JUDGMENT Heard parties. 2. Though the hearing of the writ petitions were concluded on different dates, however, in view of identical issues being involved, both of them are being considered together and disposed of by a common judgment. 3. In both the writ petitions, identical communications of the Bihar State Election Commission disclosing its decision that the persons, who were Chief Councillor and Deputy Chief Councillor, even after removal from their respective offices under Section 25(4) of the Bihar Municipal Act, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) upon no confidence motion having been passed by the House, would be competent to contest the election being held for filling up the vacancies of the said posts for the remaining tenure of the Municipal Corporation, are under challenge. 4. Vide order dated 7.9.2015 passed in C.W.J.C. No.19507/2014, the amendment sought for challenging the election to concerned post held subsequently, was allowed but the respondents were given liberty to question the maintainability of the writ petition at the time of final hearing. Thus, the issue of maintainability of the writ petition has also been raised in the aforesaid writ petition. It has been contended on behalf of the respondents that, once the election has been conducted and result has been declared, the writ petition would not be maintainable as the petitioner would be required to file election petition before the Tribunal constituted under the Act if he wants to challenge it on any ground. It is urged that Article 243 ZG(b) of the Constitution of India mandates in clear terms that no election to any Municipality shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to competent authority. It is contended that Rule 102 of the Bihar Municipal Election Rules, 2007 also mandates that no election to the office of Municipal Councillor / Chief Councillor or Deputy Chief Councillor shall be called in question except by an election petition. Thus, it is contended that once the election has been held now the same cannot be allowed to be challenged in the writ petition. 5. Learned counsel has placed reliance upon a decision of a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court rendered in Mohinder Singh Gill & anr. V. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi & ors. Thus, it is contended that once the election has been held now the same cannot be allowed to be challenged in the writ petition. 5. Learned counsel has placed reliance upon a decision of a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court rendered in Mohinder Singh Gill & anr. V. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi & ors. [(1978) 1 Supreme Court Cases 405] holding in a case arising out of the Representation of People Act, 1951 that Article 329 (b) of the Constitution operates as a complete bar to challenge to steps in election including that by a writ petition under Article 226. It is submitted that the same principle would apply in the case of Municipality or Panchayat in view of the constitutional and statutory provisions. 6. However, subsequently, a matter of election of Bar Council of Delhi came for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bar Council of Delhi and anr. V. Surjeet Singh and ors. [AIR 1980 Supreme Court 1612]. The Supreme Court held the proviso to Rule 3 (j) of the Bar Council of Delhi Election Rules (1968) to be invalid and, as a result, whole election based on electoral roll prepared pursuant to the aforesaid proviso was also set aside. Writ petition under Article 226 challenging the election on such ground was held to be maintainable. A Single Judge Bench of this Court in its decision rendered in Shardanand Singh & Anr. Vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. [ 2015 (2) PLJR 598 ] had set aside the re-election of the Chief Councillor and the Deputy Chief Councillor and had restored the petitioners to such posts after holding that no confidence motion passed against them was in violation of the Rule 2(v) of the Bihar Municipal No Confidence Motion Process Rules, 2010. A Division Bench of this Court in Sheikh Hasssmuddin & Anr. Vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. [ 2015 (3) PLJR 203 ], after finding procedural lapse in passing of no confidence motion, has also set aside the elections of Pramukh and Up-Pramukh. Thus, it can safely be construed that though the election as per the constitutional provision and relevant rules cannot be put to challenge in the petition under Article 226 ordinarily but under certain circumstances, as found above, the writ petition would be maintainable. Thus, it can safely be construed that though the election as per the constitutional provision and relevant rules cannot be put to challenge in the petition under Article 226 ordinarily but under certain circumstances, as found above, the writ petition would be maintainable. In the present case also, the writ petition was originally filed challenging the decision of the Bihar State Election Commission as contained in Annexure 4 holding that even after no confidence motion having been passed, the persons so removed would be entitled to re-contest the election for the remaining tenure of the Municipality. Subsequently, the election was held, thus, a prayer for setting aside the same has only been made by way of consequential relief. If the decision of the Election Commission is held to be erroneous and is set aside then the election would have to be set aside as a consequence thereof. That apart, under the provisions contained in Section 18(2), if an elected person incurs any disqualification laid down in Section 18(1) of the Act, a petition can be filed before the Election Commission to hold that such person, having incurred such disqualification, would have to be removed from the post. Therefore, in such case his election automatically would stand set aside if the Election Commission allows such petition. In the case in hand, the view of the Election Commission declared prior to such election is under challenge. If the petitioner succeeds then the person removed from office under Section 25(4) would become disqualified to contest the election and in above view of the matter even if the election has been held and he has been elected, that election has to go as a consequence thereof. Apart from the above, the identical issue is also under challenge in C.W.J.C. No.12051/2015 which is being considered together. In that case a prayer seeking stay of election during pendency of the writ petition was made. This Court, though had allowed the election to be held, however, had directed the result of the election to be kept under sealed cover. Thus, the result having not been declared, the election process is not complete. If aforesaid writ petition succeeds holding the decision of Election Commission to be erroneous, then identical decision under challenged in C.W.J.C. No.19507/2014 would also not survive. Thus, the result having not been declared, the election process is not complete. If aforesaid writ petition succeeds holding the decision of Election Commission to be erroneous, then identical decision under challenged in C.W.J.C. No.19507/2014 would also not survive. Thus, as a consequence, the election held during pendency of the case would also become non-est in view of the person concerned having incurred fatal disqualification. 7. Thus, in my view the present writ petition, even after election concerned having been held during its pendency, would be maintainable for the reasons mentioned above. 8. Now I proceed to consider the writ petitions on their merit. 9. Following issue has emerged for consideration in both the writ petitions:- “(A) Whether, the stand of State Election Commission that the respondent no.5 in both the cases are fit and entitled to re-contest the election for filling up the vacancies of the Chief Councillor and Deputy Chief Councillor for the remaining tenure of the respective Municipal Corporations even after introduction of Sub Section (6) of Section 25 of the Bihar Municipal Act, 2007 by way of amendment, is erroneous ? 10. The issue involved revolves around the different provisions contained in Section 25 of the Act. 11. Admittedly, the respondent no. 5 of both the writ petitions were removed from their respective elected post of Chief Councillor (Mayor) and Deputy Chief Councillor (Deputy Mayor) of Patna and Gaya Municipal Corporation on account of passing of no confidence motion against them on different dates under the provisions of Section 25(4) of the Act. Thereafter, when the process for filling up of the respective vacancies created due to their removal began, an issue was raised before the State Election Commission as to whether the persons, who were removed from the office on passing of no confidence motion against them, would be entitled to again contest such election? The State Election Commission vide its letter dated 4.8.2015 appended as Annexure 4 in C.W.J.C. No. 12051 of 2015 and dated 7.11.2014 in C.W.J.C. No. 19507 of 2014 addressed to the respective District Magistrate – cum – District Election Officers (Municipal Corporation) concerned, who had sought guidance in the matter, opined that such persons would be entitled to contest the election again for filling up the vacancies for the remaining tenure of the elected body concerned. 12. In C.W.J.C. No. 19507/2014 the respondent no. 12. In C.W.J.C. No. 19507/2014 the respondent no. 5 was removed from the post of Deputy Chief Councillor (Deputy Mayor) of Gaya Municipal Corporation on no confidence motion being passed under Section 25(4) of the Act against him and the date fixed for the election of the Deputy Mayor was 15.11.2014. Prior to that petitioner had already filed the writ petition on 12.11.2014. However, the same was registered on 17.11.2014. The petitioner has challenged the Annexure 4 dated 7.11.2014 through which, the decision concerned of the State Election Commission was communicated by the Deputy Secretary of the Election Commission to the District Magistrate–cum–District Election Officer (Municipal Corporation), Gaya. However, subsequently he has challenged the fresh election of the Deputy Mayor also by way of consequential relief. 