and 3 have power to blacklist the borrowing organizations/Non-Government Organizations, invoking Clause 3(c) or Clause 25 of the Agreement. Clause 3(c) is not applicable to the facts of the present case. 25. At this juncture, it is relevant to extract Clause 25 of the Agreement. "25. That in case of default of payment of interest/instalments continuing for more than six months without any sufficient and cogent reasons. Rastriya Mahila Kosh reserves its right to initiate action including blacklisting the NGO and for recovery of its dues by filing necessary legal proceedings at Delhi." 26. As per Clause 25, respondents 2 and 3 have power to blacklist the borrowing organizations/Non-Government Organizations, if the default of payment of interest/instalments continuing for more than six months without any sufficient and cogent reasons. In the present case, the petitioner has paid a total sum of Rs.70,34,574/-. As per Clause 25, respondents 2 and 3 have power to blacklist the borrowing organizations/Non-Government Organizations, if the default of payment of interest/instalments continuing for more than six months without any sufficient and cogent reasons. In the present case, the petitioner has paid a total sum of Rs.70,34,574/-. Out of this amount, the petitioner has paid a sum of Rs.6,45,159/- on 21.12.2009; Rs.1,20,000/- and Rs.2,80,000/- on 09.04.2010; and Rs.2,00,000/- on 27.08.2011. 27. The respondents 2 and 3 did not deny these averments. It is seen that within 15 days of receipt of Rs.4,00,000/- by Demand Drafts, dated 09.04.2010, the respondents 2 and 3 have blacklisted the petitioner by the impugned communication, dated 24.04.2010. This action of the respondents 2 and 3 is contrary to Clause 25 of the Agreement and hence, it is invalid. 28. Secondly, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the respondents 2 and 3 passed impugned order without notice to the petitioner. This is in violation of principles of natural justice. Blacklisting a person is a serious matter and it involves civil consequences. Without subjective satisfaction, the authority cannot blacklist a person. Even if the rules do not provide notice to be given to a party, it is an elementary principle of natural justice that party affected must be given an opportunity of being heard and making representations against the order. In the case of the petitioner, the respondents 2 and 3 did not give any opportunity to put forth their case. In these circumstances, the following Judgments relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner are squarely applicable to the facts of the present case and the relevant of portions of the Judgments had already been extracted. (i) M/s.Erusian Equipment & Chemicals Ltd. Vs. State of West Bengal and another [ 1975 (1) SCC 70 ]. (ii) Joseph Vilangandan Vs. The Executive Engineer (P.W.D.), Ernakulam and others [ AIR 1978 SC 930 ]. (iii) Raghunath Thakur Vs. State of Bihar and Others [1989 (1) SCC 229]. (iv) K.V.S.Palanivel Vs. The District Collector, Pudukottai District and others [2010 (1) CWC 108]. (v) A.Gnanaboominathan Vs. The District Collector, Ramanathapuram and another [2011 (1) CWC 555]. 29. (ii) Joseph Vilangandan Vs. The Executive Engineer (P.W.D.), Ernakulam and others [ AIR 1978 SC 930 ]. (iii) Raghunath Thakur Vs. State of Bihar and Others [1989 (1) SCC 229]. (iv) K.V.S.Palanivel Vs. The District Collector, Pudukottai District and others [2010 (1) CWC 108]. (v) A.Gnanaboominathan Vs. The District Collector, Ramanathapuram and another [2011 (1) CWC 555]. 29. For the above reasons, I hold that (a) this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the present writ petition, as part of cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court; (b) in the facts and circumstances of the case, Arbitration Clause is not applicable to the relief sought for by the petitioner and even if Arbitration remedy is available, it is not a bar in the facts and circumstances of the case to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court; and (c) the impugned order blacklisting the petitioner is invalid and illegal in view of contravention of Clause 25 of Agreement and violation of principles of natural justice. 30. In the result, the impugned order of the third respondent, dated 24.04.2010, is set aside and the Writ Petition is allowed. No costs. Consequently, M.P.(MD) No.1 of 2012 is closed.