13. It has been contended on behalf of both the petitioners that, after the amendment brought in Section 25 of the Act by Bihar Municipal (Amendment) Act, 2011 (hereinafter referred to as the Amendment Act, 2011), part of sub-Section (5) has been brought out of the aforesaid sub-Section and has been put under a new sub-Section (6) in the Hindi version and it reads that the Chief Councillor/Deputy Chief Councillor so removed shall not be eligible for re-election on such posts during the remaining terms of office of such Municipality. I have already noticed in the order dated 10.8.2015 that there was variation in the Hindi and English version of the concerned statute prior to such amendment. I have already noticed in the order dated 10.8.2015 that there was variation in the Hindi and English version of the concerned statute prior to such amendment. For better appreciation, the Hindi and English version of the relevant provisions which were in existence before the amendment brought by the aforesaid Amendment Act, 2011, are extracted as under:- Hindi Version ^^25- eq[; ik"kZn@mi eq[; ik"kZn dks gVk;k tkuk xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ¼5½ bl vf/kfu;e ds v/khu mica/kksa ij dksbZ izfrdwy izHkko Mkys fcuk uxjikfydk ij vf/kdkfjrk j[kus okys izeaMyh; vk;qDr ds fopkj esa ;fn dksbZ eq[; ik"kZn@mi eq[; ik"kZn fcuk leqfpr dkj.k ds rhu yxkrkj cSBdksa esa vuqifLFkr jgus ;k tku&cw>dj bl vf/kfu;e ds v/khu vius d`R;ksa ,oa vius drZO;ksa dks djus ls bUdkj ;k mis{kk djus ;k vius drZO;ksa fd fuoZgu esa nqjkpkj dk nks"kh ik;s tkus ;k vius drZO;ksa ds fuoZgu djus esa 'kkjhfjd ;k ekufld rkSj ij v{ke gksus ;k fdlh vkijkf/kd ekeys dk vfHk;qDr gksus ds pyrs N% ekg ls vf/kd Qjkj gks tkus dk nks"kh gks rks izeaMyh; vk;qDr ,sls eq[; ik"kZn@mi eq[; ik"kZn dks Li"Vhdj.k gsrq leqfpr volj iznku djus ds mijkar vkns’k ikfjr dj ;FkkfLFkfr ,sls eq[; ik"kZn@mi eq[; ik"kZn dks mlds in ls gVk ldsxkA bl izdkj gVk;k x;k eq[; ik"kZn@mi eq[; ik"kZn ,slh uxjikfydk esa mldh 'ks"k inkof/k ds nkSjku eq[; ik"kZn@mi eq[; ik"kZn ds :i esa iqu% fuokZpu dk ik= ugha gksxk] izeaMyh; vk;qDr ds vkns’k ds fo:) jkT; ljdkj ds le{k vihy nk;j dh tk ldsxh^^A (emphasis is mine) English Version “25. Removal of Chief Councillor/Deputy Chief Councillor. Removal of Chief Councillor/Deputy Chief Councillor. x x x x x x x x x x x x x x xx XxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxXxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx (4) The Chief Councillor/Deputy Chief Councillor may be removed from office by a resolution carried by a majority of the whole number of Councillors holding office for the time being at a special meeting to be called for this purpose in the manner prescribed, upon a requisition made in writing by not less than one-third of the total number of Councillors, and the procedure for the conduct of business in the special meeting shall be such as may be prescribed: "Provided that a no confidence motion shall not be brought against the Chief Councillor/Deputy Chief Councillor within a period of two years of taking over the charge of the post: Provided further that a no confidence motion shall not be brought again within one year of the first no confidence motion: Provided further also that no confidence motion shall not be brought within the residual period of six months of the municipality. (5) “Without prejudice to the provisions under this Act, if, in opinion of the Divisional Commissioner having territorial jurisdiction over the Municipality the Chief Councillor/Deputy Chief Councillor absents himself without sufficient cause for more than three consecutive meetings or sittings or wilfully omits or refuses to perform his duties and functions under this Act, or is found to be guilty of misconduct in the discharge of his duties or becomes physically or mentally incapacitated for performing his duties or is absconding being an accused in a criminal case for more than six months, the Divisional Commissioner may, after giving the Chief Councillor/Deputy Chief Councillor a reasonable opportunity for explanation, by order, remove such Chief Councillor from office. (6) The Chief Councillor/Deputy Chief Councillor so removed shall not be eligible for re-election as Chief councillor/Deputy Chief Councillor or Councillor during the remaining term of office of such Municipality. Appeal shall lie before the State Government against the order of the Divisional Commissioner.” (emphasis in mine) 14. (6) The Chief Councillor/Deputy Chief Councillor so removed shall not be eligible for re-election as Chief councillor/Deputy Chief Councillor or Councillor during the remaining term of office of such Municipality. Appeal shall lie before the State Government against the order of the Divisional Commissioner.” (emphasis in mine) 14. It appears from Section 25(5) that there was a provision for removal of Chief Councillor or Deputy Chief Councillor by the Divisional Commissioner in a situation when such incumbent of the office absents himself without sufficient cause for more than three consecutive meetings or sittings or willfully omits or refuses to perform his duties and functions under the Act or is found to be guilty of misconduct in the discharge of his duties or becomes physically or mentally incapacitated for performing his duties or is absconding being an accused in a criminal case for more than six months. In the Hindi version, it was further provided that the Chief Councillor or Councillor so removed would not be eligible for re-election as such during the remaining terms of office of such Municipality and also an appeal would lie before the State Government against the order of the Divisional Commissioner, whereas, in the English version the aforesaid provision was shown under a separate sub-Section (6) with an addition that the a person so removed would not only be disentitled from contesting re-election on the post of Chief Councillor/Deputy Chief Councillor but also for Councillor during the remaining term of the office of the Municipality. Thereafter, the legislature in its wisdom brought amendment in several provisions of the Act including Section 25 by the Amendment Act, 2011. Thereafter, the legislature in its wisdom brought amendment in several provisions of the Act including Section 25 by the Amendment Act, 2011. The amendments brought in Section 25 by the Amending Act, as disclosed in Section 9 of the Hindi and English versions, are reproduced as under for better appreciation:- Hindi Version ^^9- fcgkj vf/kfu;e] 11] 2007 dh /kkjk&25 dk la'kks/kuA& ¼1½ mDr vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk&25 dh mi&/kkjk ¼5½ eas tgk¡ dgh Hkh iz;qDr 'kCn** izeaMyh; vk;qDr** dk s 'kCn ^^ljdkj** ds }kjk izfrLFkkfir fd;k tk;sxk vkSj 'kCn ^^uxjikfydk ij vf/kdkfjrk j[kus okys** dks foyksfir fd;k tk;sxkA ¼2½ mDr vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk&25 dh mi&/kkjk ¼5½ ds ckn fUkEu ijUrqd tksM+k tk;sxk] ;Fkk %& ^^ijUrq] /kkjk&44 ds v/khu yksdizgjh dh fu;qfDr ds ckn ljdkj] bl mi&/kkjk ds v/khu ,sls yksdizgjh dh vuq'kalk ds vk/kkj ij gh vkns'k ikfjr dj ldsxhA** ¼3½ fgUnh ikB dh mi&/kkjk ¼5½ dh nwljh dafMdk dks mi&/kkjk ¼6½ ds :i esa la[;kafdr djrs gq;s bldh vafre dafMdk ds 'kCnksa ^^izeaMyh; vk;qDr ds vkns'k ds fo:) jkT; ljdkj ds le{k vihy nk;j dh tk ldsxhA** foyksfir fd;k tk;sxkA ^^ (emphasis is mine) English Version “9. Amendment of Section-25 of the Bihar Act 11, 2007 - In the said Act in Section-25 the following amendments shall be made, namely- (i) In sub-Section-(5) the words "divisional commissioner" wherever occur in Section 25 of the said Act shall be substituted by the word "Government" and the words “having territorial jurisdiction over the municipality" shall be deleted. (ii) The following proviso shall be added after Section-25 (5) of the Act as under:- "Provided that after appointment of Lok Prahari, under Section-44, the Government, may pass order under this sub-Section only on the basis of recommendation of such Lok Prahari." (iii) In sub-Section-(6) the last line “appeal shall lie before the State Government against the order of divisional commissioner, shall be deleted-" 15. It appears from the Hindi version of the aforesaid amending provision that the word Divisional Commissioner, wherever has been used earlier, now stands substituted by word the State Government and a proviso has been introduced in Section 25 in the end that, after appointment of Lok Prahari, the State Government would be able to pass order under this sub-Section only on the basis of recommendation of such Lok Prahari. Further amendment is that the second part/sub-paragraph of sub-Section (5) would be renumbered as sub-Section (6) and the sentence that an appeal against the order passed by the Divisional Commissioner could be preferred before the State Government stands deleted. It would mean that the earlier provision which was part of sub-Section (5) stating that the persons so removed would not be able to contest the election for the post of Chief Councillor/Deputy Chief Councillor for the remaining tenure of the Municipal Corporation, now stands described under a separate sub-Section (6). In the English Version also similar amendment has been brought in sub-Section (5), however, last part was not required in it as the English version was already having such provision under separate sub-Section (6). However, interestingly one difference in English and Hindi version still persists as sub-Section (6) of Hindi version lays down that the person so removed would not be able to contest the election for Chief Councillor/Deputy Chief Councillor for remaining period of the elected body of the Municipal Corporation, whereas, in the English version it stands stated that he/she would not be able to contest even the election of Councillor apart from the above posts. 16. Be that as it may, as has been discussed in the order dated 10.8.2015 referring a decision of this Court rendered by a Full Bench of this Court in Dr. Sachidanand Sinha Vrs. The Collector, Patna and others [ 1989 PLJR 1141 ], by now it is well settled that in case of variation in Hindi and English version of a statute, both published in the official gazette, the provisions shown in Hindi Versions would prevail, one has to understand that for the relevant purpose Hindi version has to be read. 17. Mr. Jitendra Singh, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner in C.W.J.C. No. 12051 of 2015 as well as Mr. Y.V.Giri, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner in C.W.J.C. No. 19507/2014 have vehemently argued that the extraction of relevant passage from sub-Section (5) of Section 25 in Hindi version and placing it under new sub-Section (6) is purposive and the same is not a cosmetic change brought by the legislature. It is contended that, in fact, the legislature never brings a cosmetic change in the Statute. Whenever an amendment is made that is always purposive and reflects the intention of the legislature. It is contended that, in fact, the legislature never brings a cosmetic change in the Statute. Whenever an amendment is made that is always purposive and reflects the intention of the legislature. It is submitted that previously the concerned provision was part of sub-Section (5) which would definitely mean that the person removed by the Divisional Commissioner under sub-Section (5) of the Act would not be entitled to re-contest the election of the post of Chief Councillor / Deputy Chief Councillor for the remaining period of the tenure of the elected body but once it has been extracted out from sub-Section (5) and has been brought under new sub-Section (6) the words “if so removed” would mean removal in any manner which has been prescribed under Section 25 as a whole. Therefore, the respondent no. 5 in both the cases having been removed under Section 25(4) of the Act would also be covered by the sub-Section (6) and as such they would not be entitled to contest the election for the remaining tenure. Learned counsel further submits that every amendment or change is brought by the legislature in the public interest and, after taking help of the aims and object appended with the Hindi version of the Amendment Bill, 2011 brought on record as Annexure 8, it is contended that the purpose of brining amendment in the Bihar Municipal Act is for making it more effective and public oriented. It has been further urged that in the absence of any prefix or suffix in the newly created sub-Section (6) confining it to sub-Section (5) only, it has to be understood that it is for the purpose of the entire Section 25 otherwise the whole purpose of the amendment would get defeated. 18. It is next contended that there is proper protection given under sub-Section (4) ensuring that no confidence motion not be brought again and again only for the purpose of harassing the incumbents of the office. First proviso to Section 25(4) protects the Councillors/Deputy Councillor by stating that no confidence motion cannot be brought against incumbent of the aforesaid office within a period of two years of taking over the charge of the post. First proviso to Section 25(4) protects the Councillors/Deputy Councillor by stating that no confidence motion cannot be brought against incumbent of the aforesaid office within a period of two years of taking over the charge of the post. The second proviso says that no confidence motion shall not be brought again within one year of first no confidence motion and third proviso says that no confidence motion shall not be brought within the residual period of six months of the Municipality. It is contended that such privilege already having been given to protect the incumbents of the office from unwarranted and unnecessary no confidence motion, it has also to be construed that if a no confidence motion is eventually passed then the intention of the legislature would be to remove such persons from office at least for the remaining tenure of such Municipality. It is urged that, since the aforesaid protection has already been provided by way of aforesaid three proviso to Section 25(4) of the Act to the incumbents of the office from being unnecessarily harassed, the legislature in its wisdom, has also brought amendment by including the removal under Section 25(4) within the ambit of sub-Section (6) so that after having been removed from the office of Chief Councillor/Deputy Chief Councillor the person so removed does not engage himself in horse trading and destabilizing the things to pressurize the Councillors to re-elect him. After all, the will of the majority to remove such incumbent from the office has to be accepted and respected. 19. Mr. Singh has further contended that the opening word of the amended provision, i.e., sub-Section (6) of Section 25 is of great importance as it says the Chief Councillor / Deputy Chief Councillor “so removed” shall not be eligible for re-election as such for the remaining terms of office of such of such Municipality. He submits that emphasis should be given upon the word so removed as it was earlier under sub-Section (5) but has been extracted out of it and placed under a new sub-Section (6). For proper interpretation of the aforesaid expression, rule of ejusdem generis should be applied. In this regard he submits that Section 25(6) does not have expression to limit it to the Section 25(5) only excluding Section 25(4). For proper interpretation of the aforesaid expression, rule of ejusdem generis should be applied. In this regard he submits that Section 25(6) does not have expression to limit it to the Section 25(5) only excluding Section 25(4). He has referred to 6th Edition, Reprint 1997 of the Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, in particular, page 308 where observation of Lord Scarman stands quoted. For better appreciation the same is extracted as under: “As stated by LORD SCARMAN; “If the legislative purpose of a statute is such that a statutory series should be read ejusdem generis, so be it, the rule is helpful. But, if it is not, the rule is more likely to defeat than to fulfil the purpose of the statute. The rule like many other rules of statutory interpretation, is a useful servant but a bad master.” 20. However, there is question mark as to whether such observation of Lord Scarman really comes to the help of the petitioner? 21. He also places reliance upon a decision of Apex Court rendered in Subramanian Swamy and others Vs. Raju through Member, Juvenile justice Board and another [(2014) 8 Supreme Court Cases 390]. With the help of the observation of the Apex court in paragraphs 61, 62 and 63 it is contended that there is no need of reading down 25(6) for applying it only with respect to Section 25(5) as the meaning of the sub-Section is plain, unambiguous and legislative intent is clear. 22. Mr. Singh Submits with the help of provisions contained in Clauses iv and ix of Rule 2 of Bihar Municipal No Confidence Motion process Rules, 2010 that, while issuing notice for the purpose of passing of no confidence motion, it is mandatory that the reasons/allegations on which the no confidence motion is to be brought, be clearly stated. He also emphasizes the word New used in the aforesaid Clause to show that the same is for electing a new Chief Councillor or Deputy Chief Councillor not the old one who stood removed on account of passing of no confidence. 23. He further draws attention of this Court towards the provisions contained in Articles 89, 91 and 92 that the elected heads of third tier of democracy cannot be equated with the elected members of parliament or legislative assembly or the ministers etc. 23. He further draws attention of this Court towards the provisions contained in Articles 89, 91 and 92 that the elected heads of third tier of democracy cannot be equated with the elected members of parliament or legislative assembly or the ministers etc. rather from plain reading of respective powers, they may well be equated with the Deputy Chairman or the Chairman or the Speaker of the House. He also refers towards Article 243R as well as 243V. 24. The decision of the Apex Court rendered in Grasim Industries Ltd. Vs. Collector of Customs, Bombay [(2002) 4 Supreme Court Cases 297] has been relied by the petitioners to impress upon this Court that no word or expression used in any statute can be said to be redundant or superfluous. In the matters of interpretation one should not concentrate too much on one word and pay too little attention to the other words. No provision in the statute or no word in any Section can be construed in isolation. The elementary principle of interpreting any word while considering a statute is to gather the mens or sentential legis of the legislature. 25. He also places reliance upon foot note 35 of Craies on Statute Law, 6th Edition by S.G.G. Edgar, M.A. Specially the phrases “nemo enim aliquam partem recte intelligere potest antequam totum interum atque iterum perlegerit”, i.e., no one can rightly understand any part without perusing the whole again and again. . The author has stated that, besides the rules laid down in Heydon’s Case, there is general rule of construction applicable to all statutes alike, which is spoken of as construction ex visceribus actus, i.e., within the four corners of the Act. 26. In addition to the above learned counsel has also placed reliance upon the decisions rendered in Madanlal Fakirchand Dudhediya Vs. Shree Changdeo Sugar Mills Ltd. and others [AIR 1962 Supreme Court 1543], State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Mohd. Hussain alias Saleem [(2014) 1 Supreme Court Cases 258], and Anand Brothers Private Limited Vs. Union of India & others [(2014) 9 Supreme Court Cases 212]. 27. Shree Changdeo Sugar Mills Ltd. and others [AIR 1962 Supreme Court 1543], State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Mohd. Hussain alias Saleem [(2014) 1 Supreme Court Cases 258], and Anand Brothers Private Limited Vs. Union of India & others [(2014) 9 Supreme Court Cases 212]. 27. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondents have submitted that the intention of the legislature is not to disentitle a person, against whom no confidence motion has been passed, from again contesting the election for remaining tenure of the Corporation as the removal under Section 25(4) of the Act upon passing of no confidence motion does not cast any stigma upon the Chief Councillor or Deputy Chief Councillor who have been removed rather the same is expression of the majority of the House and the same majority may once again decide to choose the same person as Mayor or Deputy Mayor. However, the removal under Section 25(5) of the Act is stigmatic as, in such cases, the removal is on the basis of charges that may vary from negligence or omission in performing duties and functions to being guilty of misconduct or absconding for more than six months as an accused in a criminal case. However, before passing an order of removal of such Chief Councillor or Deputy Chief Councillor, charges have to be framed, show cause notice has to be issued and reasonable opportunity for explanation has to be given to the concerned person. In view of the fact that reasonable opportunity of explaining the conduct is to be given to the incumbent of the aforesaid office prior to passing of the final order of removal, the competent authority would be required to consider the grounds raised by such person also and a finding has to be recorded as to why grounds raised by him/her are not tenable and why he/she is required to be removed from the office. 28. Thus, it is urged on behalf of the respondents that the removal under Section 25(4) of the Act is the expression of the majority of the House whereas removal under Section (5) is after recording a finding upon guilt of the person occupying the concerned office. Therefore, both cannot be equated and clubbed within a class as they are too different in nature to be brought together within the canvass of the sub-Section (6) of Section 25 of the Act. 29. Mr. Therefore, both cannot be equated and clubbed within a class as they are too different in nature to be brought together within the canvass of the sub-Section (6) of Section 25 of the Act. 29. Mr. S.B.K. Manglam, learned counsel appearing for the respondent no. 5 in C.W.J.C. No. 12051 of 2015 has placed reliance upon Chapter 10 (Construction Most Agreeable to Justice and Reason) from “Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes”. It stands stated that artificiality and anomaly is to be avoided during construction. Where possible, a construction should be adopted which will facilitate the smooth working of the scheme of legislation established by the Act, which will avoid producing or prolonging artificiality in the law, and which will not produce anomalous results. The author has referred the case of I.R.C. v. J.B.Hodge & Co. (Glasgow), Ltd. [1961] 1 W.L.R. 1218, in this connection. He has also placed reliance upon another book, v.i.z, Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, 12th Edition. It is contended that it is cardinal principle of interpretation of statute that it must be read as a whole as words are to be understood in their context. However, this rule permits reference to other statutes in pari materia, i.e., statutes dealing with the same subject matter or forming part of the same system. It is urged that the provisions contained in Section 25(5) and 25(6) are in pari materia with sub-Sections(4) and (5) of Section 18, sub-Sections (4) and (5) of Section 44 as well as sub-Sections (4) and (5) of Section 70 of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 2006 which are the provisions for removal of Mukhia/Up-Mukhia of the Panchayat, Pramukh / Up-Pramukh of the Panchayat Samiti and Adhyaksha and Up-Adhyaksha of Zila Parishad respectively. It is contended that identical provisions are there for removal of incumbents from the aforesaid office on account of passing of no confidence motion and also upon establishing and finding guilt. In all the cases there are provisions indicating that in case of removal on account of establishing their guilt, the persons so removed would not be entitled to contest the election for the concerned posts for the remaining tenure of the said body, however, on being removed on passing of no-confidence motion, such provision is not there. In all the cases there are provisions indicating that in case of removal on account of establishing their guilt, the persons so removed would not be entitled to contest the election for the concerned posts for the remaining tenure of the said body, however, on being removed on passing of no-confidence motion, such provision is not there. It is urged that the Municipality and Panchayati Raj are integral part of third tier of our democratic system and, therefore, they form a class together and, as such, the relevant provision of the Municipal Act being in pari materia with the aforesaid provision of the Panchyat Raj Act can conveniently be read together for reaching to a logical and just conclusion. In this regard he also refers to the different provisions of Constitution of India under part IX and IXA specially Article 243B and 243Q. 30. In support of his aforesaid submission learned counsel has placed reliance upon a decision of the Supreme Court rendered in Ahmedabad Pvt. Primary Teachers’ Assn. Vs. Administrative Officer and others [(2004) 1 Supreme Court Cases 755] in particular paragraph 12 thereof to impress upon this court that the doctrine of pari materia, if it refers other statutes dealing with the same subject or forming part of the same system, would be a permissible aid to the construction of provisions in a statute. 31. He further submits that, as has been held in several judicial pronouncements, for the purpose of construction of statutory provisions, the aims and objects and purpose for bringing such statute would be of immense help for coming to the conclusion as to what was the intention of the legislature. It is contended that it is not only the amendment in Section 25(5) that has been brought by the Amendment Act, 2011 rather several other provisions of the Act have been amended. A copy of the bill which was tabled before the House along with its aims and objects has been brought on record by the petitioner of C.W.J.C. No. 12051 of 2015 appending it as Annexure 8 to the second supplementary affidavit. With the help of the aforesaid aims and objects appended with the concerned bill, Mr. Mangalam points out that the main reason for bringing amendment was the variation found in the Hindi and English version of the Municipal Act, 2007. With the help of the aforesaid aims and objects appended with the concerned bill, Mr. Mangalam points out that the main reason for bringing amendment was the variation found in the Hindi and English version of the Municipal Act, 2007. Therefore, the legislature in its wisdom has brought the amendment concerned under Section 25 of the Act so that parity could be achieved in the both versions, i.e., English and Hindi. He points out that amendment which has been brought in Section 25 regarding disentitlement of Chief Councillor/Deputy Chief Councillor in contesting re-election under sub-Section (5) of Section 25 was already there in the English version as a separate sub-Section (6). Thus, reason for amendment was to achieve parity and also for substituting the word Divisional Commissioner by the State Government which was to be given power to decide such issue after recommendation by Lok Prahari, therefore, the part of sub-Section (5) providing appeal has also been deleted as there would no question of any appeal before the State Government against the orders passed by the State Government itself. Hence it is contended that amendment should not be read more than that or should not be enlarged wider than what the aims and objects described in Annexure 8 disclose. Mr. Mangalam has placed reliance upon a decision rendered in Attorney–General v. H.R.H.Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover ([1957] 1 All E.R. 49) in support of his submission that general words cannot be read in isolation and their colour and content are derived from their context and, thus, every word of the statute and its context would have to be examined for reaching to a just and proper conclusion. He places reliance upon yet another decision rendered in Oliver Ashworth (Holdings) Ltd v Ballard (Kent) Ltd ([1999] 2 All ER 791 on the point that, for construing any enacting provision, regard must be had to the whole of the Act. He further places reliance upon a decision of the Apex Court rendered in Jugal Kishore Vs. State of Maharashtra and others [1989 Supp (1) Supreme Court Cases 589] which has been referred on the point that unless the Acts, with the intention of implementing various socio – economic plans, are read in such complimentary manner, the operation of different Acts in the same field would create contradiction and would become impossible. State of Maharashtra and others [1989 Supp (1) Supreme Court Cases 589] which has been referred on the point that unless the Acts, with the intention of implementing various socio – economic plans, are read in such complimentary manner, the operation of different Acts in the same field would create contradiction and would become impossible. He places reliance upon a decision of the Supreme Court rendered in Subramanian Swamy and others Vs. Raju through Member, Juvenile justice Board and another [(2014) 8 Supreme Court Cases 390] to demonstrate that classification and categorization need not be the outcome of a mathematical or arithmetical precision in the similarities of the persons included in a class as there may be differences amongst the members included within a particular class. With the help of a decision of the Single Bench of this Court rendered in Akchay Kumar Mandal Vs. State of Bihar [2015(2) BLJR 11], Mr. Mangalam has submitted that for the purpose of removal of Mukhiya on the ground of misconduct as envisaged under Section 18(5) of the Bihar Panchayat Act Raj, 2006, charges are required to be framed and findings are also required to be recorded after appreciation of material produced before the competent authority, whereas, in a proceeding for the purpose of passing of no confidence motion, only the allegations are required to be stated in the notice. While framing of charges or recording of evidence and deciding the matter, reasonable opportunity to the concerned affected persons is required to be given. In the process of passing of no confidence motion, there is no provision of recording finding upon the guilt of incumbent of the concerned office rather that is merely expression of no confidence against him/her shown by the House and, as such, both the events cannot be clubbed together as a class so that to bring Section 25(4) also under the mischief of sub-Section (6). 32. Mr. 32. Mr. Binod Kumar Kanth, learned counsel appearing for the respondent no.5 in C.W.J.C. No. 19507/2014 has submitted that Article 75(1B) as well as Article 102, which lays down the grounds for incurring disqualifications from membership of Houses of Parliament and Article 164(1B) and Article 191 being similar provision with respect to the State, if read with Article 243 F laying down terms of disqualification from membership of Panchayat and Article 243 V which deals in disqualification from the membership of Municipality, there would appear an uncanny resemblance so far the grounds on which either a member of the Parliament or the Legislative Assembly or the Panchayat or the Municipality becomes disqualified as a member. It is apparent from Article 243B read with 243C as well as 243E read with 243F that the Panchayat and Municipality are constituted under the provisions of the Constitution of India and the relevant statutes have been brought in existence in terms of the entry no.5 of List II (State List) of Schedule VII of the Constitution. Thus, it has been contended that the provision for the Municipality and the Panchayats are not to be seen in a different context as both are integral parts of the local self government or third limb of our democratic set up. It is contended that there is no contemplation in the three tier system of our democracy that a minister or any office bearer, if removed or if the Councils of Ministers is removed in view of no confidence motion having been passed in the House, the same Council of Ministers or other office bearers cannot be allowed to assume the office once again if the majority of the House again shows confidence in them. 33. Mr. Kanth has next contended that, to ascertain the true meaning, scope and effect of the amendment brought, one would have to take recourse to the sound rule of construction of statute firmly established in England as far back as in 1584 when Heydon’s case was decided. He has placed reliance upon a decision of the Supreme Court rendered in Bengal Immunity Co. V. State of Bihar [ AIR 1955 SC 661 ] specially paragraph 22 thereof where the Heydon’s case stands elaborately discussed. 34. He has placed reliance upon a decision of the Supreme Court rendered in Bengal Immunity Co. V. State of Bihar [ AIR 1955 SC 661 ] specially paragraph 22 thereof where the Heydon’s case stands elaborately discussed. 34. Answering the application of the rule of ejusdem generis raised by the petitioner he has submitted that when this rule is to be applied and what is the extent of rule has been considered extensively and elaborately by the Apex Court in Bengal Immunity Co. (supra). He submits that, when in a statute, particular phrases are mentioned by name and they are followed by general word then the general words are sometime construed ejusdem generis, i.e., limited to the same category or genus comprehended by particular words. He refers to a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in Jagdish Chandra Gupta Vs. Kajaria Traders (India) Ltd. [AIR 1964 Supreme Court 1882], the paragraph 6 in particular, to impress upon this Court that it is not necessary that this rule must always be applied and the nature of special words and general words must be considered before the rule is applied. 35. He further places reliance upon a decision of the Apex Court in Grid Corporation of Orissa Limited and others Vs. Eastern Metals and Ferro Alloys and others [(2011) 11 Supreme Court Cases 334], paragraph 25 thereof in particular, wherein the Supreme Court has held that the golden rule of interpretation is that the words of a statute have to be read and understood in their natural, ordinary and popular sense. However, where the words are capable of bearing two or more constructions, it is necessary to adopt purposive construction by posing the following questions: (i) What is the purpose for which the provision is made? (ii) What was the position before making the provision? (iii) Whether any of the proposed construction would lead to an absurd result or would render any part of the provision redundant?, (iv) Which of the interpretations will advance the object of the provision? 36. It is submitted that the interpretation of ejusdem generis or noscitur a sociis need not always be made when words showing particular class are followed by general words. 36. It is submitted that the interpretation of ejusdem generis or noscitur a sociis need not always be made when words showing particular class are followed by general words. Before the general words can be so interpreted there must be a genus constituted or a category disclosed with reference to which the general words can and are intended to be restricted or expanded. It is contended that provisions contained in Sections 25(4) and 25(5) operates in entirely different field and are class apart. Under Section 25(4), the removal is wish of majority of the House without recording any finding, therefore, the same House would always have an authority and power to re-elect the same persons whereas, under Section 25(5) of the Act, a decision is taken by the State authority which casts stigma. Therefore, the provision of Section 25(6) cannot be read ejusdem generis or noscitur a sociis as their class are not similar. 37. Lastly, Mr. Kanth has pointed out that Article 243V is regarding disqualification of members of municipality and submitted that it is almost in pari materia with Article 191 which lays down the grounds of disqualification for membership of Legislative Assembly of a State. He also draws attention towards the provisions contained in Article 243ZA for elections to the Municipalities and Article 243ZG under which bar has been created for preventing interference by Courts in electoral matters. 38. Learned counsel form both sides have referred various judicial pronouncements and passages from several books on interpretation of statutes in support of their respective claim. A decision of the Apex Court in Administrator, Municipal Corporation, Bilaspur V. Dattatraya Dahankar & Anr. [ AIR 1992 SC 1846 ] has been cited on behalf of the petitioners referring paragraph 4 thereof to impress upon this Court that, while interpreting the statute, mechanical approach to construction is to be avoided as the same is altogether out of step with the modern positive approach which has a purposeful way of construction that is to effectuate the object and purpose of the Act. In another decision cited by the petitioner in Balram Kumawat Vrs. Union of India & Ors. [(2003) 7 Supreme Court Cases 628], the Apex Court has observed that the Courts will reject that construction which will defeat the plain intention of the legislature even though there may be some inexactitude in the language used. In another decision cited by the petitioner in Balram Kumawat Vrs. Union of India & Ors. [(2003) 7 Supreme Court Cases 628], the Apex Court has observed that the Courts will reject that construction which will defeat the plain intention of the legislature even though there may be some inexactitude in the language used. Reducing the legislation to futility shall always be avoided and in a case where the intention of the legislature cannot be given effect to, the courts would accept the bolder construction for the purpose of brining about an effective result. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has referred and quoted passage from an earlier decision rendered in Supdt. And Remembrancer of Legal Affairs to Govt. of W.B. V. Abani Maity [ 1979(4) SCC 85 ] in this regard. In nut shell it has been held that the courts should avoid the construction which would reduce the legislation to futility and should rather accept the bolder construction based on the view that the Parliament would legislate only for the purpose of brining the effective result. An observation of Lord Cranworth in Gundry Vs. Pinniger [(1843-60) All ER Rep 403] has been quoted in the aforesaid decision which is reproduced as under for better appreciation: “12. “…. To adhere as closely as possible to the literal meaning of the words used, is a cardinal rule from which if we depart we launch into a sea of difficulties which it is not easy to fathom.” 39. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent no. 5 in C.W.J.C. No. 19507/2014 has also raised an issue that once the misconduct of Chief Councillor/Deputy Chief Councillor is established under Section 25(5) then, apart from his removal and his disentitlement from contesting the election for the remaining period of the said office, the same may result in disqualification even from holding the post of Councillor also under Section 18 (1)(J) of the Act, if he is found guilty of corrupt practices and in such a situation an application can be filed before the State Election Commission for holding him disqualified for election or holding the post of member of the Municipality under Section 18(2). The aforesaid provision lays down in clear terms that such action can be taken even after election, however, the same cannot be a case if a person, even on the allegation that he has not conducted himself fairly, has been removed under Section 25(4) of the Act from the post of Chief Councillor/Deputy Chief Councillor on account of passing of no confidence motion as the same would not incur such disqualification. Therefore, both the provisions are class apart and operate in different fields and, thus, sub-Section (6) cannot be made applicable in the case of removal under Section 25(4) as the same has nothing to do with establishing or finding or proving guilt or misconduct of the concerned person. 40. Mr. Lalit Kishore, learned Principal Additional Advocate General, has appeared for the State in C.W.J.C. No. 12051 of 2015 whereas Mr. P.K. Verma, learned A.A.G. 5 has appeared for the State in C.W.J.C. No. 19507/2014. Both of them have raised almost similar issues. 41. Mr. Lalit Kishore has contended that the decision contained in the impugned letters of the State Election Commission appended as Annexure 4 to both the writ petitions cannot be faulted with. He has placed reliance upon a decision rendered in Hopes V. Hopes [1948 (2) 920 All E.R.] to impress upon this Court that merely taking out the concerned provision of sub-Section (5) and placing it under sub-Section (6) cannot necessarily mean that the intention of the legislature was to make it applicable also in the case of removal under Section 25(4). It is held in the aforesaid decision that draftsman may make such change simply to improve the style. He has further placed reliance upon a decision of the Supreme Court rendered in Gramophone Company of India Ltd. Versus Birendra Bahadur Pandey and Others [(1984) 2 Supreme Court Cases 534]. It is contended that though the matter came to be considered by the Apex Court in a different context arising out of Copyright Act, however, it has been held that while interpreting the meaning of words it has to be kept in mind that simple meaning or reference to dictionaries is hardly of any avail particularly in the case of words of ordinary parlance. Such words take colour from the context. Such words take colour from the context. It is urged that the endeavor of the petitioners to make sub-Section (6) applicable with respect to removal under Section 24(4) by giving emphasis on the words that Chief Councillor or/Deputy Chief Councillor “so removed” would be of no avail as it is necessarily indicating towards the previous provision, i.e., of removal under Section 25(5). For the said purpose, he has placed reliance upon yet another decision of the Supreme Court rendered in K. Ramanathan Versus State of Tamil Nadu and Another [(1985) 2 Supreme Court Cases 116] to impress upon this Court that construction of words must depend on the context in which it is used in the statute and the object sought to be achieved by the legislation. It is contended that by the amending Act, several provisions of the Municipal Act, 2007 have been amended, however, it would be evident from the aims and object appended with the bill which was tabled that the main purpose for bringing amendment in Section 25(5) was to achieve parity between the Hindi and English version of the Act as sub-Section (6) was already there in the English version even before the aforesaid amendment. Mr. P.K. Verma, learned A.A.G. 5, has also submitted that only intention of the legislation for bringing out the concerned sentence from sub-Section (5) under a new sub-Section (6) was to achieve parity and numbering it for convenience. He has placed reliance upon a decision of the Apex Court rendered in Nathi Devi Versus Radha Devi Gupta [(2005) 2 Supreme Court Cases 271] to demonstrate that, while making a construction, statute should be read in a manner which would give effect to all the words used in the Act as it is well settled principle that endeavor should be made to give effect to all the expressions used in the statute. In this regard, he has placed reliance upon yet another decision of the Apex Court rendered in Nasiruddin And Ors vs Sita Ram Agarwal [ 2003 (2) SCC 577 ]. 42. Mr. In this regard, he has placed reliance upon yet another decision of the Apex Court rendered in Nasiruddin And Ors vs Sita Ram Agarwal [ 2003 (2) SCC 577 ]. 42. Mr. Amit Shrivastava, learned counsel for the State Election Commission in both the writ petitions has almost toed the line taken by learned counsel for the State, however, with one difference as he has submitted that the decision of the Election Commission in the impugned letters as contained in Annexure 4 to both the writ petitions cannot be put to challenge in an election petition, thus, the writ petitions would be maintainable. 43. In order to appreciate the rival submissions and to proceed for just and proper interpretation or construction of the concerned sub-Section (6) of Section 25, one would have to understand the scheme of Section 25. Section 25 of the Act is a provision for removal of Chief Councillor/Deputy Chief Councillor and it declares under sub-Section (1) that one would cease to hold office if he ceases to be a Councillor. Another provision under sub-Section (2) is that the Chief Councillor and the Deputy Chief Councillor may resign from their respective offices. However, under sub-Section (4), they can be removed from the office by a resolution brought by one third of the Councillors in a special meeting called for the said purpose by passing a vote of no confidence against them. However, such option of passing of no confidence comes with certain riders as the legislature has also ascertained that the sword of no confidence motion should not be allowed to hang upon their head all along at the wishes of the brute majority. Thus, three provisions have been inducted as proviso to the aforesaid sub-Section (4). First is that no confidence motion cannot be brought against the Chief Councillor/Deputy Chief Councillor within a period of two years of taking over of the charge of the post. Secondly, the same shall not be brought again within one year of the first no confidence motion and the third is that no confidence motion shall not be brought during the residual period of six months of the municipality. Sub-Section (5) is a punitive provision which was earlier with the Divisional Commissioner and now, after amendment in the year 2011, is with the State Government. Sub-Section (5) is a punitive provision which was earlier with the Divisional Commissioner and now, after amendment in the year 2011, is with the State Government. It provides that the Chief Councillor/Deputy Chief Councillor can be removed from the office by the State Government after giving reasonable opportunity of explanation to the concerned and by passing an order in case such Chief Councillor/Deputy Chief Councillor absents himself without sufficient cause for more than three consecutive meetings or sittings or willfully omits or refuses to perform his duties and functions under the Act or is found to be guilty of misconduct in discharge of his duties or becomes physically or mentally incapacitated for performing his duties or in case he is absconding, being an accused in a criminal case, for more than six months. After the above, there was following provision in the Hindi version of sub-Section (5) of the Act prior to the amendment bought in 2011: ^^bl izdkj gVk;k x;k eq[; ik"kZn@mi eq[; ik"kZn ,slh uxjikfydk esa mldh 'ks"k inkof/k ds nkSjku eq[; ik"kZn@mi eq[; ik"kZn ds :i esa iqu% fuokZpu dk ik= ugha gksxkA^^ 44. Obviously, the same was with reference to the removal under sub-Section (5). However, at the same time, in the English version this provision was under a separate sub-Section (6). Now after amendment brought in the 2011, the aforesaid provision has been placed under a separate sub-Section (6) in the Hindi version also whereas the same has not been touched, as it was not required to be done, in the English version of the Amending Act. So far the other amendments brought in Section 25(5) are concerned, it has been inducted that the decision for removal under sub-Section (5) can be taken only after recommendation of the Lok Prahari and word Divisional Commissioner has been substituted by State Government. The provision of appeal has also been deleted in both the versions i.e., Hindi and English. However, one variation still appears to persist as it stands stated in Hindi version that the person so removed would not be entitled to again contest the election for Chief Councillor/Deputy Chief Councillor for the remaining tenure whereas in the English version it is stated that the person so removed shall not be eligible even for the post of Councillor apart from Chief Councillor/Deputy Chief Councillor. 45. 45. In view of such amendment having been brought, it has been submitted that the respective District Magistrate-cum-District Election Officer had sought guidance from the State Election Commission as to whether the Chief Councillor /Deputy Chief Councillor, after having been removed from the office under sub-Section (4) upon no confidence motion having been passed by the House of Municipality, would be eligible to contest the election again which was to be held for the purpose of filling up the vacancies created after such removal and which would be only for the remaining term or tenure of the Municipality concerned? That question has been answered by the State Election Commission by communicating the decision through the impugned letters (Annexure 4) by stating that they would of course be eligible for contesting such election. The aforesaid decision has been challenged by the petitioners by taking a stand that had it been the intention of the legislature to exclude such removal under sub-Section (4) from the ambit of newly created sub-Section (6) then the relevant provision was not at all required to be extracted out from sub-Section (5) and placed under a new sub-Section. It has been contended that legislature never intends to do a thing for bringing out a cosmetic change in the statute rather the purpose always would be public oriented. It has been urged that extracting out the concerned provision from sub-Section (5) and placing it under new sub-Section (6) clearly indicates that the intention of the legislature was to make it effective or applicable with respect to all types of removal stated under Section 25 and in support thereof various decisions of the Supreme Court as well as passages from the different books on interpretation of the statute have been referred by both the sides as has been discussed above. Before proceeding to consider the decisions of the Apex Court, one would have to keep in mind that the provision concerned was already under a separate sub-Section (6) in the English versions even before the amendment. Now, even after amendment, there is still slight difference between the Hindi and English version as noted above. The English version says that such person would not only be disentitled from contesting the re-election of Chief Councillor/Deputy Chief Councillor rather he would be disentitled for the post of the Councillor also whereas the word Councillor is missing from the Hindi version. The English version says that such person would not only be disentitled from contesting the re-election of Chief Councillor/Deputy Chief Councillor rather he would be disentitled for the post of the Councillor also whereas the word Councillor is missing from the Hindi version. However, I have already discussed in the order dated 10.08.2015 referring a Full Bench decision of this Court in Dr. Sachidanand Sinha (supra) that by now it is well settled that in case of variation in Hindi and English version, both having been published in official gazette, the provision shown in Hindi version has to prevail. Thus, Hindi version has to be taken as correctly amended version. 46. Now, before finally making a construction or interpreting the concerned provision, the differences or similarities in both the provisions of law, i.e., Section 25(4) and Section 25(5) is required to be considered. In both the situations, i.e., if no confidence motion is passed against the Chief Councillor/Deputy Chief Councillor under Section 25(4) or if such incumbents of such offices are removed under Section 25(5) of the Act, the net result would be their removal from the respective offices. However, the question is whether there is any similarity in their scope, ambit and nature? In my view answer has to be in negative. There are several distinctions between removal under Section 25(4) and 25(5). Removal under Section 25(4) is by way of democratic process showing the will of the majority of the members of the House of the Councillor/Municipality by adopting and passing no confidence motion and for that a requisition has to be made by not less than one third of the total members of Councillors and, thereafter, special meeting has to be convened for notifying in terms of procedure laid down under Bihar Municipal No Confidence Motion process Rules, 2010. Under Rule 2 (iv) of the aforesaid Rules it is required that such notice for considering no confidence motion against the Chief Councillor/Deputy Chief Councillor shall contain the reasons/allegations on the basis of which the no confidence motion is to be brought and the allegations contained in the requisition are discussed by the members in the special meeting and, thereafter, the motion is tabled and after voting the fate of the concerned Councillor or Deputy Chief Councillor is decided by the majority. 47. 47. However in my view such passing of no confidence motion is not stigmatic in nature as no explanation by the concerned person is required and though he is allowed to participate in the debate, no finding regarding guilt is recorded. Merely a discussion in the House is held followed by casting of votes and majority decides the fate, whereas, under Section 25(5) charges have to be framed, notice is to be given to the concerned and his explanation has to be considered by the State Government and then only, a final order recording a finding of guilt or otherwise is passed. Such order can be put to judicial review invoking the powers of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, removal on passing of no confidence motion cannot ordinarily be challenged questioning as to whether such decision of House is correct or not or the motion was fit to be adopted or not though such decision may of course be challenged and even set aside under Article 226 of the Constitution of India under certain circumstances, for example, if it suffers from any procedural lapse or lacunae or the relevant statutory provisions have not been followed etc. Therefore, remedy to a person by knocking at the door of this Court under Article 226 for holding that no confidence motion passed by the House of Councillor is bad on its merit as the allegations levelled are not found, save and except under certain conditions, would not be ordinarily available. The reason for such difference is that the Municipality is one of the limb of self governance constituted in terms of Article 243Q and, as such, the will of the majority of the House has to be respected and cannot be questioned except under certain specific conditions. In nutshell it has to be understood that Section 25(4) and 25(5) operate entirely in a different field. Now, that distinction being there, the question would be how to proceed to determine as to whether amended sub Section (6) would be applicable in both types of removal or would be confined only to Section 25(5). Various decisions have been cited by both the sides. Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes (Twelfth Edition) by P.St. Now, that distinction being there, the question would be how to proceed to determine as to whether amended sub Section (6) would be applicable in both types of removal or would be confined only to Section 25(5). Various decisions have been cited by both the sides. Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes (Twelfth Edition) by P.St. J. Langan in Chapter 10 captioned as “CONSTRUCTION MOST AGREEABLE TO JUSTICE AND REASON” referring a decision in Artemiou v. Procopiou ([1966] 1 Q.B. 878, per Danckwerts L.J. at p. 888) has stated that in determining either the general object of the legislature, or the meaning of its language in any particular passage, it is obvious that the intention which appears to be most in accord with convenience, reason, justice and legal principles should, in all cases of doubtful significance, be presumed to be the true one. An intention to produce unreasonable result is not to be imputed to a statute if there is some other construction available. However, the same author in Chapter 2 has stated that the first and most elementary rule of construction is that it is to be assumed that the words and phrases of technical legislation are used in their technical meaning if they have acquired one, and otherwise in their ordinary meaning, and the second is that the phrases and sentences are to be construed according to the rules of grammar. The relevant passage is extracted for better appreciation: “CHAPTER 2 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION 1. THE PRIMARY RULE : LITERAL CONSTRUCTION "The first and most elementary rule of construction is that it is to be assumed that the words and phrases of technical legislation are used in their technical meaning if they have acquired one, and otherwise in their ordinary meaning, and the second is that the phrases and sentences are to be construed according to the rules of grammar. "The length and detail of modern legislation," wrote Lord Evershed M.R., "has undoubtedly reinforced the claim of literal construction as the only safe rule." If there is nothing to modify, alter or qualify the language which the statue contains, it must be construed in the ordinary and natural meaning of the words and sentences. "The length and detail of modern legislation," wrote Lord Evershed M.R., "has undoubtedly reinforced the claim of literal construction as the only safe rule." If there is nothing to modify, alter or qualify the language which the statue contains, it must be construed in the ordinary and natural meaning of the words and sentences. "The safer and more correct course of dealing with a question of construction is to take the words themselves and arrive if possible at their meaning without, in the first instance, reference to cases." 48. As the Hindi version has been decided to be read as correct version, the relevant provision quoted above indicates that it is with respect to the preceding sub-Section (5) only as the words ^^bl izdkj gVk;k x;k eq[; ik"kZn@mi eq[; ik"kZn ,slh uxjikfydk esa mldh 'ks"k inkof/k ds nkSjku eq[; ik"kZn@mi eq[; ik"kZn ds :i esa iqu% fuokZpu dk ik= ugha gksxkA^^ indicates towards its use in singular number. Had it been applicable to entire Section 25 and not only confined to sub-Section (5) then, the words ^^bu izdkjksa ls gVk;s x;s^^ were to be used. The Apex Court also in its decision rendered in Madanlal Fakirchand Dudhediya (supra) has observed that the words used in a Section must be given their plain grammatical meaning. Where the Court is dealing with two sub-Sections of a Section, it is necessary that the two sub-Sections must be construed as a whole “each portion throwing light, if need be, on the rest.” The two sub-Sections must be read as parts of an integral whole and as being inter dependent, and attempt should be made in construing them to reconcile them if it is reasonably possible to do so, and to avoid repugnancy. However, in the case in hand it has already been noticed that the concerned sub-Sections (4) and (5) operate entirely in different field and, thus, if a plain grammatical meaning is given it cannot be held that they can be read as a part of an integral whole only similarity between them being that both of them eventually lead to removal of Chief Councillor/Deputy Chief Councillor. 49. Therefore, if the provision is interpreted in its literal and grammatical sense then also one has to come to conclusion that sub-Section (6) is referring to the preceding sub-Section (5). 49. Therefore, if the provision is interpreted in its literal and grammatical sense then also one has to come to conclusion that sub-Section (6) is referring to the preceding sub-Section (5). Alternatively, if it is assumed that sub-Section (6) would be applicable to the entire Section 25 then that would necessarily be applicable to the sub-Section (2) also under which is a provision of removal by resignation from office. However, the same would lead to an absurd result. 50. Mr. Jitendra Singh, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has referred passages from the Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P.Singh (6th Edition Reprint 1997) specially the reference to the observation of Lord Scarman that the legislative purpose of a statute is such that a statutory series should be read ejusdem generis However, at the same time the same author has cautioned that the ejusdem generis has to be applied with care and caution. It is not inviolable rule but it is only permissible inference in the absence of an indication to the contrary. The Black\s Law dictionary Eighth edition by Bryan A. garner Editor In Chief defines ejusdem generis as “A canon of construction that, when a general word or phrase follows a list of specifics, the general word or phrase will be interpreted to include only items of the same type as those listed”. In the Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 13th Edition 2012 by Justice G.P.Singh rule ejusdem generis has been explained as – “when particular words pertaining to a class, category or genus are followed by general words, the general words are construed as limited to things of same kind as those specified”. Thus, it appears that purpose of this rule is to reconcile incompatibility between the specific and general words. 51. In my considered view, since the provisions under Sections 25(4) and 25(5) operate entirely in different fields and are class apart, they cannot be clubbed together as of same genus, the Rule of ejusdem generis cannot be applied in the present case in favour of the petitioner to read sub-Section (6) for both the aforesaid provisions. 52. Now let it be examined as to whether the Heydon’s Case can be applied in the matter as the same has been referred by both the sides, i.e., by the petitioners as well as the respondents. The Apex Court in Bengal Immunity Co. 52. Now let it be examined as to whether the Heydon’s Case can be applied in the matter as the same has been referred by both the sides, i.e., by the petitioners as well as the respondents. The Apex Court in Bengal Immunity Co. (supra) has elaborately discussed the Heydon’s case. Relevant passage threrefrom is extracted for better appreciation:- (22) It is a sound rule of construction of a statute firmly established in England as far back as 1584 when Heydon's case, 3 Co. Rep. 7a; 76 ElR. 637, was decided that- ".................... for the sure and true interpretation of all Statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law) four things are to be discerned and considered: 1st. What was the common law before the making of the Act., 2nd. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide., 3rd. What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the Commonwealth, and 4th. The true reason of the remedy; and then the office of all the judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and pro private commodo, and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the Act, pro bono publico". In - In re. Mayfair Property Company, L R. [1898] 2 Ch. 28, 35 Lindley, M.R. in 1898 found the rule "as necessary now as it was when Lord Coke reported Heydon's case". In Eastman Photographic Material Company v. Comptroller General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks, L.R [1898] A.C. 671, 576 Earl of Halsbury re-affirmed the rule as follows: "My Lords, it appears to me that to construe the Statute in question, it is not only legitimate but highly convenient to refer both to the former Act and to the ascertained evils to which the former Act had given rise, and to the later Act which provided the remedy' These three being compared I cannot doubt the conclusion". x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x " 53. x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x " 53. It has already been noticed that, before amending Act, there was variation in the Hindi and English versions as the relevant provision was already placed under sub-Section (6) in the English one and one of the substitutions is that the Legislative Assembly in its wisdom has resolved it by bringing the aforesaid amendment by extracting out the relevant provision from sub-Section (5) of Hindi version and has placed under new sub-Section (6) to make it compatible or in parity with the English version. 54. The aforesaid view stands supported by the aims and object of the concerned Amended Bill which was tabled before the House, a copy of which has been appended as part of Annexure 8 of C.W.J.C. No 12051 of 2015. Relevant passage from the aforesaid is extracted as under:-. ^^AAmn~ns'; ,oa gsrqAA x x x x x x x x x x x x vf/kfu;e ds fgUnh ,oa vaxzsth ikBksa esa Hkh dqN fHkUurk,¡ n`f”Vxkspj gqbZ gS muesa Hkh ,d:irk LFkkfir djuk vko’;d gS A x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x” 55. That being the object of the Amended Bill, in my view the same cannot be made applicable to sub- Section (4) of Section 25 of the Act. Thus, on this count also this Court finds force in the submission raised on behalf of the respondents. 56. The issue requires to be tested from another angle. Section 18 of the Act discloses that, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, a person shall be disqualified for election or even after election from holding the post as member of the Municipality, if he/she incurs such disqualification explained as 18(1)(a) to 18(1)(n). A conjoint reading of Section 18(1) with sub-Section (5) of Section 25 would reveal that some of the grounds for taking action under sub-Section (5) of Section 25 and incurring ground for disqualification under Section 18(l) appear to be common. A conjoint reading of Section 18(1) with sub-Section (5) of Section 25 would reveal that some of the grounds for taking action under sub-Section (5) of Section 25 and incurring ground for disqualification under Section 18(l) appear to be common. Thus, if a person is held by the State Government to be guilty under sub-Section (5), he may also incur disqualification for election to the post or, even after election, for holding such post as member of the Municipality under Section 18(1) if such action is under the grounds found common in Section 25(5) and 18(1). In such a situation, a petition can be filed before the Election Commission under Section 18(2) which may declare that the person, even after election on the post, has incurred disqualification or was disqualified even before election and, as such, he cannot hold the concerned post. However, removal by passing of no confidence motion by the House does not incur such disqualification as there is no declaration or finding of guilt recorded by House. Thus, this may be another reason for holding that both the provisions, i.e. Section 25(4) and (5) operate in entirely different field. 57. The matter has to be tested from yet another angle. The Municipalities under Bihar Municipal Act, 2007 as well as the Local Bodies under the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 2006 are parts of the third limb of our democratic setup. It would be interesting to look into the similar provision under the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 2006 and compare and contrast it with the relevant provisions of the Municipal Act. Before proceeding towards it, it has to be understood as to whether the same would be permissible or not for the purpose of necessary interpretation or construction of the relevant provision. In Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P.Singh, 13th Edition 2012 the issue has been discussed in Chapter 4 (Syn. 4 at page 301) under the heading “Reference to other statutes”. It stands stated that the statute must be read as a whole as words are to be understood in their context, however, it can be permitted to be extended to refer to other statutes which are in pari materia, i.e. statutes dealing with the same subject matter or forming part of the same system. The Supreme Court in Ahmedabad Pvt. Primary Teachers’ Assn. The Supreme Court in Ahmedabad Pvt. Primary Teachers’ Assn. (supra) has opined after having referred the relevant passage from the Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P.Singh, (8th Edn.) Syn. 4 at pp. 235 to 239) that, on the doctrine of “pari materia”, reference to other statutes dealing with the same subject matter or forming part of the same system is permissible aid to the construction of provisions in a statute. 58. The Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 2006 and the Bihar Municipal Act, 2007 being part of the same system, in above view of the matter, the relevant provisions, if pari materia, can be considered for proper and just construction of the statutory provision. 59. Upon deeper scrutiny it appears that provisions contained in Section 25 (4) as well as Section 25(5) of the Act are in pari materia to the relevant provisions of Panchayat Raj Act, for example, Section 18(4) which is for removal of Mukhiya by passing no confidence motion and Section 18(5) which provides for removal after recording finding on guilt, are in pari materia with Section 25(4) and 25(5). Section 18(5) empowers the Commissioner to remove a Mukhiya or Up-Mukhiya of the Gram Panchayat on the grounds of absenting himself without sufficient cause for more than three consecutive meetings or sittings or willfully omits or refuses to perform his duties and functions under the Act or abuses the power vested in him or found to be guilty of misconduct in the discharge of his duties or becomes physically or mentally incapacitated for performing his duties or is absconding being an accused in a criminal case for more than six months. It is provided thereafter that Mukhiya or Up-mukhiya so removed under sub-Section (5) shall not be eligible for election to any Panchayat Body for five years from the date of such removal if he is found guilty of misuse of vested powers or misconduct, however, in case he is removed on the rest of the charges mentioned in sub-Section (5) then he would not be eligible to be elected for Mukhiya or Up-Mukhiya or member of Gram Panchayat during the remaining term of office of such Gram Panchayat. Similar provisions are there for the purpose of removal of Pramukh and Up-Pramukh under Section 44 of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 2006 and for removal of Adhyaksha and Up-Adhyaksha of the Zila Parishad under Section 70 of the aforesaid Act. In none of such provisions, the restriction from contesting the election for the remaining tenure of the office has been extended or imposed in case of removal by passing no confidence motion against such person. Thus, in view thereof, the intention of the legislature should not be read differently in case of removal under Section 25(4) and 25(5) of the Act than what has been provided under the relevant section of the Panchayat Raj Act as discussed above. 60. In my view the decision rendered by the Apex Court in Asstt. Collector of Central Excise, Guntur v. Ramdev Tobacco Company [ AIR 1991 SC 506 ] on the plea of ejusdem generis would not come to the help of the petitioner inasmuch as I have already held that sub-Sections (4) and (5) of Section 25 of the Act operate entirely in different fields. 61. As noted above the petitioners have placed reliance upon a decision of the Apex Court in Grasim Industries Ltd. (supra) to impress upon this Court that no words or expressions used in any statute can be said to be redundant or superfluous. It has been contended that elementary principle of interpreting any word while considering a statute is to gather the mens or sentential legis of the legislature. However, in my view the aforesaid decision would not come to the help of the petitioner in the case in hand as the issue is not of reading a word or expression of the statute rather its applicability in two different sub-Sections and, in same decision, it has also been held that contextual interpretation would be required and such interpretation of course goes against the petitioner as I have discussed above. 62. The Apex Court in Anand Brothers Private Limited (supra) has observed that while interpreting any statutory provision, the expression shall have to be given to its ordinary literal meaning having regard to the context in which the same is used. A textual interpretation that matches the contextual is known to be the best. 63. 62. The Apex Court in Anand Brothers Private Limited (supra) has observed that while interpreting any statutory provision, the expression shall have to be given to its ordinary literal meaning having regard to the context in which the same is used. A textual interpretation that matches the contextual is known to be the best. 63. The Apex Court in Grid Corporation of Orissa Limited and others (supra) has held that the golden rule of interpretation is that the words of a statute have to be read and understood in their natural, ordinary and popular sense. 64. Having regards to the aforesaid discussion, one would have to come to irresistible conclusion that the intention of the legislature in extracting the relevant sentence from sub-Section (5) of Section 25 and placing it under a new sub-Section (6) is only for the purpose of attaining parity in the Hindi version and English versions. As has been held above, the sub-Sections (4) and (5) operate in entirely different field and they cannot be clubbed together for applying sub-Section (6). In my considered view, sub-Section (6) would only be applicable to the preceding sub-Section (5) of Section 25 of the Act and, as such, the impugned decision of the State Election Commission contained in the letters appended as Annexure 4 in both the writ petitions, cannot be faulted with. 65. Accordingly, the issue concerned stands decided against the petitioners and in favour of the respondents and both the writ petitions are dismissed, however, there would be no order as to costs. The interim relief granted in C.W.J.C. No.12051 of 2015 stands vacated. The State Election Commission is directed to immediately declare the result of the concerned election.